Which airlines will take control of the takeoff and landing slots at LaGuardia that were held by Spirit Airlines prior to their May 2026 bankruptcy?

TL;DR

Frontier is the leading answer: I put it at 56.2% to receive at least one usable former Spirit LaGuardia slot pair. The next tier is JetBlue at 28.8%, Southwest at 27.9%, and Other airline(s) at 25.4%, because a split allocation is credible and Porter has public interest in more LGA access (Bloomberg Law, June 17, 2026) . American is the main legacy-carrier threat at 17.2%, while United, Delta, and Alaska remain long shots because the FAA and Port Authority are pushing the process toward low-fare or non-dominant carriers (Federal Register, May 13, 2024; Bloomberg Law, June 17, 2026) .

Context

Spirit announced on May 2, 2026 that it had started an immediate wind-down and cancelled all flights (Spirit wind-down release, May 2, 2026) . As of June 20, 2026, there is no reported final allocation of Spirit’s former LaGuardia slots: public reporting still has bids due June 30, 2026 and an auction set for July 9, 2026, after court approval to market the 22 LGA slots (Bloomberg Law, June 17, 2026; The Points Guy, May 28, 2026) .

The unit is a source of confusion. FAA Summer 2025 data show Spirit with 22 individual LGA slots, not 22 slot pairs; The Points Guy describes this as roughly 12 daily flights because airlines generally need separate takeoff and landing authorities (FAA Summer 2025 LGA operator totals, generated Dec. 9, 2025; The Points Guy, May 28, 2026) . The current FAA LGA order runs through October 24, 2026, keeps the 71 scheduled-operation-per-hour limit, imposes an 80% use rule, allows trades and leases for consideration, and provides for FAA lottery reallocation of withdrawn, surrendered, or unallocated operating authorizations (Federal Register, May 13, 2024) .

Evidence

The historical backbone is small but clear. In the 2011 Delta-US Airways slot swap remedy, DOT/FAA sold 16 LGA slot pairs as two eight-pair bundles; only carriers with less than 5% of slots at the airport could bid, and WestJet received one LGA bundle even though JetBlue had submitted the highest bids for all three available bundles, because no carrier could win more than one LGA bundle (U.S. DOT, Aug. 1, 2019 recap) . In the 2013 American-US Airways merger settlement, DOJ required 34 LGA slots plus needed facilities to be divested or transferred to approved low-cost carrier purchasers, with preference for airlines that did not already operate a large slot or gate share at the airport (U.S. DOJ, Nov. 12, 2013) . Those are the two closest modern LGA competition remedies, and both point away from awarding scarce access to dominant incumbents.

The current slot map makes that pressure concrete. FAA Summer 2025 operator totals were generated on December 9, 2025, use 2025 current-and-future status, exclude FAA-held slots, and exclude slots held fewer than five days (FAA Summer 2025 LGA operator totals) .

Delta and American operated 907 of the 1,148 listed slots, or 79.0%, and Delta, American, and United together operated 974, or 84.8%, based on that FAA operator table (FAA Summer 2025 LGA operator totals) . That is why I put Delta at only 3.3% and American at 17.2% despite their ability to pay.

Frontier has the strongest direct signal. On June 1, 2023, JetBlue and Frontier announced a definitive agreement under which JetBlue would divest all Spirit LGA holdings to Frontier if the JetBlue-Spirit merger closed; the package was described as six Marine Air Terminal gates and 22 takeoff and landing slots, subject to Port Authority and FAA/DOT approvals (JetBlue/Frontier press release, June 1, 2023) . That deal did not close, but it is strong revealed preference: Frontier had already accepted this exact asset package and it fit the public story of preserving ultra-low-cost access at LGA (JetBlue/Frontier press release, June 1, 2023) .

The current regulatory signal points the same way. Bloomberg Law reported that FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford said the slots should go to a low-cost carrier or be retired, and that Port Authority Executive Director Kathryn Garcia asked for redistribution based on competition, access, and underserved markets rather than optimization for dominant carriers (Bloomberg Law, June 17, 2026) . The Port Authority also told the bankruptcy court that runway slots alone are not enough and that a buyer may need to assume Spirit’s Terminal A lease and cure defaults (Bloomberg Law, June 17, 2026; The Points Guy, June 9, 2026) . That makes this a regulatory-and-facilities sale, not a pure cash auction.

The weaker direct signals shape the middle tier. JetBlue said it was evaluating opportunities at LaGuardia while warning about the high cost of operating at New York-area airports, and Porter said it was interested in more LGA slots if the allocation process was defined (Bloomberg Law, June 17, 2026) . The Points Guy reported American CEO Robert Isom saying in April 2026 that American has a history of being aggressive when assets become available, and reported United CEO Scott Kirby saying on May 28, 2026 that United did not expect to participate in consolidation for the foreseeable future (The Points Guy, May 28, 2026) . Alaska appears in FAA holder totals with 12 LGA slots but not in FAA operator totals, and I found no public Alaska-specific interest in this Spirit package (FAA Summer 2025 LGA holder totals, generated Dec. 5, 2025; FAA Summer 2025 LGA operator totals, generated Dec. 9, 2025) .

My model puts 8% on retirement, no qualifying airline allocation, or no clear resolution by the May 2, 2028 deadline; 60% on one primary buyer; and 32% on a split allocation. In the single-buyer branch, I assign Frontier 52%, JetBlue 17%, Southwest 14%, American 10%, Other 4%, United 2%, Delta 0.7%, and Alaska 0.3%. In the split branch, the at-least-one-slot probabilities are Frontier 78%, Other 72%, Southwest 61%, JetBlue 58%, American 35%, United 17%, Delta 9%, and Alaska 6%. The marginal calculation is $P_i=0.60s_i+0.32b_i$, where $s_i$ is the single-buyer share and $b_i$ is the split-branch inclusion probability.

What's non-obvious

The obvious story is that the highest bidder buys the slots. That is incomplete. The bankruptcy court can approve a sale process, but FAA confirmation and Port Authority facilities make a lower cash bid more executable if it is low-fare, non-dominant, and willing to solve Terminal A (Federal Register, May 13, 2024; Bloomberg Law, June 17, 2026) . That is the main reason Frontier leads even though American, Delta, and United can probably pay more.

Other airline(s) is not just a residual bucket. Porter already operated six LGA slots in the FAA Summer 2025 operator table and has publicly stated conditional interest in more slots, while Allegiant was among the airlines the Port Authority named as interested in expanding or entering Port Authority airport markets (FAA Summer 2025 LGA operator totals; Bloomberg Law, June 17, 2026) . I still keep Other below Frontier because the 22-slot package is small and the prior signed remedy deal already points to one whole-package ULCC buyer.

Limitations

No public qualified-bidder list, bid amount, stalking-horse buyer, FAA confirmation, DOT order, or Port Authority consent was available to me as of June 20, 2026; the reported bid deadline is still June 30, 2026 and the auction is still July 9, 2026 (Bloomberg Law, June 17, 2026) . The largest unknowns are private: which carriers will actually bid, whether Frontier will pay enough while staying disciplined, and how expensive Terminal A lease cure obligations become.

The slot-pair language is also ambiguous. FAA records count Spirit at 22 individual LGA slots, while market discussion sometimes converts that into daily flights or pairs; if the final resolution administrator treats the package differently, split probabilities could move (FAA Summer 2025 LGA operator totals; The Points Guy, May 28, 2026) . If the FAA retires the slots or litigation prevents a clear final allocation by May 2, 2028, all airline options should resolve false or the question should be annulled under the stated criteria.