# Who will be exercising the powers of the Venezuelan presidency on 31 December 2026?

Canonical URL: https://preseen.com/reports/d549349b-56f3-4403-ba99-45b6364f9ec2/who-will-be-exercising-the-powers-of-the-venezuelan-presidency-on-31-december-20
Markdown URL: https://preseen.com/reports/d549349b-56f3-4403-ba99-45b6364f9ec2/markdown

## Forecast

Top outcome: Delcy Rodriguez at 63.4%. Other leading outcomes: Other Chavista (Jorge Rodriguez, Diosdado Cabello, or other PSUV figure): 19.0%; Maria Corina Machado: 9.2%; Other / power vacuum / civil war: 7.2%; Nicolas Maduro: 1.2%.

Generated: June 21, 2026 at 7:08 PM UTC
Forecast model: gpt-5.5
Research model: gpt-5.5

## Analysis

## TL;DR
Delcy Rodríguez is the most likely person to be exercising Venezuelan presidential powers on 31 December 2026. The live alternative is a Chavista or security-service replacement, not a Maduro return or a fast Machado inauguration. My forecast is Delcy 63.4%, Other Chavista 19%, Machado 9%, Other/power vacuum 7%, and Maduro 1%.

## Context
Rodríguez is the current de facto executive. Reuters reported that Venezuela’s TSJ ordered her to assume the presidency after Maduro’s 3 January 2026 capture, and AP reported on 6 April 2026 that she stayed in office after the first 90-day temporary-absence period expired without a public National Assembly extension vote ([Reuters/Investing](https://www.investing.com/news/stock-market-news/venezuelas-supreme-court-orders-delcy-rodriguez-become-interim-president-4428548), [AP](https://apnews.com/article/f33d6fe7407305b513940dfa4f69136c)). She is also doing head-of-state work: AP described her as Venezuela’s acting president during her 8 June 2026 meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Venezuela’s foreign ministry called her “Presidenta (E)” and “Jefa de Estado encargada” during her June India trip ([AP](https://apnews.com/article/1bfc2b2d1ebb9a47aebbfcbc3b646af0), [MPPRE](https://mppre.gob.ve/?p=11088)).

The transition track is real but slow. El País reported on 20 June 2026 that Washington-backed Dinorah Figuera and the 2015 National Assembly channel are expected to produce concrete results by late 2026, including a new CNE; Reuters separately reported that the U.S. welcomed the Jorge Rodríguez–Figuera meeting as a first step toward a democratic-transition agenda ([El País](https://elpais.com/america/2026-06-20/washington-marca-el-ritmo-de-la-transicion-en-venezuela.html), [Reuters/Internazionale](https://www.internazionale.it/ultime-notizie-reuters/2026/06/19/us-hails-initial-meeting-between-venezuelan-government-opposition)). That points to institution-building by year-end, not a sworn-in new president by year-end.

## Evidence
The historical backbone favors regime continuity after leader removal when the coercive and ruling-party apparatus survives. Wright and Bak find that 40–60% of “autocratic breakdown” events in common datasets occur while the incumbent regime remains in power, which is the right warning here: Maduro was removed, but the TSJ, National Assembly, PSUV networks, ministries, and armed/security services remained in place ([Wright and Bak, 2016](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2053168015626606)). Derpanopoulos, Frantz, Geddes, and Wright find that successful coups against dictatorships produced democracy within two years in 40% of post-1990 cases, while authoritarian outcomes remained common; Venezuela’s case is not a normal coup, but the base rate still argues against assuming a six-month democratic handoff ([Research & Politics](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2053168016630837)). Foreign-imposed regime-change research points the same way: decapitating a regime without rebuilding institutions is unlikely on its own to produce democratic change ([Belfer Center](https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/why-foreign-imposed-regime-change-rarely-path-democracy)).

The current hard-power evidence favors Delcy. On 18 March 2026, she removed longtime Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López and replaced him with Gen. Gustavo González López; AP says González had already been serving since 6 January as commander of the presidential honor guard and head of military counterintelligence ([AP](https://apnews.com/article/0710f93bbc6a9e2d5fac17a12257b242)). That is both a consolidation signal and a warning sign: she can move the chain of command, but she depends on security actors whose loyalty is hard to observe.

