Will Bolivian president Rodrigo Paz Pereira remain in power through the end of 2026?

TL;DR

My forecast is 80% YES: Rodrigo Paz Pereira remains president of Bolivia continuously through 23:59 Bolivia time on 31 December 2026. Since the question was asked, the May-June blockade crisis has shifted from acute danger to a managed emergency: roads are open, Congress ratified the emergency, and the police and military followed orders. The risk remains large because the 26 June currency devaluation, IMF talks, fuel shortages, and Vice President Edmand Lara's opposition can feed a second wave before year-end.

Context

As of 27 June 2026, Paz is the incumbent president; the official presidency site lists Rodrigo Paz Pereira as President of Bolivia and says he assumed office on 8 November 2025 (Bolivian Presidency). He won the 19 October 2025 runoff with 54.96% of valid votes, with 100% of tally sheets processed, according to the Tribunal Supremo Electoral's 27 October 2025 proclamation (OEP/TSE). From the current timestamp to resolution there are 187.4 days left, ending at 23:59 Bolivia time on 31 December 2026.

The live issue is whether the May-June social crisis returns with enough force to break his government. At the peak, nearly two months of blockades produced shortages, cabinet resignations, and open demands for Paz to resign; by 23 June, the state road agency and major press reported no active national blockade, while the 90-day state of exception remained in force (El País, 3 Jun, El País, 23 Jun, Infobae, 21 Jun).

Evidence

The historical base rate says Bolivia is not a normal presidential-survival case. From the democratic restoration in October 1982 to 27 June 2026, I count four clear permanent early presidential exits before a normal elected handoff: Hugo Banzer in 2001 for illness, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in 2003 under protest pressure, Carlos Mesa in 2005 under protest and blockade pressure, and Evo Morales in 2019 after protests, police withdrawal, and military pressure (Georgetown chronology, CBS on Banzer, BBC on Sánchez de Lozada, AIN on Mesa, Guardian on Morales). That is 4 exits over 43.7 country-years, a crude annual hazard of 9.2%, or 4.6% over the remaining 187.4 days; counting Hernán Siles Zuazo's crisis-shortened mandate as an interruption raises the six-month baseline to 5.7% (Journal of Democracy). I treat this as a floor, because Paz is already in a removal-challenge environment. The South American reference class is also harsh: Hochstetler and Edwards counted 11 failed presidencies out of 44 elected South American presidential terms from 1978 to 2005, and 17 challenged presidents of whom 11 failed (Hochstetler and Edwards, 2009).

The June crisis was severe enough to put Paz in the historical danger class. On 3 June, El País reported the defense and education ministers had resigned, the third cabinet resignation in ten days, with about 100 road cuts in seven of nine departments and shortages of food, gasoline, and medicine in La Paz and El Alto (El País, 3 Jun). EFE reported the same day that protests by campesinos, workers, and Morales supporters demanded Paz's resignation, extended to eight of nine regions, and had caused nine deaths by that date, mostly from disrupted medical access (EFE, 3 Jun). By 20-23 June, reported deaths ranged from 14 in the Ombudsman's count to at least 17 in AP and Infobae reporting, depending on date and definition (El País, 23 Jun, AP, 20 Jun, Infobae, 21 Jun).

The end-state of that crisis is more favorable to Paz than the peak headlines. The Assembly ratified Supreme Decree 5636 by more than two-thirds of parliamentarians present, and Infobae reported that the LIBRE and APB Súmate blocs helped consolidate the majority for the 90-day state of exception (Infobae, 21 Jun). The road-clearing operation did not produce the massacre scenario that would most endanger him: El País reported on 23 June that the police and armed forces mostly found empty barricades, the Ombudsman's Office said most operations used no significant force, and the national roads were open after more than 50 days of conflict (El País, 23 Jun). EFE reported the same day that Paz said the blockade had been defeated, that no blockades were then registered, and that land travel from La Paz's bus terminal had resumed after about 50 days, though fuel lines and shortages persisted (Swissinfo/EFE, 23 Jun).

