Which airlines will take control of the takeoff and landing slots at LaGuardia that were held by Spirit Airlines prior to their May 2026 bankruptcy?

TL;DR

Frontier Airlines is the most likely recipient of Spirit’s former LaGuardia slots; Southwest, JetBlue, and American are the main alternatives, and Delta, United, and Alaska are long shots.

Context

Spirit’s own May 2, 2026 wind-down notice says all flights were canceled and passengers should not go to the airport (Spirit wind-down notice). One correction to the question wording: the court docket says Spirit’s Chapter 11 cases were filed on August 29, 2025, so May 2, 2026 was the operating shutdown and liquidation pivot, not the original petition date (Spirit Doc. 1118). As of May 30, 2026, I find no final FAA, DOT, court, or Port Authority allocation. The live process is a court sale: Spirit’s 22 LGA slots are scheduled for a July 9 auction, the winner is to be the bidder with the highest and otherwise best offer, and use is still subject to bankruptcy-court approval (The Points Guy).

LaGuardia slots are FAA operating authorizations, not ordinary real estate. The current LGA order, effective until October 24, 2026, caps scheduled operations at 71 per hour, requires 80% two-month usage, allows leases or trades only after written FAA confirmation, and gives FAA a lottery or retirement path for withdrawn, surrendered, or unassigned operating authorizations (Federal Register). FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford said on May 28 that FAA/DOT would support the slots going to a low-fare airline if it served the public good, and that otherwise retirement could reduce congestion (Bloomberg Law; AirlineGeeks).

Evidence

The historical backbone points to low-cost or limited-incumbent recipients. In 2008, Southwest agreed to pay $7.5 million for bankrupt ATA’s 14 LaGuardia takeoff and landing slots, a precedent for a bankruptcy slot asset sale to a low-fare entrant (Travel Weekly). In the Delta–US Airways slot-swap remedy, DOT/FAA sold 16 LGA slot pairs in two eight-pair bundles, limited eligibility to carriers with under 5% of slots, and awarded them to JetBlue and WestJet rather than dominant incumbents (DOT). In the American–US Airways settlement, DOJ required 34 LGA slots and related facilities to be divested to low-cost carrier purchasers, with preference for airlines without a large airport share (DOJ). The closest analogue is the 2023 JetBlue–Frontier agreement for this exact Spirit package: all Spirit LGA holdings, mainly six Marine Air Terminal gates and 22 takeoff and landing slots, would have gone to Frontier to preserve ultra-low-cost access at LGA if the JetBlue–Spirit merger had closed (JetBlue).

The latest official holder snapshot I found is FAA’s Summer 2025 LGA holder totals, generated December 5, 2025 at 07:59, with status date 2025 current and future. Units are individual operating authorizations; slots held fewer than five days and FAA-held slots are excluded. The sample is 1,141 listed OAs across 12 holders (FAA holder totals; FAA data notes).

That table does most of the work. Frontier is the cleanest regulatory fit because it is the only listed ultra-low-cost carrier with a prior signed deal for these exact assets, and its four-slot LGA base means the package would add competition rather than consolidate an incumbent (FAA holder totals; JetBlue). Frontier reported $974 million of total liquidity as of March 31, 2026, so a package valued near $87 million is financeable but material, and management has signaled discipline rather than a blank check (Frontier Q1 2026; The Points Guy).

Southwest is the best backup because it has prior LGA slot-sale history, a low-fare public profile, and ended Q1 2026 with $3.3 billion in cash plus a $1.5 billion revolver (Southwest Q1 2026). JetBlue has a strong New York network and only 31 listed LGA OAs, but the strongest evidence on these particular assets is that JetBlue had agreed to divest them to Frontier, not keep them (FAA holder totals; JetBlue). American can pay and has appetite: it ended Q1 2026 with $10.8 billion of liquidity, and TPG reported Robert Isom saying American would be aggressive if assets became available, but its 327 listed LGA OAs and legacy-carrier model make it a weaker public-interest fit (American Q1 2026; The Points Guy). Delta is lower still because it already holds 511 listed LGA OAs, and United has less strategic need because Newark is its New York-area hub and Scott Kirby said United did not expect to participate in consolidation for the foreseeable future (FAA holder totals; The Points Guy).

I modeled three paths. I put 72% on a single court-approved package sale, because the current process is a July 9 auction and bankruptcy filings show the RCF lenders have a senior lien on the LGA slots, with management incentives tied to fast monetization (Spirit Doc. 1115). I put 21% on a split sale, secondary lease, or FAA-shaped reallocation, because prior LGA remedies used bundles and the FAA signal may push away from a simple highest-cash sale. I put 7% on full retirement, legal delay past the resolution window, or another no-counted-recipient path. The resulting at-least-one-slot probabilities are Frontier 49.1%, Southwest 23%, JetBlue 19%, American 16%, Other airline(s) 11%, United 3%, Delta 2%, and Alaska 2%. They do not sum to 100% because a split allocation can make several options true.

What’s non-obvious

The obvious read is that the richest bidder wins. The better read is that the richest executable bidder wins. The estate has a real creditor-value motive, but the FAA must confirm slot transfers in writing and the FAA Administrator has already framed the acceptable public-interest outcome as low-fare access or retirement (Federal Register; Bloomberg Law). That is why Frontier beats American in this forecast even though American can outbid it.

The slots and gates also need not move together. Spirit used Terminal A, the Marine Air Terminal, but the Port Authority controls Terminal A, can reallocate its six gates, and said redevelopment plans continue after Spirit’s shutdown (The Points Guy). A carrier could get the slots and operate from existing space, or a carrier could become the Terminal A tenant without receiving all former Spirit OAs. That is the main reason the split path is still material.

Limitations

No public bidder list, stalking-horse bidder, final bidding-procedures order, FAA transfer approval, or Port Authority terminal assignment was available by May 30, 2026. TPG also reported that no airline executive had explicitly said they wanted Spirit’s LGA slots, so the airline ranking rests on historical interest, regulatory fit, current LGA concentration, balance sheets, and management comments rather than confirmed bids (The Points Guy).

The terminology is messy. FAA’s official holder table reports 22 individual Spirit OAs, while some public language and the question text use slot-pair wording (FAA holder totals; JetBlue). I forecast the identity of the recipient of the former Spirit LGA operating rights. If the actual lot is treated as 22 slot pairs rather than 22 individual OAs, the package is larger and the split probability rises, but the airline ranking changes little.