Who will be exercising the powers of the Venezuelan presidency on 31 December 2026?

Latest forecast

Generated Nov 15, 2026, 7:10 PM · High effort

0%25%50%75%100%Delcy Rodriguez96.1%Other Chavista (Jorge Ro…2.2%Other / power vacuum / c…1.0%Maria Corina Machado0.5%Nicolas Maduro0.0%

Write-up

Executive Summary

Delcy Rodriguez is overwhelmingly likely to be exercising Venezuela’s presidential powers at year-end. The forecast distinguishes preparations for a political transition from an actual transfer of executive authority: the publicly described process points toward elections after 2026, while Rodriguez remains the functioning incumbent.

OptionProbability
Nicolas Maduro0.0%
Delcy Rodriguez96.1%
Maria Corina Machado0.5%
Other / power vacuum / civil war1.0%
Other Chavista (Jorge Rodriguez, Diosdado Cabello, or other PSUV figure)2.2%

The strongest alternative is an internal succession to another Chavista—an official aligned with the existing governing movement—not an opposition victory followed by an inauguration before the deadline. Resolution turns on who actually governs at 23:59 ET on 31 December 2026, regardless of legal title.

Routine update

Fresh reporting reinforces Delcy Rodriguez’s continued control, without changing the basic outlook. Her chance of exercising presidential powers on December 31 edges up by about 0.6 percentage points to 96%; continued rule remains overwhelmingly favored over an insider replacement or opposition handover.

Key drivers

Rodriguez is still exercising executive authority. Reuters identified her as Venezuela’s interim president in November 12 reporting on border-security cooperation. Qatar News Agency reported her conducting head-of-state talks in Doha on November 15. This supports active officeholding, rather than reliance solely on the question’s older description. It does not establish that every security faction is loyal to her.

The transition timetable extends beyond year-end. Rubio’s November 9 account envisaged a renewed Supreme Tribunal of Justice, or TSJ, around mid-December, followed by a new electoral council, a presidential-vacancy declaration and an election process. EFE’s November 13 stocktake found that electoral-council renewal and a concrete election agreement remained unsettled. Completing those steps, holding a vote and installing a successor before December 31 is not the public plan.

Washington is pressing for reform while continuing to work with the incumbent. The November 11 G7 declaration, including the United States, endorsed negotiations with the interim government. AP’s November 12 reporting described continued implementation of the resource-revenue arrangement with Venezuela’s interim authorities. The inference is that Washington has an operating counterpart it can pressure without immediately replacing. That is an incentive for continuity, not a guarantee of protection.

Machado’s political strength is not yet executive power. Her return increases pressure for change, but November reporting placed her outside the principal negotiating table and described her support for elections the following year. Her strongest short-term route is therefore an extraordinary negotiated installation, not the ordinary completion of the announced electoral sequence. The forecast does not translate the question’s older popularity figures into accession probabilities.

Insider succession is the main uncertainty. Cabello continued publicly attributing security instructions to Rodriguez in November. Such statements show public alignment, not private loyalty. Another Chavista could take over through an internal bargain, coup or incapacity-related succession without first completing an opposition transition.

Scenarios

The forecast considers three broad paths. Their weights are judgmental assessments of the remaining short window, not measured historical frequencies.

PathRelative weight and rationaleHow it leads to an outcome
The institutional roadmap broadly continuesDominant: Rodriguez holds office, Washington continues engagement, and several sequential reforms remain unfinished.Rodriguez remains in command while talks and appointments proceed. A new title, a transition announcement or a declaration of Maduro’s permanent absence need not displace her.
Succession bargaining accelerates without an acute crisisMuch smaller: negotiations could move faster or contain unpublished caretaker terms, but no implemented replacement agreement was established.Rodriguez could still head the transition. If she leaves, another Chavista has a more immediately available route through the existing state apparatus; Machado or another transitional figure would require an exceptional agreement.
An acute security, personal or institutional shock occursSmallest, but consequential: public reporting cannot rule out covert plotting, incapacity or rapid escalation of unrest.An aligned successor could preserve the government, or authority could pass to a junta, another figure or fragmented institutions. A shock would not automatically remove Rodriguez or produce civil war.