U.S. policy also favors Delcy. OFAC removed Delcy Rodríguez from the SDN list on 1 April 2026, and AP reported that the U.S. lifted sanctions on Venezuela’s acting president the same day ([Federal Register/OFAC](https://regulations.justia.com/regulations/fedreg/2026/04/07/2026-06723.html), [AP](https://apnews.com/article/d819e64fcdefa132c5b06c3ce0a81f88)). This makes her unusually valuable to both Washington and Venezuelan elites: replacing her with Cabello, Jorge Rodríguez, González López, or another sanctioned hardliner risks sanctions snapback and loss of the U.S. economic channel.

The legal clock cuts against her but has not bound her yet. Article 234 of Venezuela’s constitution allows a temporary presidential absence to be covered by the executive vice president for up to 90 days, extendable by National Assembly resolution for another 90 days ([Constitute Project](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Venezuela_2009)). AP reported on 6 April 2026 that Rodríguez had already exceeded the first 90-day limit and that no public extension vote had occurred; that makes the early-July 180-day point a political pretext, not a self-executing transfer mechanism ([AP](https://apnews.com/article/f33d6fe7407305b513940dfa4f69136c)).

Machado has public legitimacy but not the machinery. CSIS summarized a late-January 2026 Gold Glove Consulting face-to-face poll showing Machado’s coalition beating Rodríguez 67% to 25% in a hypothetical vote, and WLRN summarized an April 2026 Meganálisis poll saying almost 90% wanted a 2026 presidential election and roughly three-fourths would vote for Machado ([CSIS](https://www.csis.org/analysis/venezuelans-welcome-us-intervention-hope-rapid-democratic-transition-post-maduro), [WLRN](https://www.wlrn.org/light/americas/2026-04-29/poll-venezuela-trump-delcy-rodriguez)). But AP reported on 23 May 2026 that it remained unclear when Venezuela would hold a presidential election, and the current U.S.-backed dialogue is focused on CNE reform rather than a 2026 inauguration ([AP](https://apnews.com/article/4f3c9306b348040f63a43c82272f141b), [El País](https://elpais.com/america/2026-06-20/washington-marca-el-ritmo-de-la-transicion-en-venezuela.html)).

The main anti-Delcy evidence is intra-Chavista fracture. AP reported on 1 June 2026 that longtime loyalists were criticizing Rodríguez’s U.S. alignment, oil-sector changes, prisoner releases, and authorization of U.S. military training in Caracas; the same report noted only a few dozen people joined a Caracas protest against the U.S. training exercise ([AP](https://apnews.com/article/venezuela-chavez-maduro-rodriguez-chavismo-us-trump-a8d96666a51289f0c88efcd89a9413bc)). I read this as a real palace-replacement risk, not yet evidence of state collapse.

Recent political-violence data do not show a civil-war path. ACLED/HDX weekly political-violence data for Venezuela, July 2024 through partial June 2026, show 775 events and 928 fatalities across 24 monthly observations; June is month-to-date through 21 June 2026, so it is not comparable to a full month ([ACLED/HDX](https://data.humdata.org/organization/acled)).

| Month | Events | Fatalities |
|---|---:|---:|
| 2024-07 | 54 | 42 |
| 2024-08 | 50 | 58 |
| 2024-09 | 39 | 49 |
| 2024-10 | 39 | 42 |
| 2024-11 | 30 | 31 |
| 2024-12 | 39 | 35 |
| 2025-01 | 39 | 39 |
| 2025-02 | 38 | 55 |
| 2025-03 | 30 | 44 |
| 2025-04 | 24 | 30 |
| 2025-05 | 25 | 25 |
| 2025-06 | 30 | 41 |
| 2025-07 | 28 | 30 |
| 2025-08 | 27 | 33 |
| 2025-09 | 16 | 12 |
| 2025-10 | 35 | 36 |
| 2025-11 | 32 | 31 |
| 2025-12 | 16 | 24 |
| 2026-01 | 28 | 98 |
| 2026-02 | 28 | 29 |
| 2026-03 | 38 | 39 |
| 2026-04 | 35 | 50 |
| 2026-05 | 42 | 44 |
| 2026-06 partial | 13 | 11 |

My scenario tree puts 61% on managed continuity with no sworn successor by year-end, 19% on a Chavista/security replacement, 15% on a fast election or negotiated installation, 4% on disorder/foreign-admin/power-vacuum outcomes, and 1% on a Maduro restoration. Applying conditional outcomes to those branches gives Delcy 63.4%, Other Chavista 19%, Machado 9%, Other/power vacuum 7%, and Maduro 1%. Maduro stays very low because Reuters reported on 4 June 2026 that he is fighting U.S. criminal charges and is due in federal court, and this question resolves on who exercises power rather than on legal-title fiction ([Reuters/Investing](https://www.investing.com/news/world-news/venezuelas-maduro-adds-sean-diddy-combs-lawyer-to-defense-team-4727184)).

