# Will Bolivian president Rodrigo Paz Pereira remain in power through the end of 2026?

Canonical URL: https://preseen.com/reports/f8753a6b-ed6e-41bf-8c02-d2c8c0f8c3a6/will-bolivian-president-rodrigo-paz-pereira-remain-in-power-through-the-end-of-2
Markdown URL: https://preseen.com/reports/f8753a6b-ed6e-41bf-8c02-d2c8c0f8c3a6/markdown

## Forecast

P(Yes): 88.4%; P(No): 11.6%.

Generated: September 18, 2026 at 4:27 AM UTC
Resolution check date: 2027-01-02
Forecast model: gpt-5.6-sol
Research model: gpt-5.6-sol

## Analysis

## TL;DR
I assign an **88% probability of YES**. Paz survived a 53-day national blockade crisis, and the legislature has since backed both a 90-day emergency extension and his IMF financing plan while the military remains publicly aligned with constitutional continuity ([El País](https://elpais.com/america/2026-09-17/paz-extiende-el-estado-de-excepcion-por-otros-90-dias-en-bolivia-para-evitar-nuevas-protestas.html), [Economy Ministry](https://economiayfinanzas.gob.bo/node/23373), [Los Tiempos](https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/pais/20260807/comandante-ffaa-ratifica-que-defendera-estabilidad-del-gobierno-voluntad)). The main path to NO is an attempt to arrest Evo Morales that turns violent, reunites the fragmented protest coalition, and causes police, military, or legislative defections ([La Razón](https://larazon.bo/nacional/2026/09/16/oviedo-dice-que-el-gobierno-ejecutara-la-operacion-evo-morales/)).

## Context
Bolivia’s official presidency website still identifies Rodrigo Paz Pereira as president and records his inauguration on November 8, 2025 ([Presidency of Bolivia](https://presidencia.gob.bo/index.php/presidente-de-bolivia/)). At the September 18 cutoff, he needs to survive just under 105 more days. No resignation, completed removal proceeding, incapacity finding, or succession event is underway publicly.

The political environment remains dangerous. Paz’s approval has collapsed, fuel and foreign-exchange problems persist, his cabinet and party are fractured, and several sectors are preparing further pressure. Yet the country is not currently experiencing the nationwide siege seen in May and June: a September 17 road report showed one socially motivated obstruction on the trunk network rather than dozens of simultaneous blockades ([Red Uno](https://www.reduno.com.bo/noticias/viaja-este-jueves-revise-las-rutas-con-bloqueos-y-restricciones-202691793227)).

## Evidence
The historical prior favors survival over a short window. A classic comparative study found that 23% of elected South American presidents were forced from office before completing their terms, but that is a full-term rate spread across several years, not a three-and-a-half-month probability ([Hochstetler, 2006](https://doi.org/10.2307/20434009)). Bolivia is riskier than the regional norm: research on Bolivian protest politics identifies four protest-driven shortened presidencies since democratic restoration—in 1985, 2003, 2005, and 2019 ([Journal of Latin American Studies](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X24000208)). Across roughly 43.94 country-years from October 1982 to this cutoff, a constant-hazard calculation gives a political-exit baseline of \(1-e^{-(4/43.94)(104.99/365.25)}=2.6\%\) for the remaining period.

Paz’s present risk is several times that baseline, but the closest analogue has already broken in his favor. The May–June confrontation lasted 53 days, generated explicit demands for his resignation, disrupted national supplies, and left 22 reported deaths; Paz survived, negotiated away parts of the coalition, and restored road access under emergency powers ([El País, June 23](https://elpais.com/america/2026-06-23/paz-logra-desbloquear-las-carreteras-de-bolivia-despues-de-mas-de-50-dias-de-conflicto-social.html), [El País, September 17](https://elpais.com/america/2026-09-17/paz-extiende-el-estado-de-excepcion-por-otros-90-dias-en-bolivia-para-evitar-nuevas-protestas.html)). Bolivian presidents usually fall only after street pressure is joined by elite isolation and police or military withdrawal. Neither of those decisive end-stage conditions is visible now.

