Which airlines will take control of the takeoff and landing slots at LaGuardia that were held by Spirit Airlines prior to their May 2026 bankruptcy?

TL;DR

Frontier is the leading answer at 58.6% because it had a prior signed deal for the exact Spirit LaGuardia package and matches the FAA's stated low-fare preference (JetBlue-Frontier agreement, Bloomberg Law May 28). Southwest, JetBlue, Other airline(s), and American are the next tier because the sale can be split and the auction has drawn robust bidder interest (Spirit bidding procedures motion, Doc. 1117, Bloomberg Law July 8). Delta, United, and Alaska are long shots because the FAA holder data and DOJ slot-divestiture history point away from adding scarce LGA capacity to larger incumbents (FAA Summer 2025 LGA holder totals, DOJ 2013 settlement).

Context

Spirit announced on May 2, 2026 that it had begun an immediate wind-down and that all flights had been cancelled (Spirit SEC exhibit). The clean pre-shutdown baseline is the FAA Summer 2025 LGA holder report, status date December 5, 2025, which excludes FAA-held slots and slots held less than five days; it lists Spirit with 22 LGA slots, versus Delta 511, American 327, United 94, Southwest 57, JetBlue 31, Alaska 12, and Frontier 4 (FAA Summer 2025 LGA holder totals). DOT's slot terminology says a slot pair is two slots, one takeoff and one landing, so I model Spirit's package as about 11 daily round trips if the slots pair cleanly (DOT slot auction notice).

The sale is not publicly resolved as of July 12, 2026 at 00:39 UTC. Spirit's May 27 sale motion set a June 10 LGA stalking-horse deadline, a June 30 final LGA bid deadline, and a July 9 auction date for non-campus assets including the LGA slots (Spirit bidding procedures motion, Doc. 1117); Bloomberg Law reported on July 8, 2026 at 5:11 PM UTC that Spirit had robust bidder interest and was consulting regulators ahead of a planned July 16 closed auction (Bloomberg Law July 8). The FAA's June 23, 2026 LGA order extends slot controls through October 28, 2028, keeps 71 scheduled operating authorizations per hour, lets carriers lease or trade authorizations for consideration, and requires FAA written approval before a transfer is effective (Federal Register LGA order).

Evidence

The historical backbone is small but consistent. In the closest bankruptcy analogue, Southwest won court approval in 2008 to buy bankrupt ATA's 14 LGA slots for $7.5 million (Aviation Week, December 3, 2008). In the Delta-US Airways slot-swap remedy, DOT and FAA forced a divestiture of 16 LGA slot pairs, limited eligibility to carriers with less than 5% of slots at the airport, and awarded one eight-pair bundle each to JetBlue and WestJet even though JetBlue bid highest for every bundle (DOT slot auction notice). In the American-US Airways merger settlement, DOJ required 34 LGA slots and related facilities to go to approved low-cost-carrier purchasers, with preference for airlines that did not already hold a large airport share; Southwest later said it acquired 12 LGA slots and permanent control of 10 leased LGA slots in that process (DOJ 2013 settlement, Southwest 2013 release).

That base rate favors Frontier, Southwest, JetBlue, or an unlisted low-cost or limited-incumbent carrier over Delta, American, or United. The strongest current regulator signal points the same way: FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford said on May 28, 2026 that Spirit's LGA slots should go to a low-fare airline for the public good, and that retirement was the alternative if that could not happen (Bloomberg Law May 28). I read that as more than a press quote because the FAA order gives the agency the written-approval gate for leases and trades, and because unused or surrendered operating authorizations can be retired until each hour reaches the 71-operation cap (Federal Register LGA order).

Frontier has the best direct evidence. On June 1, 2023, JetBlue and Frontier signed a definitive divestiture agreement under which JetBlue would transfer all of Spirit's LaGuardia holdings to Frontier if the JetBlue-Spirit merger closed; the package was described as six Marine Air Terminal gates and 22 takeoff and landing slots, subject to Port Authority and FAA/DOT approval (JetBlue-Frontier agreement). That transaction died with the blocked merger, but it is a revealed-preference signal for this exact asset package: Frontier wanted it, JetBlue accepted Frontier as the remedy buyer, and the public-interest theory was preserving ultra-low-cost service at LaGuardia.

