Will Bolivian president Rodrigo Paz Pereira remain in power through the end of 2026?

TL;DR

Rodrigo Paz Pereira is favored to remain President of Bolivia continuously through 31 December 2026; my probability is 78%. The June blockade crisis was severe, but by 23 June it had shifted from expansion to containment: roads were reopening, parliament had ratified emergency powers, and the security forces were still acting under Paz (AP, 21 Jun 2026; ABC, 23 Jun 2026). The NO path is a renewed protest-repression spiral that reunites labor, campesino, El Alto/La Paz, and Chapare forces and then triggers legislative or security-force abandonment.

Context

Paz is the elected incumbent. Bolivia's electoral authority certified the 19 October 2025 runoff with the PDC ticket of Rodrigo Paz and Edmand Lara at 3,519,534 valid votes, or 54.96%, and it delivered their credentials on 5 November 2025; Paz was sworn in for a five-year term on 8 November 2025 (OEP results separata, 31 Oct 2025; OEP credentials, 5 Nov 2025; EFE, 8 Nov 2025). The forecast now covers the remaining 191 days from 23 June through 31 December 2026, because Paz has not left office during the question window so far.

The current crisis is real regime stress. AP reported on 20 June that five weeks of protests had demanded Paz's resignation, caused 365 arrests and 37 injuries, and produced at least 17 deaths, mostly tied to lack of medical care from transport disruption; El País reported on 3 June that Defense Minister Marcelo Salinas and Education Minister Beatriz García resigned amid nearly 100 road cuts in seven of nine departments, making three cabinet resignations in ten days (AP, 20 Jun 2026; El País, 3 Jun 2026). The late update cuts the other way: after Paz's 20 June state of exception, parliament overwhelmingly ratified the decree, AP said roadblocks were being cleared, and Bolivia's highway agency said on 23 June that it was restoring nationwide transitability after the Chapare blockade suspension (AP, 21 Jun 2026; ABC, 23 Jun 2026).

Evidence

The historical backbone says Bolivia is a high-risk presidential system, but not one where presidents fall from protest alone. Across South America in 1978-2005, Hochstetler and Edwards count 44 elected presidential terms, 17 challenged presidents, and 11 failed presidencies; that is 25% of all terms and 65% of challenged terms, but it is an eventual-term statistic, not a six-month hazard (Hochstetler & Edwards, 2009). Bolivia's democratic-era history is the more relevant reference class:

A blind Bolivia-only base rate is too low for this case. Counting Siles, Sánchez de Lozada II, Mesa, and Morales as political early exits gives roughly four political interruptions over about 44 democratic years, or about a 5% six-month hazard before conditioning on the live challenge shown in the table above. The live challenge pushes the risk much higher: the current episode has national blockades, La Paz supply disruption, resignation demands, fatalities, and cabinet resignations, all features present in the dangerous Bolivian analogues (AP, 9 Jun 2026; El País, 3 Jun 2026).

The best survival evidence is the late-June institutional turn. Paz signed a pact with the COB after 50 days of protest and 14 deaths by El País's count; then, when campesino and Morales-aligned sectors rejected the deal, he declared a 90-day state of exception allowing police and armed-force support to restore order (El País, 20 Jun 2026; El País, 20 Jun 2026). The legislature then validated Decree 5636 by more than two-thirds according to EFE/Swissinfo, while AP described the ratification as overwhelming (Swissinfo/EFE, 21 Jun 2026; AP, 21 Jun 2026). By 23 June, La Razón said Bolivia woke without social-conflict road cuts, though four routes still had stones and debris, and the ABC said its crews were clearing the national road network after the Six Federations of the Tropics suspended blockades (La Razón, 23 Jun 2026; ABC, 23 Jun 2026).

The economic backdrop keeps the NO tail large. Bolivia's statistics institute reported May 2026 CPI inflation of 2.13% month-on-month, 2.62% year-to-date, and 12.51% over twelve months, with La Paz's conurbation at 5.41% month-on-month; that is a June 3 publication covering May 2026, not a forecast (INE Bolivia, 3 Jun 2026). Harvard Growth Lab's April 2026 energy paper says the January 2026 fuel reform raised diesel prices by 163% and gasoline by 86%, while still leaving structural energy and fiscal weaknesses unresolved (Harvard Growth Lab, Apr 2026). Those conditions make another blockade cycle plausible even if the June one has broken.

The legal path favors continuity. Bolivia's Constitution gives the president and vice president five-year mandates under Article 168; Article 169 puts the vice president first in succession for definitive absence; Article 170 ends the presidential mandate by death, resignation to the Assembly, definitive absence or impediment, final criminal conviction, or recall; Article 240 allows recall only after at least half the mandate has elapsed (Constitute Project, Bolivia 2009 Constitution; Infoleyes, Article 169). Since Paz took office on 8 November 2025, a normal recall route is not available before the end of 2026. That leaves resignation under pressure, security-force pressure, a coup-like break, death/incapacity, or a very fast criminal/judicial path as the plausible NO routes.

My event-tree calculation gives 21.7% NO. I assign 4.5% to near-term failure from the still-hot June crisis, 38% to a renewed national blockade or comparable economic-political shock before year-end, 38% conditional removal if that renewed shock happens, and 4.2% to residual VP/elite, security, judicial, coup, health, or other discontinuity paths. The calculation is:

$$P(\text{NO})=1-(1-0.045)(1-0.38\times0.38)(1-0.042)=21.7\%.$$

That implies 78.3% YES. I weight this slightly above the more optimistic reading because the economy has not stabilized and the state of exception itself can create the kind of protester-death shock that toppled earlier Bolivian presidents.

What's non-obvious

The obvious story is that 50 days of blockades and resignation chants mean Paz is near collapse. That misses the timing. By 23 June, the crisis had already crossed a major test and Paz had not lost the legislature, the police, or the military; instead, parliament ratified emergency powers, COB moved into a pact, Morales-aligned Chapare forces paused, and the road network was being restored (AP, 21 Jun 2026; ABC, 23 Jun 2026).

The other missed point is that recall and impeachment are not the main 2026 risk. The constitution blocks recall until half-term, and the legislature's revealed preference in the peak week was to back Paz's emergency decree, not remove him (Constitute Project, Bolivia 2009 Constitution; Swissinfo/EFE, 21 Jun 2026). Vice President Edmand Lara is a real spoiler because he is first in line, but his public line during the crisis has been dialogue and skepticism of resignation as a solution, not a clear succession campaign (Bolivia.com, May 2026; La Razón, 17 Jun 2026).

Limitations

The largest gap is private security-force sentiment. Public evidence shows police and armed forces clearing roads under Paz, but Bolivia's 2019 crisis changed quickly when police and military support shifted; no open-source article can rule out a private command-level break before December (AS/COA, 12 Nov 2019). Casualty counts also differ by source and cutoff: El País used 14 deaths around the 20 June pact, while AP reported at least 17 deaths on 20 June, and the distinction between direct state-caused deaths and indirect medical-access deaths matters for political legitimacy (El País, 20 Jun 2026; AP, 20 Jun 2026).

The forecast is also sensitive to economic-policy timing. More fuel-price changes, exchange-rate adjustment, an IMF-style package, or a failed supply normalization could restart the exact blockade mechanism that June temporarily resolved. I also lack a high-quality national approval poll after the 20-23 June emergency operations; pre-emergency polling showed damage but not collapse, with one CB Global Data report putting Paz at 46.4% approval and 52.3% disapproval in early June (Brújula Digital, 9 Jun 2026).