The freshest institutional evidence is favorable. On September 17, the legislature approved a further 90 days of emergency rule by **100 votes to 58 among 158 members present** ([Panamericana](https://www.panamericana.bo/articulo/nacional/100-votos-respaldo-ejecutivo-logra-prorrogar-estado-excepcion-entre-debates-reactivacion-economica-riesgos-gobernabilidad/20260917110259016904.html)). Paz’s PDC entered the legislature with only 49 of 130 deputies and 16 of 36 senators, so that result required broad support outside his own bloc ([Congressional Research Service](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48767/R48767.2.pdf)). On the same date, the Chamber of Deputies approved the proposed $1.9 billion IMF financing by more than two-thirds and sent it onward in the legislative process ([Bolivian Economy Ministry](https://economiayfinanzas.gob.bo/node/23373)). These are issue-specific votes, not a stable governing majority. They still show that much of the political class prefers an empowered and financed Paz administration to near-term collapse.

The security evidence points the same way. Armed Forces commander Víctor Hugo Balderrama said on August 7 that the military and police would protect the stability of the democratically elected government ([Los Tiempos](https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/pais/20260807/comandante-ffaa-ratifica-que-defendera-estabilidad-del-gobierno-voluntad)). The security institutions subsequently supplied assessments supporting the emergency extension, and there is no credible public report of a mutiny, unit-level refusal, military ultimatum, or senior commander demanding succession. The Organization of American States also reported broad support for respecting Bolivia’s elected mandates and said they should be altered only through constitutional mechanisms ([OAS, September 3](https://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-095/26)). External backing cannot prevent collapse after a domestic coercive rupture, but it increases the cost of an overt coup.

The largest discrete risk is Evo Morales. Interior Minister Marco Antonio Oviedo told the legislature on September 16 that the government would execute an operation to arrest him, without giving a date or plan ([La Razón](https://larazon.bo/nacional/2026/09/16/oviedo-dice-que-el-gobierno-ejecutara-la-operacion-evo-morales/)). Morales remains protected in Chapare, has warned that an intervention could produce civil conflict, and his supporters have called a national meeting at Lauca Ñ for September 26 ([Euronews](https://www.euronews.com/2026/06/24/evo-morales-warns-of-civil-war-from-chapare-stronghold-i-will-not-surrender), [Visión 360](https://www.vision360.bo/noticias/2026/08/14/62851-cocaleros-afirman-que-no-permitiran-la-ampliacion-del-estado-de-excepcion-y-convocan-al-ampliado-del-evo-pueblo-para-el-26-de-septiembre)). Against that, two warrants have remained unexecuted and the state has repeatedly avoided a direct assault on his stronghold, showing that officials understand the political and human cost ([EFE](https://efe.com/mundo/2026-08-09/ordenes-captura-evo-morales-por-que-sigue-libre/)). I estimate roughly an even chance of a serious arrest attempt before year-end. A clean arrest would strengthen Paz; a failed or bloody operation is the clearest route to NO.

Other protest sectors remain active but fragmented. Public teachers marched in several cities on September 15, while official security reports recorded seven localized blockade points in the two weeks before September 10 and warned of possible coordination among transport, labor, campesino, and cocalero groups ([EFE via Infobae](https://www.infobae.com/america/agencias/2026/09/16/maestros-bolivianos-marchan-contra-ampliacion-de-estado-de-excepcion-y-ajustes-economicos/), [Bolivian Interior Ministry](https://web.mingobierno.gob.bo/?nota_prensa=%F0%9D%97%A0%F0%9D%97%B6%F0%9D%97%BB%F0%9D%97%B6%F0%9D%98%80%F0%9D%98%81%F0%9D%97%BF%F0%9D%97%BC-%F0%9D%97%B1%F0%9D%97%B2-%F0%9D%97%9A%F0%9D%97%BC%F0%9D%97%AF%F0%9D%97%B6%F0%9D%97%B2%F0%9D%97%BF-11)). Santa Cruz organizations have also threatened escalating pressure over fuel, revenue-sharing, and autonomy demands ([La Pólvora](https://lapolvora.net/contenido/194/santa-cruz-gobierno-10-octubre-autonomia-facto)). These actors do not share a natural successor or program: eastern business groups want open roads and stronger enforcement, while Morales-aligned groups use blockades as leverage. That coordination problem materially lowers removal risk.

