Will Bolivian president Rodrigo Paz Pereira remain in power through the end of 2026?

Executive Summary

The probability that the question resolves YES is 90.7%. Rodrigo Paz Pereira is strongly favored to remain President of Bolivia continuously from the question’s opening on 5 June through 23:59 Bolivian time on 31 December 2026.

As assessed on 25 October, the strongest evidence is not that unrest has ended—it has not—but that opponents remain divided, security forces continue implementing government policy, and newly approved financing provides breathing room. With roughly two months remaining, presidential continuity is the clear base case.

The principal failure path is renewed nationwide confrontation combined with consequential political or security-force defections. A separate legal risk matters under the question’s strict rules: a genuine interim succession would produce NO even without a permanent overthrow.

Key drivers

Opposition remains fragmented despite real unrest

The Central Obrera Boliviana (COB), Bolivia’s main labor confederation and an important participant in the earlier protest movement, declined to join the latest Morales-aligned campaign. October reporting also described postponed national action, staggered demonstrations, and an organizer ruling out road blockades. These are signs of limited coordination, not proof that opposition has disappeared.

Teachers nevertheless conducted a national one-day strike on 23 October and threatened longer stoppages and blockades. The crucial distinction is between separate sectoral disputes and a sustained coalition capable of forcing a presidential transition.

Paz has demonstrated resilience and retains operational institutional support

Paz survived the earlier resignation-demanding confrontation, which September reporting described as lasting 53 days and causing 22 deaths. The legislature subsequently approved another 90 days of emergency powers.

Recent security-force conduct also favors continuity. October reporting documented joint police-military road deployments, while the Senate approved military and police promotion reports. These show continuing institutional cooperation, although neither deployments nor promotions establish commanders’ private loyalties in a more severe crisis.

Financing reduces immediate pressure without resolving the economic crisis

On 2 October, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a 36-month lending arrangement worth approximately US$1.9 billion, permitting an immediate disbursement of approximately US$214 million. The full package is not immediately available cash; subsequent installments depend on reviews.

Approval reduces near-term financing pressure. At the same time, subsidy reform, fiscal adjustment, fuel concerns, and living-cost grievances preserve the conditions for further protests.

Political weakness does not yet amount to a removal coalition

AP’s August reporting described a break with a key congressional ally, hostility from Vice President Edmand Lara, and substantial cabinet turnover. Public-opinion research also showed weak support for Paz—but still weaker support for Lara. These findings establish vulnerability, not an obvious successor with a popular mandate.

Formal removal faces barriers. Recall is unavailable this early in the presidential term, while authorization for a presidential responsibilities trial requires two-thirds of legislators present. Party fragmentation means those barriers are not an absolute guarantee of protection.

The September succession dispute is unresolved, but no effective transfer was demonstrated

During Paz’s September foreign trip, Lara claimed presidential authority, and prosecutor Roger Mariaca recognized Senate president Diego Ávila as president. Crucially, Ávila expressly denied formally assuming the presidency, while Paz continued directing his cabinet remotely.

The executive relies on Article 22 of Decree 5675 for presidential exercise from abroad. That decree replaced the earlier Decree 5515, often still cited in coverage. Its existence supports the government’s continuity position, but is not equivalent to final constitutional-court clearance. The evidence favors continuity; it does not conclusively certify it.

Scenarios

The forecast distinguishes political scenarios by the most severe conditions reached before the deadline. Their relative weights are judgmental, rather than frequencies measured from a large dataset.

Separate allowances cover qualifying events outside those political pathways: discovery of an earlier legal interruption, a future interim succession, death, or incapacity. Ordinary foreign travel or limited delegation does not itself count if Paz legally remains president.