## What's non-obvious
The popular-vote story is not the year-end-power story. Machado is probably the leading figure in a free election, but the resolution turns on the armed forces, TSJ, National Assembly, CNE, oil-money channel, and U.S. recognition. Those levers currently run through Delcy, Jorge Rodríguez, González López, and Washington’s managed-transition process, not through Machado.

The bigger tail is a Chavista swap. Rodríguez’s coalition is useful because she is less sanctioned and more acceptable to Washington, but old Chavista and security networks may tolerate her only while she protects them. If she becomes a liability, the system is more likely to replace her with another PSUV/security figure than to hand power straight to Machado before 31 December.

## Limitations
The biggest gap is private military and security-service loyalty. Public evidence shows Rodríguez removed Padrino and installed González López, but it does not show how Army, National Guard, DGCIM, SEBIN, colectivos, and regional commanders would behave under a July legal crisis or a Machado return.

The second gap is U.S. intent. Public signals favor stability, economic recovery, CNE reform, and later elections, but a Trump/Rubio pivot toward a hard 2026 election date would move Machado up quickly.

The third gap is legal-source opacity. I found no public National Assembly extension vote after the first 90 days, and Venezuelan institutions can create legal justifications after the fact. The legal calendar matters as a pretext for bargaining or a palace move, but the April overrun shows that legality alone does not decide who exercises power.