Paz is nevertheless politically weak. An Ipsos CIESMORI survey fielded online among 400 internet-connected adults in La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz from August 19–31 found 21% approval and 65% disapproval; it is a useful urban indicator but not a nationally representative rural-and-urban probability sample ([Brújula Digital](https://brujuladigital.net/politica/2026/09/02/encuesta-tras-escandalo-cerimedo-aprobacion-de-rodrigo-paz-cae-al-21--65847)). The same polling series put Vice President Edmand Lara at 10% approval and 75% disapproval, making him a weak consensus replacement despite his open hostility toward Paz ([Oxígeno](https://oxigeno.bo/encuesta-paz-tiene-una-desaprobacion-del-65-y-lara-del-75-en-el-eje-troncal-del-pais/)). Only six of Paz’s original 15 ministers remained by August 21, and the Cerimedo scandal has damaged the government’s anti-corruption claims ([Associated Press](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-rodrigo-paz-fba61c2e7879a51000c7ad8230bda4a6)). The PDC itself split between a faction withdrawing support and legislators defending governability ([Correo del Sur](https://correodelsur.com/politica/20260910/pdc-se-divide-entre-respaldo-a-rodrigo-paz-y-ruptura-con-el-gobierno.html)).

Those weaknesses lack a fast constitutional channel. Bolivia’s electoral authority says a recall can start only after half the elected term has elapsed, which puts an ordinary recall outside 2026 ([Órgano Electoral Plurinacional](https://www.oep.org.bo/institucional-institucional/conoce-los-requisitos-y-el-sistema-electoral-para-las-revocatorias-de-mandato/)). The constitution requires a prosecutor-general request and approval by at least two-thirds of legislators present before the Supreme Tribunal can try a president, while actual cessation requires a final criminal judgment, resignation, death, definitive incapacity, or recall ([Bolivian Constitution](https://web.oep.org.bo/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/constitucion_politica_estado.pdf)). Completing that route before December 31 would require a sudden and broad institutional realignment.

The economy keeps the protest risk alive. An independent estimate published September 14 put real GDP contraction at 3.34% in the first half of 2026, while official August CPI data published September 3 showed 1.10% monthly inflation and 5.02% over twelve months ([INESAD](https://www.inesad.edu.bo/2026/09/14/pulso-macroeconomico-agosto-2026/), [Bolivian INE](https://www.ine.gob.bo/index.php/el-indice-de-precios-al-consumidor-ipc-presento-una-variacion-positiva-de-110-en-agosto-de-2026/)). The IMF’s July 29 staff-level agreement offers about $1.9 billion over 36 months and could catalyze a package exceeding $5 billion, but it still requires Executive Board approval and agreed prior actions ([IMF](https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/07/29/pr26268-bolivia-imf-reaches-staff-level-agreement-on-an-extended-fund-facility-arrangement)). Financing lowers near-term collapse risk; subsidy, exchange-rate, and fiscal reforms can also trigger protests.

My scenario model assigns 54% to broadly managed politics with a 1.5% conditional exit risk, 29% to disruptive but contained protests with an 8% exit risk, 14% to a severe crisis involving lethal violence or partial elite and security fracture with a 50% exit risk, and 3% to another sudden legal, health, or coercive shock with a 49% exit risk. These judgmental branches produce 11.6% NO and 88.4% YES.

