Will the Iranian soccer team be able to play all of their scheduled matches in the 2026 FIFA World Cup?

TL;DR

Iran has a 93% chance to complete every 2026 World Cup match it becomes scheduled to play.

Context

As of June 17, 2026 at 22:18 UTC, Iran has already completed one official Group G match: IR Iran 2–2 New Zealand at Los Angeles Stadium on June 16 at 01:00 UTC. Its two remaining guaranteed matches are Belgium vs IR Iran on June 21 at 19:00 UTC in Los Angeles and Egypt vs IR Iran on June 27 at 03:00 UTC in Seattle, using official FIFA fixture data checked at the forecast time (FIFA schedule/results; AP match report).

The remaining risk is political and administrative, not sporting. Iran is operating from Tijuana, Mexico, entering the U.S. only around matchdays, while some officials and support staff remain excluded. But U.S. officials say all players and coaches have visas, one known player visa problem was fixed with a multiple-entry visa, and the same process is supposed to repeat for Los Angeles and Seattle (AP, June 16).

Evidence

The historical base rate is strongly pro-Yes once a team has already taken the field. In the 22 completed men’s World Cups from 1930 through 2022, FIFA’s team-count history gives 489 team-tournament entries that actually began finals play; I find zero cases where a team started the finals and then failed to complete a later scheduled finals match (FIFA team-count history). The cleaner modern sample is 1954 through 2022: 432 team-tournament entries, also zero such failures. The relevant historical failures are pre-start withdrawals: Austria in 1938 after the Anschluss, and Turkey, India, and France around the 1950 finals; those are real political and logistical analogues, but weaker now because Iran has already played its opener (UEFA 1938 history; FIFA 1950 draw history).

The live administrative evidence is mixed but leans toward completion. U.S. law still treats Iran as a fully restricted country, but the travel-ban proclamation has a World Cup exception for athletes, team members, coaches, necessary support roles, and immediate relatives (White House proclamation). AP reported on June 5 that all Iranian players were approved for visas and that visas had been issued for players, coaches, trainers, and some support staff; that datapoint covers the pre-tournament visa process through June 5 (AP, June 5). AP then reported on June 16 that Iran winger Mehdi Torabi’s expired entry visa had been replaced with a multiple-entry visa, and that the State Department said it worked to ensure he could participate in every game (AP, June 16).

The negative evidence is that the process is not normal. Iran’s coach said the team was ordered to leave the U.S. only hours after the New Zealand match, and Iran’s captain said the team endured five hours of travel and security checks before the opener (AP match report). AP also reported before the opener that Iran’s training camp had been moved from the U.S. to Tijuana because of the war and visa issues, and that some media-relations staff were denied U.S. visas (AP, June 15). These facts raise the failure risk above a normal World Cup team, but they do not yet show a team-level inability to take the field.

FIFA’s current posture is facilitation, not exclusion. On June 11, FIFA said it had held another meeting with the Iranian federation and would focus on resolving outstanding matters so Team Melli could compete safely and seamlessly through the tournament (FIFA, June 11). The geopolitical backdrop also improved on June 17: Axios reported at 21:34 UTC that the U.S. and Iran had remotely signed a memorandum of understanding to end the war and open the Strait of Hormuz, while AP earlier the same day described the agreement as tentative and the ceasefire as shaky (Axios, June 17; AP, June 17). I treat that as a real reduction in near-term withdrawal or entry-revocation risk, not as a permanent peace settlement.

I also modeled knockout exposure, because Iran only has to play knockout matches if it qualifies for them. The 2026 format sends the top two teams in each of 12 groups plus the eight best third-placed teams to a Round of 32 (FIFA format explainer). Using current World Football Elo ratings checked on June 17 — Belgium 1879, Iran 1756, Egypt 1711, New Zealand 1578 — and fixing the two opening Group G draws, an 81-scenario win/draw/loss enumeration gives Iran a 43.5% chance to finish top two and about a 58.9% total chance to advance once third-place paths are included (World Football Elo Ratings; FIFA schedule/results).

My final model sets the probability of failing to complete the two remaining group matches at 5.4%. That is far above the historical base rate because Iran is still in an abnormal U.S. entry lane, but lower than a pre-tournament estimate because the first match and the Torabi visa fix both show the system works under stress. I set Iran’s advancement probability at 58.9%, and the conditional risk of failing to complete all knockout matches if it advances at 3.2%. The calculation is: P(YES) = (1 - group failure risk) × (1 - advancement probability × knockout failure risk) = 92.8%.

What's non-obvious

The first match changed the question. In May, the main risk was that Iran might never arrive, be replaced, or refuse to participate. On June 17, that risk has mostly burned off. The crux is now whether a strained but tested border-and-security process breaks before two more guaranteed U.S. matchdays and perhaps one knockout match.

The visible staff and fan disputes are less decisive than they look. Missing federation officials, media staff, or fans can make the tournament unfair and politically charged, but the resolution criterion is whether the team takes the field and completes matches. The evidence says the players and coaches have been admitted, a player-level visa issue was fixed, and FIFA and U.S. officials are still working toward participation rather than replacement (AP, June 16; FIFA, June 11).

Limitations

The biggest uncertainty is political. The public sources do not reveal every Iranian player’s visa validity, every staff member’s status, or the full operational agreement governing each U.S. entry. The Torabi episode shows that individual visa edge cases can still appear, even if the first one was fixed (AP, June 16).

The historical sample is large but not perfectly comparable. There is no close modern analogue for a World Cup team from a country recently at war with the main host, operating from a third-country base under same-day U.S. departure rules. The sporting model is also simplified: it uses Elo win/draw/loss outcomes and rough third-place advancement cutoffs rather than a full goal-difference simulation across all 12 groups. Those limitations move the estimate by a few points, not by tens of points, because Iran has already cleared the largest participation bottleneck.