Will Bolivian president Rodrigo Paz Pereira remain in power through the end of 2026?
Latest forecast
Generated Oct 31, 2026, 4:34 PM
Write-up
Executive Summary
90.6% probability of YES: Rodrigo Paz Pereira remains President of Bolivia without a qualifying interruption from June 5, 2026 through 23:59 Bolivia time on December 31, 2026.
As of October 31, continued tenure is strongly favored. Paz survived the earlier nationwide blockade crisis, retains functioning security-force command, and has obtained legislative backing for important measures. His opponents have not yet rebuilt a sustained national challenge.
The main political danger is convergence: labor disputes, economic grievances and scandal combining with defections among legislators or security commanders. Separately, the question’s strict continuity rule makes even a legally effective interim succession consequential. The evidence favors treating Vice President Edmand Lara’s September claim to presidential authority as contested—not an established transfer—but that legal uncertainty remains important.
Routine update
Paz’s continued presidency remains the clear base case, with fresher confirmation that he is governing rather than a major change in the political assessment. His chance of remaining president continuously through year-end rose about one percentage point, from roughly 90% to 91%.
Key drivers
A short remaining window, following demonstrated resilience
Only about two months remain. Paz survived the prolonged, deadly May–June protest campaign and the clearing of roadblocks by police and military forces. That experience is stronger evidence of resilience than resignation demands alone are evidence of impending departure. An official presidential announcement dated October 30 confirms that he remained actively governing immediately before the forecast.
Fragmented opposition—but a possible bridge between protest movements
The Central Obrera Boliviana, or COB, Bolivia’s principal national labor federation, declined to join an October mobilization organized by supporters of Evo Morales. A planned Cochabamba march was subsequently suspended. Those observed setbacks carry more weight than organizers’ promises of nationwide action.
However, the COB later supported teachers’ demands and threatened coordinated pressure. That creates a plausible route for previously separate grievances to become a broader challenge. The decisive issue is not whether protests occur, but whether they become sustained, coordinated and explicitly focused on removing Paz.
Institutional support has weakened without collapsing
Security forces continued joint road deployments in October, and the reviewed evidence contained no verified decisive break with Paz. Legislative approval of emergency powers and the financing agreement also demonstrates that bargaining remains possible despite a fragmented legislature.
Formal removal faces substantial barriers. A presidential criminal proceeding requires a prosecutorial accusation and authorization by two-thirds of legislators present. Recall cannot begin before half the term has elapsed. These safeguards constrain formal removal; they do not prevent a politically forced resignation.
Financing buys time; adjustment sustains grievances
On October 2, the International Monetary Fund approved a 36-month arrangement worth approximately US$1.9 billion, permitting an immediate disbursement of approximately US$214 million. The full program amount is not cash already received, and later installments depend on reviews.
That financing reduces immediate economic-collapse risk. It does not eliminate recession or the political costs of ending diesel subsidies. The leaked recordings attributed to former adviser Fernando Cerimedo add another potential source of elite defections, although their authenticity and legal significance remained unresolved.
Legal continuity is distinct from current incumbency
Lara declared himself president in exercise on September 21 while Paz was abroad. Decree 5675 directs the president to exercise his powers remotely during foreign travel and provides for substitution under specified circumstances. Contemporary verification reporting found that Senate officials continued recognizing Paz’s authority.
The forecast therefore does not treat Lara’s declaration alone as proof of succession. Nor does it treat the decree’s operation as a definitive judicial ruling on its constitutionality. Current recognition of Paz cannot, by itself, establish uninterrupted tenure throughout the forecasting period.
Scenarios
The reasoning gives the greatest weight to contained disputes, less to renewed broad disruption, and the least to an acute institutional break.
| Scenario | Relative weight and rationale | How it leads to the outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Disputes remain contained or negotiated | Dominant. Recent mobilizations underperformed, opposition coordination remains difficult, and security and legislative institutions continue functioning. | Sectoral protests, bargaining and concessions continue without a transfer of the presidency, producing YES. |
| Sustained unrest spreads across sectors | A smaller but material possibility. Teachers’ action and COB support could connect economic and political grievances. | Protests alone need not remove Paz. Departure becomes more plausible if prolonged disruption and casualties cause legislators or commanders to withdraw support. |
| An acute elite or security-force break | Least likely, but most dangerous if it occurs. No decisive break was verified, yet scandal or another violent confrontation could accelerate one. | Loss of command, an agreed replacement coalition, forced resignation or irregular removal could produce NO quickly. |
These political scenarios are supplemented by separate continuity risks: authoritative evidence of an earlier succession, a new legally effective interim replacement, or death or permanent incapacity. An interim succession could produce NO without a broader collapse of the government.
