# Which airlines will take control of the takeoff and landing slots at LaGuardia that were held by Spirit Airlines prior to their May 2026 bankruptcy?

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## Forecast

Top outcome: JetBlue Airways at 86.0%. Other leading outcomes: Frontier Airlines: 14.0%; Other airline(s): 2.4%; Southwest Airlines: 1.6%; American Airlines: 0.9%.

Generated: July 19, 2026 at 12:50 AM UTC
Forecast model: gpt-5.5
Research model: gpt-5.5

## Analysis

## TL;DR
JetBlue is the current winning bidder for all 22 former Spirit LaGuardia operating authorizations, and I put JetBlue YES at 86%. Frontier is the real fallback because the same auction notice names Frontier as the alternate bidder for the same 22 slots. Every other airline is a tail outcome because the filed sale is a single-package transaction, not a split allocation.

## Context
Spirit’s estate has already run the key auction. The July 17, 2026 bankruptcy notice says Spirit selected JetBlue Airways Corporation as the successful bidder for 22 LGA slots at $58.5 million and Frontier Airlines, Inc. as the alternate bidder for 22 LGA slots at $57.5 million ([Spirit docket 1352](https://document.epiq11.com/document/getdocumentbycode?docId=4593216&projectCode=SPJ&source=DM)). The same notice sets a July 22, 2026 sale hearing before Judge Sean H. Lane and a July 20, 2026 objection deadline ([Spirit docket 1352](https://document.epiq11.com/document/getdocumentbycode?docId=4593216&projectCode=SPJ&source=DM)).

The sale is not final yet. The transfer agreement requires FAA regulatory approvals, bankruptcy-court approval by August 5, 2026, no blocking order, and closing by October 31, 2026; either party may terminate if the FAA denies the transfer ([Spirit docket 1352](https://document.epiq11.com/document/getdocumentbycode?docId=4593216&projectCode=SPJ&source=DM)). CourtListener’s public docket metadata showed the case still ongoing and the latest filing as July 17, 2026, so I did not find a later sale order as of the forecast time ([CourtListener docket](https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/71233134/spirit-aviation-holdings-inc/)).

## Evidence
The historical pattern at LGA is that regulators use scarce slots to protect competition, but they still let a named carrier take the slots once a formal divestiture or sale process clears. In the Delta–US Airways slot-swap remedy, DOT required divestiture of 16 LGA slot pairs through an FAA auction limited to carriers with under 5% of slots; JetBlue bought one eight-pair LGA bundle for $32.0 million and WestJet bought the other for $17.6 million ([DOT, 2019 archive of 2011 result](https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/jetblue-westjet-gain-slots-laguardia-reagan-national-airports)). In the American–US Airways merger settlement, DOJ required 34 LGA slots and supporting facilities to be divested to approved low-cost carrier purchasers, with preference for airlines without large slot or gate shares ([DOJ, November 12, 2013](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-us-airways-and-american-airlines-divest-facilities-seven-key)). Southwest later said it acquired 12 LGA takeoff and landing slots and permanent control of 10 more leased slots from American in that divestiture ([Southwest, December 5, 2013](https://www.southwestairlinesinvestorrelations.com/news-events/press-releases/detail/979/southwest-airlines-acquires-slots-at-new-yorks-laguardia-airport)).

The direct 2026 evidence dominates those analogues. The auction notice says the estate, after consulting the relevant parties, chose JetBlue as the “highest and best” bid and Frontier as the alternate bid; both bids cover all 22 slots, so the current process points to one buyer rather than several recipients ([Spirit docket 1352](https://document.epiq11.com/document/getdocumentbycode?docId=4593216&projectCode=SPJ&source=DM)). The bid spread is only $1.0 million, or 1.7% of JetBlue’s price, which makes Frontier a strong fallback if JetBlue hits an FAA, court, or closing problem ([Spirit docket 1352](https://document.epiq11.com/document/getdocumentbycode?docId=4593216&projectCode=SPJ&source=DM)).

The clean concentration baseline is the FAA Summer 2025 LGA holder-total file, with status/vintage December 5, 2025. Its units are individual operating authorizations, not slot pairs; it excludes FAA-held slots and slots held fewer than five days; and it has 12 carrier rows. It lists Spirit with 22 individual LGA slots, JetBlue with 31, Frontier with 4, Southwest with 57, United with 94, American with 327, and Delta with 511 ([FAA Summer 2025 holder totals](https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/systemops/perf_analysis/slot_administration/data/doc/LGA_S25_Slot_HOLDER_TOTALS.pdf)). Adding all 22 former Spirit slots would leave JetBlue far below American and Delta, which lowers the odds of a concentration-based rejection.

| Holder in FAA Summer 2025 file | Individual LGA slots |
|---|---:|
| Delta Air Lines | 511 |
| American Airlines | 327 |
| United Airlines | 94 |
| Southwest Airlines | 57 |
| Air Canada | 43 |
| JetBlue Airways | 31 |
| Spirit Airlines | 22 |
| WestJet | 16 |
| Republic Airways | 15 |
| Alaska Airlines | 12 |
| Endeavor Air | 9 |
| Frontier Airlines | 4 |