## What's non-obvious
The state of exception is evidence of weakness and strength at the same time. The government believes renewed national blockades are plausible, but 100 legislators chose to give Paz additional coercive authority rather than constrain him. The vote matters more than hostile speeches from party leaders because it reveals what legislators did when forced to choose.

The successor problem also protects Paz. Lara benefits formally from a vacancy, but he is less popular than Paz and has not assembled a credible legislative, social, and security coalition for succession. Meanwhile, an Evo arrest is not automatically bearish: a low-casualty operation could restore state authority and strengthen Paz. The dangerous branch requires several events in sequence—an operation, serious bloodshed or failure, a reunited national protest coalition, and then elite or security-force defection.

## Uncertainties
- The September legislative totals show issue-specific support, but no complete named roll-call was available showing whether the same members would protect Paz personally during a removal crisis.
- Public military statements and completed deployments show command alignment, not the private mood of rank-and-file police or regional commanders. Bolivia’s prior collapses show that cohesion can change quickly after deaths or a failed operation.
- The government disclosed no timetable, force composition, or operational plan for arresting Morales. Public promises may represent real preparation, deterrence, or political signaling to anti-Morales legislators and Santa Cruz groups.
- The best approval poll is an online urban survey with a sample of 400, while the first-half GDP contraction is an estimate rather than finalized national accounts. Both establish stress, but neither precisely measures the size of a removal coalition.

The forecast stays below 90% because Paz faces a real October–December escalation path. It stays well above even odds because the current protest level is far below its earlier peak, formal removal routes are slow, opposition interests conflict, and both the legislature and security command have recently acted in ways that support continuity.