Maduro faces two distinct barriers: release from US custody and restoration of actual command in Venezuela. A favorable legal ruling or continued nominal claim to the presidency would not, by itself, satisfy the resolution criteria.

Implications

For year-end planning, continuation under Rodriguez is the appropriate central assumption, rather than an imminent Machado presidency. Contingencies should give particular attention to an abrupt insider replacement that changes the individual at the top while preserving much of the governing apparatus.

This is a narrow leadership forecast—not an endorsement of constitutional legitimacy, a prediction of social stability or a forecast of who would win a future election. Likewise, the residual “Other” category includes an orderly non-Chavista caretaker or collective authority; it should not be read solely as a civil-war probability.

Signs to watch

Timing or triggerWhat would matterDirection for the forecast
November 16: announced national stoppageUnions reaffirmed the action, while the medical federation said it would not participate. Actual participation, persistence and security-force behavior matter more than the announcement.Limited disruption and continued obedience would favor Rodriguez. Sustained disruption coupled with security defections would lower her likelihood and raise insider-succession or fragmented-authority outcomes. A coordinated defection would warrant rerunning the forecast.
November 18: extended deadline for TSJ applicationsThe Assembly’s announced extension tests whether judicial renewal remains on schedule.Delay without executive rupture favors Rodriguez remaining through year-end. Rapid progress would favor a successor only if accompanied by concrete terms for an accelerated handover.
December 11 and mid-December: judicial milestonesDecember 11 was described by a participating negotiator as presentation of selected candidates, not necessarily completed appointments. Rubio targeted a renewed court around mid-December.A process that leaves subsequent steps for 2027 favors Rodriguez. A signed agreement naming another caretaker and requiring her departure before year-end would lower her likelihood and warrant rerunning the forecast.
Without warning: a change in US policyRecognition of another executive or an explicit agreement for immediate replacement would be more important than general demands for elections.An implemented change would lower Rodriguez’s likelihood and raise the named successor’s. Rerun the forecast if such an agreement emerges.
Without warning: security realignment or incapacityCoordinated disobedience by the armed forces or security services, an effective removal, or sudden incapacity would directly challenge her control.An aligned replacement favors “Other Chavista”; competing command centers favor “Other / power vacuum / civil war.” Either development warrants rerunning the forecast.
Before year-end: an extraordinary Machado handover agreementThe decisive evidence would be agreed assumption of office and acceptance by executive and security institutions—not a rally or an election announcement.This would raise Machado’s likelihood and lower Rodriguez’s. A credible signed handover would warrant rerunning the forecast.

Research and methodology

The forecast uses a judgmental scenario model linking continuity, accelerated bargaining and acute shocks to the person exercising power at the deadline. The short time remaining and the distinction between institutional preparation and an implemented handover are central. Historical precedents test possible mechanisms; they do not provide a statistical sample precise enough to determine these probabilities.

The most influential sources were:

Limitations

The most important missing information concerns private military loyalties, unpublished succession terms and a complete current TSJ record. The research did not establish a comprehensive operational command map. Public endorsements cannot close that gap, and failure to find a replacement agreement does not prove none exists.

There is also unresolved legal tension: the reported six-month election process differs from Article 233’s literal 30-day election deadline following a permanent vacancy. Neither timetable should be treated as a mechanically reliable guide to actual control.

The displayed precision reflects the forecast calculation, not equally precise knowledge of covert bargaining or sudden shocks. Confidence is stronger in the direction—continued Rodriguez rule—than in the exact size of the remaining succession risks.

Forecast history

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Signed Nov 15, 2026, 7:10 PM with ed25519 key preseen-prod-ed25519-20260523 and externally timestamped Nov 15, 2026, 7:10 PM.

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