Will Bolivian president Rodrigo Paz Pereira remain in power through the end of 2026?

TL;DR

I put YES at 86%. Paz survived a 53-day blockade campaign without a military, police, or legislative break, and there is no active constitutional process capable of removing him quickly. The main remaining danger is the mid-September collision of the COB agreement deadline, the expiry of the 90-day state of exception, economic adjustment, and a possible attempt to arrest Evo Morales.

Context

The official presidency website continues to identify Rodrigo Paz Pereira as president and says he took office on November 8, 2025. I found no official record of a resignation, definitive incapacity, succession, or other interruption since the question opened.

The May–June crisis was severe. The public ombudsman recorded 89 active roadblocks across six departments on May 31, while later reporting put the peak above 100. Paz reached an agreement with the COB on June 19, declared a nationwide state of exception on June 20, won more than two-thirds legislative support, and had reopened the national road system by June 23. The roads are open, but the grievances that caused the crisis remain.

Evidence

The historical starting point favors survival. The full democratic-era presidential history is below; the older chronology comes from Georgetown University’s Political Database of the Americas.

This gives roughly 44 presidential-years and five broadly unscheduled exits if Siles’s planned early handover and Banzer’s illness are included. A constant-hazard model produces about a 5% interruption probability over the remaining period; counting only the three clear protest-driven resignations gives about 3%. Paz deserves a large upward risk adjustment because he is emerging from a national resignation campaign, but the base rate rules out treating removal as the default outcome.

The strongest evidence for YES is revealed institutional behavior. Paz faced a crisis with shortages, cabinet departures and explicit resignation demands, yet the protest coalition split after the June 19 COB agreement. Police and military units then cleared the roads, while the legislature ratified his emergency decree. Bolivia’s prior presidential collapses involved a wider endgame: opposition across sectors, failed negotiations, eroding elite support, and security forces that became unwilling or unable to defend the incumbent (Oxford Academic). That bridge from protest to removal has not appeared under Paz.

Public opinion also cuts against a simple “unpopular president must fall” story. An Ipsos CIESMORI survey, conducted June 22–30 among 400 respondents in the main urban axis, found 38% approval and 45% disapproval for Paz. The same survey found 79% had a negative view of the COB and 62% supported severe anti-blockade legislation. The sample is not nationally representative, but it shows that discontent with Paz did not create broad urban support for the groups seeking his resignation.

Formal removal is difficult. The Bolivian Constitution lists death, resignation, definitive absence or incapacity, a final criminal sentence, and recall as routes out of office. Recall cannot begin until half the five-year term has elapsed, so it is unavailable in 2026. Bolivia has no ordinary parliamentary no-confidence vote that automatically replaces the president, and no mature responsibility-trial process against Paz is underway.

Paz’s political coalition is weaker than it was in June. His PDC began with only 49 of 130 lower-house seats, and Samuel Doria Medina formally broke with the government on July 27. Yet Doria Medina simultaneously said Unidad would pursue “constructive opposition” and would not conspire against presidential stability. This raises the risk of legislative paralysis, but it is not evidence of an organized succession coalition.

The economy is the main adverse driver. Official CPI data published July 3 showed 2.15% month-over-month inflation in June, 4.82% for January–June and 9.23% over twelve months. At March 31, total international reserves were about $3.6 billion, but only $144 million were monetary reserves, while $3.4 billion were gold reserves (Banco Central de Bolivia). The IMF announced a $1.9 billion, 36-month staff-level agreement on July 29, subject to prior actions and Executive Board approval. Financing could relieve dollar and fuel shortages, while fiscal and exchange-rate reforms could also reactivate opposition.

My scenario model assigns 47% to manageable conditions, with a 2% conditional exit risk; 39% to renewed national unrest without a decisive institutional rupture, with a 12% exit risk; and 14% to a systemic crisis involving broad mobilization plus elite or security-force fracture, with a 65% exit risk. The weighted result is about a 14% probability of NO and 86% probability of YES.

What's non-obvious

The number of protesters is not the central variable. The key variable is whether protests gain allies inside the security forces, legislature, urban public and business establishment. Paz already survived a campaign larger and longer than the protests that immediately preceded some past Bolivian resignations. Its failure exposed the opposition’s fragmentation and the public cost of road blockades.

The IMF agreement and the Morales warrant are both double-edged. IMF money could stabilize imports and fuel supply, but the accompanying reforms may revive labor opposition. Arresting Morales could weaken the strongest removal-minded network, but a violent operation in the Chapare could create the deaths, moral outrage and security strain needed to turn another protest wave into a presidential endgame.

Uncertainties

The largest gap is the effective whip count inside Paz’s nominal PDC bloc. Public seat totals do not show how many legislators answer to Paz, Vice President Edmand Lara, or neither. I also found no nationally representative post-crisis approval poll; the best transparent survey covers only four major urban areas.

The situation inside the Chapare is hard to verify. Reliable data are thin on the number, organization and armament of Morales supporters or on whether the government intends to execute the latest warrant soon. The forecast would fall sharply after a police mutiny, military refusal, a renewed indefinite COB strike, or a violent Chapare operation. Its reasonable uncertainty range is roughly 75%–91%, with the September deadlines accounting for most of that spread.