Will the Iranian soccer team be able to play all of their scheduled matches in the 2026 FIFA World Cup?

TL;DR

Iran has an 82.8% chance to play and complete every 2026 World Cup match it is scheduled to play.

Context

Iran is still an official 2026 World Cup participant in Group G. Its known group matches are New Zealand on June 15 in Los Angeles, Belgium on June 21 in Los Angeles, and Egypt on June 26 in Seattle, with any knockout match added only if Iran advances FIFA, May 16 .

The setup is now a managed compromise. FIFA says Iran will participate and play in the U.S.; Iran says it will participate but wants visa and security guarantees; and FIFA has finalized Iran’s base camp in Tijuana, Mexico, while keeping the group matches in the U.S. FIFA, Apr. 30 AP, May 25 .

Evidence

The historical base rate is strongly pro-Yes. FIFA’s current-vintage list of teams at each men’s World Cup shows 489 actual team-tournament entries from 1930 through 2022; the modern reference class from 1954 through 2022 has 432 entries. I find zero modern cases of a finalist failing to play its scheduled finals matches after reaching the tournament. Le Monde’s March 2026 review says that since the 1950 World Cup, when Turkey, Scotland and India withdrew, no team has given up its place in the tournament FIFA, Jan. 1 2025 Le Monde, Mar. 5 .

That base rate is not enough by itself. Iran is not an ordinary entrant. On March 11, Iran’s sports minister said conditions for participation did not exist after U.S.-Israeli attacks, and NPR said it was not immediately clear that Iran had formally withdrawn NPR, Mar. 11 . Since then the practical evidence has moved toward participation: Iran’s federation said on May 9 that Iran would definitely participate while demanding visa and treatment guarantees AP, May 9 ; FIFA and the Iranian federation held a May 16 logistics meeting in Istanbul and described it as constructive FIFA, May 16 ; and players and delegation members attended U.S. and Canadian visa appointments in Ankara on May 21 Al Jazeera/Reuters, May 21 .

The visa risk is real but bounded. The White House’s December 16 proclamation keeps Iran under a full entry suspension, but it carves out athletes or members of athletic teams, including coaches, necessary support personnel and immediate relatives, when traveling for the World Cup or another major sporting event White House, Dec. 16 . That makes a blanket player-entry failure unlikely. The harder issue is whether U.S. and Canadian screeners admit enough IRGC-linked or formerly conscripted staff for Tehran to accept the delegation as legitimate; AP reported that Canada denied entry to federation president Mehdi Taj before the FIFA Congress and that Iran wants visas for players and technical staff who served mandatory military service in the Revolutionary Guard AP, May 9 .

The Tijuana base is the biggest positive update since early May. FIFA’s final base-camp list puts Iran at Centro Xoloitzcuintle in Tijuana FIFA, May 25 . AP reported that Mexico had no issue hosting the team, that the team would still play its U.S. group matches, and that the U.S. did not want Iran staying overnight in the United States outside match activity AP, May 25 . I read this as de-risking because it turns a symbolic problem into an operational one: Iran can avoid living in the U.S. while FIFA keeps the schedule intact.

The main negative update is that the conflict is not over in any normal sense. On May 25 the U.S. military said it carried out self-defense strikes in southern Iran, including missile-launch sites and minelaying boats, while saying it was using restraint during the ceasefire AP, May 25 . On May 26 Iran called the strikes a ceasefire violation and warned that no aggression would go unanswered, even as negotiations toward a possible deal continued AP, May 26 . That raises tail risk, but it is not yet a collapse of the participation track.

My model uses three hazards: pre-first-match failure, group-stage failure after Iran starts, and extra knockout-stage failure if Iran advances. I set pre-first-match failure at 11.5%, mainly from war escalation and unresolved visa guarantees. I set group-stage non-completion after starting at 4.5%, mainly from repeated border/travel events, renewed strikes, and security or political incidents. I set Iran’s chance to reach a knockout match at 58%, because the 2026 format sends the top two teams in each group plus eight of twelve third-place teams to the Round of 32 FIFA format , and Iran is a credible but not dominant Group G team. I set extra non-completion risk after a knockout match is scheduled at 3.5%, because the visa regime should already be partly solved by then, but the exposure window and venue uncertainty grow.

The calculation is:

P(YES) = (1 - p_pre) * (1 - p_group) * (1 - p_adv * p_KO)

Using p_pre = 11.5%, p_group = 4.5%, p_adv = 58%, and p_KO = 3.5% gives 82.8%.

What’s non-obvious

The obvious story is that Iran might boycott. The better read is that Iran is bargaining over the terms of playing. The move from March threats, to May visa demands, to an Istanbul FIFA meeting, to a Tijuana base camp looks like accommodation under stress, not quiet preparation for withdrawal.

The central failure mode is not a FIFA ban. FIFA is publicly committed to Iran playing. The live risk is a boundary case: the U.S. admits the players but rejects people Iran treats as essential, or another military incident makes participation in a U.S.-hosted event politically impossible for Tehran. That is why the No probability is far above the modern World Cup base rate, but still below 20%.

Limitations

I could not verify a final public list of issued U.S. or Canadian visas for Iran’s final players, coaches, doctors, trainers, security staff and officials. The strongest missing evidence would be confirmation that the final squad and matchday-essential staff have multi-entry documents valid through the end of Iran’s possible tournament run.

Private FIFA-U.S.-Mexico-Iran operating rules are also opaque. Public sources show the Tijuana base and U.S. match venues, but not the exact border and flight mechanics for Los Angeles and Seattle match days.

The war risk can change faster than sports logistics. A major Iranian retaliation, a broader U.S. or Israeli strike, a collapse in ceasefire talks, or a serious threat against an Iran match would move this forecast sharply down. A public visa issuance for the final delegation and a stable ceasefire through early June would move it into the high 80s.