Will Bolivian president Rodrigo Paz Pereira remain in power through the end of 2026?

TL;DR

I put the chance of YES at 81%. Paz survived a 53-day removal campaign, and the legislature and security chain still function under him. The decisive downside is a new diesel-driven blockade coalition in October; the temporary-succession dispute is a smaller but real path to NO.

Context

At the September 27 cutoff, Bolivia’s official presidency still identifies Rodrigo Paz Pereira as president. Vice President Edmand Lara claimed to be president in exercise during Paz’s September trip, but Senate President Diego Ávila said he had not formally assumed and that Paz remained president in exercise. I do not treat the episode as an interruption already sufficient for NO. (Official presidency; Ávila’s statement)

Paz is still in a dangerous position. His government is unpopular, much of his original cabinet has departed, and the September diesel-price increase creates a direct grievance for transporters, farmers and food distributors. But the government has recently won major legislative votes, the planned September 28 transport action is fragmented, and there is no verified command-level police or military break. (Diesel decree; transport divisions)

Evidence

The historical baseline strongly favors survival over a window this short. A broad count since Bolivia’s return to civilian rule gives five early presidential departures over 43.96 occupied presidential-years: Hernán Siles Zuazo’s shortened term, Hugo Banzer’s illness resignation, and the political exits of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, Carlos Mesa and Evo Morales. Under a deliberately simple constant-hazard model, the implied 95.5-day interruption risk is:

$$p_0=1-e^{-(5/43.96)(95.5/365.24)}=2.93\%.$$

Here, five is the number of broad premature exits, 43.96 is presidential exposure in years, and 95.5 is the remaining forecast window in days. Counting only the three political exits produces 1.77%. These are anchors, not forecasts: research on South American presidential failure shows that mass removal protests become far more dangerous when legislative allies desert the president. (Presidential chronology; comparative research)

Paz is plainly riskier than that baseline. The May–June crisis lasted about 53 days and demanded his resignation. The Ombudsman later documented 22 deaths associated with the conflict, including 19 third parties and three mobilized people who may have died during police or military action. Yet the same episode also demonstrated state capacity: after the June 20 emergency declaration, active roadblocks fell from 42 to zero in three days, and Paz remained in office. (Ombudsman monitoring; death breakdown)

The pressure did not disappear. The Ombudsman counted 128 conflict events between June 20 and September 18, with 55 occurring in the final 30 days of that window. The new diesel regime then raised the regulated consumer price from Bs 9.80 to Bs 17.95 per liter, roughly an 83% increase. Evo Morales gave the government until October 3 to reverse the measures and announced mobilization beginning October 13. (Ombudsman report; diesel decree; October mobilization)

The near-term protest front is divided. The September 28 action was planned as a 24-hour vehicle withdrawal, not an established indefinite national blockade. Major organizations in La Paz, El Alto and Cochabamba said they would keep operating, while support was stronger in Santa Cruz and Chuquisaca. That does not preclude later escalation, but removal usually requires several sectors to synchronize rather than protest separately. (September 28 plans)

Paz retains more institutional support than his approval numbers suggest. The Assembly extended the state of exception for 90 days by 100 votes to 58, despite Paz’s PDC holding only 49 of 130 deputy seats. Both chambers also passed the US$1.9 billion, 36-month IMF arrangement by more than two-thirds, though actual financing still requires IMF Executive Board approval and prior actions. These votes show a broad bloc willing to keep the government functioning even without a stable governing coalition. (Emergency vote; chamber composition; IMF agreement)

The internal weaknesses are real. By August 21, only six of the original 15 ministers remained. An online Ipsos CIESMORI poll of 400 internet-connected adults in four major urban areas, fielded August 19–31, reported 21% approval and 65% disapproval. The sample is not a national probability survey, but it confirms severe urban political weakness. (Cabinet turnover; Ipsos CIESMORI results)

The security apparatus remains the key stabilizer. Paz ratified the military high command during the June crisis and installed a new police command on August 31. When Lara later confronted an Army officer, the military hierarchy backed the officer rather than the vice president. These acts do not prove future loyalty, but they are the opposite of the visible police and military abandonment that preceded Morales’s 2019 exit. (Military command; police command; Lara–Army dispute)

The succession dispute deserves a separate risk allowance. Constitution Article 169 says that the vice president assumes the presidency during a temporary presidential absence, while Article 170 separately lists events that end the elected president’s mandate. Decree 5675 says a president temporarily abroad should exercise power through technology and provides for written substitution only when that is impossible. The Constitutional Court had not resolved the challenge to the predecessor remote-governance decree, but no formal September handover, oath or generally accepted alternative executive was documented. (Constitution; Decree 5675; legal dispute)

My numerical construction is:

$$P(\text{YES})=(1-0.40\times0.35)(1-0.025)(1-0.030)(1-0.003)=0.8109.$$

I assign a 40% chance of a renewed, sustained national removal campaign and a 35% chance that Paz actually loses office conditional on that campaign, giving 14% for the main protest-led route. I add 2.5% for a separate elite, scandal or security rupture; 3% for a recognized interim succession or adverse legal resolution; and 0.3% for death or permanent incapacity. I combine them multiplicatively to reduce double counting.

What's non-obvious

The obvious story is that a president with 21% urban approval, a hostile vice president and heavy cabinet turnover is close to falling. That misses the last step. Bolivian presidents fall when street pressure combines with legislative abandonment and security-force defection. Paz has the street-pressure component, but the September votes and military chain show that the other two pieces are not yet present.

The succession headlines also overstate what has happened. Lara asserted authority, and the prosecutor-general offered his own contrary interpretation, but Ávila refused to treat himself as president and the executive continued operating under Paz. The custom resolution wording makes a future formal temporary handoff dangerous, but the evidence does not support scoring the September dispute as an interruption already completed. (Competing succession claims)

Uncertainties

The largest unknown is whether transporters, the COB, teachers, campesino organizations, coca growers and El Alto neighborhood groups will coordinate around a single indefinite campaign rather than pursue separate demands. A lethal clearing operation could change elite and security incentives within hours.

The legal record is also incomplete. I found no binding Constitutional Court ruling on remote presidential exercise, no formal September transfer instrument and no authoritative resolution of whether an Article 169 temporary assumption would count as Paz ceasing to hold office under the client’s bespoke rule. Finally, the IMF money was not yet verified as disbursed, and the August inflation data predate the September diesel increase, so the size and speed of the cost-of-living shock remain unknown. (IMF conditions; August CPI)