Which airlines will take control of the takeoff and landing slots at LaGuardia that were held by Spirit Airlines prior to their May 2026 bankruptcy?

TL;DR

Frontier is the best answer at 58.6% because it is the cleanest regulatory fit and already had a signed 2023 deal to take this exact Spirit LaGuardia package. JetBlue, Other airline(s), Southwest, and American each have live 18–22% paths because the portfolio can be split or conditioned in a regulator-friendly sale. Delta, United, and Alaska are long shots because the FAA signal points toward low-fare or limited-incumbent access, not more capacity for legacy carriers.

Context

Spirit says it began an orderly wind-down on May 2, 2026, with all flights cancelled and no remaining customer service operation (Spirit wind-down notice). The LGA asset is being sold through Spirit Aviation Holdings, Inc., case No. 25-11897 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York: Spirit’s May 27 sale-procedures filing set a June 30, 2026 final bid deadline for the LGA slots, a July 9 auction if needed, and a July 10 target date to file auction results (Spirit sale procedures, Doc. 1117).

There is no public final allocation yet. A bankruptcy sale is not enough by itself: FAA rules require written FAA confirmation before a LaGuardia Operating Authorization trade or lease takes effect, and the Port Authority argues that a slot buyer also needs workable terminal access, especially because Spirit used Terminal A / the Marine Air Terminal (FAA LGA order, June 23, 2026; Port Authority response, June 9, 2026).

Evidence

The base rate favors a sale, but not a pure highest-cash result. In 2008, Southwest agreed to buy 14 ATA LaGuardia slots for $7.5 million through bankruptcy, subject to court approval (Travel Weekly, Nov. 19, 2008). In 2011, the Delta–US Airways slot swap went through only after divestitures; JetBlue won eight LGA slot pairs and WestJet won another LGA bundle, showing that regulators can use scarce slots to expand limited-incumbent service (Travel Weekly, Dec. 1, 2011). In 2013, DOJ made American and US Airways divest 34 LGA slots plus necessary facilities to low-cost-carrier purchasers, with preference for airlines that did not already hold large shares (DOJ, Nov. 12, 2013).

The current FAA structure is a veto point. The June 23, 2026 LGA order extends slot controls through October 28, 2028; keeps the 71 scheduled operations-per-hour cap; keeps the 80% usage rule; allows trades and leases for consideration only with FAA written approval; and lets FAA retire surrendered, withdrawn, or unassigned OAs while hourly totals remain above 71 (FAA LGA order, June 23, 2026). The sale procedures also require bidders to show financial wherewithal, operational ability, required approvals, and closing certainty, and let Spirit evaluate bids on execution risk as well as price (Spirit sale procedures, Doc. 1117).

The public FAA data can look inconsistent because holder and operator reports answer different questions. I use the Summer 2025 operator totals as the concentration anchor because they show actual scheduled operation of slots; the report was generated December 9, 2025, has status date 2025, excludes FAA-held slots and slots held under five days, and lists Spirit with 22 LGA slots (FAA Summer 2025 LGA operator totals).

Frontier has the strongest carrier-specific signal. In 2023, JetBlue and Frontier signed a definitive agreement under which JetBlue would divest all Spirit LGA holdings to Frontier if the JetBlue-Spirit merger closed; that package included six Marine Air Terminal gates and 22 takeoff-and-landing slots and was subject to Port Authority and FAA/DOT approval (JetBlue/Frontier release, June 1, 2023). That failed transaction is not binding now, but it is strong revealed-preference evidence: Frontier has already diligenced this exact asset and fits the FAA Administrator’s public low-fare preference.

The current regulatory signal points the same way. FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford said the FAA and DOT would support the slots going to a low-fare airline for the public good, and that retirement was possible if they could not go to such a carrier (AirlineGeeks, May 28, 2026). That cuts against Delta most sharply, and against American and United to a lesser degree. American can pay and has LGA scale, but adding scarce LGA capacity to a 28.5% operator share is a harder regulatory story than adding it to Frontier, JetBlue, Southwest, or Porter.

JetBlue, Southwest, American, and Other are still real outcomes. The Points Guy reported that observers saw American, Frontier, JetBlue, and Southwest as leading candidates, while no airline executive had publicly confirmed a bid as of May 28 (The Points Guy, May 28, 2026). Bloomberg Law reported that JetBlue said it was evaluating LaGuardia opportunities and that Porter was interested in more LGA slots if the allocation process was defined (Bloomberg Law, June 17, 2026). Porter matters because the resolution threshold is only one former Spirit pair; a split award or carveout could make Other resolve YES without Porter or another unlisted carrier winning the whole package.

My calculation used an at-least-one-recipient scenario tree, not a mutually exclusive single-winner model. I put 6% on retirement, litigation, or no clear final allocation before the resolution window; 58% on a single or near-single winner; and 36% on a split or conditioned award. For each airline option, I summed the scenarios in which it receives at least one usable former Spirit LGA pair, using $P_i = \sum_s w_s \mathbf{1}(i \in s)$, where $w_s$ is a scenario weight and $i$ is the airline option. I then made small qualitative adjustments: Frontier up for the 2023 exact-package agreement and low-fare fit; Other up for Porter and the one-pair threshold; Delta, United, and Alaska down for weak strategic fit and regulatory mismatch.

What's non-obvious

The obvious read is that American or Delta can outbid everyone. That misses the closing problem. Spirit’s estate wants money, but a richer bid is less valuable if the FAA will not confirm the transfer or if the Port Authority forces a fight over Terminal A access. The true test is highest and best bid that can close, not highest posted price.

The other missed point is that Other airline(s) is not a tail bucket. Porter already appears in FAA’s LGA operator data with six slots, Bloomberg reported direct Porter interest, and past LGA divestitures have been split into viable bundles for limited incumbents. One pair is enough for YES, so a small carveout can matter.

Limitations

The biggest gap is the qualified-bidder list after the June 30, 2026 final bid deadline. I found the sale timeline, rules, slot data, regulatory signals, and public comments from likely participants, but not a public filing naming the bidders or bid amounts by July 1, 2026. That single document would move the forecast sharply.

The slot unit is also messy. FAA data and current reporting say Spirit held 22 LGA slots or Operating Authorizations, while the question says slot pairs; airlines need both takeoff and landing authority to operate round trips, so I interpret YES as control of a usable former Spirit operating pair or equivalent practical authority (The Points Guy, May 28, 2026). Finally, Bedford’s low-fare statement is a powerful signal, not a formal allocation order, and bankruptcy creditors still have strong incentives to maximize cash recovery.