Which airlines will take control of the takeoff and landing slots at LaGuardia that were held by Spirit Airlines prior to their May 2026 bankruptcy?

TL;DR

Frontier is the best bet to receive Spirit’s former LaGuardia slots, with Southwest, JetBlue, and American the only other serious listed candidates.

Context

Spirit announced an immediate wind-down on May 2, 2026, cancelled all flights, and said passenger claims would move through the bankruptcy process. (spiritrestructuring.com) Spirit’s LaGuardia asset is now in a fast bankruptcy sale track: indications of interest and stalking-horse bids are due June 10, final bids June 30, the slot auction is scheduled for July 9, and needed regulatory approvals must be obtainable by July 17. (chapter11cases.com)

No final allocation is public as of June 3, 2026. The best current reporting says Spirit held 22 LaGuardia slots, valued near $87 million, and that the bankruptcy winner will be the 'highest and otherwise best' offer, subject to court approval before the buyer can use the slots. (thepointsguy.com)

Evidence

The historical backbone points toward smaller and low-fare carriers. In the 2011 Delta-US Airways slot swap, DOT and FAA required divestitures and limited eligibility to carriers with less than 5% of slots at the airport; the 16 LaGuardia slot pairs were split into two eight-pair bundles, and JetBlue and WestJet won even though JetBlue had bid highest for all bundles. (transportation.gov) In the 2013 American-US Airways settlement, DOJ required slots and gates at constrained airports to be divested to low-cost carriers, including LaGuardia slots, to preserve competition. (justice.gov) This is a small reference class, not a law of nature, but it is the right reference class: when federal actors shape scarce LaGuardia access, they do not normally hand it to the biggest incumbent.

The third analogue is even closer. In June 2023, JetBlue and Frontier signed a definitive agreement under which Frontier would receive all of Spirit’s LaGuardia holdings if the JetBlue-Spirit merger closed. The package was described as six Marine Air Terminal gates and 22 takeoff and landing slots, subject to Port Authority and FAA/DOT approval, and JetBlue framed the deal as preserving ultra-low-cost access at LaGuardia. (investor.jetblue.com) The merger failed, so this does not bind the bankruptcy estate. It does prove that Frontier already diligenced this exact asset, wanted it, and fit a regulator-friendly remedy story.

The current FAA data show why the regulatory story matters. The latest public FAA LaGuardia operator-total file I found is Summer 2025, generated December 9, 2025 at 07:56, with status date 2025; it excludes FAA-held slots and slots held less than five days. The sample is nine listed regular operators. (faa.gov)

Spirit’s 22 slots are small in airport-wide terms but large for Frontier, JetBlue, Porter, or another entrant. If all 22 went to Frontier, Frontier would still be a small LGA operator. If they went to Delta or American, they would deepen already-large positions. The FAA’s live policy signal matches that arithmetic: FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford said the former Spirit slots should go to another low-fare airline for the public good, and that the slots could be retired if no low-cost carrier can take them. (airlinegeeks.com) The FAA also says all slot transfers are subject to prior FAA confirmation, and the LaGuardia order in force through October 24, 2026 keeps the 71 scheduled-operation hourly limit, the 80% use rule, withdrawal/reallocation tools, and written FAA approval for trades and leases. (faa.gov)

The counterweight is cash. American reported $10.8 billion of liquidity at the end of Q1 2026, Southwest reported $3.3 billion of cash and a $1.5 billion revolving credit line, JetBlue reported $1.857 billion of cash and cash equivalents, and Frontier reported $974 million of total liquidity as of March 31, 2026. (americanairlines.gcs-web.com) A nearly $87 million slot package is easy for American and Southwest, manageable but meaningful for JetBlue, and material for Frontier. That is why I do not put Frontier above 50%, despite the very strong policy fit.

Airline by airline, Frontier has the cleanest path: small LGA footprint, prior agreement for the exact package, and the best match to a low-fare replacement for Spirit. Southwest is next because it can pay, already has LGA scale, and is still easier to defend as a low-fare carrier than a legacy airline. JetBlue has New York focus and limited LGA slots, but its blocked Spirit merger and its own 2023 plan to divest these same assets to Frontier weaken its regulatory case. American remains live because it can pay and its CEO has said American is aggressive when assets become available, but it is the second-largest LGA slot holder and not the buyer the FAA is describing. (thepointsguy.com) United and Delta can pay, but United’s New York strategy is centered on Newark and its CEO has ruled out near-term consolidation, while Delta’s dominant LGA position makes it the hardest approval story. (marketscreener.com) Alaska has little strategic fit because it is not a current FAA-listed LGA operator in the Summer 2025 table and LaGuardia’s perimeter-constrained market is not central to Alaska’s network. (faa.gov)

My model puts 75% on a single-buyer or near-single-buyer outcome, because the estate is marketing the LGA slots on their own track and public reporting describes a winning bid. I put 17% on a split sale, regulator-shaped bundle, or later lease structure in which more than one airline receives at least one usable slot pair. I put 8% on retirement, failed approval, litigation, or no clear qualifying allocation. In the single-buyer branch, I assign Frontier 42%, Southwest 21%, JetBlue 15%, American 13.5%, Other 6.5%, United 1.2%, Delta 0.6%, and Alaska 0.2%. In the split branch, I assign at-least-one-slot-pair chances of Frontier 64%, Southwest 50%, JetBlue 45%, American 32%, Other 35%, United 12%, Delta 5%, and Alaska 5%. Using P_i = 0.75s_i + 0.17m_i gives Frontier 42.4%, Southwest 24%, JetBlue 19%, American 16%, Other 11%, United 3%, Delta 1%, and Alaska 1%. The probabilities sum above 100% because a split allocation can make several options resolve yes.

What's non-obvious

The auction is not a pure high-dollar sale. The bankruptcy estate wants value, but the buyer also needs FAA confirmation and practical regulatory approval on a tight July timetable. Bedford’s low-fare-or-retire statement changes the auction economics: a lower Frontier or Southwest bid may be 'otherwise best' if an American or Delta bid has closing risk. (airlinegeeks.com)

The Marine Air Terminal also should not be treated as destiny. The 2023 Frontier remedy bundled Spirit’s gates and slots, but it still required separate Port Authority and FAA/DOT approvals, and the current docket summary describes the LaGuardia slots as their own sale track. (investor.jetblue.com) That keeps the field wider than just whichever airline most wants Terminal A. It also keeps 'Other airline(s)' alive: Porter already appears in FAA data with six LGA slots, and Billy Bishop Toronto City Airport opened U.S. preclearance on March 10, 2026, making additional precleared Toronto-LaGuardia flying more plausible than it was before. (faa.gov)

Limitations

The biggest missing fact is the bid list. I found no public qualified-bidder list, stalking-horse bid, or final FAA/DOT position as of June 3, 2026, and current industry reporting says no airline executive has explicitly declared interest in the LGA slots even though American, Frontier, JetBlue, and Southwest are viewed as leading candidates. (thepointsguy.com)

The second gap is legal discretion. FAA approval is required for the transfer, and the administrator has made a clear low-fare statement, but I could not verify a public written FAA order saying a non-low-cost buyer would be rejected. That uncertainty is the main reason American stays at 16% rather than falling into the low single digits. (faa.gov)

The slot count is messy. FAA’s public file counts 22 individual LGA slots for Spirit in the Summer 2025 season, while some coverage and merger-remedy language uses slots, slot pairs, and round-trip capacity loosely. (faa.gov) I treat the question as a recipient question, not a capacity-count question: the relevant event is formal control of enough former Spirit LGA operating authority to run scheduled service.