Will Bolivian president Rodrigo Paz Pereira remain in power through the end of 2026?

Bolivia: Presidential continuity through the end of 2026

Executive Summary

The probability that the question resolves YES is 93.8%. Rodrigo Paz Pereira is highly likely to remain continuously President of Bolivia through 23:59 local time on 31 December 2026, without a qualifying interruption since the question was asked on 5 June.

As of 8 November, Paz has survived the earlier nationwide confrontation, remains officially recognized as president, and has roughly 53 days left to navigate. Demonstrations have declined, security forces continue implementing government policy, and external financing provides some breathing room.

The principal threat is a renewed nationwide protest crisis combined with defections among political or security leaders. A separate constitutional dispute over temporary succession also matters: an effective transfer of the presidency—even temporarily—would produce NO under the question’s rules.

Key drivers

The earlier confrontation has receded

The May–June blockades and resignation demands did not remove Paz. Negotiations and emergency measures broke up the confrontation, and current reporting continues to identify him as president. The June crisis should therefore not be treated as an uninterrupted siege continuing into November.

Recorded demonstration events fell from 216 in May to 57 in October. These are event counts, not participant totals or measures of blockade effectiveness, but they support the broader evidence of reduced mobilization. A Morales-aligned march scheduled to leave Patacamaya on 6 November did not begin after police and military deployment; organizers said they would reschedule.

Institutional support remains sufficient, though fragile

Recent security deployments demonstrate that the government can still execute its policies. They do not prove how commanders would behave during a larger confrontation.

Paz lacks a legislative majority, but lawmakers outside his party have supported major initiatives, including the IMF agreement. Formal removal also faces substantial barriers: presidential prosecution requires a substantiated prosecutorial request and authorization from two-thirds of legislators present. Recall cannot be requested before half the presidential term has elapsed. These constraints impede a rapid legal exit, although they cannot prevent forced resignation or extra-constitutional removal.

Economic and political weakness could regenerate pressure

The latest reported Ipsos CIESMORI survey found 25% approval and 59% disapproval. Its 400 respondents were adult internet users in four major cities, so it indicates urban vulnerability rather than a precise national measure.

Economic hardship remains substantial. Official data reported real gross domestic product—the value of economic output—down 3.27% in the first half of 2026 from the corresponding period a year earlier. October consumer prices rose 2.07% from September. The output figures are lagged, but both releases help explain why renewed protests remain plausible.

The rupture with Vice President Edmand Lara, withdrawal of an important ally’s support, and controversy surrounding former adviser Fernando Cerimedo create additional channels for a fresh shock to fracture political support.

Financing provides a near-term buffer

On 2 October, the IMF approved a 36-month arrangement worth approximately US$1.9 billion, authorizing an immediate disbursement of approximately US$214 million. The larger amount is phased financing, not cash already received. Approval nevertheless reduces immediate funding pressure; associated reforms can simultaneously generate opposition.

Constitutional continuity is a distinct uncertainty

Lara has declared himself “president in exercise” during Paz’s foreign travel. The evidence reviewed does not establish that those declarations produced an effective transfer: Paz continued issuing decrees remotely, and Senate leadership continued recognizing him as president.

The legal dispute is consequential nonetheless. Article 169 of the Constitution provides for temporary presidential substitution, while Article 22 of Decree 5675 permits remote government and specifies a substitution procedure when communication is impossible. The forecast treats the reported declarations as disputed claims, not completed successions, while retaining uncertainty about an authoritative legal determination.

Scenarios

The reasoning gives the greatest weight to continued tenure, while distinguishing renewed unrest from an actual loss of office.

Implications

• Presidential continuity is the appropriate year-end planning assumption. The evidence does not support expecting a replacement before the deadline.
• Continuity does not mean political or operational calm. Strikes, blockades, economic pressure and legislative conflict could persist while Paz remains president. Disruption planning remains warranted even under the main scenario.
• The forecast should not be extrapolated to his full term. Its high probability depends substantially on the short remaining horizon, not on a conclusion that the underlying political and economic weaknesses have been resolved.
• Legal status matters more than succession rhetoric. A unilateral acting-president claim is not conclusive, but an effective constitutional transfer would settle the question against YES even if Paz later returned.

Signs to watch

Research and methodology

The forecast combines a historical benchmark with a judgment-based scenario model: whether another nationally consequential crisis occurs, whether it leads to departure, and whether a separate interruption defeats continuity. The calculation is structured, but its inputs are judgments rather than precisely measured political probabilities.

The most influential sources were:

• Current incumbency and political conditions: the official presidential record and EFE’s 8 November anniversary review support current officeholding and document political vulnerabilities.
• Protest activity: a twelve-month review of ACLED aggregated demonstration data assessed the change in activity through October. ACLED’s assessment of the easing confrontation supplied context. Counts were not treated as direct measures of removal risk.
• Constitutional continuity: the Constitution, a reproduction of Decree 5675, Bolivia Verifica’s documentary review, and ANF’s 6 November reporting informed the distinction between disputed claims and effective succession.
• Economic resilience and distress: the IMF approval announcement, official national accounts and consumer-price release established the financing buffer and continuing hardship. Reporting on the Ipsos CIESMORI survey informed the public-support assessment.
• Near-term calendar: reporting documented the teachers’ strike, 17 December emergency endpoint and ministerial statements on fuel-subsidy timing.
• Historical benchmark: a study of protest and repression in Bolivia from 1982–2021 identified four protest-driven shortened presidencies. This small, uneven reference class anchored the assessment without determining it mechanically.

Limitations

The most consequential missing evidence is a complete, current judicial docket and official succession record. No authoritative evidence of a completed qualifying transfer was found, but the review was not an exhaustive legal audit. The official-gazette copy of Decree 5675 could not be retrieved, so that check relied on a legal-text reproduction and documentary reporting.

Security-force cohesion and opposition coordination are only partly observable. Recent deployment demonstrates present operational capacity, not future loyalty under greater pressure. A nationally representative public-opinion survey would also improve on the available four-city online poll.

Finally, the demonstration series lacked an exact underlying release timestamp and November observations. It cannot measure whether a few strategically placed blockades are becoming more consequential. These gaps limit confidence in the probability’s precision, rather than altering the stated forecast.