# Will the ceasefire between Iran and the United States continue to hold 7 days from today?

Canonical URL: https://preseen.com/reports/b906f4a6-2ded-4aab-9565-0b34c4715ec8/will-the-ceasefire-between-iran-and-the-united-states-continue-to-hold-7-days-fr
Markdown URL: https://preseen.com/reports/b906f4a6-2ded-4aab-9565-0b34c4715ec8/markdown

## Forecast

P(Yes): 81.4%; P(No): 18.6%.

Generated: June 22, 2026 at 10:59 PM UTC
Forecast model: gpt-5.5
Research model: gpt-5.5

## Analysis

## TL;DR
I estimate an 81% chance that the U.S.–Iran ceasefire is still considered in effect on Monday, June 29, 2026. The ceasefire is in force now because the June 17 interim agreement took immediate effect, June 22 talks ended with a 60-day roadmap, and technical teams are still working. The main path to NO is a Hormuz or Lebanon-triggered incident that becomes direct, sustained U.S.–Iran fighting and is described that way by major outlets.

## Context
The forecast date is Monday, June 22, 2026, so the resolution date is Monday, June 29, 2026. AP reported that the June 17 U.S.–Iran initial deal took immediate effect, called for a permanent end to hostilities, and started a 60-day negotiating clock on Iran’s nuclear program ([AP, June 17](https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-israel-war-oil-deal-june-17-2026-19652f4611b704c0a991bf1f5bc9a4b9)). Reuters reported on June 22 that the first high-level talks in Switzerland ended with a 60-day roadmap, technical talks continuing through the week, a Lebanon mechanism, and a Hormuz communications line ([Reuters via Investing.com, June 22](https://za.investing.com/news/world-news/us-and-iran-conclude-highlevel-talks-in-switzerland-mediators-say-4336769)).

This is a live ceasefire, not a settled peace. Iran said on June 20 that it was closing the Strait of Hormuz over alleged U.S. and Israeli ceasefire violations, while U.S. Central Command said traffic continued and 55 merchant ships carried more than 17 million barrels of oil through the strait that day ([AP, June 20](https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-israel-lebanon-hezbollah-june-20-2026-6e23fb5f37e23427dbfc2bc80c59bda8)). AP reported on June 22 that Vance said the talks created a “good foundation,” that technical teams were still negotiating, and that Iran had not acknowledged all U.S. claims on IAEA access ([AP live, June 22](https://apnews.com/article/5db564631db45e92c939d834873d0828)).

## Evidence
The historical backbone points above 80%, but not into the 90s. The ETH/PRIO civil-conflict ceasefire dataset covers 2,202 ceasefires in 66 countries and 109 civil conflicts from 1989 to 2020 ([PRIO, ETH/PRIO Civil Conflict Ceasefire Dataset](https://www.prio.org/publications/13532)). Its published summaries report median durations of 65 days at a 25-fatality threshold and 193 days at a 100-fatality threshold ([Journal of Conflict Resolution summary](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00220027221129183)). A simple exponential conversion gives 7-day survival of \(0.5^{7/65}=92.8\%\) and \(0.5^{7/193}=97.5\%\). That reference class is too optimistic here because this is an interstate, maritime, nuclear-linked dispute with active third-party spoilers.

The better prior is this ceasefire’s own record. On May 31, CENTCOM described U.S. self-defense strikes on Iranian radar and drone command sites after Iran shot down a U.S. MQ-1 drone, but still called the setting the “ongoing ceasefire” and reported no American service members harmed ([CENTCOM, May 31](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PUBLIC-RELEASES/Article/4504919/us-defends-disables-threats-in-response-to-iranian-aggression/)). On June 5, AP reported U.S. forces shot down Iranian missiles and drones and struck Iranian radar sites, while describing the episode as fraying the ceasefire rather than ending it ([AP, June 5](https://apnews.com/article/iran-war-hormuz-drones-a9495a8e67035b8596a3739c8cde0978)). The resolution rule is forgiving: violations and one-off self-defense actions do not resolve NO unless major reporting says sustained direct hostilities have resumed.

