# Will Bolivian president Rodrigo Paz Pereira remain in power through the end of 2026?

Canonical URL: https://preseen.com/reports/ea17c698-b6c0-4778-87fa-3df1e2be30a4/will-bolivian-president-rodrigo-paz-pereira-remain-in-power-through-the-end-of-2
Markdown URL: https://preseen.com/reports/ea17c698-b6c0-4778-87fa-3df1e2be30a4/markdown

## Forecast

P(Yes): 81.1%; P(No): 18.9%.

Generated: August 26, 2026 at 9:59 PM UTC
Resolution check date: 2027-01-02
Forecast model: gpt-5.6-sol
Research model: gpt-5.6-sol

## Analysis

## TL;DR
I assign an **81% chance of YES**: Rodrigo Paz Pereira remains continuously president through December 31, 2026. He survived the much larger May–June resignation campaign, and Bolivia’s political and security institutions have not converged on replacing him ([El País](https://elpais.com/america/2026-06-23/paz-logra-desbloquear-las-carreteras-de-bolivia-despues-de-mas-de-50-dias-de-conflicto-social.html)). The main threat is a new nationwide blockade cycle around the September 18 expiry of emergency powers, amplified by diesel anger and evidence emerging from the Cerimedo investigations ([El Post](https://elpost.com.bo/2026/08/13/paz-no-aclara-si-ampliara-el-estado-de-excepcion-que-vence-el-18-de-septiembre/), [El País](https://elpais.com/america/2026-08-26/la-fiscalia-boliviana-abre-una-tercera-investigacion-contra-cerimedo-por-supuestos-vinculos-con-el-narcotrafico.html)).

## Context
Paz remains Bolivia’s constitutional president at the August 26, 2026 cutoff. He took office on November 8, 2025, and official government reporting still recorded programs conducted under his presidency on August 24 ([Bolivian presidency](https://presidencia.gob.bo/index.php/presidente-de-bolivia/), [official August 24 release](https://presidencia.gob.bo/index.php/nota_prensa/gobierno-lanza-segunda-fase-del-programa-de-emergencia-para-generar-mas-de-73-mil-empleos/)). About 127.3 days remain until resolution.

His government is weak. Only six of the original 15 ministers remained by August 21, his alliance with Vice President Edmand Lara had become openly hostile, his legislative partners had fractured, and the arrest of former adviser Fernando Cerimedo opened a fast-growing scandal ([Associated Press](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-rodrigo-paz-fba61c2e7879a51000c7ad8230bda4a6), [El Post](https://elpost.com.bo/2026/08/26/paz-negocia-voto-a-voto-ni-su-propia-bancada-le-responde-en-bloque/)). Weakness makes further crises likely. It does not yet imply that Paz will lose the office.

## Evidence
The historical backbone is adverse but easy to misuse. A study of Bolivia’s democratic period identifies four presidents pushed out early by protests—in 1985, 2003, 2005 and 2019 ([Journal of Latin American Studies](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X24000208)). Four events over roughly 43.9 years imply an average 127.3-day protest-removal risk of about 3.1%: `1 − exp[−(4/43.9) × (127.3/365.25)]`. Paz’s present risk is several times higher because he already faces the conditions associated with presidential failure: mass protest, economic adjustment, scandal exposure and minority government. Across South America, one study found that one in six presidents failed to complete their terms among 65 presidencies from 1979–2012; an earlier reference class found 11 failures among 17 challenged South American presidents, but those figures cover whole terms and complete crises rather than the next four months ([Martínez](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0192512115604904), [Hochstetler and Edwards](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1866802X0900100202)).

