Will Bolivian president Rodrigo Paz Pereira remain in power through the end of 2026?

TL;DR

I assign an 82% chance that Rodrigo Paz Pereira remains President of Bolivia continuously through December 31, 2026. He has already survived the December–January fuel-subsidy protests and a 53-day May–June campaign that explicitly demanded his resignation, while the military command still backs constitutional continuity, Congress has renewed emergency powers, and both chambers approved the IMF financing law. The live danger is the diesel shock: fuel-tanker operators stopped loading and unloading nationwide and La Paz transport declared an indefinite strike, but their stated demands still target the decree, freight or fare relief, and ministerial handling rather than Paz’s resignation.

Context

At the cutoff, the official presidency site still identified Paz as president and carried activity dated September 19. His government had just set diesel at Bs17.95 per liter, up from Bs9.80, while announcing cash support, cheaper credit, and other compensation. The price change affects the sectors with the greatest capacity to paralyze the country: public transport, trucking, fuel distribution, farming, and food supply.

Paz is weak but not isolated. An August 19–31 online poll of 400 internet users in four major cities found 21% approval and 65% disapproval, and only six of the original 14 ministers remained by September 13. Yet Vice President Edmand Lara is also deeply unpopular in the same urban poll, while the Assembly’s September emergency vote and IMF-law votes show broad transactional support for continuity.

Evidence

The historical backbone is adverse. A comparative study of 44 elected South American presidential terms from 1978–2005 found 17 presidents faced explicit civilian challenges and 11 of those 17 left office early; the failure rate was 25% across all terms and 65% among challenged presidents. Those are whole-term figures from an older era, not a 103-day forecast, but they correctly flag the combination Paz faces: a minority government, large street mobilization, economic adjustment, and scandal. Bolivia itself has repeatedly shortened presidencies, including the early exits of Siles Zuazo, Banzer, Sánchez de Lozada, Mesa, and Morales.

The closer analogues show why protests alone are not enough. Evo Morales’s 2019 resignation followed a police mutiny and a public military request that he step down. Paz’s May–June crisis already included prolonged blockades, shortages, deaths, and an explicit resignation demand, but it ended after negotiation, fragmentation, and road-clearing without a comparable security-force break. The OAS mission’s September report also found broad support among consulted sectors for preserving the constitutional mandate, raising the political cost of an extra-constitutional transition.

Paz retains more legislative cover than his party numbers imply. The 90-day extension of the state of exception passed on September 17 with 100 votes among 158 legislators present. That was enough for approval but was below two-thirds. By contrast, the $1.9 billion IMF financing bill passed the lower house by more than two-thirds and then passed the Senate by more than two-thirds. These are transactional majorities, not loyalty, but a Congress preparing to remove Paz would not normally hand him emergency powers and the centerpiece of his economic program days earlier.

The formal removal routes are narrow. Bolivia’s Constitution lists death, resignation, definitive incapacity or absence, a final criminal conviction, and recall as grounds for leaving office; the electoral authority says recall cannot begin until half the term has elapsed. The Cerimedo scandal has produced accusations and an attempt to force a responsibilities trial, but the process still requires prosecutorial action, legislative authorization, trial, and a final judgment. That is unlikely to finish by year-end.

The September escalation is real. Nine La Paz transport federations and allied operators ratified an indefinite strike. Fuel-tanker operators reported a nationwide suspension of loading and unloading. The COB called a national emergency meeting, the national transport chamber requested a meeting with Paz for September 21, and Morales-aligned coca growers had a major meeting planned for September 26. This makes another major protest cycle more likely than not. It is not yet a removal coalition: the published demands center on repealing the diesel decree, changing freight or fare economics, dismissing the hydrocarbons minister, or meeting Paz.

The security picture still favors Paz. The armed-forces commander said on August 7 that the military and police would defend the stability of the elected government. After the diesel announcement, more than 500 police were deployed on the Cochabamba–Oruro–La Paz route alongside military personnel. The Army also publicly backed an officer whom Lara confronted in Viacha, which cuts against the idea that Lara already commands an alternative chain of loyalty. Reports of a recent anti-Paz police mutiny were fact-checked as false.

The economy can still turn this into a political crisis. The latest official CPI release, published September 3 and covering August, showed 1.10% month-over-month inflation and 5.02% year-over-year inflation. It predates the diesel increase, so it misses the likely transport and food-price pass-through. The 36-month IMF staff agreement for about $1.9 billion remained subject to Executive Board approval and prior actions, meaning Paz had incurred immediate political costs before the full financing benefit was secured.

I use a three-branch scenario tree rather than treating old whole-term base rates as a direct forecast. I assign a 35.0% chance that bargaining contains the dispute or limits it to short disruptions, with 99% survival inside that branch; a 45.0% chance of sustained national strikes or blockades without an elite or security split, with 92% survival; and a 20% chance of a unified resignation campaign plus visible elite or security fracture, with 28% survival. The calculation is $0.35\times0.99+0.45\times0.92+0.20\times0.28=0.8165$. The model’s key judgment is that serious unrest is likely, but a removal-capable coalition remains a minority scenario.

What's non-obvious

The most important distinction is between a costly sectoral strike and a presidential-removal movement. Bolivia is already in the first category, but the current transport and labor texts ask for policy reversal, compensation, a minister’s dismissal, or direct talks. The earlier crisis only became existential after organizations adopted Paz’s resignation as a shared demand; even then, it failed because Congress and the security forces did not join.

The successor is not neutral. Lara would constitutionally benefit from a vacancy, but the same urban poll that put Paz at 21% approval put Lara at 10%, and the Army’s Viacha response showed little deference to Lara outside his legal role. Libre and Unidad therefore have reason to keep pressuring a weak Paz rather than install a less predictable president during an IMF adjustment. I read the recent votes as support for continuity, not support for Paz personally.

Uncertainties

• I could not verify a cutoff-valid national road map showing the exact number and location of new diesel-related blockades. The fuel-tanker suspension could end after a freight agreement or become the mechanism that recreates shortages; the difference would move the forecast sharply.
• Security-force loyalty is hard to observe before it is tested. Current deployments and public statements favor Paz, but absence of a verified mutiny is not proof that commanders would accept large civilian casualties to keep clearing roads.
• The approval evidence is an online four-city sample of 400 adults with internet access, not a national rural-inclusive probability survey. It measures severe urban weakness but cannot precisely estimate the support of the rural organizations most capable of sustaining blockades.
• The forecast would benefit most from verified implementation data on the compensation package, the first IMF disbursement, fuel availability, and the resolutions of the COB, national drivers, and September 26 coca-grower meetings. The IMF agreement was still conditional on Board approval and prior actions at the cutoff.