# What will the US tariff rate on China be on July 1?

Canonical URL: https://preseen.com/reports/de82e5de-7091-4ea8-b871-2fe71d3e3254/what-will-the-us-tariff-rate-on-china-be-on-july-1
Markdown URL: https://preseen.com/reports/de82e5de-7091-4ea8-b871-2fe71d3e3254/markdown

## Forecast

Median forecast: 23.8; 80% interval: 23.6 to 25.2.

Generated: June 23, 2026 at 5:34 AM UTC
Forecast model: gpt-5.5
Research model: gpt-5.5

## Analysis

## TL;DR
My best estimate is **23.7%**. The direct anchor is Budget Lab Yale’s June 9 release: China has `weighted_etr = 0.237333` on July 1, 2026 under HTS revision `2026_rev_10`, with the 10% Section 122 surcharge still active until July 24 ([Budget Lab manifest](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Budget-Lab-Yale/tariff-rate-tracker/master/release/MANIFEST.json), [Budget Lab country file](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Budget-Lab-Yale/tariff-rate-tracker/master/release/data/daily_by_country_2026-06-09.csv), [CBP Section 122 guidance](https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSCBP/bulletins/40b3b7b)). The main noncentral branch is measurement risk: current-law statutory trackers sit near 23.7%–24.0%, while stale collected-duty or 15%-Section-122 estimates put China near 29%–30% ([Penn Wharton, June 16](https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/p/2026-06-16-effective-tariff-rates-and-revenues-updated-june-16-2026/), [USAFacts, Apr. 16](https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/china/), [China Briefing, June 3](https://www.china-briefing.com/news/us-china-tariff-rates-2025/)).

## Context
The July 1 rate sits after the February 20, 2026 Supreme Court decision that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs and after Executive Order 14389 ended collection of IEEPA ad valorem duties; Section 232 and Section 301 duties were expressly left in place ([Supreme Court opinion](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-1287_4gcj.pdf), [White House EO 14389](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/02/ending-certain-tariff-actions/)). The live broad overlay is Proclamation 11012’s Section 122 surcharge: 10% ad valorem from February 24, 2026 through 12:01 a.m. EDT on July 24, 2026, with product exemptions and no stacking on the Section 232-covered share of imports ([Federal Register Proclamation 11012](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/full_text/html/2026/02/25/2026-03824.html), [CBP CSMS 67844987](https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSCBP/bulletins/40b3b7b)).

The question asks for a trade-weighted average rate in effect on a date. That fits Budget Lab’s tracker better than a monthly customs-collections ratio, because the tracker computes daily statutory rates by HTS-10 product and partner country, then weights them with 2024 Census import values ([Budget Lab methodology](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/research/introducing-tariff-rate-tracker-open-source-tool-daily-effective-tariff-rates), [Budget Lab release README](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Budget-Lab-Yale/tariff-rate-tracker/master/release/README.md)). The relevant vintage is the June 9, 2026 release, published at 17:59:46 -0400, current through HTS revision `2026_rev_10`, with 175,200 country-day rows in the country file ([Budget Lab manifest](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Budget-Lab-Yale/tariff-rate-tracker/master/release/MANIFEST.json)).

## Evidence
The historical backbone is that China was already the high-tariff outlier before the 2025–2026 tariff cycle, then fell sharply after the IEEPA layer was removed. USAFacts’ observed customs-duty measure says China averaged about 5% over 2002–2024, 10.9% in calendar 2024, 30.6% in calendar 2025, and 29.6% in February 2026; that source defines the rate as estimated customs duties and import-related fees divided by goods imports, not the statutory rate in force on a given day ([USAFacts China page](https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/china/)). Penn Wharton’s June 16 update, using USITC DataWeb customs data, reports that China faced the highest major-partner effective rate in April 2026 at 24%, after the March decline from IEEPA repeal and Section 122 replacement ([Penn Wharton, June 16](https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/p/2026-06-16-effective-tariff-rates-and-revenues-updated-june-16-2026/)).