Implications

• Presidential continuity is a reasonable year-end planning assumption; political calm is not. Strikes, concessions, cabinet changes, and contested economic measures can all coexist with a YES outcome.
• Institutional alignment matters more than protest announcements alone. A coordinated national campaign accompanied by security-force or legislative defections would be more consequential than another isolated demonstration or hostile statement.
• Legal continuity requires separate attention. Confirmation that Paz is president on 31 December would not, by itself, prove uninterrupted tenure. A legally effective interim presidency earlier in the period would still produce NO.
• The financing cushion should not be mistaken for completed stabilization. Conditional future funding and opposition to adjustment measures leave room for renewed pressure before year-end.

Signs to watch

• 4–5 November: planned Madrid meetings; 9 November: planned France visit. These dates appeared in the announced international agenda. Travel alone is neutral under the rules. Authoritative evidence of uninterrupted remote presidential exercise would make YES more likely; an effective constitutional handover would make it less likely and could settle the question NO. A consequential transfer instrument would warrant rerunning the forecast.

• 6 November: previously announced opposition march, but not a firm current timetable. Earlier reporting identified this date for a march toward La Paz; later October reporting left national action unsettled. A large, sustained mobilization joined by the COB and other sectors would make YES less likely. Another postponement, limited turnout, or continued sectoral separation would make it more likely.

• December: the end of the extended emergency period. The September 90-day extension does not provide an automatic shield through the deadline. Renewed blockades or weakened enforcement around its expiry would make YES less likely. An orderly end without escalation would make it more likely.

• At any time: security-force or elite defections. Police refusals, military demands for a transition, or a credible legislative removal coalition would make YES less likely. Continued enforcement and issue-specific legislative cooperation would favor YES. A verified command-level break would warrant rerunning the forecast.

• At any time: a consequential constitutional-court ruling or authenticated succession record. A ruling establishing a qualifying earlier transfer could settle NO. Authoritative clarification supporting uninterrupted tenure would make YES more likely. The ruling’s scope and timing matter: invalidating the old decree would not automatically establish that its replacement was invalid or that a September succession occurred. This is a major rerun trigger.

• At any time: financing or fuel deterioration that unifies grievances. A renewed acute shortage or financing setback that brings previously separate groups into sustained joint action would make YES less likely. Financing implementation and negotiated settlements that keep disputes separate would make it more likely.

Research and methodology

The most consequential sources were:

• Official incumbency and legal records: the presidential record, Bolivian Constitution, and official-hosted Decree 5675. These established current recognition and the competing legal frameworks for succession and remote presidential exercise. Ávila’s reported denial was important episode-specific evidence against an accepted September handover.
• Recent protest and security reporting: Infobae, 19 October and Los Tiempos, 22 October informed the assessment of opposition coordination. AFP’s teacher-protest report supplied counter-evidence, while El Deber’s deployment reporting documented operational security cooperation.
• Crisis and political-cohesion reporting: El País, 17 September documented the earlier confrontation and emergency extension; AP’s August account established cabinet and alliance fragility.
• Financing and opinion evidence: the IMF’s 2 October approval announcement distinguished approved financing from promises. The Ipsos CIESMORI release and reported fieldwork details supported a directional assessment of political vulnerability.

The quantitative work assembled a Bolivian presidential-departure chronology covering 1982–2025, using the presidential roster and historical accounts, including the Congressional Research Service’s account of 2019. A constant-rate calculation provided a historical scale check, not the final prediction. The forecast then weighted the political scenarios and separately allowed for prior continuity uncertainty and additional qualifying events. Those assumptions are judgmental; the reported precision is not statistical certainty.

Limitations

The most important missing evidence is the current constitutional-court record and a complete set of presidential substitution communications. The latest affirmative court-status statement recovered dated from September; the research could not establish the disposition through the forecast date or authenticate a complete succession record. Failure to find a transfer therefore cannot certify that none occurred.

Other evidence also has limits. The cited Ipsos survey covered 400 internet-connected adults in four cities, not a national probability sample. Security deployments reveal conduct rather than private loyalty, and the historical departure sample is small and does not systematically capture interim presidencies.