Will Bolivian president Rodrigo Paz Pereira remain in power through the end of 2026?

TL;DR

I assign an 80% probability that Rodrigo Paz Pereira remains continuously President of Bolivia through December 31, 2026. He is favored because he survived the 50-plus-day resignation campaign, the roads reopened, parliament ratified the emergency, and the military high command has since defended the elected government. The main loss path is a September-October cascade in which post-emergency blockades return, the Cerimedo allegations reach Paz directly, opposition leaders align, and the security forces stop acting as his shield.

Context

As of August 20, 2026, Bolivia's official presidency page still lists Paz as president and records that he took office on November 8, 2025. I found no evidence of a prior interruption that would already resolve the question NO.

The May-June movement demanded his resignation and blocked roads for more than 50 days. Paz reached an agreement with the COB on June 19 and declared a 90-day state of exception on June 20; by July 3, the Ombudsman's monitoring report recorded no active roadblocks affecting free movement. The government is now functioning, but with low approval, an estranged vice president, an unstable legislative coalition and new fuel-related grievances. (elpais.com)

Evidence

The historical prior is much safer than the headlines suggest. A comparative study covering 1990-2023 found 24 interrupted presidencies among 125 elected Latin American presidents, or 19.2% over complete terms; Bolivia recorded three interruptions among six presidencies, though that national sample is tiny. Scaling those full-term rates to the remaining 134 days under a constant-hazard assumption gives roughly 2% NO from the regional reference class and 5% from Bolivia. These are floors, not forecasts: the current combination of divided government and social crisis is exactly the setting the study associates with elevated interruption risk. (dialnet.unirioja.es)

Formal removal routes are narrow. The Bolivian Constitution says a president's mandate ends through death, resignation, definitive incapacity or absence, a final criminal conviction, or recall; recall cannot begin until half the five-year term has elapsed. Ministerial censure is not a presidential no-confidence vote. Paz's PDC holds 49 deputies and 16 senators, or 65 of 166 Assembly seats, so he lacks a majority but his opponents also need a broad coalition to force a constitutional outcome. (senapi.gob.bo)

The August 18 vote against Economy Minister José Gabriel Espinoza is therefore a warning, not a removal mechanism. Ninety-one of 129 legislators present voted for censure; the government argues that the Constitution required 111 votes, two-thirds of all 166 legislators. The vote shows that a large anti-government majority can form around a minister. It does not yet show agreement on ending Paz's presidency.

The full 2026 demonstration series through the cutoff contains 928 recorded events in the weekly updated ACLED aggregated dataset. August is partial through August 20; these are coded demonstration events, not unique protest days or participant counts.

The fall after May is large and matches the official record of reopened roads. But it is not proof that the grievances disappeared. The state of exception raises the cost of remobilizing, while transport, peasant and labor organizations have threatened renewed action after it ends. Vice President Edmand Lara also described the settlement as a pause rather than the end of the conflict. (acleddata.com)

The strongest survival signal is the security apparatus. Police and military forces obeyed the June deployment orders, and parliament approved the emergency by more than two-thirds of those present. On August 7, armed-forces commander Víctor Hugo Balderrama said the military and police would protect the stability of the democratically elected government. That is backed by revealed behavior, not just ceremony. Bolivia's recent presidential collapses required a wider cascade than protests alone, including political isolation and security-force withdrawal. (lostiempos.com)

Paz still has several live vulnerabilities. An Ipsos CIESMORI online survey of 400 adults in four major urban areas, fielded July 23-August 2, put him at 32% approval and 55% disapproval; Lara was weaker at 12% approval and 75% disapproval. Samuel Doria Medina ended his alliance with the government on July 27, though he also said his bloc would not conspire against presidential stability. On August 19, Jorge Quiroga, Doria Medina and Manfred Reyes Villa were preparing a meeting to decide their common posture. (vision360.bo)

Economics cuts both ways. Official data published August 4 showed July CPI falling 2.79% month over month, with 4.93% inflation over 12 months, largely because food distribution normalized after the blockades. The July 29 US$1.9 billion IMF staff-level agreement gives Paz a possible stabilization path, but remains contingent on prior actions and IMF Executive Board approval. On August 17, the government set a Bs 18 per liter reference price for direct and large diesel consumers, versus Bs 9.80 for smaller users. This may improve supply while creating another protest trigger. (ine.gob.bo)

The newest downside risk is the Cerimedo case. Consultant Fernando Cerimedo was detained on August 18 over the shooting of Nadia Beller, who then made unproven corruption allegations involving Paz's family and fuel, gold and insurance transactions. The allegations are not established evidence against Paz. Their importance is political: corroboration could unite labor, Lara and center-right parties that otherwise distrust one another. (elpais.com)

My scenario model is:

The weighted result is 20% NO and 80% YES. The short horizon, the failed resignation campaign and continued military support keep survival favored; the scheduled protest window and fresh political shocks keep it well below 90%.

What's non-obvious

The current quiet is neither a clean victory nor mere cosmetic repression. The emergency suppressed mobilization, but the previous coalition also fragmented after the COB negotiated and other sectors failed to sustain the blockade. Paz's survival through the June peak is positive selection evidence: parliament and the security forces revealed that they preferred constitutional continuity when the presidency was under direct pressure.

The opposition has enough votes to damage ministers and block policy, but not a shared succession plan. Lara's 12% urban approval makes him a poor consensus replacement. For many center-right actors, weakening Paz and extracting concessions is safer than removing him and handing Lara the presidency. The August 19 summit is a risk signal, but its very purpose shows that a removal coalition had not yet formed. (vision360.bo)

Uncertainties

• The Cerimedo allegations are extremely new. Documentary evidence directly implicating Paz or his immediate family would move the forecast down sharply.
• The emergency makes observed protest counts a weak measure of latent mobilization capacity. Better nationwide polling of unions, transport organizations and rural federations would clarify whether the June coalition can re-form.
• The outcomes of the opposition summit, the Espinoza constitutional challenge, and any decision on extending the state of exception were unknown at the cutoff.
• The approval survey is an online sample of four urban areas, not a national probability sample. It captures the direction of opinion better than its exact national level.