## Sources

- Domain Expert Search (mcp)
  > Found 14 domain experts for 'Bolivia politics Rodrigo Paz survival protests military legislature presidential removal September 2026':
- Domain Expert Research Task (mcp)
  > Job domain_expert_research_task_de56e7dcd7 done after 380954ms.
- [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/who-is-bolivias-new-president-rodrigo-paz-2025-10-20) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-congreso-ampliacion-estado-excepcion-protestas-62e0549d9c417d622aa93b2ec245d0eb) (tool)
- [infobae.com](https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2026/09/03/nuevo-comandante-de-la-policia-de-bolivia-afirma-que-la-detencion-de-evo-morales-es-una-prioridad) (tool)
- [eju.tv](https://eju.tv/2026/09/la-operacion-evo-morales-se-va-a-realizar-gobierno-ratifica-su-aprehension) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-protestas-rodrigo-paz-evo-morales-145f235d923211c6175199ee43790c5d) (tool)
- [france24.com](https://www.france24.com/es/minuto-a-minuto/20260904-partidarios-de-evo-morales-protestan-en-bolivia-contra-alza-de-combustible) (tool)
- [france24.com](https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20260822-bolivia-rodrigo-paz-destituye-a-su-ministro-de-econom%C3%ADa-en-medio-de-una-semana-de-esc%C3%A1ndalos) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-rodrigo-paz-crisis-economica-5290fae581b98696c332660a20b1989c) (tool)
- [elpais.com](https://elpais.com/america/2026-09-17/fernando-cerimedo-el-estratega-digital-de-la-derecha-latinoamericana-caido-en-desgracia.html) (tool)
- [france24.com](https://www.france24.com/es/minuto-a-minuto/20260917-el-congreso-boliviano-aprueba-ampliar-por-90-d%C3%ADas-el-estado-de-excepci%C3%B3n-ante-las-amenazas-de-protestas-sociales) (tool)
- [eju.tv](https://eju.tv/2026/06/vicepresidencia-propuesta-de-referendo-revocatorio-de-alarcon-es-inconstitucional) (tool)
- [eju.tv](https://eju.tv/2026/06/oficialismo-y-oposicion-rechazan-propuesta-de-referendo-revocatorio-contra-rodrigo-paz) (tool)
- [bolivia.com](https://www.bolivia.com/actualidad/politica/ya-tenemos-claro-que-es-masista-crecen-las-criticas-contra-edmand-lara-por-su-cercania-con-leonardo-loza-600669) (tool)
- [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/30/evo-morales-defiant-after-new-bolivia-arrest-warrant?traffic_source=rss) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-evo-morales-orden-detencion-protestas-contra-paz-e6a13512246aadf420f92e7a9e6f9656) (tool)
- [france24.com](https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20260521-bolivia-el-gobierno-intenta-el-despeje-de-v%C3%ADas-mientras-evo-morales-pide-elecciones-anticipadas) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-rodrigo-paz-protestas-evo-morales-b2db0559aa05c6f8332a553a0144a6a0) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-rodrigo-paz-evo-morales-protestas-crisis-economica-f475da26726b74adf459f8d7421e2879) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-protesta-maestros-estado-de-excepcion-economia-crisis-a1bef6a9e7ef7675d307602e4f8da2b7) (tool)
- [france24.com](https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20260603-paz-prepara-el-terreno-para-el-estado-de-excepci%C3%B3n-mientras-bolivia-registra-10-muertes-por-bloqueos) (tool)
- [infobae.com](https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2026/08/04/el-gobierno-y-la-policia-de-bolivia-se-contradicen-sobre-la-aprehension-de-evo-morales-tras-casi-dos-anos-sin-ejecucion) (tool)
- [dw.com](https://www.dw.com/es/rodrigo-paz-pide-combatir-el-narcoterrorismo-en-bolivia/a-78581763) (tool)
- [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/bolivia-extends-state-emergency-over-risks-new-blockades-2026-09-17) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-rodrigo-paz-explosion-cuartel-rescatistas-fallecidos-heridos-desaparecidos-0995aebec4bf786ebe3560cdd3ae331c) (tool)
- [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/7/bolivian-military-base-blast-leaves-seven-dead-seven-missing) (tool)
- [france24.com](https://www.france24.com/es/video/20260908-contin%C3%BAa-la-b%C3%BAsqueda-de-v%C3%ADctimas-por-explosi%C3%B3n-de-dep%C3%B3sito-militar-en-bolivia) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-protestas-rodrigo-paz-evo-morales-7ccaba47a2ab116bc67c8787924c541c) (tool)
- [swissinfo.ch](https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/evo-morales-dice-que-ampliar-estado-de-excepci%C3%B3n-en-bolivia-es-%22para-reprimir-al-pueblo%22/92063452) (tool)
- [eldeber.com.bo](https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/115-legisladores-instalan-sesion-asamblea-debatir-estado-excepcion_1789591318) (tool)
- [eldeber.com.bo](https://eldeber.com.bo/santa-cruz/nueve-delitos-comite-pro-santa-cruz-presenta-denuncia-evo-morales-argollo-salazar-bloqueos_1782917952) (tool)
- [eldeber.com.bo](https://eldeber.com.bo/santa-cruz/civicos-evo-morales-tiene-dos-caminos-presentarse-voluntariamente-justicia-ser-aprehendido_1785424627) (tool)
- [reduno.com.bo](https://www.reduno.com.bo/noticias/confirman-directorio-ampliado-del-comite-pro-santa-cruz-con-autoridades-nacionales-2026828194552) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-ypfb-intervencion-diesel-rodrigo-paz) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-ley-inversiones-paz-atraer-capitales-crisis-d3c62138405357e7e0943090e9c52b04) (tool)
- hdx Hapi (mcp)
  > ACLED Conflict Events (20 records)
- GDELT (mcp)
  > {"query":"in BL with event codes 14, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145","parameters":{"actor1":null,"actor2":null,"event_codes":["14","140","141","142","143","144","145"],"locations":["BL"],"themes":null,"date_range":["2026-01-01","2026-09-17"],"aggregation":"monthly","return_format":"timeseries"},"backtesting_info":{"cutoff_date":"2026-09-18","effective_end_date":"2026-09-17","is_backtesting":false,"warning":null},"data":{"data":[{"date":"2026-01","event_count":69,"avg_tone":-2.6344491661800387,"av…
- [Paz extiende el estado de excepción por otros 90 días en Bolivia para evitar nuevas protestas](https://elpais.com/america/2026-09-17/paz-extiende-el-estado-de-excepcion-por-otros-90-dias-en-bolivia-para-evitar-nuevas-protestas.html) (openai)
- [Evo Morales warns of civil war from Chapare stronghold: 'I will not surrender' | Euronews](https://www.euronews.com/2026/06/24/evo-morales-warns-of-civil-war-from-chapare-stronghold-i-will-not-surrender) (openai)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-protestas-rodrigo-paz-evo-morales-aeb95047942ef6ab5239f1c7cefa39df) (tool)
- [dw.com](https://www.dw.com/es/ley-1341-en-bolivia-sacar%C3%A1-rodrigo-paz-a-los-militares-a-las-calles/a-77397855) (tool)
- [eldeber.com.bo](https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/medio-crisis-bolivia-rodrigo-paz-ratifica-alto-mando-militar_1781869705) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-fmi-credito-crisis-economica-0c1923b2f031023545c3b22089e39140) (tool)
- [brujuladigital.net](https://brujuladigital.net/economia/2026/09/11/legisladores-anticipan-debate-por-eliminacion-de-la-subvencion-a-carburantes-y-el-credito-del-fmi-66249) (tool)
- [infobae.com](https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2026/09/03/caso-cerimedo-la-fiscalia-de-bolivia-descarta-ampliar-investigacion-contra-la-esposa-de-rodrigo-paz) (tool)
- [brujuladigital.net](https://brujuladigital.net/politica/2026/09/02/encuesta-tras-escandalo-cerimedo-aprobacion-de-rodrigo-paz-cae-al-21--65847) (tool)
- [diariolibre.com](https://www.diariolibre.com/mundo/america-latina/2026/09/10/altercado-entre-edmand-lara-y-oficial-del-ejercito-en-bolivia/3655502) (tool)
- [france24.com](https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20260604-el-congreso-de-bolivia-debate-un-proyecto-para-reglamentar-un-estado-de-excepci%C3%B3n-humanitario) (tool)
- [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/30/evo-morales-defiant-after-new-bolivia-arrest-warrant) (tool)

