Which airlines will take control of the takeoff and landing slots at LaGuardia that were held by Spirit Airlines prior to their May 2026 bankruptcy?

TL;DR

Frontier is the front-runner: it is the cleanest low-fare replacement, already agreed in 2023 to take all of Spirit’s LaGuardia holdings, and held only 4 FAA-reported LGA slots before Spirit’s shutdown (JetBlue/Frontier release, FAA Summer 2025 holder report). JetBlue, Other airline(s), Southwest, and American are the meaningful secondary paths because the estate is running a court sale for the 22-slot package and the FAA, DOT, and Port Authority still control execution (Spirit bidding-procedures filing, The Points Guy). Delta, United, and Alaska sit far back because the strongest public signals point to competition-preserving allocation, not more capacity for an already-large LGA incumbent (AirlineGeeks, FAA Summer 2025 holder report).

Context

Spirit announced on May 2, 2026 that it had begun an immediate wind-down and that all flights were cancelled, after no further funding was available (Spirit wind-down release). The LaGuardia asset is not ordinary airport real estate. The FAA administers LGA operating authorizations, while the Port Authority controls terminal and gate access; the Port Authority told the bankruptcy court that runway slots alone do not let an airline deplane passengers safely without terminal access (Port Authority June 9 filing).

The current public process is still unresolved as of July 4, 2026. Spirit’s estate scheduled a July 9, 2026 auction for assets including the LGA slots, and The Points Guy reported that the estate described the sale standard as the “highest and otherwise best” offer, subject to bankruptcy-court approval before use (Spirit bidding-procedures filing, The Points Guy). The best FAA baseline says Spirit held 22 individual LGA slots in the Summer 2025 holder report, generated December 5, 2025 with status date 2025, excluding FAA-held slots and slots held fewer than 5 days; that is about 11 daily round trips if paired cleanly (FAA Summer 2025 holder report, The Points Guy).

Evidence

The historical backbone is small, but it points in one direction: scarce LGA access usually moves through a mix of cash sale, court approval, and competition policy, not a pure highest-bidder rule.

The FAA holder data are the most useful current cross-section. The report is a one-season holder snapshot, not a full time series: Summer 2025, generated December 5, 2025, status date 2025, N=12 listed holders, 1,141 listed slots, excluding FAA-held slots and slots held fewer than 5 days (FAA Summer 2025 holder report).

This table is the main reason Frontier leads. Giving the package to Frontier would move a tiny 0.4% holder to a still-small low-fare presence; giving it to Delta or American would add capacity to carriers that already held 44.8% and 28.7% of listed LGA slots in the FAA holder snapshot (FAA Summer 2025 holder report). The FAA’s separate Summer 2025 operator report, generated December 9, 2025 with status date 2025, listed Delta operating 580 slots, American 327, Southwest 70, United 67, JetBlue 31, Frontier 10, Spirit 22, Air Canada 35, and Porter 6, which supports Delta’s very low probability and keeps Porter alive inside “Other airline(s)” (FAA Summer 2025 operator report).

The current regulatory signal is explicit. FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford said on May 27, 2026 that Spirit’s LGA slots should go to another low-fare carrier if that serves the public good, and that retirement was possible if that could not happen (AirlineGeeks). The FAA order published June 23, 2026 keeps LGA slot controls through October 28, 2028, maintains 71 scheduled operating authorizations per hour, imposes an 80% two-month use rule, allows trades and leases only with FAA approval, and says withdrawn, surrendered, or unassigned operating authorizations may be retired or reallocated by lottery (Federal Register). If a lottery occurs, 14 CFR 93.225 lets new entrants and limited incumbents select before other incumbents, and 14 CFR 93.213 defines a limited incumbent as fewer than 12 slots at the airport (14 CFR 93.225, 14 CFR 93.213). Frontier’s 4 held slots fit that limited-incumbent logic; JetBlue’s 31, Southwest’s 57, United’s 94, American’s 327, and Delta’s 511 do not (FAA Summer 2025 holder report).

The main counterforce is cash. American, JetBlue, Southwest, and United can all pay, and The Points Guy reported that American, Frontier, JetBlue, and Southwest were widely viewed as leading candidates, while Porter was a dark horse after U.S. preclearance at Billy Bishop made a Toronto-LGA shift more practical (The Points Guy). But Frontier and JetBlue are the two carriers most visibly absorbing Spirit’s network: Aviation Week’s OAG-based analysis found that, across 339 former Spirit routes, competitors added about 2.7 million June–August 2026 seats versus June–August 2025, replacing about 48% of Spirit’s former capacity; Frontier added about 1.3 million seats and JetBlue more than 500,000, while United added about 334,000, American about 299,000, Southwest about 130,000, and Delta was broadly unchanged (Aviation Week). JetBlue gets a real probability because it is New York-based and has only 31 FAA holder slots at LGA, but its case is weakened by its 2023 decision to divest these exact assets to Frontier and its June 2026 move to scale back parts of its New York-area operation while shifting growth to Fort Lauderdale (JetBlue/Frontier release, Aviation Week).

My scenario model is unconditional on the question resolving. I put 94% on a clear formal allocation before the May 2, 2028 annulment deadline, because the court sale is already scheduled and the slots are valuable, and 6% on retirement, litigation, or no clear final allocation. Conditional on allocation, I use 62% for a single approved buyer, 28% for a split sale, and 10% for a regulator-led reallocation or lottery after the sale process fails. In the single-buyer branch I assign shares of Frontier 51%, JetBlue 16%, Other 10%, Southwest 9%, American 9%, United 2.5%, Delta 1.5%, and Alaska 1%. In the split branch I assign inclusion rates of Frontier 75%, JetBlue 45%, Other 42%, Southwest 36%, American 26%, United 9%, Delta 4%, and Alaska 4%. In the regulator-led branch I assign inclusion rates of Frontier 55%, Other 55%, JetBlue 25%, Southwest 25%, American 8%, Alaska 6%, United 4%, and Delta 2%. This yields Frontier 55%, JetBlue 24%, Other 22%, Southwest 17%, American 13%, United 4%, Alaska 2%, and Delta 2%.

What's non-obvious

The obvious read is that this is an auction and the highest bidder wins. That misses the main constraint. The estate can choose the “highest and otherwise best” offer, the FAA must approve trades and leases, and the Port Authority says LGA runway rights have no practical value without terminal access (The Points Guy, Federal Register, Port Authority June 3 objection). A rich incumbent bid can still be a weak executable bid if it worsens LGA concentration or lacks a clean Marine Air Terminal plan.

The other missed point is that the package is probably 22 individual operating authorizations, not 22 slot pairs. The FAA holder report says 22 slots, and contemporary reporting says that supports roughly 12 daily flights because airlines need separate takeoff and landing slots (FAA Summer 2025 holder report, The Points Guy). That small size makes a single Frontier-led package more plausible than a broad distribution to many airlines.

Limitations

The biggest unknown is the qualified-bid list. The June 30, 2026 final bid deadline had passed before this forecast date, but I found no public court notice, airline announcement, or major-news report naming qualified bidders or a winner as of July 4, 2026 (Spirit bidding-procedures filing). The second unknown is legal texture: I could verify the FAA holder count, but not the owned-versus-leased composition of every Spirit LGA authorization, which could affect who needs to consent and how quickly the rights can move. The third unknown is resolution wording. Public sources mostly discuss 22 “slots” or operating authorizations, while the question asks about “slot pairs”; I forecasted each option as YES if it receives at least one usable arrival/departure pair drawn from Spirit’s former 22 individual authorizations.