The regulatory gate is the main reason JetBlue is not above 90%. The FAA’s June 23, 2026 order keeps LGA slot controls in force until October 28, 2028, caps scheduled authorizations at 71 per hour, imposes an 80% use requirement, allows trades and leases only with written FAA approval, and lets the FAA retire surrendered, withdrawn, or unassigned authorizations until each affected hour reaches 71 authorizations ([Federal Register, June 23, 2026](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-06-23/pdf/2026-12592.pdf)). FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford also said the former Spirit slots should go to a low-fare carrier for the public good, or otherwise could be retired to reduce congestion ([AirlineGeeks, May 28, 2026](https://airlinegeeks.com/2026/05/28/faa-chief-spirits-slots-at-laguardia-should-go-to-another-low-cost-carrier/)). That statement helps Frontier, but it does not kill JetBlue: JetBlue is small at LGA and has often been treated as a low-fare carrier in slot-divestiture contexts.

The Port Authority is the second risk. Bloomberg Law reported that the Port Authority argued Spirit could not auction the slots as ordinary fungible assets and that slots have no practical value without airport facility permission ([Bloomberg Law, June 4, 2026](https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcy-law/ny-port-authority-objects-to-spirit-push-to-sell-laguardia-slots/)). Bloomberg Law later reported that the Port Authority wanted any buyer to address Terminal A lease and facility issues, while JetBlue said it was evaluating LGA opportunities and Porter also expressed interest if the allocation process were defined ([Bloomberg Law, June 17, 2026](https://news.bloomberglaw.com/mergers-and-acquisitions/spirits-laguardia-slot-sale-kicks-off-high-stakes-airport-fight)). I treat this as a closing and negotiation risk, not as a veto, because the July 17 transfer agreement names FAA approval and bankruptcy-court approval as the explicit conditions ([Spirit docket 1352](https://document.epiq11.com/document/getdocumentbycode?docId=4593216&projectCode=SPJ&source=DM)).

My model is a gate-and-fallback tree. I start with a 95% chance of court approval, because the court already approved sale procedures and the estate selected a highest-and-best bid under those procedures. I use a 92% chance of FAA approval conditional on court approval, because JetBlue is not a dominant LGA holder but the FAA’s low-fare-carrier language and Frontier’s near-equal alternate bid create real political risk. I use a 98% chance of closing after those approvals, because JetBlue posted a required deposit and represented that it has the cash and operating authority needed to close ([Spirit docket 1352](https://document.epiq11.com/document/getdocumentbycode?docId=4593216&projectCode=SPJ&source=DM)). That gives about 86% for the main JetBlue path, with a small extra chance that JetBlue still receives some slots in a modified or split outcome.

## What's non-obvious
The obvious pre-auction answer was Frontier. Frontier was the planned recipient of Spirit’s LaGuardia assets in the failed JetBlue–Spirit merger remedy, including six Marine Air Terminal gates and 22 takeoff and landing slots, subject to Port Authority and FAA/DOT approvals ([JetBlue, June 1, 2023](https://news.jetblue.com/latest-news/press-release-details/2023/JetBlue-and-Frontier-Announce-Divestiture-Agreement-in-Connection-with-JetBlues-Combination-with-Spirit/default.aspx)). That fact still matters, but it is now secondary. The estate has a live JetBlue sale agreement and a named Frontier backup agreement, not an open policy contest.

The other missed point is the unit issue. Public discussion often says “slot pairs,” but the FAA and the sale notice use individual operating authorizations: the schedule has 22 slots, with 12 departures and 10 arrivals, all operating daily ([Spirit docket 1352](https://document.epiq11.com/document/getdocumentbycode?docId=4593216&projectCode=SPJ&source=DM)). This makes a split less likely than it would be if the asset were 22 true round-trip pairs. A 22-slot package is useful, but it is small enough that the estate had reason to sell it as one lot.

## Limitations
The forecast is being made before the July 20 objection deadline and before the July 22 sale hearing, so the strongest remaining unknowns are objections from Frontier, the Port Authority, regulators, or creditors. I also could not verify any written FAA position on JetBlue specifically; the public FAA signal is the broader low-fare-carrier statement, not an approval or denial of JetBlue. The Port Authority facility issue is unresolved in the public record I found, and it could still force a lease cure, terminal plan, condition, or delay even if it does not change who controls the slots.