The best survival evidence is observed, not theoretical: Paz already endured the peak crisis. Bolivia’s ombudsman recorded 103 blockade points across seven departments on June 2, while the June 20 emergency declaration followed weeks of shortages, violence and at least 17 deaths ([Defensoría del Pueblo](https://www.defensoria.gob.bo/uploads/files/segundo-reporte-preliminar-sobre-la-conflictividad-social-en-bolivia-del-1%C2%B0-de-mayo-al-2-de-junio-2026.pdf), [Associated Press](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-state-of-emergency-blockades-food-fuel-b279b823152c51c27f794cd9837d4aa6)). By June 23, the national road network was open again ([El País](https://elpais.com/america/2026-06-23/paz-logra-desbloquear-las-carreteras-de-bolivia-despues-de-mas-de-50-dias-de-conflicto-social.html)). Current unrest is real but much smaller: roughly 200 producers were blocking one Beni–Santa Cruz route on August 26 without reported clashes, and pro-Morales governor Leonardo Loza said his movement was not formally demanding Paz’s resignation at that point ([Oxígeno](https://oxigeno.bo/en-medio-del-estado-de-excepcion-productores-bloquean-la-carretera-entre-beni-y-santa-cruz-por-el-diesel/), [Radio Fides](https://radiofides.com/politica/loza-sostiene-que-el-evismo-no-plantea-la-renuncia-de-paz-pero-dice-que-hay-un-sentimiento-generalizado)).

Security-force behavior remains the central variable. Armed-forces commander Víctor Hugo Balderrama publicly committed on August 7 to defending the stability of the democratically elected government ([Los Tiempos](https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/pais/20260807/comandante-ffaa-ratifica-que-defendera-estabilidad-del-gobierno-voluntad)). Military and police units have continued deploying under government authority. Their negotiated withdrawal from Yapacaní after a long standoff and a 48-hour deadline to reconsider the diesel decree is a weakness signal, but it is not a mutiny or transfer of allegiance ([Red Uno](https://www.reduno.com.bo/noticias/fuerzas-armadas-y-policiales-se-repliegan-en-yapacani-tras-un-acuerdo-por-decreto-5676-202682520238)). A viral video purporting to show Balderrama demanding Paz’s resignation was fabricated ([AFP Factual](https://factual.afp.com/doc.afp.com.B4BX49E)). Public statements cannot reveal private loyalties, but the observed conduct is still closer to institutional support than to the police and military rupture that preceded Evo Morales’s 2019 departure.

Formal removal is difficult within the remaining window. Bolivia’s Constitution says a president leaves through death, resignation, definitive incapacity or absence, a final criminal conviction, or recall; recall cannot begin until half the five-year term has passed ([Constitution, Articles 169–170 and 240](https://www.senapi.gob.bo/normativas/constitucion-politica-del-estado/constitucion-politica-del-estado-plurinacional-de-bolivia)). A presidential criminal trial requires the prosecutor general’s involvement, authorization from two-thirds of legislators present, and adjudication by the Supreme Tribunal ([Law 044, Articles 16–18](https://www.contraloria.gob.bo/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/COMPENDIO-NORMATIVO-DEL-ORGANO-LEGISLATIVO-PLURINACIONAL-2.pdf)). The phrase “members present” matters: the threshold is not always a fixed 111 votes. Congress’s 91-vote censure of Economy Minister José Gabriel Espinoza shows that a large anti-government majority can form against an official, but ministerial censure is far easier than obtaining a final presidential conviction before December 31 ([El Post](https://elpost.com.bo/2026/08/26/paz-negocia-voto-a-voto-ni-su-propia-bancada-le-responde-en-bloque/)).

Public opinion and economics raise the chance of another crisis. An Ipsos CIESMORI online survey of 400 respondents in La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, fielded July 23–August 2, measured Paz at 32% approval and 55% disapproval; Lara’s approval was only 12% ([Ipsos CIESMORI](https://www.ipsosciesmori.com/direccion-del-pais-y-evaluacion-de-autoridades-julio-2026/), [Visión 360](https://www.vision360.bo/noticias/2026/08/05/61432-paz-y-lara-bajan-en-sus-niveles-de-aprobacion-y-escalan-en-la-desaprobacion-de-la-gestion)). The survey covers the main urban corridor, not a nationally representative electorate. July CPI fell 2.79% month over month, leaving inflation at 1.89% year-to-date and 4.93% year over year, largely because food supply normalized after the blockades ([Bolivian statistics agency](https://www.ine.gob.bo/index.php/el-indice-de-precios-al-consumidor-disminuyo-279-en-bolivia-durante-julio-de-2026/)). The IMF’s July 29 staff-level agreement offers $1.9 billion over 36 months and could unlock a package exceeding $5 billion, but it still requires prior actions and Executive Board approval ([IMF](https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/07/29/pr26268-bolivia-imf-reaches-staff-level-agreement-on-an-extended-fund-facility-arrangement)).