| Source and vintage | Coverage and unit | China value | How I use it |
|---|---:|---:|---|
| USAFacts, updated Apr. 16, 2026 | Customs-duty/import-value approximation; annual 2002–2025 and monthly through Feb. 2026 | 10.9% in 2024, 30.6% in 2025, 29.6% in Feb. 2026 | High-side history, but lagged and collected-duty based ([USAFacts](https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/china/)) |
| Penn Wharton, published June 16, 2026 | USITC DataWeb customs duties divided by import value; latest observation Apr. 2026 | 24% | Cross-check that post-IEEPA observed data moved into the mid-20s ([Penn Wharton](https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/p/2026-06-16-effective-tariff-rates-and-revenues-updated-june-16-2026/)) |
| Budget Lab State of U.S. Tariffs, Apr. 8, 2026 | Statutory pre- and post-substitution scenarios; end-2026 with Section 122 active or expired | 23.9% pre-substitution if Section 122 extended; 19.4% if expired | Confirms the active-Section-122 statutory China rate is about 24% and the post-expiry rate is about 19% ([Budget Lab Apr. 8 report](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/sites/default/files/page_to_pdf/1466/publication_1466.pdf)) |
| Budget Lab country file, published June 9, 2026 | Statutory daily `weighted_etr`; 2024 Census import weights; China code 5700; 20,329 HTS products | **23.7333% on July 1, 2026** | Main resolution anchor ([Budget Lab country file](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Budget-Lab-Yale/tariff-rate-tracker/master/release/data/daily_by_country_2026-06-09.csv), [manifest](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Budget-Lab-Yale/tariff-rate-tracker/master/release/MANIFEST.json)) |
| Budget Lab country file, published June 9, 2026 | Same series, scheduled Section 122 step-down | 19.3270% on July 24, 2026 | Lower-tail anchor if Section 122 is not counted or is removed before July 1 ([Budget Lab country file](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Budget-Lab-Yale/tariff-rate-tracker/master/release/data/daily_by_country_2026-06-09.csv)) |
| China Briefing / Global Trade Alert, updated June 3, 2026 | Trade-weighted China estimate under a global-tariff framing | 29.7% after a 15% global-tariff scenario | Method/source tail; the same article says the formal order in force was still 10% ([China Briefing](https://www.china-briefing.com/news/us-china-tariff-rates-2025/), [Federal Register Proclamation 11012](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/full_text/html/2026/02/25/2026-03824.html)) |

The direct Budget Lab row is unusually strong evidence. The June 9 release gives China `weighted_etr = 0.237333`, `mean_total_exposed = 0.347157`, `mean_additional_exposed = 0.303897`, and `n_products_present = n_products_total = 20329` on both June 23 and July 1, 2026 ([Budget Lab country file](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Budget-Lab-Yale/tariff-rate-tracker/master/release/data/daily_by_country_2026-06-09.csv)). The same file steps China down to `weighted_etr = 0.193270` on July 24, 2026, matching the Section 122 end date in the Federal Register and CBP guidance ([Budget Lab country file](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Budget-Lab-Yale/tariff-rate-tracker/master/release/data/daily_by_country_2026-06-09.csv), [Federal Register Proclamation 11012](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/full_text/html/2026/02/25/2026-03824.html), [CBP CSMS 67844987](https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSCBP/bulletins/40b3b7b)). The authority file is consistent with this: IEEPA and fentanyl tariff contributions are zero on the target dates, while Section 122 is positive on July 1 and zero from July 24 onward ([Budget Lab authority file](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Budget-Lab-Yale/tariff-rate-tracker/master/release/data/daily_by_authority_2026-06-09.csv)).

The policy calendar does not point to a pre-July-1 change. USTR’s forced-labor Section 301 proposal includes China in the 12.5% group, but written comments are due July 6, 2026 and hearings begin July 7, 2026, after the target date ([USTR forced-labor Section 301 notice](https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026/june/ustr-makes-findings-and-proposes-action-60-section-301-investigations-relating-failures-take-action), [Federal Register notice](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/06/05/2026-11296/notice-of-determinations-and-request-for-comments-concerning-actions-in-section-301-investigations)). USTR’s U.S.-China Board of Trade process seeks comments on possible reciprocal tariff modifications, but comments close July 10, 2026 and rebuttals close July 27, 2026, also after the target date ([USTR Board of Trade notice](https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026/june/ustr-seeks-public-comment-scope-and-operation-mechanism-promote-balanced-and-reciprocal-trade-china)).

I convert that into a distribution centered on the Budget Lab row. I put 85% on statutory or near-statutory current-law outcomes centered around 23.7%–24.0%, 4% on Section 122 being removed or ignored before July 1 and the rate landing near 19.3%, 3% on a formal 15% Section 122 or similar mid-20s interpretation, 4% on a stale or alternative source around 29.7%, and the rest on small relief and escalation tails. This gives a median of 23.8%, a mean of 24.2%, and a 90% interval of about 22.3% to 29.4%.

## What's non-obvious
The 10% Section 122 tariff does not add 10 percentage points to China’s average. Budget Lab’s encoded July 24 step-down is from 23.7333% to 19.3270%, a 4.4-point move, because Section 122 has exemptions and does not stack on the Section 232-covered part of an import ([Budget Lab country file](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Budget-Lab-Yale/tariff-rate-tracker/master/release/data/daily_by_country_2026-06-09.csv), [Federal Register Proclamation 11012](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/full_text/html/2026/02/25/2026-03824.html), [CBP CSMS 67844987](https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSCBP/bulletins/40b3b7b)). That is why the correct July 1 level is near 24%, not 29% from simply adding a headline 10% to a legacy China base.

The “near 30%” narrative is a source-definition problem. USAFacts’ 29.6% February 2026 value is a customs-duty/import-value ratio that straddles the IEEPA-to-Section-122 transition, while Penn Wharton’s newer April 2026 customs-data estimate has already fallen to 24% ([USAFacts](https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/china/), [Penn Wharton](https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/p/2026-06-16-effective-tariff-rates-and-revenues-updated-june-16-2026/)). China Briefing’s 29.7% Global Trade Alert number also sits under a 15% global-tariff framing, while the formal Federal Register and CBP implementation rate is 10% ([China Briefing](https://www.china-briefing.com/news/us-china-tariff-rates-2025/), [Federal Register Proclamation 11012](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/full_text/html/2026/02/25/2026-03824.html), [CBP CSMS 67844987](https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSCBP/bulletins/40b3b7b)).