The institutional route to a clean removal is narrow. Paz's PDC won 49 of 130 deputies and 16 of 36 senators in the August 2025 legislative election, so he lacks a standalone majority, but his party is the largest bloc in both chambers and MAS is tiny in the new legislature (IPU Chamber, IPU Senate). Bolivia's Article 170 lists the routes by which the president ceases in office: death, resignation to the Assembly, definitive absence or impediment, final criminal sentence, or revocation of mandate; Article 240 says revocation can be requested only after at least half the mandate has elapsed, which rules out a recall route in 2026 for a term that began on 8 November 2025 (Article 170, Article 240). Vice President Edmand Lara is a real accelerant because he opposed the state of exception and on 27 June attacked the new flexible exchange-rate regime as inflationary and legally suspect, but he is not yet a removal mechanism by himself (Infobae, 21 Jun, Erbol, 27 Jun).

The economy is the main reason I do not go higher. INE's latest official CPI release, published 3 June for May 2026, shows nominal consumer-price inflation of 2.13% month over month, 2.62% year to date, and 12.51% over twelve months (INE, 3 Jun). Reuters reported on 27 June that the government ended a 15-year dollar peg, moved toward a flexible exchange-rate system, shifted the official rate from 6.86-6.96 bolivianos per dollar toward 9.73, and was negotiating IMF financing of at least $2.5 billion while labor groups opposed IMF borrowing (Reuters via Investing.com, 27 Jun). El País had reported on 4 May that reserves had fallen from more than $15 billion in 2014 to under $2 billion at end-2024, that the parallel dollar had moved above 10 bolivianos in early May, and that the IMF projected a 3.3% GDP contraction and inflation above 20% for 2026 (El País, 4 May). The devaluation is macro-economically coherent, but politically it creates a new focal point for anti-austerity mobilization.

The public-opinion data show damage, not collapse. CB Global Data's 2-7 June survey, reported by Brújula Digital/EFE, put Paz at 46.4% positive image and 52.3% disapproval, down 9.2 percentage points from May; the survey covered 40,517 people across 18 Latin American countries, with country samples of 1,993 to 2,671 and a stated 95% confidence level (Brújula Digital/EFE, 9 Jun). Ipsos CIESMORI's April monitor, reported by Unitel, put Paz's approval at 52%, down from 65% after taking office, and reported very high rejection of Lara, which weakens Lara as a consensus replacement even while he can hurt Paz from inside the executive (Unitel, 5 May).

My scenario model from 27 June to the 31 December resolution date is:

So $P(\text{NO}) = 0.196$, and $P(\text{YES}) = 0.804$. This puts Paz's remaining-six-month removal risk at roughly 3.5 to 4 times Bolivia's crude post-1982 baseline, which fits the evidence: this is an active crisis, but one in which the first major removal attempt has just failed.

What's non-obvious

The simple story is that Bolivia is repeating 2003 or 2005. The better read is that Paz has already passed one of the most dangerous tests: he got legislative cover, kept police and military obedience, split the protest coalition, and reopened roads without mass lethal repression (Infobae, 21 Jun, El País, 23 Jun). In Bolivia, street pressure becomes presidential exit when it fuses with elite abandonment or coercive-force defection. I see the first ingredient; I do not yet see the second.

The countervailing point is that the exchange-rate break came after the visible blockade crisis eased. That means a forecast based only on the cleared roads is too high. The 26 June policy may stabilize the balance of payments over time, but in the next three to six months it can raise food, fuel, and wage pressure, giving Lara, the COB, Morales-aligned cocaleros, and campesino groups a common grievance again (Reuters via Investing.com, 27 Jun, Erbol, 27 Jun).

Limitations

The biggest missing variable is private security-force sentiment. Public evidence shows military and police compliance in June, but the decisive moments in 2019 were visible only when the police and military changed posture in public (Guardian, 10 Nov 2019). If police units refuse orders, the high command asks Paz to resign, or a road-clearing operation produces many direct civilian deaths, this forecast should move sharply down.

The second gap is the social reaction to the 26 June exchange-rate regime. The May CPI and Reuters exchange-rate data are current, but they predate most price pass-through from devaluation and any final IMF package (INE, 3 Jun, Reuters via Investing.com, 27 Jun). The third gap is polling: the best public approval numbers I found were before the road clearing had fully normalized daily life and before the currency move, so they may miss either a rally-around-order effect or a new anti-austerity backlash (Brújula Digital/EFE, 9 Jun).