Which airlines will take control of the takeoff and landing slots at LaGuardia that were held by Spirit Airlines prior to their May 2026 bankruptcy?

TL;DR

Frontier leads at 48.8% because it is the cleanest low-fare replacement and had a prior agreement to take these exact LaGuardia assets; Southwest is the main spoiler at 24%.

Context

Spirit stopped flying on May 2, 2026, and AP reported that the airline began an orderly wind-down after 34 years with all flights canceled (AP, May 2, 2026). The LaGuardia asset is reported as 22 individual takeoff/landing slots, worth nearly $87 million in an April 2026 court filing, enough for about 11-12 daily round trips because each flight normally needs one arrival slot and one departure slot (The Points Guy, May 28, 2026).

As of June 12, 2026, I found no final allocation. The live process is a court-approved sale track: Judge Sean H. Lane approved Spirit's process to market the LGA slots on June 10, while the proposed auction date remains July 9 (Bloomberg Law, June 10, 2026; The Points Guy, May 28, 2026). The sale still needs the aviation regulators and airport operator to live with the result, because FAA operating authorizations and Port Authority facilities are separate chokepoints (Federal Register LGA order, May 13, 2024; The Points Guy, June 9, 2026).

Evidence

The historical base rate is small, so I used the four closest public LaGuardia slot-transfer analogues I found rather than treating this as a normal asset auction. In all four, federal approval or competition policy shaped the outcome; three favored smaller or low-fare carriers rather than the largest incumbents.

The current regulatory mechanics reinforce that history. The LGA order in force through October 24, 2026 keeps scheduled operations capped at 71 operating authorizations per hour, imposes an 80% two-month use rule, allows trades and leases for consideration, and requires FAA written confirmation before a transaction is effective (Federal Register LGA order, May 13, 2024). FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford then said the Spirit slots should go to another low-fare airline, and that retirement would be preferable if no suitable low-fare transfer occurs (AirlineGeeks, May 28, 2026). The Port Authority objected on June 3 that slots have no practical value without facility permission and that the facility permission cannot simply be auctioned with the slots (The Points Guy, June 9, 2026).

The latest FAA public baseline I used is the Summer 2025 LGA slot data, with reports generated on December 5-9, 2025, status date 2025, excluding FAA-held slots and slots held fewer than five days; these are current-series FAA reports, not a May 2026 bankruptcy-court schedule (FAA data page, last updated Jan. 21, 2026). Units are individual operating authorizations, not round-trip pairs. The operator report lists 1,148 regular scheduled operator slots: Delta 580, American 327, Southwest 70, United 67, JetBlue 31, Spirit 22, Frontier 10, Air Canada 35, and Porter 6, so Delta plus American operated 907 of 1,148 slots, or 79.0% (FAA Summer 2025 LGA Operator Totals). That is the main reason I keep Delta and American below their financial capacity.

Frontier is the best fit. It is the remaining national ultra-low-cost carrier in the option list, has a tiny LGA position in the FAA data, and was the 2023 agreed buyer for the same six gates and 22 slots (FAA Summer 2025 LGA Operator Totals; JetBlue/Frontier, June 1, 2023). The cap is price discipline: Frontier had $974 million of total liquidity at March 31, 2026, but it also posted a Q1 2026 GAAP net loss of $272 million and an adjusted net loss of $68 million, so an $87 million nominal bid is meaningful even if affordable (Frontier Q1 2026 results, May 5, 2026).

Southwest is the strongest non-Frontier path. It has an ATA-bankruptcy precedent, existing LGA scale, and ended Q1 2026 with $3.3 billion in cash and a $1.5 billion revolving credit line (Travel Weekly, Nov. 19, 2008; Southwest Q1 2026 results, Apr. 22, 2026). JetBlue has a real New York-network reason to bid and only 31 listed LGA operator slots, but it also carries the political baggage of its blocked 2024 Spirit acquisition and reported a Q1 2026 operating loss of $224 million despite $2.4 billion of liquidity (FAA Summer 2025 LGA Operator Totals; DOJ, Mar. 4, 2024; JetBlue Q1 2026 results, Apr. 29, 2026). American can pay and its CEO said the airline would be aggressive if Spirit assets became available, but it is not a low-fare replacement and is already the second-largest LGA operator (The Points Guy, May 28, 2026; American Q1 2026 results, Apr. 23, 2026).

I modeled the final probabilities with a scenario tree. I put 68% on a single-buyer sale, 20% on a split or conditioned transfer to multiple airlines, 7% on FAA/Port Authority recapture and reallocation, and 5% on retirement, litigation delay, or no clear airline allocation before the deadline. For each airline $i$, I used $P_i = 0.68S_i + 0.20B_i + 0.07R_i$, where $S_i$ is its single-buyer conditional chance, $B_i$ is its chance of getting at least one slot pair in a split, and $R_i$ is its chance in a recapture/reallocation path; the remaining 5% gives no listed YES. The single-buyer conditional distribution I used was Frontier 48%, Southwest 20%, JetBlue 13%, American 10%, Other 6%, United 1.5%, Delta 1%, and Alaska 0.5%. That yields Frontier 48.8%, Southwest 24%, JetBlue 17.6%, Other 15%, American 12%, United 4%, Delta 2%, and Alaska 2%.

What's non-obvious

The “highest bidder wins” frame is wrong. The bankruptcy estate wants the highest and otherwise best offer, but the FAA must confirm transfers, the Port Authority controls usable facilities, and the FAA head has already said a low-fare airline or retirement is the public-interest answer (The Points Guy, May 28, 2026; Federal Register LGA order, May 13, 2024; AirlineGeeks, May 28, 2026). That is why Frontier outranks American, even though American has far more liquidity (American Q1 2026 results, Apr. 23, 2026).

The other live path is “Other airline(s),” not just the named U.S. carriers. Porter already appears in the FAA operator report with six LGA slots, and current reporting flags Porter as a dark horse because U.S. preclearance at Toronto Billy Bishop could let it move New York-area flying from Newark to LaGuardia if it gets slots (FAA Summer 2025 LGA Operator Totals; The Points Guy, May 28, 2026). Breeze, Allegiant, Sun Country, Avelo, WestJet, or Air Canada are each weaker than Frontier, but as a bucket they matter if regulators split the package or run a competition-oriented reallocation.

Limitations

The public record still lacks the key private data: actual bids, any stalking-horse bidder, bid terms, lender-credit bids, and side agreements with the Port Authority or FAA. The next hard public update should come around the June 30 final-bid deadline or the July 9 auction, not from more background evidence (Stretto case-process summary, June 2026).

There is also a unit problem. The question says “slot pairs,” but the FAA files and most current reporting say Spirit had 22 individual slots or operating authorizations, which translate to about 11-12 daily round trips (FAA Summer 2025 LGA Holder Totals; The Points Guy, May 28, 2026). I treated the target as Spirit's former LGA slot portfolio, not a literal 22 round-trip-pair package. If a court or regulator treated the package as materially larger, the split-allocation probabilities for Southwest, JetBlue, American, and Other would rise. The FAA order also expires on October 24, 2026, although it has been extended repeatedly; a policy change or nonuse withdrawal could slow or reshape the outcome (Federal Register LGA order, May 13, 2024).