Will Bolivian president Rodrigo Paz Pereira remain in power through the end of 2026?

TL;DR

I put the chance that Rodrigo Paz Pereira remains continuously president through December 31 at 82%. He has already survived a stronger 53-day removal campaign, the armed forces still defend constitutional continuity, and the Constitution offers no fast routine removal route (OAS mission report coverage, Los Tiempos, Bolivian Constitution). The live danger is a September–October convergence of diesel protests, the Cerimedo scandal, Vice President Edmand Lara’s legal offensive, and a security-force split (El Deber, EFE).

Context

As of September 2, 2026 at 19:54 UTC, Paz was still exercising presidential authority. He appeared at an official municipal-government meeting on August 31 and issued decrees on September 2 to intervene in YPFB and change diesel access rules (Presidency, EFE, Hydrocarbons Ministry).

The question is narrower than whether his government is popular or effective. Paz can lose ministers, legislation, and public support and still resolve YES. A NO requires resignation, removal, succession, death, permanent incapacity, or an extra-constitutional exit before the end of December.

Evidence

The historical starting point favors survival. A South American study found that about one in six presidents since 1979 failed to complete a term (Loyola University Chicago). Bolivia’s democratic-era chronology gives five defensible premature exits or early handovers from October 10, 1982 through September 2, 2026—Hernán Siles Zuazo, Hugo Banzer, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, Carlos Mesa, and Evo Morales—over about 43.9 president-years (Georgetown chronology, Revista de Ciencia Política). Treating those as a constant Poisson hazard gives a 3.7% exit rate over the remaining 120.3 days, or 3.0% if Banzer’s illness is excluded. That is a floor, not the forecast, because Paz is already in a live political crisis.

The closer analogues show why. Sánchez de Lozada in 2003, Mesa in 2005, and Morales in 2019 fell when mass mobilization combined with the loss of elite, police, or military support; protest by itself was not the full mechanism (Centellas, Revista de Ciencia Política). Paz passed a severe version of this test in May and June. The movement spread across all nine departments, reached roughly 100 roadblocks, and demanded his resignation, yet he secured more than two-thirds legislative approval for a 90-day state of exception and the main roads were cleared without a security-force break (ACLED, ABI, AP).

The full recent demonstration series also supports survival, though it is not a crowd-size measure. ACLED’s weekly aggregated data, retrieved on September 2, covers September 2025 through August 2026 and contains 1,308 recorded protest or riot events; events are coded at city level, so one national protest day can create many records (ACLED methodology, ACLED Bolivia).

The May-to-August fall was 89%. September is not in that series, and the calm has begun to fray. At midday on September 2, four roadblocks still cut Santa Cruz routes toward Beni and Cochabamba, but the organizers’ immediate demand was repeal of diesel Decree 5676, not Paz’s resignation (El Deber). The government then raised the subsidized monthly diesel allowance for registered small farmers from 120 to as much as 2,500 liters at Bs 9.80 per liter and sent ministers to negotiate (Hydrocarbons Ministry, ANF). This does not prove the blockades will end. It does show the same sector-by-sector concession strategy that fragmented the earlier coalition.

The institutional picture is mixed. Paz’s PDC won 49 of 130 deputy seats and 16 of 36 Senate seats, leaving him far short of a majority on his own (official election portal, CRS seat summary). Only six of his original 15 ministers remained by August 21, and Congress forced out his economy minister (AP). Yet the Constitution does not contain a parliamentary no-confidence shortcut for removing the president. Recall cannot start until half the five-year term has elapsed, while criminal removal requires a final conviction; the practical near-term path is forced resignation, not a normal legislative timetable (Bolivian Constitution, Articles 169–171 and 240).

