Will Bolivian president Rodrigo Paz Pereira remain in power through the end of 2026?

Executive Summary

Probability that the question resolves YES: 90.1%. Rodrigo Paz Pereira is strongly favored to remain President of Bolivia continuously through 23:59 local time on 31 December 2026.

As of 4 November, Paz continues to exercise presidential authority. He survived the May–June confrontation, opposition mobilization remains fragmented, and legislative and security institutions continue to cooperate with his government. With about 57 days remaining, these advantages favor continuity despite severe economic and political weakness.

The main risks are a renewed nationwide confrontation accompanied by institutional defections, and a legally effective transfer to an interim president. The latter matters especially: under the question’s rules, even a temporary constitutional succession would produce NO, regardless of whether Paz subsequently returned.

Key drivers

1. The earlier crisis subsided rather than continuing unchanged

Paz survived the campaign demanding his resignation. El País reported on 23 June that roads had reopened after more than 50 days of conflict. This demonstrates that severe disruption and resignation demands do not automatically translate into presidential departure.

Recorded demonstrations subsequently fell substantially. The ACLED extract reviewed for the forecast recorded 216 demonstration events in May, 59 in September and 21 in October. These are counts of events—not participants, blockade severity or economic disruption—but they support the conclusion that November is not simply the June crisis continuing at full intensity.

2. Opponents have not assembled a unified replacement coalition

The Central Obrera Boliviana (COB), the major labor federation involved in the earlier confrontation, declined to join the renewed Morales-aligned campaign. On 3 November, an opposition spokesperson confirmed forthcoming mobilizations but ruled out an initial general road blockade, citing the security deployment.

Meanwhile, institutions continue functioning under Paz. The legislature approved the September extension of the state of exception—an emergency-powers regime—with 100 votes among 158 members present. Paz also presided over security-command promotions in late October. These are evidence of practical cooperation, not guarantees of loyalty under renewed pressure.

3. External financing provides a buffer, while reforms generate fresh grievances

On 2 October, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a 36-month arrangement worth approximately US$1.9 billion, permitting an immediate disbursement of approximately US$214 million. The full arrangement is not cash already available; later disbursements depend on reviews.

The financing reduces immediate pressure on the government. It does not remove the political costs of subsidy changes and public-enterprise reforms. Recession, fuel shortages and household hardship remain potential triggers for renewed unrest. Urban polling also indicates pronounced disapproval, although its limited geographic coverage prevents treating it as a nationwide measure.

4. The remaining window is short, and ordinary removal routes face barriers

Bolivia’s history warrants concern about premature presidential departures, especially when protests combine with elite or security-force abandonment. But historical instability does not make departure within the remaining weeks the default.

Some constitutional routes are constrained. Recall requires at least half the presidential term to have elapsed. A presidential criminal trial requires legislative authorization by two-thirds of members present before Supreme Court proceedings. These barriers do not prevent resignation, a coup or other succession, but they limit straightforward formal removal before year-end.

5. Political survival is not the same as uninterrupted legal tenure

Vice President Edmand Lara declared himself president in exercise on 3 November while Paz was abroad. The cabinet rejected that claim and reported that Paz had participated remotely in a meeting approving three decrees.

The operative remote-governance provision is Article 22 of Decree 5675. It preserved remote presidential exercise while repealing the earlier Decree 5515. Repeal of the earlier decree therefore did not itself transfer the presidency to Lara.

The constitutional dispute remains important: Article 169 provides for temporary presidential substitution. The available evidence favors continuity, but the research did not retrieve a conclusive court ruling or authenticated handover instrument settling every disputed episode. Lara’s declaration alone is not proof of a qualifying transfer; equally, executive rejection of his claim does not conclusively settle the constitutional issue.

Scenarios

The forecast gives the greatest weight to continued institutional functioning, while retaining meaningful allowance for renewed disruption and a smaller, consequential risk of institutional breakdown. These are judgmental scenarios, not measured historical frequencies.

A legal-continuity risk applies across all three scenarios. A constitutionally effective interim transfer could produce NO even without a lasting political collapse. The assessment accounts separately for this risk, uncertainty about earlier continuity, and death or incapacity, rather than treating every possible succession as an additional independent political crisis.

Implications

• Use continuity under Paz as the year-end planning baseline. An imminent change of president is not the central expectation.
• Do not equate presidential survival with political calm. Further strikes, blockades, cabinet changes and contested economic measures remain compatible with a YES outcome.
• Prioritize institutional behavior over rhetoric. Security-force defections, legislative abandonment and authoritative succession decisions matter more than another resignation demand or protest announcement.
• Track legal continuity separately from political control. Paz could remain the dominant political figure yet fail the question’s strict test if the presidency legally transfers even briefly.

Signs to watch

All dates below are in 2026. Directions refer to the probability of YES.

Research and methodology

The assessment combined a historical reference rate with current political evidence and judgmental scenarios. It counted early permanent presidential departures during 2000–2025, considered the short remaining horizon, and then assessed how current conditions differ from that historical average. Separate conditional allowances addressed legal continuity and other qualifying interruptions, avoiding double-counting political departures followed by succession.

The most consequential sources were:

• Contemporaneous presidential authority: the official Presidency’s 3 November release and La Razón’s cabinet report. These document active exercise of authority, rather than merely listing Paz as incumbent.
• The legal framework: Bolivia’s Constitution, the official text of Decree 5675, and the Constitutional Tribunal’s legal compendium. These informed succession, removal barriers, and the presumption that legislation remains constitutional until invalidated.
• Protest trajectory and organization: El País’s June account, Infobae’s October reporting, and the 3 November Radio Panamericana interview. Together they distinguish announced opposition activity from a unified national campaign.
• Demonstration data: an extract of ACLED aggregated data covering November 2025–October 2026. Comparing monthly event counts provided a quantitative check on the reported decline in mobilization.
• Economic and public-support evidence: the IMF’s 2 October announcement, official economic reporting, and a Ciesmori survey report. These informed the balance between financial support and continuing social pressure.
• Historical comparison: the Congressional Research Service’s Bolivia history and Reuters’ account of Morales’s 2019 departure. These identify the importance of institutional abandonment alongside protests.

Limitations

The largest unresolved information gap is the complete constitutional-case and succession record. No conclusive ruling or authenticated instrument establishing a qualifying handover was retrieved. That is not proof that none exists; such a record could materially change the assessment.

Actual protest participation, coordination among organizations and security-force behavior under renewed pressure could not be established directly. National event counts do not measure those features, and the extract did not provide its exact publication timestamp. The cited opinion survey covered four major cities rather than rural Bolivia.

Finally, the historical sample is small, departures cluster in crises, and ordinary interim substitutions were excluded from that benchmark. The forecast is therefore a structured judgment, not a statistically fitted estimate whose decimal precision implies comparable certainty.