Implications
- Continued dealings with Paz’s administration are the planning base case. An imminent presidential replacement should not be treated as the central expectation.
- Presidential survival does not imply political calm. Road disruption, strikes, costly negotiations and emergency measures remain compatible with YES. Operational disruption and leadership replacement are different risks.
- Institutional behavior matters more than resignation rhetoric. Actual strike coordination, legislative cooperation and security-force compliance are more informative than another demand that Paz leave office.
- Resolution requires checking continuity, not merely the year-end officeholder. A documented interim succession would matter even if Paz subsequently resumed exercising presidential authority.
Signs to watch
| Timing or development | What to watch and direction of change |
|---|---|
| November 6: announced Morales-aligned march toward La Paz | Broad participation by organizations beyond Morales’s existing supporters would make YES less likely. Another postponement or limited turnout would make it more likely. A genuinely national coalition would warrant rerunning the forecast. |
| November 9–10: announced national teachers’ strike | Coordinated action involving the COB and other major sectors would make YES less likely, particularly if demands shift toward presidential resignation. A settlement or limited participation would make YES more likely. These dates concern announced actions, not assured turnout. |
| December: expiry or renewal of the emergency extension | Reporting differs on the exact expiry date. Continued legislative backing and effective public-order arrangements would favor YES. Expiry combined with renewed widespread blockades would make YES less likely; expiry alone would not remove Paz. |
| At any time: security-force noncompliance | Command refusals, defections or withdrawal of support during violent unrest would make YES substantially less likely. Continued compliance would support it. A verified institutional break would warrant an immediate rerun. |
| At any time: consequential findings in the recordings investigation | Authenticated evidence directly implicating Paz, followed by coordinated legislative or elite action, would make YES less likely. Further allegations without verification or institutional consequences would be less informative. Rerun if the scandal creates a workable removal coalition. |
| During planned foreign travel, or upon an authoritative legal decision | Confirmed continuation of Paz’s authority would make YES more likely. An official record establishing legally effective succession would settle the question as NO under its criteria. A binding ruling or transfer record would warrant rerunning the assessment—or resolving the question if conclusive. |
Research and methodology
The forecast combines a historical benchmark with a judgment-based scenario calculation. Historical presidential departures were converted into a benchmark for the short remaining period. Current evidence then informed the relative weights of containment, broad unrest and institutional rupture. Earlier continuity and future interim-succession risks were assessed separately from permanent political departure.
The most consequential sources were:
- Official officeholding and legal documents: the Presidency’s October 30 announcement, the Constitution, and Decree 5675, particularly Article 22. These establish current activity and the competing legal frameworks for continuity and removal.
- Contemporaneous succession verification: Bolivia Verifica’s September 22 reporting and September 24 legal explainer provided institutional statements and legal interpretations distinguishing Lara’s claim from an accepted transfer.
- Observed protest and institutional behavior: El País’s September 17 account, Los Tiempos on the suspended October mobilization and labor coordination, and the teachers’ strike announcement informed the escalation scenarios.
- Economic support and adjustment: the IMF’s October 2 approval and AP’s subsidy-reform reporting explain the simultaneous stabilizing and destabilizing effects of financing and reform.
- Historical and opinion benchmarks: Latinobarómetro’s 2024 report supplied five premature Bolivian departures for the historical check. Ipsos CIESMORI’s September opinion findings, published October 16, suggested that dissatisfaction with Paz did not translate directly into support for Lara or road blockades.
- Scandal status: Los Tiempos’s October 29 report distinguished preliminary investigative work from an established criminal case.
Limitations
The most important missing evidence is a final binding judgment conclusively settling the remote-presidency arrangement and its implications for September’s disputed succession. No such merits judgment was retrieved. This limits confidence in retrospective continuity, not just the prediction of future events.
Other limitations concern calibration. The historical departure sample is small and mixes different mechanisms. The opinion survey consisted of 400 online interviews in four cities, not a precise national sample. Announced protests do not establish eventual participation, and observed deployments cannot establish how commanders would respond to another prolonged, violent crisis. The scenario assumptions are therefore judgmental; the reported decimal precision should not be mistaken for equivalent certainty.
Forecast history
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Signed forecast receipt
Signed Oct 31, 2026, 4:34 PM with ed25519 key preseen-prod-ed25519-20260523 and externally timestamped Oct 31, 2026, 4:34 PM.
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