Who will be exercising the powers of the Venezuelan presidency on 31 December 2026?

TL;DR

Delcy Rodríguez is the year-end favorite because she is the current de facto president, the U.S. is protecting the working relationship with her, and no credible election process has started.

Context

As of 31 May 2026, Delcy Rodríguez is exercising the presidency in practice. Venezuela’s foreign ministry says she was sworn in on 5 January under a TSJ ruling after Maduro’s forced absence, with FANB backing, and AP reported on 6 April that she was still acting president after the initial 90-day period had expired without a public Assembly extension vote. (mppre.gob.ve)

The formal legal fiction still leaves Maduro as the absent president, but this question resolves on substantive power. The U.S. side has moved from recognition to active support: a March 2026 U.S. filing says the State Department recognized Rodríguez as Venezuela’s sole head of state while maintaining nonrecognition of Maduro; OFAC removed her from the SDN list on 1 April; and AP reported on 28 May that the Trump administration told Miami prosecutors not to pursue investigations into her because it did not want to upset stabilization efforts. (venezuelapolitica.info)

Evidence

The historical backbone points to elite continuity, not a fast clean handoff. A review of 70 twentieth-century cases of foreign-imposed regime change found that pro-democratic reforms and sponsored elections were often not enough to produce democratization when local conditions were poor. A separate study of 79 dictators who died in office from 1946 to 2012 found the regime remained intact through the following year in 87% of cases; Maduro’s capture is more destabilizing than a natural death, but the mechanism still matters: ruling coalitions often replace or front a successor before they democratize. (belfercenter.org)

The Venezuela-specific evidence is stronger than the generic base rate. Rodríguez is issuing decrees, receiving U.S. energy officials, traveling as the head of Venezuela’s delegation, and changing the coercive command structure. The most important move was her 18 March replacement of longtime defense minister Vladimir Padrino López with intelligence figure Gustavo González López, who had already been given control of the presidential honor guard and military counterintelligence after 6 January. (apnews.com)

The main anti-Delcy risk inside the regime is a Chavista substitution, not Maduro. Reuters reported on 17 January that Rodríguez was installing loyalists to protect herself from internal threats, especially Diosdado Cabello, and that Cabello’s security-service and colectivo networks could make the country hard to govern if turned against her. But the same reporting also said Rodríguez has broad influence over civilian levers, oil, and U.S. backing; that makes her more useful to the coalition than a harder-line replacement unless the bargain breaks. (investing.com)

Machado is the likely winner of a fair election, but the clock is short. The Gold Glove / Atlantic Council poll was a nationwide face-to-face survey of 1,000 Venezuelans fielded 24-30 January 2026 with a 3.1-point margin of error; it put Machado at 67% versus Rodríguez at 25% in a hypothetical presidential vote. A May AtlasIntel poll of 3,626 adults fielded 21-25 May 2026 with a ±2-point margin found only 25.2% approval and 58.7% disapproval for Rodríguez, while Machado had the strongest positive image among named leaders. (atlanticcouncil.org)

The election mechanism is still missing. AP reported on 30 May that neither Caracas nor Washington had indicated elections were imminent. AP also reported on 23 May that Machado intends to return before year-end and run, but that she herself said a democratic election would require seven to nine months of preparation, including neutral electoral authorities, voter registration updates, and freedom for opposition candidates. El País reported on 29 May that the opposition’s Panama manifesto seeks a new CNE and an urgent but viable calendar; that is a demand for a process, not evidence that the process has begun. (apnews.com)

The rights and institutional environment also argues against a fast Machado swearing-in. Human Rights Watch said on 18 February that the repressive apparatus remained in place, about 400 political prisoners had been released but about 600 remained, and electoral and judicial reforms were still needed. UN investigators said on 13 March that the repressive state apparatus remained operational, at least 87 new politically motivated detentions had been reported since Maduro’s capture, and officials previously linked to crimes against humanity still exercised power. (hrw.org)

I used a three-branch scenario tree. First, I put 73% on no completed leadership-changing election or negotiated swearing-in before the deadline; inside that branch I allocate 82% to Delcy, 13% to another Chavista, 3% to other/vacuum, and 2% to Maduro. Second, I put 16% on an election or negotiated presidential transition with a sworn leader by 31 December; inside that branch I allocate 69% to Machado, 15% to Delcy, 10% to other/vacuum, 5% to another Chavista, and 1% to Maduro. Third, I put 11% on rupture without a clean election; inside that branch I allocate 55% to another Chavista, 30% to Delcy, 10% to other/vacuum, and 5% to Maduro. Summing those branches gives 65.6% Delcy, 16.3% other Chavista, 11.0% Machado, 4.9% other/vacuum, and 2.2% Maduro.

What's non-obvious

The expired 90-day clock is less predictive than it looks. The state already passed the April deadline with Rodríguez still issuing decisions and with AP unable to identify a public Assembly extension vote. That makes the legal defect a lever for future elite bargaining, not a hard stop that automatically creates elections or restores Maduro. (apnews.com)

The other overlooked point is that public support and state power are pointing in opposite directions. Machado has the voters; Rodríguez has the TSJ, National Assembly, executive ministries, oil diplomacy, U.S. recognition, and the current defense-ministry chain. If Rodríguez falls quickly, the fastest path is an internal Chavista/security replacement, because those actors can inherit the machinery without first building a credible national election. (venezuelapolitica.info)

Limitations

The largest unknowns are private: the bargain among Delcy Rodríguez, Jorge Rodríguez, Diosdado Cabello, Gustavo González López, the FANB high command, and Washington. Public reporting can see appointments and speeches, but not the veto threats behind them.

I could not verify a public Assembly vote regularizing Rodríguez’s mandate after the first 90 days, a public CNE reform, or a binding presidential election date. If a credible election calendar with a 2026 inauguration appears by July, Machado should move sharply up. If Delcy loses Defense, DGCIM, Interior, or U.S. recognition, the other-Chavista bucket becomes the main challenger.