## Sources

- Federalregister (mcp)
  > Tool federalregister_search on federalregister returned an error:
- [errors.pydantic.dev](https://errors.pydantic.dev/2.13/v/unexpected_keyword_argument) (tool)
- Court Listener (mcp)
  > Found 1 total dockets (showing 1-1):
- [federalregister.gov](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/06/23/2026-12592/operating-limitations-at-new-york-laguardia-airport) (tool)
- Domain Expert Search (mcp)
  > Found 14 subagent groups for 'US airline airport slots LaGuardia FAA DOT bankruptcy airline industry asset allocation':
- Aviationstack (mcp)
  > Routes operated by AA from LGA
- SEC EDGAR (mcp)
  > Tool arguments must be valid JSON when provided as a string.
- Claude Code (e2b)
  > Job coding_whiz_job_917601aa41 done after 411112ms.
- [dm.epiq11.com](https://dm.epiq11.com/SpiritAirlines) (tool)
- [document.epiq11.com](https://document.epiq11.com/document/getdocumentbycode?docId=4593216&projectCode=SPJ&source=DM) (tool)
- Domain Expert Research Task (mcp)
  > Job domain_expert_research_task_7bb6c3c3fc done after 87508ms.
- bts Transtats (mcp)
  > Yearly Passengers at LGA — 2019..2025
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- [sec.gov](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1670076/000167007626000073/fron-20260630.htm) (tool)
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- [sec.gov](http://www.sec.gov/CIK) (tool)
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- [courtlistener.com](https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/71233134/spirit-aviation-holdings-inc) (tool)
- [en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LaGuardia_Airport) (tool)
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- [faa.gov](https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/systemops/perf_analysis/slot_administration) (tool)
- [en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spirit_Airlines) (tool)
- [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/spirit-airlines-prepares-cease-operations-overnight-sources-say-2026-05-02) (tool)
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- [federalregister.gov](https://www.federalregister.gov/) (tool)
- [wfmynews2.com](https://www.wfmynews2.com/article/news/nation-world/reports-spirit-airlines-preparing-cease-operations/507-dc162a80-89a5-4ffc-9aba-e50bdd09e4a4) (tool)
- [en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hart%E2%80%93Scott%E2%80%93Rodino_Antitrust_Improvements_Act) (tool)
- [document.epiq11.com](https://document.epiq11.com/document/getdocumentbycode?docId=4593216&projectCode=SPJ) (tool)
- [dm.epiq11.com](https://dm.epiq11.com/case/spirit) (tool)
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- tsa Checkpoints (mcp)
  > TSA Checkpoint Trend Summary (US air-travel demand)
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- [federalregister.gov](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/06/23/2026-12593/staffing-related-relief-concerning-operations-at-ronald-reagan-washington-national-airport-john-f) (tool)
- [federalregister.gov](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/18/2026-03102/united-states-v-reddy-ice-llc-et-al-proposed-final-judgment-and-competitive-impact-statement) (tool)
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- [federalregister.gov](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/11/12/2025-19850/emergency-order-establishing-operating-limitations-on-the-use-of-navigable-airspace) (tool)
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- [federalregister.gov](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/03/05/2025-03589/agency-information-collection-activities-requests-for-comments-clearance-of-renewed-approval-of) (tool)

## Question Details

On May 2, 2026, Spirit Airlines ceased operations and began liquidating its assets following bankruptcy, canceling all flights and vacating facilities including its operations at LaGuardia Airport (LGA) in New York. (opb.org) Spirit had been the sole tenant of the Marine Air Terminal at LaGuardia and held a portfolio of FAA-controlled takeoff and landing slots at this slot-constrained airport. (en.wikipedia.org) In a liquidation scenario, such slots are valuable assets that may be reassigned by regulators (e.g., the FAA and U.S. Department of Transportation) or transferred/sold through bankruptcy proceedings to other airlines. This question asks which airlines will ultimately take control (through purchase, transfer, or regulatory reallocation) of the LaGuardia slot pairs that were held by Spirit Airlines immediately prior to its shutdown on May 2, 2026. The resolution will consider developments from May 2, 2026 onward until a clear, authoritative allocation of the majority of these slots has occurred.

### Resolution Criteria

This question will resolve based on publicly reported final allocation(s) of Spirit Airlines' former LaGuardia (LGA) slot pairs. Primary sources for resolution will include: - Official announcements or orders from the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) or Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) - Bankruptcy court filings or rulings related to Spirit Airlines asset disposition - Confirmed reporting from major reputable news outlets (e.g., Reuters, AP News, Bloomberg, Wall Street Journal) Each listed airline option will be considered "true" if it is confirmed to have obtained control of at least one slot pair formerly held by Spirit at LGA, whether via purchase, lease, or regulatory reassignment. If multiple airlines acquire slots, multiple options may resolve as true. If no clear or final allocation is reported by May 2, 2028, the question will be annulled.

### Fine Print

- "Control" includes ownership, long-term lease, or formal allocation of slot usage rights sufficient to operate scheduled service at LGA. - Temporary or emergency use of slots (e.g., short-term accommodation flights immediately after shutdown) does not count unless later formalized. - If a merger or acquisition results in slots being transferred indirectly (e.g., via acquisition of Spirit assets), the acquiring airline counts. - If slots are returned to a general FAA pool and later redistributed, the eventual recipient airlines count. - If an airline ceases to exist or merges before resolution, its successor entity is credited. - Options are not mutually exclusive: multiple airlines may receive portions of the slot portfolio.