The Cerimedo case is the largest event-driven downside. Prosecutors had opened investigations involving attempted femicide, alleged illicit enrichment and alleged narcotics links by August 26; Nadia Beller also made allegations involving people in Paz’s circle ([El País](https://elpais.com/america/2026-08-26/la-fiscalia-boliviana-abre-una-tercera-investigacion-contra-cerimedo-por-supuestos-vinculos-con-el-narcotrafico.html), [Associated Press](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-rodrigo-paz-fba61c2e7879a51000c7ad8230bda4a6)). These are serious allegations, not proof against Paz. I could not verify a formal criminal charge or completed evidentiary filing against Paz personally by the cutoff. The case becomes presidency-threatening if authenticated documents or recordings directly connect him to corruption, violence or obstruction.

International support adds a smaller survival edge. The Organization of American States concluded its July mission by reiterating support for Bolivia’s constitutional, legitimately elected government under Paz ([OAS](https://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-088%2F26)). This cannot stop a domestic resignation, but it raises the cost of an overt coup or irregular succession.

My primary scenario model is:

| Path through year-end | Weight | P(NO given path) | Contribution to NO |
|---|---:|---:|---:|
| Managed weakness; local disputes, concessions and reshuffles | 36.0% | 2.5% | 0.90% |
| Recurrent but contained protests; no security rupture | 36.0% | 10.0% | 3.60% |
| Severe nationwide confrontation, with security forces initially cohesive | 16% | 35.0% | 5.60% |
| Elite or security cascade, coup-like pressure or coerced resignation | 8% | 82% | 6.56% |
| Scandal, legal, health or other sudden succession shock dominates | 4% | 60.0% | 2.40% |

This model gives 19.06% NO and 80.94% YES. I give it 55% weight, then combine it with a crisis-adjusted historical model at 83% YES, an institutional and actor model at 84% YES, and a 65% pessimistic stress case. The weighted result is `0.55 × 0.8094 + 0.25 × 0.83 + 0.15 × 0.84 + 0.05 × 0.65 = 0.81117`, reported as 0.8112.

## What's non-obvious
**A weak government is not the same as a departing president.** Legislative fragmentation, cabinet turnover and Lara’s hostility make governing harder, but they also make it harder to assemble a stable coalition for succession. Lara is the constitutional beneficiary of Paz’s departure, yet his 12% urban approval makes him an unattractive replacement for many legislators, business groups and foreign partners who dislike Paz ([Ipsos CIESMORI](https://www.ipsosciesmori.com/direccion-del-pais-y-evaluacion-de-autoridades-julio-2026/), [El Post](https://elpost.com.bo/2026/08/26/paz-negocia-voto-a-voto-ni-su-propia-bancada-le-responde-en-bloque/)).

The current protest cycle also differs from the terminal phase of 2003 or 2019. Productive sectors are joining the diesel dispute, which broadens the risk, but the pro-Morales movement was not yet formally renewing its demand for Paz’s resignation at the cutoff, and the security forces were negotiating or enforcing government policy rather than backing a successor ([Radio Fides](https://radiofides.com/politica/loza-sostiene-que-el-evismo-no-plantea-la-renuncia-de-paz-pero-dice-que-hay-un-sentimiento-generalizado), [Oxígeno](https://oxigeno.bo/en-medio-del-estado-de-excepcion-productores-bloquean-la-carretera-entre-beni-y-santa-cruz-por-el-diesel/)). The dangerous event is convergence: nationwide blockades, major casualties, documentary scandal evidence and an elite or security split occurring together.