The June 17 MOU is a strong 7-day stabilizer. The text read to reporters says both sides declare the immediate and permanent termination of military operations, commit to a final deal within 60 days, require the U.S. to begin removing its naval blockade and fully end it within 30 days, require Iran to use best efforts for safe commercial passage through Hormuz for 60 days, maintain the nuclear status quo during talks, and require U.S. oil-export waivers ([Axios full MOU text, June 17](https://www.axios.com/2026/06/17/read-full-us-iran-deal-memorandum-understanding)). AP’s June 22 live coverage said Treasury issued an Iranian-oil license lasting through August 21, 2026, which gives Tehran an immediate benefit from keeping the deal alive ([AP live, June 22](https://apnews.com/article/5db564631db45e92c939d834873d0828)).

The most important hard signal is Hormuz. The available IMF PortWatch pull for the Strait of Hormuz contained 1,000 daily chokepoint observations from September 19, 2023 through June 14, 2026; this is a lagged series, so it misses the post-MOU June 17–22 reopening, and I treat it as a pre-reopening baseline ([IMF PortWatch](https://portwatch.imf.org/)). The full annual history available from that pull is:

| Year | Coverage in PortWatch pull | Daily observations | Avg vessels/day | Avg capacity/day, tons |
|---|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| 2023 | Sep. 19–Dec. 31 | 104 | 94.9 | 3,692,347 |
| 2024 | Jan. 1–Dec. 31 | 366 | 98.6 | 3,795,757 |
| 2025 | Jan. 1–Dec. 31 | 365 | 93.7 | 3,571,863 |
| 2026 | Jan. 1–Jun. 14 | 165 | 33.6 | 1,321,860 |

The June seasonal comparison shows how abnormal the strait remained before the new deal: June 2024 averaged 104.9 vessels/day, June 2025 averaged 105.9 vessels/day, and June 1–14, 2026 averaged 3.9 vessels/day over 14 observations ([IMF PortWatch](https://portwatch.imf.org/)). After the MOU, current reporting shows partial reopening rather than normal traffic: AP reported 71 confirmed weekend transits through Hormuz with a peak of 35 on Saturday, while the prewar normal was about 100–130 vessels/day and the main central route remained mined and closed ([AP, June 22](https://apnews.com/article/united-states-iran-war-nuclear-negotiations-4bbde727c7095c4ad9da0285ca79f1e1)). Reuters reported a more cautious Kpler read: five vessels passed the strait on Sunday, down from 26 Saturday, and transponder-off vessels may be missing from the data ([Reuters via Investing.com, June 22](https://za.investing.com/news/world-news/us-and-iran-conclude-highlevel-talks-in-switzerland-mediators-say-4336769)).

The regional violence data point in the same direction: Iran is far below the March peak, while Lebanon remains the live spoiler. ACLED/HDX recent political-violence aggregates are country-month totals, not U.S.–Iran dyad incidents; coverage is July 2025 through June 2026 with a June 22, 2026 cutoff and weekly-update vintage ([ACLED data portal](https://acleddata.com/data/)). The full 12-month series I used is:

| Month | Iran events | Iran fatalities | Lebanon events | Lebanon fatalities |
|---|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| 2025-07 | 39 | 47 | 175 | 49 |
| 2025-08 | 21 | 38 | 161 | 38 |
| 2025-09 | 13 | 20 | 166 | 35 |
| 2025-10 | 28 | 18 | 156 | 34 |
| 2025-11 | 23 | 22 | 186 | 43 |
| 2025-12 | 8 | 19 | 190 | 13 |
| 2026-01 | 207 | 4,980 | 234 | 22 |
| 2026-02 | 109 | 277 | 193 | 33 |
| 2026-03 | 2,327 | 1,131 | 2,392 | 967 |
| 2026-04 | 685 | 201 | 1,774 | 788 |
| 2026-05 | 41 | 51 | 2,100 | 623 |
| 2026-06 to Jun. 22 | 90 | 32 | 1,171 | 361 |