## Sources

- Domain Expert Search (mcp)
  > Found 14 subagent groups for 'Venezuela political transition Chavismo Delcy Rodriguez Maria Corina Machado military elite incentives 2026':
- Acled (mcp)
  > {
- [data.humdata.org](https://data.humdata.org/dataset/c946742e-cf48-4d8f-8338-4f030768ca14/resource/4e98e767-d28d-4711-b575-ded17a0421ce/download/demonstration-events.xlsx) (tool)
- [developer.mozilla.org](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Status/404) (tool)
- Electionguide (mcp)
  > Election Search Results | country=Venezuela | year=2026 | type=presidential
- Statedept (mcp)
  > Travel Advisory for VE
- [travel.state.gov](https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/venezuela-travel-advisory.html) (tool)
- [ve.usembassy.gov](https://ve.usembassy.gov/) (tool)
- Domain Expert Research Task (mcp)
  > Job domain_expert_research_task_c33b75a93e done after 234243ms.
- [ungeneva.org](https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2026/03/116725/venezuelas-repressive-state-apparatus-intact-despite-leadership) (tool)
- [foreign.senate.gov](https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/dem/release/shaheen-meeks-press-rubio-for-answers-on-admins-inaction-on-venezuela-question-lack-of-progress-to-secure-democratic-transition) (tool)
- [atlanticcouncil.org](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/democratic-transition-framework-chart-forward-venezuela) (tool)
- [chathamhouse.org](https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2026-04/2026-04-20-democratic-elections-venezuela-wont-happen-overnight-groundwork-needed-first-sabatini.pdf) (tool)
- [elpais.com](https://elpais.com/america/2026-06-20/washington-marca-el-ritmo-de-la-transicion-en-venezuela.html) (tool)
- [wlrn.org](https://www.wlrn.org/light/2026-02-13/nbc-news-venezuelan-president-delcy-rodriguez-pledges-free-and-fair-elections-but-no-future-date) (tool)
- [elpais.com](https://elpais.com/us/2026-03-26/el-juez-rechaza-desestimar-el-caso-por-narcoterrorismo-contra-maduro-y-su-esposa.html) (tool)
- [amnesty.org](https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr53/0884/2026/en) (tool)
- [vpm.org](https://www.vpm.org/npr-news/npr-news/2026-01-28/marco-rubio-tells-senators-venezuela-transition-wont-be-fast-or-easy) (tool)
- [caracaschronicles.com](https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2026/05/02/delcys-approval-is-already-slipping) (tool)
- [wlrn.org](https://www.wlrn.org/americas/2026-04-29/poll-venezuela-trump-delcy-rodriguez) (tool)
- [ofac.treasury.gov](https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20260401) (tool)
- [euronews.com](https://www.euronews.com/2026/04/02/us-lifts-sanctions-on-venezuelas-interim-president-delcy-rodriguez) (tool)
- [devdiscourse.com](https://www.devdiscourse.com/article/politics/3937184-us-hails-initial-meeting-between-venezuelan-government-opposition) (tool)
- [knkx.org](https://www.knkx.org/2026-01-18/venezuela-maduros-enforcer-cabello-still-central-to-power) (tool)
- [elpais.com](https://elpais.com/america/2026-06-09/diosdado-cabello-descarta-una-negociacion-con-maria-corina-machado.html) (tool)
- [elpais.com](https://elpais.com/america/2026-02-02/delcy-rodriguez-nombra-ministra-a-la-hija-de-diosdado-cabello-que-gana-poder-en-venezuela.html) (tool)
- [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/20/delcy-rodriguez-replaces-venezuelas-top-military-commanders) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/ddb91c7d22559c0952e4b23433d63edf) (tool)
- [elpais.com](https://elpais.com/america/2026-05-29/maria-corina-machado-dice-estar-dispuesta-a-negociar-con-el-gobierno-de-delcy-rodriguez-unas-elecciones.html) (tool)
- [ksat.com](https://www.ksat.com/news/world/2026/06/01/venezuelas-ruling-party-unity-cracks-as-delcy-rodriguez-shifts-chavez-era-policies) (tool)
- [axios.com](https://www.axios.com/2026/04/14/venezuela-bank-sanctions-protests-delcy-rodriguez) (tool)
- [longwarjournal.org](https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/03/interim-venezuelan-president-ousts-defense-chief-as-washington-makes-limited-progress-in-caracas.php) (tool)
- [dailysignal.com](https://www.dailysignal.com/2026/02/11/stability-recovery-transition-power-venezuela) (tool)
- [washingtonpost.com](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/2026/05/27/federal-prosecutors-venezuela-rodriguez-avoid-criminal-investigations/ed28e4dc-5a2b-11f1-8a9d-afb1148204e1_story.html) (tool)
- [en.mercopress.com](https://en.mercopress.com/2026/03/20/delcy-rodriguez-renews-venezuela-s-military-high-command-following-padrino-s-ouster) (tool)
- Ofac (mcp)
  > Tool ofac_search_sanctions on ofac returned an error:
- [errors.pydantic.dev](https://errors.pydantic.dev/2.13/v/unexpected_keyword_argument) (tool)
- hdx Hapi (mcp)
  > Tool hdx_get_country_overview on hdx-hapi returned an error:
- [errors.pydantic.dev](https://errors.pydantic.dev/2.13/v/missing_argument) (tool)
- [developer.mozilla.org](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Status/502) (tool)
- Vdem (mcp)
  > v2x_polyarchy
- Views (mcp)
  > ViEWS Conflict Forecasts: Venezuela (VEN)
- gpr (mcp)
  > Country GPR Index (Benchmark (1985-present))
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/1bfc2b2d1ebb9a47aebbfcbc3b646af0) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/f33d6fe7407305b513940dfa4f69136c) (tool)
- [investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/commodities-news/maduro-set-to-appear-in-us-court-to-face-narcoterrorismcharges-4428787) (tool)
- [gmanetwork.com](https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/world/971590/venezuela-s-supreme-court-orders-delcy-rodriguez-become-interim-president/story) (tool)
- [mppre.gob.ve](https://mppre.gob.ve/publicacion/6535-delcy-rodriguez-asume-como-presidenta-encargada-de-venezuela) (tool)
- [investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/commodities-news/venezuelas-rodriguez-to-discuss-energy-ties-during-india-visit-from-june-37-4721567) (tool)
- [democrats-foreignaffairs.house.gov](https://democrats-foreignaffairs.house.gov/2026/6/meeks-shaheen-press-rubio-for-answers-on-admin-s-inaction-on-venezuela-question-lack-of-progress-to-secure-democratic-transition) (tool)