## Uncertainties
- The Ivirgarzama rally began at 16:00 Bolivia time on August 26, less than two hours before the cutoff. I could not verify its final written resolutions or whether it authorized immediate nationwide blockades; the available reporting described the event beforehand as the start of mobilizations ([Nómada News](https://nomada.bo/evismo-convoca-a-movilizacion-en-el-tropico-y-anuncia-inicio-de-protestas-contra-el-dieselazo/)).
- Public reporting does not reveal internal military or police sentiment after the Cerimedo scandal. A fresh statement from the high command, records of refused orders, or credible reporting on command-level divisions would move the forecast more than another politician’s speech.
- The public evidence against Cerimedo is developing quickly, but the link to Paz remains unproven. Authenticated financial records, messages, recordings or a formal prosecutorial action naming Paz would close the largest factual gap ([El País](https://elpais.com/america/2026-08-26/la-fiscalia-boliviana-abre-una-tercera-investigacion-contra-cerimedo-por-supuestos-vinculos-con-el-narcotrafico.html)).
- Better data would include a nationally representative approval poll, daily official blockade counts, and a confirmed IMF Executive Board timetable. The current approval study is an online urban sample, while the IMF agreement remained conditional at the cutoff ([Ipsos CIESMORI](https://www.ipsosciesmori.com/direccion-del-pais-y-evaluacion-de-autoridades-julio-2026/), [IMF](https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/07/29/pr26268-bolivia-imf-reaches-staff-level-agreement-on-an-extended-fund-facility-arrangement)).