The coercive institutions still lean toward continuity. Armed Forces commander Víctor Hugo Balderrama said on August 7 that the military and police would protect the democratically elected government and that the voters’ will was not negotiable (Los Tiempos). Police commander Mirko Sokol resigned amid investigations, but Paz appointed Adrián Álvarez on August 31 through an orderly transition, and the new command accepted presidential authority (ANF). A report obtained by El Deber, scheduled for formal presentation to the OAS Permanent Council on September 3, defended continuity of Paz’s constitutional mandate and broadly backed the government’s handling of the 53-day crisis (El Deber). Public declarations can fail under pressure, but there was no verified military ultimatum or police mutiny by the cutoff.

The strongest negative signal is inside the executive. On September 1, Lara filed a criminal complaint against first lady María Elena Urquidi and former adviser Fernando Cerimedo over six alleged offenses, using an unverified audio that supposedly discussed police and cabinet changes (EFE). Cerimedo was already in preventive detention over the attempted killing of his former partner, Nadia Beller; Beller says she has documents, chats, and audio about his influence and alleged corruption, while also saying she does not believe Paz directly ordered the attack (AP, Brújula Digital). These are allegations, not verified evidence against Paz. Their forecasting value is that direct proof could join street, legislative, police, and family scandals into one removal coalition.

The economy supplies the fuel for that coalition. The IMF projects a 3.3% real GDP contraction and 20.7% average consumer-price inflation for 2026 (IMF country page). The latest official CPI vintage covers July and was published August 4: prices fell 2.79% month over month, leaving inflation at 1.89% year-to-date and 4.93% over 12 months, largely because food supply normalized after the blockades (INE). That reading predates the August diesel shock and renewed fuel queues. The IMF’s July 29 staff-level agreement offers US$1.9 billion over 36 months and could catalyze more than US$5 billion, but it still requires prior actions and Executive Board approval; no approval had been announced by September 2 (IMF). The September 2 intervention of YPFB confirms that fuel distribution remains a live state-capacity problem, even as it shows Paz is acting on it (EFE).

My scenario calculation for the remaining period is:

This produces a 17.96% probability of NO and an 82.04% probability of YES. The historical model is more optimistic; the active-crisis and scandal models are more pessimistic. I give the current institutional and scenario evidence most of the weight.

What's non-obvious

A weak presidency is not always an unstable presidency. Lara is the constitutional successor, and mainstream opposition actors do not see his accession as an obvious improvement. Unidad Nacional said on September 1 that it wanted Paz to finish his term and would join constructive talks; Jorge Quiroga’s Libre also signaled willingness to negotiate laws and constitutional reform rather than demand immediate succession (Visión 360, Correo del Sur). Cabinet censure and policy obstruction can therefore coexist with presidential survival.

The other hidden edge is that the May–June crisis was both terrible news and a successful stress test. Paz’s opponents revealed their maximum tactics, while Paz revealed that he would trade policies, ministers, and emergency powers before surrendering office. The September diesel concession strengthens that pattern. The forecast falls sharply only if separate grievances become one resignation campaign and the security apparatus stops enforcing presidential authority.

Uncertainties

• The public record does not establish whether Beller’s promised evidence or Lara’s audio is authentic, nor whether either directly implicates Paz rather than people around him (Brújula Digital, Paz response).
• Military and police loyalty is inferred from public statements, appointments, and recent compliance. Internal factional views are not observable, and Bolivia’s 2019 experience shows that public loyalty can reverse quickly (Los Tiempos, Revista de Ciencia Política).
• The state of exception runs for 90 days from June 20, placing its expiry around September 18, but there was no verified legislative whip count for an extension at the cutoff (decree text, Red Uno).
• The next CPI release, the IMF prior-action list, the Board date, and the timing of any disbursement were unavailable. Those data would show whether the economic crisis is stabilizing before the highest-risk protest window (INE bulletins, IMF).
• Approval polling is too inconsistent to carry much weight. An Ipsos CIESMORI online urban sample of 400 put Paz at 32% approval and 55% disapproval in late July and early August, while CB Global Data reported 50.5% positive image from August 5–10 (El Post, Red Uno).