## Limitations
The main limitation is resolution-method risk. Budget Lab is statutory and import-weighted, which matches “in effect on July 1,” but collected-duty sources can differ because of timing, liquidation, refunds, drawback, de minimis treatment, product mix, and compliance behavior; Budget Lab states this distinction directly in its release README ([Budget Lab release README](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Budget-Lab-Yale/tariff-rate-tracker/master/release/README.md), [USAFacts methodology note](https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/china/)). If the resolver prefers a monthly collected-duty source over a daily statutory tracker, the outcome could move away from 23.7%, though the freshest collected-duty signal I found is Penn Wharton’s April 2026 value of 24% ([Penn Wharton, June 16](https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/p/2026-06-16-effective-tariff-rates-and-revenues-updated-june-16-2026/)).

The second limitation is legal and release risk. Section 122 litigation was still active in June 2026, and a broader court or executive change before July 1 would move the Budget Lab-style value toward the 19.3% post-Section-122 row ([Subject to Inquiry, June 2026](https://www.subjecttoinquiry.com/2026/06/federal-circuit-stays-injunctions-against-section-122-balance-of-payments-tariffs-pending-appeal/), [Budget Lab country file](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Budget-Lab-Yale/tariff-rate-tracker/master/release/data/daily_by_country_2026-06-09.csv)). Budget Lab also warns that specific and compound duties are not yet converted to ad-valorem equivalents and that some conditional carve-outs are approximated or unmodeled, which can bias the statutory estimate downward in affected chapters ([Budget Lab release README](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Budget-Lab-Yale/tariff-rate-tracker/master/release/README.md)).

## Sources

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  > Active Chapter 99 tariffs for China as of 2026-07-01
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- Domain Expert Search (mcp)
  > Found 14 subagent groups for 'US China tariffs trade policy effective tariff rate 2026 legal challenges Section 301 IEEPA Budget Lab Yale USITC':
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  > Job domain_expert_research_task_da7ec6c744 done after 309294ms.
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- [regulations.justia.com](https://regulations.justia.com/regulations/fedreg/2025/04/16/2025-06591.html) (tool)
- [whitehouse.gov](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/regulating-imports-with-a-reciprocal-tariff-to-rectify-trade-practices-that-contribute-to-large-and-persistent-annual-united-states-goods-trade-deficits?query-11-page=61) (tool)
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## Question Details

This question asks for the effective trade-weighted average tariff rate imposed by the United States on imports from China as of July 1, 2026. As of early 2026, U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods are highly complex and consist of multiple overlapping measures, including longstanding Section 301 tariffs (generally ranging from 7.5% to 25% or higher on specific goods), sector-specific tariffs (e.g., steel, semiconductors), and more recent policy changes. (lenzo.ai) In 2025–2026, additional “reciprocal” and emergency tariffs were introduced and then partly invalidated by a U.S. Supreme Court ruling in February 2026, which removed certain IEEPA-based tariffs. (chrobinson.com) Following these changes, a temporary global tariff (reported around 10–15%) and other adjustments have resulted in an estimated trade-weighted average U.S. tariff rate on Chinese imports of roughly 25–30% as of early 2026, though this remains in flux due to ongoing legal, legislative, and executive actions. (china-briefing.com) Because tariffs vary widely across products, this question focuses on the overall trade-weighted average tariff rate applied to Chinese imports, rather than any single statutory tariff rate. The forecast should reflect the rate in effect on July 1, 2026.

### Resolution Criteria

The question will resolve to the best available estimate of the trade-weighted average effective U.S. tariff rate on imports from China in effect on July 1, 2026. Primary source: Publications from reputable economic policy trackers such as: - The Budget Lab at Yale - OECD - World Bank - U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) - Other widely cited economic research institutions If multiple credible sources report values, the resolution will use: 1. The most recent estimate explicitly referring to a date closest to July 1, 2026; or 2. If multiple estimates exist for that date, the median of those estimates. If no source reports an exact July 1 value, the closest available estimate (within ±30 days) will be used. The value will be expressed as a percentage (e.g., 29.7%).

### Fine Print

- “Tariff rate” refers to the trade-weighted average effective tariff rate across all imports from China, not statutory rates on specific products. - The measure should include all applicable tariffs in force on July 1, 2026 (e.g., Section 301, Section 232, or any new tariffs), and exclude any tariffs that have been repealed or invalidated before that date. - Temporary tariffs count if they are in effect on July 1, 2026, even if scheduled to expire later. - If the U.S. eliminates all China-specific tariffs but applies a global tariff affecting China, that global tariff should be included. - If no credible estimate is available by December 31, 2026, the question will be annulled. - Units: percent (%), measured to at least one decimal place.