## Question Details

This question asks whether Rodrigo Paz Pereira will continue to hold the office of President of the Plurinational State of Bolivia without interruption through the end of calendar year 2026. Rodrigo Paz Pereira assumed the presidency on 8 November 2025 after winning the 2025 presidential election and is the incumbent president as of June 2026. Recent reporting has described significant political and social unrest, including nationwide protests, road blockades, cabinet resignations, and public calls for his resignation during 2026. (presidencia.gob.bo) (elpais.com) The forecasting period runs from the time the question is asked until 31 December 2026. The question concerns whether Paz remains president continuously through that date.

### Resolution Criteria

Resolve YES if Rodrigo Paz Pereira is still serving as President of Bolivia at 23:59 local time in Bolivia on 31 December 2026 and has not permanently left the office before that moment. Resolve NO if, at any time before that moment, he ceases to be President of Bolivia due to resignation, removal, impeachment, death, incapacity, judicial or constitutional action, military coup, succession, replacement by an acting or permanent president, or any other loss of the presidency. Resolution will be based on official Bolivian government announcements and records. If those are unclear or unavailable, major international news organizations and widely recognized reference sources documenting the officeholder of the Bolivian presidency may be used.

### Fine Print

Temporary foreign travel, medical leave, or short-term delegation of powers does not count as leaving office if Rodrigo Paz Pereira legally remains President. If constitutional succession transfers the presidency to another person, even on an interim basis, before the end of 31 December 2026, the question resolves NO. If he leaves office and later returns before the end of 2026, the question still resolves NO because he did not remain in power continuously through the period. If reliable information sufficient to determine the officeholder is unavailable on the resolution check date, resolution may be delayed until the facts can be established.