Will Bolivian president Rodrigo Paz Pereira remain in power through the end of 2026?

TL;DR

I assign an 87% chance of YES. Paz is deeply unpopular, but recent legislative backing, continued control of his cabinet, and the absence of a verified security-force break make survival the clear favorite. The forecast turns on whether the September 26 cocalero gathering and September 28 transport shutdown become an indefinite cross-sector blockade joined by police or military defections. (diputados.gob.bo)

Context

Paz remains listed as president by the official Bolivian presidency portal, which records that he took office on November 8, 2025. Vice President Edmand Lara claimed temporary presidential authority while Paz was in New York, but Paz continued directing the cabinet remotely, while Lara left for Paraguay and delegated only the presidency of the legislature. I do not treat this travel dispute as an existing NO because the resolution rules expressly exempt temporary foreign travel when Paz legally remains president. (presidencia.gob.bo)

The immediate danger is the government’s elimination of the remaining diesel subsidy, announced after Congress approved the $1.9 billion IMF arrangement. Diesel rose from Bs 9.80 to Bs 17.95 per liter, an 83% increase, but the main drivers’ organization initially chose a 24-hour withdrawal of vehicles without roadblocks. The IMF money was not yet available: the staff-level agreement still required Executive Board approval. (imf.org)

Evidence

The historical backbone is grim but not fatal. An academic study of Bolivian protest and repression counts four presidents pushed out before their terms ended by protests since democratic restoration: 1985, 2003, 2005 and 2019. Using four political exits over roughly 43.9 country-years gives a constant-hazard probability of about 2.5% over the remaining 100 days: 1 − exp[−(4/43.9) × (100.18/365.24)]. That is the unconditional floor; Paz’s recent resignation campaign, hostile vice president and fuel shock require a large crisis adjustment. (doi.org)

Diesel is the strongest trigger. The current 83% price increase resembles Bolivia’s 2010 reform, when a 60–80% fuel shock caused mass protests and a rapid policy reversal, according to an IMF study of subsidy removal. Yet the first response has been more controlled than the May–June siege: drivers scheduled one day off the roads and explicitly ruled out blockades at that stage. An Ipsos CIESMORI survey also found 63% support in the urban Eje Troncal for eliminating fuel subsidies, although only 50% accepted the resulting price increases and 46% rejected them. This lowers the chance that transport unions immediately obtain broad public backing for a campaign to remove Paz. (imf.org)

Paz’s institutional position is stronger than his approval rating suggests. The legislature extended the state of exception by 100 votes to 58 among 158 members present. The IMF financing then passed the Chamber of Deputies and Senate with more than two-thirds support. These are issue coalitions, not personal loyalty, but they show that a large bloc still prefers continuity and stabilization to immediate succession. Against this, an urban poll fielded August 19–31 with 400 respondents put Paz at 21% approval and 65% disapproval; only six of fourteen original ministers remained, and the Cerimedo scandal has produced serious investigations around Paz’s former adviser. (panamericana.bo)

No verified security-force defection is visible. The Defense Ministry backed an army officer who insisted that Lara respect the military chain of command, while a video purporting to show the armed-forces commander demanding Paz’s resignation was identified as an AI-generated fake. This does not prove future loyalty, but Bolivia’s rapid presidential collapses have usually required protests to combine with elite, police or military abandonment. Ordinary legal removal is also constrained: the Constitution permits recall only after half the term has elapsed and lists death, resignation, definitive incapacity, final criminal conviction and recall as the routes by which a president ceases office. (senapi.gob.bo)

My forward model is:

This gives 86.8% YES before rounding in prose. A separate crisis-adjusted base-rate calculation gives a similar 86–88% range, so I set the final probability at 0.8675.

What's non-obvious

The obvious reading is that an 83% diesel increase means the president is about to fall. The better historical read is that fuel shocks usually force concessions or policy reversal before they force presidential resignation. Bolivia’s 2010 government survived by reversing its measure, and current urban polling shows meaningful support for ending the subsidy despite fear of higher prices. Paz therefore has an escape valve short of leaving office: compensation, delayed implementation or partial retreat. (imf.org)

Paz’s main protection is coordination failure among his opponents. Lara is even less popular than Paz in the latest urban poll, left Bolivia after claiming temporary authority, and has not obtained recognition from the cabinet or security chain. The center-right legislators who supported the IMF package may dislike Paz, but replacing him would elevate Lara, not themselves. That makes ministerial sacrifice and policy concessions more likely than a coordinated succession before December 31. (larazon.bo)

Uncertainties

• The next protest decisions remain unknown. A unified, indefinite campaign involving transport, the COB, campesino organizations and cocaleros would move the forecast sharply downward, especially if roadblocks again isolate La Paz or disrupt fuel and food distribution.
• Security-force loyalty is opaque. Verified reporting shows compliance and chain-of-command discipline, but the absence of a public defection is not proof that internal splits do not exist. (larazon.bo)
• The IMF Executive Board had not yet approved or disbursed the program. Paz has paid much of the political cost before receiving the full stabilizing benefit. (imf.org)
• The strongest polling evidence covers 400 respondents in the principal urban corridor, not a nationally representative rural and urban sample. Its levels are less reliable than its message that both Paz and Lara are unpopular. (oxigeno.bo)
• No authoritative court ruling has settled the tension between constitutional temporary succession and the remote-governance decree. The client’s explicit foreign-travel exception makes this unlikely to alter resolution unless the dispute grows into a recognized transfer of executive power.