Will Bolivian president Rodrigo Paz Pereira remain in power through the end of 2026?

TL;DR

I forecast a 72% chance that Rodrigo Paz Pereira remains president continuously through 31 December 2026, because Bolivia’s current protest wave is dangerous but has not produced the security-force, legislative, or successor-elite break that usually turns unrest into a presidential exit.

Context

Paz is early in a five-year mandate. The electoral authority proclaimed him winner of the 19 October 2025 runoff with 54.96% of valid votes, and AP reported that he was sworn in on 8 November 2025 before Bolivia’s Congress (EFE, 27 Oct 2025; AP, 8 Nov 2025). The remaining forecast horizon is 197.1 days from the client timestamp to 23:59 Bolivia time on 31 December 2026.

The live crisis is still severe. EFE reported on 18 June 2026 that Paz and eight ministers opened talks with the Central Obrera Boliviana after a month and a half of protests and blockades, while Oxígeno reported later on 17 June that the dialogue entered a pause, probably until Thursday, with the COB keeping blockades in place until detainee issues are addressed (EFE, 18 Jun 2026; Oxígeno, 17 Jun 2026). That is not peace. It is also not an imminent handover.

Evidence

The historical base rate starts low, then needs a large crisis adjustment. Since the democratic restoration in 1982, I count 14 completed presidencies or constitutional terms before Paz. Five ended early if Banzer’s illness resignation is included; four were political or governability exits if it is excluded. That is roughly 43 president-years, so the all-cause early-exit hazard is about 11.6% per president-year and the political-exit hazard is about 9.3% per president-year. Over the 197.1-day remaining horizon, the corresponding unconditional exit risks are about 6% and 5%. This is a floor, not the forecast, because Paz is already in a national crisis.

The current facts move the risk far above that base rate. EFE reported on 3 June that the education and defense ministers resigned after five weeks of blockades by campesino, worker, and Morales-aligned sectors demanding Paz’s resignation; the same article said blockades had spread to eight of nine regions, causing shortages of fuel, food, medicine, and medical oxygen, with nine deaths and losses above 1.9 billion dollars by then (EFE, 3 Jun 2026). AP reported that an ombudsman count for 1 May through 2 June recorded 10 deaths, 37 injuries, and 365 arrests, while EFE’s 18 June update put the toll at at least 16 deaths, including 13 tied to delayed medical care, and estimated losses at 2.76 billion dollars (AP, 9 Jun 2026; EFE, 18 Jun 2026). This is the sort of stress that has toppled Bolivian presidents before.

The counterevidence is strong enough to keep YES above 70%. The blockade trend has eased from the early-June peak: La Razón reported 52 blockade points on the morning of 16 June, with 20 in La Paz, 13 in Cochabamba, 12 in Oruro, 6 in Potosí, and 1 in Santa Cruz, and said Chuquisaca and some El Alto sectors had lifted measures (La Razón, 16 Jun 2026). The COB’s written eight-point agenda did not include Paz’s resignation, even though it kept blockades active pending a response, and the first formal Paz-COB dialogue has at least opened a path for bargaining over detainees and concessions (Oxígeno, 17 Jun 2026; Oxígeno, 17 Jun 2026). That lowers the chance of a straight-line resignation.

Institutional removal is hard before year-end. Bolivia’s constitution gives the president and vice president a five-year term, says the president ceases by death, resignation to the Assembly, definitive absence or impediment, final criminal conviction, or revocation, and gives the succession line to the vice president, Senate president, and Chamber president (Bolivian Constitution, arts. 168-171). Recall is unavailable in 2026 because article 240 permits recall only after at least half the term has elapsed, and Paz took office on 8 November 2025 (Bolivian Constitution, art. 240; AP, 8 Nov 2025). A criminal-route removal also needs prior authorization by two-thirds of legislators present and a Fiscal General accusation before the Supreme Tribunal can try a sitting president (Bolivian Constitution, art. 184).

The key weak point is not formal law. It is coercive and elite support. The PDC has only a plurality, with 49 of 130 lower-house seats and no outright majority in either chamber, so Paz is institutionally exposed (IPU Parline, 2025 Chamber election). But the public security signal still favors survival: the legislature passed a law allowing troop use against roadblocks, and Al Jazeera/AFP reported police and military forces clearing a road near La Paz on 5 June rather than refusing orders (Al Jazeera, 7 Jun 2026). That is the opposite of the late-stage Morales 2019 pattern, where the armed forces called for resignation (Library of Congress, 13 Dec 2019).

The economy keeps later-2026 risk high. Official CPI rose 2.13% month-on-month in May 2026, with 12-month inflation at 12.51% and La Paz conurbation inflation at 5.41% for the month; the release was published by INE on 3 June and covers May prices (INE, 3 Jun 2026). The IMF’s 2025 Article IV warned that usable foreign-exchange reserves were expected to remain close to zero and that shocks could trigger faster parallel depreciation, higher inflation, lower growth, and disorderly adjustment (IMF, 2 Jun 2025). Polling is not decisive, but it points in the same direction: CB Global Data’s 2-7 June online regional survey put Paz at 46.4% approval and 52.3% disapproval, down 9.2 percentage points from May (Brújula Digital/EFE, 9 Jun 2026).

My final estimate uses a scenario tree. I assign 16% to the current blockade-dialogue-crackdown cycle forcing a resignation, succession, coup, or other loss of office by late August. Conditional on surviving that, I assign 11.5% to a later 2026 interruption from fuel, inflation, exchange-rate stress, a second protest wave, or a botched state-of-exception operation. I assign 2.5% to institutional, vice-presidential, judicial, or elite-break routes not captured above, and 0.4% to death or severe incapacity. Multiplying the survival legs gives 72.2% YES: YES = (1 - 0.16) × (1 - 0.115) × (1 - 0.025) × (1 - 0.004) = 0.7219.

What's non-obvious

The obvious story is that Bolivian road blockades topple presidents. They can. The less obvious point is that the resignation demand is no longer equally central across the whole anti-Paz camp. Oxígeno reported that the COB’s current eight-point proposal omits resignation, while Visión 360 reported that some departmental labor leaders called the resignation demand a personal decision by COB leader Mario Argollo, even as Morales-aligned campesino sectors still insist on it (Oxígeno, 17 Jun 2026; Visión 360, 12 Jun 2026). That split matters more than the headline blockade count.

The second missed point is that the formal exit channel is mostly closed in 2026. Recall cannot start until half the term has elapsed, and criminal removal needs a two-thirds legislative authorization plus a Fiscal General accusation (Bolivian Constitution, arts. 184 and 240). So the live NO path is not a normal constitutional vote. It is a street-pressure cascade that pulls in Congress, the vice president, police, or the military.

Limitations

The biggest blind spot is inside the police, military, and party elites. Public reporting can show operations and laws, but it is weak at detecting private refusal, bargaining, or fear before it becomes visible. If senior commanders or police leaders publicly refuse orders, or if Vice President Edmand Lara aligns with a transition demand, I would cut this forecast sharply.

The daily blockade data are noisy. I can verify reported counts of about 90-103 in early June, 52 on 16 June, and an ongoing pause in dialogue on 17 June, but I did not find a clean official time series with consistent definitions across all departments (AP, 9 Jun 2026; La Razón, 16 Jun 2026; Oxígeno, 17 Jun 2026). The next few days could move the forecast quickly: a durable COB deal and falling blockades would push YES toward the high 70s; a failed dialogue followed by direct protest deaths or a military statement would push it below 60%.