## Sources

- Domain Expert Search (mcp)
  > Found 14 domain experts for 'Bolivia political crisis 2026, presidential survival, protest movements, security forces, constitutional succession, Rodrigo Paz Pereira':
- Acled (mcp)
  > {
- Domain Expert Research Task (mcp)
  > Job domain_expert_research_task_1c5cd3adf0 done after 278231ms.
- [en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_Bolivia) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-minsitro-economia-designacion-presidente-paz-3f8f2bfa857614cc7818ab4c7c137024) (tool)
- [devdiscourse.com](https://www.devdiscourse.com/article/international/3967868-update-1-bolivias-paz-taps-deputy-to-lead-economy-after-ministers-ousting) (tool)
- [jagranjosh.com](https://www.jagranjosh.com/general-knowledge/bolivia-declares-state-of-emergency-know-causes-key-facts-and-impacts-1820009974-1) (tool)
- [latimes.com](https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2026-06-20/bolivias-president-declares-a-state-of-emergency-as-road-blockades-choke-supplies) (tool)
- [france24.com](https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20260620-bolivia-declares-state-of-emergency-as-protests-bring-economy-to-a-halt) (tool)
- [treaties.un.org](https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2026/CN.262.2026-Eng.pdf) (tool)
- [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/20/bolivia-declares-state-of-emergency-amid-blockade-crisis) (tool)
- [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/21/bolivian-president-declares-state-of-emergency-and-deploys-military-to-quell-anti-government-protests) (tool)
- [bloomberg.com](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-17/bolivia-hikes-diesel-prices-for-big-buyers-to-tame-supply-shock) (tool)
- [bolivianthoughts.com](https://bolivianthoughts.com/2026/08/17/ds-5676-the-diesel-shock-el-dieselazo) (tool)
- [reduno.com.bo](https://www.reduno.com.bo/noticias/despliegan-contingente-policial-a-yapacani-ante-anuncio-de-bloqueo-por-el-precio-del-diesel-20268256360) (tool)
- [unitel.bo](https://unitel.bo/noticias/seguridad/yapacani-policia-y-militares-se-despliegan-ante-bloqueo-anunciado-por-interculturales-contra-el-decreto-del-diesel-BF23046722) (tool)
- [jornada.com.bo](https://jornada.com.bo/gobierno-despliega-a-militares-y-policias-ante-amenaza-de-bloques-en-yapacani) (tool)
- [reduno.com.bo](https://www.reduno.com.bo/noticias/fuerzas-armadas-y-policiales-se-repliegan-en-yapacani-tras-un-acuerdo-por-decreto-5676-202682520238) (tool)
- [eldeber.com.bo](https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/gobierno-anuncia-cambios-decreto-diesel-busca-frenar-bloqueo-yapacani_1787676905) (tool)
- [eju.tv](https://eju.tv/2026/08/gobierno-abre-la-opcion-de-ajustar-o-anular-el-decreto-del-diesel-en-medio-de-presiones) (tool)
- [ahoradigital.net](https://ahoradigital.net/politica/25/08/2026/evistas-anuncian-movilizacion-nacional-contra-el-decreto-5676-pese-al-estado-de-excepcion) (tool)
- [brujuladigital.net](https://brujuladigital.net/politica/2026/08/23/seis-federaciones-llaman-a-no-tener-miedo-al-estado-de-excepcion-y-anuncian-el-inicio-de-movilizaciones-65399) (tool)
- [enfoquenews.com.bo](https://enfoquenews.com.bo/2026/08/25/camara-del-transporte-exige-al-gobierno-anular-el-ds-5676) (tool)
- [bolivia.com](https://www.bolivia.com/actualidad/nacionales/advierten-a-policias-y-militares-sobre-eventual-ingreso-al-tropico-597407) (tool)
- [prensamercosur.org](https://prensamercosur.org/2026/08/25/el-chapare-se-convierte-en-un-nuevo-foco-de-tension-en-bolivia-mientras-los-cocaleros-blindan-a-evo-morales) (tool)
- [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/bolivias-president-slams-irregular-mobilization-army-units-2024-06-26) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-coup-arce-morales-military-army-la-paz-b41453606ccd31f8f0cc4b3b7e3732ca) (tool)
- [jms.com.bo](https://jms.com.bo/mediamonitor/2026/08/24/nueve-meses-diez-ministros-asi-se-movio-el-gabinete-de-paz) (tool)
- [infobae.com](https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2026/08/04/relevos-renuncias-y-fusiones-asi-cambio-el-gabinete-de-rodrigo-paz-en-menos-de-un-ano) (tool)
- [riotimesonline.com](https://www.riotimesonline.com/bolivia-ministries-decree-5675-paz-cabinet) (tool)
- [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/21/bolivias-president-rodrigo-paz-nixes-economy-minister-amid-unrest) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-rodrigo-paz-fba61c2e7879a51000c7ad8230bda4a6) (tool)
- [ahoradigital.net](https://ahoradigital.net/politica/25/08/2026/aumenta-el-rechazo-al-ds-5676-sigue-desbande-en-el-gobierno) (tool)
- [riodejaneironews.net](https://www.riodejaneironews.net/news/279212701/bolivia-national-unity-party-leaves-ruling-coalition-joins-opposition) (tool)
- [lapatria.bo](https://lapatria.bo/enfoque-nacional/gestion/quiebre-definitivo-unidad-nacional-gobierno-paz) (tool)
- [rcbolivia.com](https://rcbolivia.com/samuel-doria-medina-rompe-con-rodrigo-paz-y-unidad-nacional-pasa-a-la-oposicion-retirando-su-respaldo-al-gobierno) (tool)
- [unitel.bo](https://unitel.bo/noticias/politica/legisladores-del-pdc-libre-y-apb-sumate-piden-modificar-o-abrogar-el-decreto-del-diesel-KH23061038) (tool)
- [noticiasfides.com](https://www.noticiasfides.com/nacional/politica/edmand-lara-afirma-que-no-piensa-renunciar-pese-a-estar-atado-de-pies-y-manos) (tool)
- [eju.tv](https://eju.tv/2026/08/lara-dice-que-su-cargo-no-es-eterno-y-asegura-que-se-ira-si-el-pueblo-decide-revocarlo) (tool)
- [canal26.com](https://www.canal26.com/politica/2026/08/22/ruptura-total-en-el-gobierno-de-bolivia-el-vicepresidente-lara-le-solto-la-mano-a-rodrigo-paz-y-aseguro-que-cerimedo-ordeno-el-ataque-a-su-expareja) (tool)
- [bolivia.com](https://www.bolivia.com/actualidad/politica/edmand-lara-exhorto-al-presidente-a-decir-la-verdad-y-gobernar-sin-mentiras-594994) (tool)
- [brujuladigital.net](https://brujuladigital.net/politica/2026/08/06/lara-le-pide-a-paz-que-tenga-valentia-y-que-no-gobierne-de-espaldas-al-pueblo-64662) (tool)
- [radiosplendid.bo](https://radiosplendid.bo/2026/08/11/lara-descarta-reunion-con-paz-yo-ya-no-tengo-porque-rogarle-ni-humillarme) (tool)
- [perfil.com](https://www.perfil.com/noticias/internacional/cerimedo-el-vice-boliviano-edmand-lara-habla-de-atentado-a-la-democracia-y-exige-a-paz-como-cerimedo-tenia-tanto-poder.phtml) (tool)
- [oxigeno.bo](https://oxigeno.bo/lara-si-hoy-habria-un-revocatorio-nos-vamos-con-mas-del-80-estamos-desprestigiados-como-gobierno) (tool)
- [noticiasfides.com](https://www.noticiasfides.com/nacional/politica/vicepresidente-y-jefes-de-bancada-convocan-a-reunion-a-movilizados-y-a-paz-para-buscar-soluciones-al-conflicto) (tool)
- [noticiasfides.com](https://www.noticiasfides.com/nacional/politica/exmagistrado-anuncia-que-planteara-un-juicio-de-responsabilidades-contra-rodrigo-paz) (tool)
- [radiosplendid.bo](https://radiosplendid.bo/2026/08/25/el-diputado-pacheco-impulsara-juicio-de-responsabilidades-contra-el-presidente-paz-y-denuncia-crisis-institucional) (tool)
- [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/aug/19/fernando-cerimedo-adviser-far-right-latin-american-leaders-arrested-allegedly-plotting-kill-girlfriend) (tool)
- [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/18/bolivia-arrests-political-adviser-to-latin-american-right-wingers) (tool)