## Question Details

On 3 January 2026 a US military operation captured Nicolas Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores in Caracas and extradited them to the United States, where Maduro is now jailed in New York awaiting trial. Two days later, Venezuela's Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) declared Maduro's situation a 'temporary absence' and swore in Vice President Delcy Rodriguez as acting president, with a constitutional 90-day cap that the National Assembly could extend to six months by formal vote. The 90-day deadline expired on 4 April 2026 without a public Assembly extension vote, but Rodriguez has remained in office, and the US State Department has formally recognised her as Venezuela's 'sole Head of State'.\n\nRodriguez has moved to consolidate power: in March 2026 she ousted longtime Defence Minister Gen. Vladimir Padrino Lopez and replaced him with intelligence chief Gen. Gustavo Gonzalez Lopez. The Trump administration lifted Treasury sanctions on her personally on 1 April 2026 and is openly backing her over opposition leader Maria Corina Machado. Trump told reporters Machado 'didn't have the support needed to run the country in the short term' — a position reportedly driven by a CIA assessment and advice from Secretary Rubio that backing Machado now would destabilise the country. Machado, who polls at ~67% support to Rodriguez's ~25%, has said she expects to return to Venezuela before year-end and is pressing Washington for a fast election timetable. The opposition coalition has unified behind her as its presidential candidate. No election date has been announced.\n\nThe original prompt asked whether Rodriguez 'or successor in role' would remain in power. The cleanest operationalisation is: which of the named candidates will be the de facto exerciser of Venezuelan presidential powers on 31 December 2026? This is the same question Polymarket's $80M+ market is resolving, and it captures the multiple plausible scenarios — Rodriguez consolidating, a Maduro-loyalist successor (Jorge Rodriguez, Cabello) replacing her, an opposition transition to Machado, a US-installed transitional figure, or a power vacuum.

### Resolution Criteria

Resolves to whichever option below describes the person who is exercising the substantive powers of the Venezuelan head of state at 23:59 ET on 31 December 2026, as determined by (1) which person is publicly recognised in that role by the US State Department (https://www.state.gov/) and the Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ), (2) confirmatory wire-service reporting from Reuters and AP describing that person as 'president', 'acting president', or 'interim president' of Venezuela, and (3) which person is in fact issuing executive decrees, commanding the FANB, and conducting head-of-state diplomacy. If those signals diverge, resolution prefers the de facto exerciser of executive power inside Venezuela (criterion 3) over formal recognition.\n\nOptions:\n- 'Delcy Rodriguez' — resolves YES if the current acting president is still in that role on 31 Dec 2026, regardless of whether her title has changed (e.g., 'president', 'transitional president').\n- 'Nicolas Maduro' — resolves YES if Maduro is somehow returned to office (e.g., released from US custody and reinstated, recognised by the TSJ as president-in-exile while Rodriguez is treated as a placeholder, or restored after a deal). Note: per Polymarket's framing, simply being the 'legally absent' officeholder while Rodriguez exercises power resolves to 'Delcy Rodriguez', not Maduro — the question is who actually exercises the powers.\n- 'Maria Corina Machado' — resolves YES if Machado is sworn in as president (whether by election, transitional accord, or US-brokered installation).\n- 'Other Chavista (Jorge Rodriguez, Diosdado Cabello, or other PSUV figure)' — resolves YES if Delcy Rodriguez is replaced by another Maduro-era PSUV figure.\n- 'Other / power vacuum / civil war' — resolves YES if no single person is exercising recognised presidential powers, or if the answer is someone not in the above buckets (e.g., a US-appointed administrator, a junta, an opposition figure other than Machado, an election produces a different winner).\n\nPrimary resolution sources: US State Department press releases (https://www.state.gov/), TSJ rulings (http://historico.tsj.gob.ve/), Reuters Venezuela coverage (https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela/), AP, and the official Presidencia de Venezuela channel for executive decrees. Polymarket's 'Venezuela leader end of 2026' market may be referenced as a sanity check but is not the resolution authority.

### Fine Print

The question is about WHO IS EXERCISING POWER, not who holds the legal title. If Maduro remains technically the 'legal' officeholder (as the TSJ initially framed) but Rodriguez or another person is actually running the country at year-end, this resolves to whoever is exercising power. If Rodriguez's formal title changes (e.g., from 'acting' to 'transitional' or 'interim' or 'president'), she still counts as 'Delcy Rodriguez'. If a transitional government is announced but Rodriguez heads it, that is still 'Delcy Rodriguez'. If elections are held by 31 Dec 2026 and a winner is sworn in before that date, the new sworn-in president resolves the question; if a winner is declared but not yet sworn in, the still-serving incumbent resolves it. If Rodriguez is killed, incapacitated, or formally deposed and replaced by someone outside the named buckets (e.g., the Defence Minister Gen. Gustavo Gonzalez Lopez), resolve to 'Other Chavista...' if the replacement is a Chavismo-aligned figure, or 'Other / power vacuum / civil war' otherwise. A US military occupation administering the country directly (with no Venezuelan figure in charge) resolves to 'Other / power vacuum / civil war'. Source ambiguity at the deadline: defer to Reuters and AP wire reporting in the 24 hours either side of 23:59 ET on 31 Dec 2026.