Southwest is the next-best listed fit. It is a low-fare carrier, already has LGA operations, and has twice shown willingness to spend on LGA slots: the 2008 ATA purchase and the 2013 American-US Airways divestiture (Aviation Week, December 3, 2008, Southwest 2013 release). The reason I keep it far below Frontier is that Southwest is less a one-for-one Spirit replacement, has a larger existing LGA slot position than JetBlue or Frontier in the FAA holder data, and has weaker direct evidence of seeking this exact package (FAA Summer 2025 LGA holder totals).

JetBlue has real upside but worse regulatory optics than Frontier. Bloomberg Law reported on June 17, 2026 that JetBlue said it was evaluating LaGuardia opportunities while being mindful of New York-area costs, and that Porter was interested in more LGA slots once the allocation process was defined (Bloomberg Law June 17). JetBlue's New York and Fort Lauderdale network would make some former Spirit flying easy to absorb, but the failed JetBlue-Spirit merger and the 2023 agreement to send this same package to Frontier make JetBlue a less clean FAA/DOT answer than Frontier.

Other airline(s) is not a junk bucket. Porter is the named dark horse with current LGA presence and a Toronto Billy Bishop strategy, and unlisted low-cost carriers such as Allegiant, Breeze, Avelo, Sun Country, or WestJet could fit a regulator-led split better than a legacy carrier (The Points Guy May 28, Bloomberg Law June 17). I still keep Other below Frontier, Southwest, and JetBlue because operating from LGA is expensive, the Port Authority says a buyer may need terminal access and potentially the Marine Air Terminal lease, and smaller carriers have thinner ability to pay for a package valued near $87 million (Port Authority response, Doc. 1181, The Points Guy May 28).

American has money and a large LGA operation, so it cannot be dismissed. It also carries the wrong public-interest story: the 2013 DOJ settlement forced American and US Airways to divest LGA capacity to low-cost carriers, and the FAA holder report already shows American at 327 slots versus Frontier's 4 and Spirit's 22 (DOJ 2013 settlement, FAA Summer 2025 LGA holder totals). United is lower because it is not a low-fare carrier and already has 94 LGA slots; Delta is lower still because it is the dominant LGA holder at 511 slots; Alaska is low because it has little strategic need for incremental LGA beyond a niche lease or partner-driven play (FAA Summer 2025 LGA holder totals).

My quantitative model is a scenario tree. I assign about 4% to no clear final allocation or effective retirement before the May 2, 2028 annulment date, about 69% to one dominant winner, and about 27% to a split package. Within those branches, I weight bidders by regulatory fit, prior revealed interest, LGA/gate fit, ability to pay, and chance of FAA/DOT and Port Authority approval. The resulting at-least-one-slot-pair probabilities are Frontier 58.6%, Southwest 20.7%, JetBlue 19.3%, Other 16.6%, American 13.2%, United 3.9%, Delta 2.1%, and Alaska 1.8%.

What's non-obvious

The obvious story is that the richest bidder wins. That is incomplete. Spirit can sell an estate asset, but final control at LGA requires usable operating authority and practical terminal access; the bankruptcy procedures themselves let the debtors choose the highest-or-otherwise-best collection of offers by auction lot, while the Port Authority says runway slots alone do not let an airline safely deplane passengers at LaGuardia (Spirit bidding procedures motion, Doc. 1117, Port Authority response, Doc. 1181).

The other edge is that Frontier is not just a generic low-cost guess. The 2023 JetBlue-Frontier contract named the exact Spirit LGA package and paired the slots with Marine Air Terminal gates, which is exactly the kind of regulatory and facility solution this 2026 process needs (JetBlue-Frontier agreement). That is why Frontier stays above richer airlines even though a pure cash auction would favor American, Delta, United, or JetBlue.

Limitations

I could not verify a qualified-bidder list, bid amounts, a current successful-bidder notice, a final FAA/DOT confirmation, or a Port Authority facility assignment as of July 12, 2026 at 00:39 UTC. The July 16 auction date comes from Bloomberg Law reporting on a July 8 court hearing, while the public sale motion still shows the older July 9 auction track; a sealed filing or a not-yet-indexed court document could change the timing or the named bidders quickly (Bloomberg Law July 8, Spirit bidding procedures motion, Doc. 1117).

The other unresolved issue is units. Public records mostly say Spirit had 22 slots, while some commentary and the market question use slot pairs; I treat the FAA count as individual takeoff-or-landing authorities and score an airline YES only if it ultimately controls enough authority to operate at least one round trip (FAA Summer 2025 LGA holder totals, DOT slot auction notice). If the FAA/DOT treats Bedford's low-fare statement as soft guidance, American and JetBlue rise; if it is a hard screen, Frontier and Other airline(s) rise.