Loading questions
Loading questions
Generated Nov 12, 2026, 11:06 PM · High effort
Other is the largest outcome category at 27.3%. Pete Buttigieg is the leading named contender at 15.3%, followed by Gavin Newsom at 13.9% and Jon Ossoff at 12.5%. No individual is a clear favorite.
| Option | Probability |
|---|---|
| Other | 27.3% |
| Pete Buttigieg | 15.3% |
| Gavin Newsom | 13.9% |
| Jon Ossoff | 12.5% |
| Josh Shapiro | 11.0% |
| Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez | 9.9% |
| Kamala Harris | 8.8% |
| Gretchen Whitmer | 1.4% |
“Other” combines every person outside the seven named candidates; it does not imply that any single unlisted contender leads Buttigieg. The forecast is dispersed because several credible candidates may compete, while important entry decisions remain unresolved.
The outcome is the official Democratic presidential nomination, not the primary popular-vote winner, the first presumptive nominee or the general-election winner.
Ossoff has substantial potential if he competes, but his October debate pledge to serve a full Senate term and his explicit rejection of presidential ambitions materially reduce his overall probability. Post-election reporting that he had avoided national interviews and was not attending the Denver gathering of prospective contenders reinforces that caution. Neither establishes an irreversible decision.
Harris and Newsom must be assessed together. Newsom has said he would not run against Harris, citing their overlapping supporters. Her decision therefore changes both candidacies. Whitmer’s public reluctance and reported interest in taking a break similarly explain her low probability; she is not treated as permanently excluded.
Extensive campaigning and a forthcoming national-policy book support the expectation that Buttigieg will seriously consider competing. The post-midterm Reuters/Ipsos survey also found strong candidate-quality ratings for both Buttigieg and Ossoff.
Buttigieg’s main obstacle is coalition breadth. His weak support among Black voters in his previous presidential campaign remains important under a calendar beginning in South Carolina. His position at the top of the named field reflects a balance of likely participation and competitive potential—not an established polling lead.
The November Economist/YouGov survey puts Harris first in national nomination preferences. Reuters/Ipsos, however, shows particularly favorable reception for Buttigieg and Ossoff, alongside substantial room for them to become better known. Harris’s near-universal recognition leaves less obvious upside from increased visibility alone.
These surveys measure different things. YouGov asks for a preferred nominee; Ipsos asks respondents to rate potential candidates, allowing favorable assessments of several people. Neither directly measures the probability of winning the nomination.
Ossoff’s decisive Georgia victory strengthens his electoral credibility, although a favorable statewide Democratic environment contributed. Shapiro’s Pennsylvania reelection supports an argument that he can win competitive states, but does not yet demonstrate a national primary constituency.
Ocasio-Cortez has a plausible progressive route and significant fundraising capacity. Her organizational changes are meaningful, but could support a Senate campaign rather than a presidential bid.
The unlisted field also contains concrete alternatives. Reporting identifies presidential staffing discussions involving Mark Kelly and Andy Beshear, while decisive reelections strengthened JB Pritzker and Wes Moore. This breadth is a central reason “Other” exceeds any named candidate.
The forecast weighs the following main routes to nomination. They describe possible outcomes rather than additional, separately quantified forecasts.
| Route | How it leads to the nomination | Why it carries its current weight |
|---|---|---|
| Buttigieg or Shapiro builds a broad coalition | A serious campaign converts existing visibility or electoral credibility into early-state support, organization and endorsements. | Both have credible paths to participation. Buttigieg has stronger demonstrated national receptivity; Shapiro has a compelling reelection record. Neither has yet proved a winning coalition across the opening states. |
| Harris or Newsom consolidates support | Harris enters and uses her existing constituency, or stays out and gives Newsom greater room to mobilize overlapping networks. | Their support and resources are real, but their participation is linked. Harris remains undecided, and Newsom’s pledge constrains the field without making future coordination certain. |
| Ossoff reconsiders and converts his opportunity into a campaign | His electoral record, national reform message and favorable reception translate into an authorized organization and a broader primary coalition. | He has the strongest assessed competitive upside if he participates. The principal discount is uncertainty about willingness, supported by both his statements and immediate post-election conduct. |
| Ocasio-Cortez wins through progressive consolidation | Fundraising and activist enthusiasm become a presidential organization capable of winning beyond her strongest supporters. | She has a distinct constituency and organizational resources. The Senate alternative and the need to broaden early-state support limit the weight on this route. |
| An unlisted contender breaks through | A governor, senator or later-emerging candidate attracts support as the field forms and other candidates decline or falter. | Several credible alternatives already show preparation or electoral strength. Their combined opportunities make this the largest category, without establishing a leading unlisted individual. |
| Whitmer reverses her reluctance | She chooses to compete and turns her governing record into an active national campaign. | This remains possible, but the available evidence supports a much lower expectation of participation than for the other principal contenders. |
Harris’s decision and Newsom’s reported early-January 2027 decision window. A Harris announcement would raise her probability and, if Newsom maintains his pledge, lower his. A Harris decision not to run would lower hers and raise Newsom’s opportunity. Either decision would settle a major uncertainty and make the forecast worth rerunning.
Ossoff-authorized preparation, at any time. Confirmed presidential staffing, committed donors, early-state organization or a directly attributable statement of reconsideration would raise his probability. A fresh post-election rejection explicitly acknowledging his improved opportunity would lower it. Either would justify rerunning the forecast. Unsolicited draft efforts or admiring commentary would be much weaker evidence.
Buttigieg’s book release on January 26, 2027. Publication is already anticipated in the forecast. Accompanying presidential organization and evidence of broader early-state support would raise his prospects; persistent weakness among Black voters would lower them. A book alone would not establish a campaign.
Ocasio-Cortez’s choice of office and unlisted contenders’ staffing decisions. A clear presidential commitment would raise her probability; a Senate commitment would lower it. Concrete presidential launches by credible unlisted contenders would generally strengthen “Other.” A decisive choice of office or major launch would make the forecast worth rerunning.
Opening contests: South Carolina on January 22, Nevada on February 1 and New Hampshire on February 8, 2028. Strong early-state polling with adequate demographic samples—and then actual results—would raise candidates demonstrating broad support and lower those whose appeal fails to transfer. These developments would directly test the forecast’s largest coalition assumptions and warrant a rerun.
The Democratic National Convention, scheduled for August 7–10, 2028. Official nomination, or an official substitute process, settles the question. A presumptive nominee’s withdrawal before that point changes the relevant outcome; a replacement after the qualifying official nomination does not.
The forecast uses a judgment-based participation-and-strength model. It separates the likelihood that a person becomes a serious contender from their competitive strength if they participate. It then considers possible fields, explicitly links Newsom’s participation to Harris’s decision, and averages the nomination outcomes across those fields. “Other” is represented as a collective alternative throughout.
Competitive strength summarizes voter appeal, coalition potential, organization, electoral credibility and campaign upside. These inputs are assessments informed by evidence, not precisely estimated polling parameters. The displayed precision should not be mistaken for equivalent certainty.
The information sources with the greatest bearing were:
Hover a data point to trace its series, or click to view the forecast generated at that time.
Showing 6 of 8 options.
Signed forecast receipt
Signed Nov 12, 2026, 11:06 PM with ed25519 key preseen-prod-ed25519-20260523 and externally timestamped Nov 12, 2026, 11:06 PM.
sha256:f33ae5ce17bb75...8d55e1d8b8Preseen researches your questions and answers them with calibrated, source-backed forecasts.