## Question Details

This question asks whether Rodrigo Paz Pereira will continue to hold the office of President of the Plurinational State of Bolivia without interruption through the end of calendar year 2026. Rodrigo Paz Pereira assumed the presidency on 8 November 2025 after winning the 2025 presidential election and is the incumbent president as of June 2026. Recent reporting has described significant political and social unrest, including nationwide protests, road blockades, cabinet resignations, and public calls for his resignation during 2026. (presidencia.gob.bo) (elpais.com) The forecasting period runs from the time the question is asked until 31 December 2026. The question concerns whether Paz remains president continuously through that date.

### Resolution Criteria

Resolve YES if Rodrigo Paz Pereira is still serving as President of Bolivia at 23:59 local time in Bolivia on 31 December 2026 and has not permanently left the office before that moment. Resolve NO if, at any time before that moment, he ceases to be President of Bolivia due to resignation, removal, impeachment, death, incapacity, judicial or constitutional action, military coup, succession, replacement by an acting or permanent president, or any other loss of the presidency. Resolution will be based on official Bolivian government announcements and records. If those are unclear or unavailable, major international news organizations and widely recognized reference sources documenting the officeholder of the Bolivian presidency may be used.

### Fine Print

Temporary foreign travel, medical leave, or short-term delegation of powers does not count as leaving office if Rodrigo Paz Pereira legally remains President. If constitutional succession transfers the presidency to another person, even on an interim basis, before the end of 31 December 2026, the question resolves NO. If he leaves office and later returns before the end of 2026, the question still resolves NO because he did not remain in power continuously through the period. If reliable information sufficient to determine the officeholder is unavailable on the resolution check date, resolution may be delayed until the facts can be established.