Will Bolivian president Rodrigo Paz Pereira remain in power through the end of 2026?

TL;DR

Rodrigo Paz Pereira has an 80% chance of remaining continuously president through December 31, 2026. The 100–58 vote extending emergency powers and passage of the IMF agreement show a real legislative shield, while the security forces still obey the civilian chain of command. The decisive NO path is a unified national blockade after the diesel shock that produces deaths and then causes legislators, police, or military commanders to defect.

Context

Paz took office on November 8, 2025 and had just over 102 days left at the forecast cutoff. He had already survived a 53-day resignation campaign that isolated cities and reportedly caused 22 direct and indirect deaths before police and military units reopened more than 100 roadblocks.

The risk rose sharply on September 19. Paz ended the remaining diesel subsidy, moving the reference price from Bs 9.80 to Bs 17.95 per liter, an 83% increase, while announcing cash assistance for 2.9 million people and preferential loans. La Paz transport groups announced indefinite roadblocks beginning September 21; the COB called an emergency national assembly; and Chapare coca-grower organizations declared mobilization.

Evidence

The historical reference class is dangerous but easy to misuse. A 2009 study of 44 elected South American presidential terms found that 17 presidents were challenged and 11 left early; 11 of the 17 challenged presidents eventually failed. That 65% figure covers the remainder of entire terms, not a three-month window. A later survival analysis of 65 South American presidencies found a full-term failure rate near one in six, equivalent to only about 1% over 102 days under a crude constant-hazard assumption. Paz belongs far above that normal baseline, but well below a 65% near-term departure risk.

The literature points to the right mechanism. Large protests become terminal when they acquire a legislative and coercive-institutional bridge. Minority status, scandal, austerity, and demonstrations raise risk, but a functioning cross-party coalition can act as a legislative shield. Bolivia’s 2003, 2005, and 2019 exits followed not just street pressure, but the loss of political or security backing. That distinction drives this forecast.

Paz’s survival of the May–June crisis is strong revealed evidence. The earlier movement was already national, prolonged, shortage-producing, and explicitly focused on his resignation. Yet the government split the coalition through separate negotiations, gained emergency authority, and cleared the roads. This does not make him safe. It shows that protest announcements alone do not imply presidential departure.

The legislative picture also favors continuity. Paz’s PDC won 49 of 130 lower-house seats and 16 of 36 Senate seats, so it cannot govern alone. Yet 100 of 158 legislators present backed another 90 days of emergency powers on September 17, and both chambers then approved the US$1.9 billion IMF arrangement. The IMF deal was still subject to Executive Board approval, but the votes show that most legislators still prefer stabilization under Paz to an uncertain succession.

Formal removal routes are narrow. Articles 169 and 170 of the Bolivian Constitution provide for succession after death, resignation, permanent incapacity or absence, final criminal conviction, or recall. A presidential trial requires authorization from at least two-thirds of legislators present. Recall cannot begin until half of the five-year term has elapsed, around May 2028. A completed legal removal by December 31 is therefore much less likely than forced resignation during a political collapse.

The strongest protective signal is security-force behavior. The armed forces reaffirmed their constitutional role during the June crisis, then joined police operations that reopened the highways. Police and military reports also supported the September emergency extension. I found no verified public mutiny, refusal to deploy, or command demand for Paz’s resignation by the cutoff. That is not proof of private loyalty, but it is the opposite of the public break that preceded Evo Morales’s 2019 departure.

The diesel shock keeps the risk high. It hits trucking, buses, agriculture, and food distribution at once. Paz is also weak: an Ipsos-Ciesmori urban online survey, fielded August 19–31 with about 400 respondents, reported 21% approval and 65% disapproval; an August review found that only six of his original 15 ministers remained. Official August CPI was 1.10% month over month, 3.01% year to date, and 5.02% over twelve months, but the September 3 release predates the new diesel price entirely.

International backing is a smaller protective factor. An OAS high-level mission supported Bolivia’s elected constitutional government while calling for dialogue and restraint. This cannot save Paz from domestic institutional collapse, but it raises the cost of an overt coup and makes constitutional continuity the default position for foreign governments.

My scenario model is:

The largest judgment is the 20% chance of a fully coordinated resignation campaign. Its probability is real because transport, labor, and coca-growing groups were all mobilizing. It remains below one in four because they had not yet formed one command structure, Congress had just backed Paz, and the security hierarchy had not broken.

What's non-obvious

A policy defeat is more likely than a presidential defeat. Bolivia’s 2010 “gasolinazo” raised fuel prices by roughly 60–80%, triggered mass protests, and was reversed within days; Evo Morales remained president. Research on the episode reaches the same conclusion: abrupt subsidy removal creates protest pressure, but governments often respond through rollback or compensation. Paz can restore part of the subsidy, adjust fares, or increase transfers and still resolve YES.

Vice President Edmand Lara is also less useful as a replacement than his feud with Paz suggests. He has attacked the president and discussed a future recall, but said he would campaign to remove himself as well as Paz. A July urban poll put Lara at 12% approval and 75% disapproval. He can damage Paz, but he has not assembled a cross-party, social-movement, and security coalition that sees him as a safe successor.

Uncertainties

• The cutoff comes before the announced September 21 transport actions. The largest missing observation is whether those actions become a sustained national blockade or end in fare, credit, and compensation talks.
• No public military or police defection is visible, but silence does not prove loyalty. Private command discussions and rank-and-file willingness to confront protesters would be more valuable than formal statements.
• The approval survey is small, online, and limited to four urban centers. It is strong evidence of deterioration, not a precise national estimate.
• Casualty totals from the May–June crisis vary by reporting cutoff and attribution. Some deaths were linked to interrupted medical access rather than direct state fire. A new episode involving verified lethal state gunfire would be much more destabilizing than the earlier aggregate count.
• The timing of IMF Board approval, initial disbursement, diesel availability, and compensation payments remains uncertain. Immediate price pain combined with delayed financing would raise the departure risk.