Lebanon is the main negative signal because Iran tied Hormuz closure to alleged U.S./Israeli failure in Lebanon. AP reported on June 20 that Israel and Hezbollah were still fighting, that neither is a signatory to the U.S.–Iran deal, and that Israeli strikes in Lebanon killed at least 16 people that day ([AP, June 20](https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-israel-lebanon-hezbollah-june-20-2026-6e23fb5f37e23427dbfc2bc80c59bda8)). The immediate signal improved by June 22: AP reported that UNIFIL saw no trajectories from either side since the previous day and no airstrikes, though airspace violations and Israeli ground movements continued ([AP live, June 22](https://apnews.com/article/5db564631db45e92c939d834873d0828)).

My final estimate is a structured 7-day hazard model. I assign 8.5% to a Hormuz naval, mine, or ship-escort incident escalating into direct sustained U.S.–Iran fighting; 4.5% to a Lebanon breakdown causing Iran or the U.S. to declare the MOU failed and move into direct hostilities; 2.5% to technical talks or IAEA access collapsing into an official ceasefire-end declaration; 3.5% to an accidental or rogue direct incident with casualties producing a strike spiral; and 1.0% to current-status opacity or media reclassification. Treating these as partly independent gives:

$$
P(\mathrm{NO})=1-(1-0.085)(1-0.045)(1-0.025)(1-0.035)(1-0.010)=0.186
$$

That implies 81.4% YES. I round the prose to 81% because the model inputs are judgmental, not measured frequencies.

## What's non-obvious
The obvious headline is that Iran said Hormuz was closed and Trump threatened more strikes. The less obvious point is that both sides have kept bargaining after those threats: Reuters reported the negotiators still produced a 60-day roadmap and a Hormuz communications line, while AP reported technical teams stayed in place after Vance left Switzerland ([Reuters via Investing.com, June 22](https://za.investing.com/news/world-news/us-and-iran-conclude-highlevel-talks-in-switzerland-mediators-say-4336769); [AP live, June 22](https://apnews.com/article/5db564631db45e92c939d834873d0828)). I read the closure language as coercive bargaining unless it turns into ship seizures, mine strikes, U.S. casualties, or official termination language.

The other non-obvious point is that this resolution is not asking whether the ceasefire is clean. It is asking whether major reporting says sustained or large-scale direct U.S.–Iran hostilities have resumed. The April–June record shows that missiles, drones, “self-defense” strikes, and proxy fighting can be treated as violations inside a still-existing ceasefire if leaders want to preserve the label ([CENTCOM, May 31](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PUBLIC-RELEASES/Article/4504919/us-defends-disables-threats-in-response-to-iranian-aggression/); [AP, June 5](https://apnews.com/article/iran-war-hormuz-drones-a9495a8e67035b8596a3739c8cde0978)).

## Limitations
The main limitation is source ambiguity. The MOU text was read to reporters rather than released as a clean jointly authenticated document, and AP reported that Iran had not acknowledged Vance’s IAEA-inspection claim ([Axios full MOU text, June 17](https://www.axios.com/2026/06/17/read-full-us-iran-deal-memorandum-understanding); [AP live, June 22](https://apnews.com/article/5db564631db45e92c939d834873d0828)).

The second limitation is maritime observability. PortWatch is reliable for daily chokepoint history but lagged to June 14 in this pull; the crucial June 17–22 period depends on AP, Reuters, Kpler, and CENTCOM reporting, and Reuters explicitly warned that ships with transponders off may be missing from the Kpler count ([IMF PortWatch](https://portwatch.imf.org/); [Reuters via Investing.com, June 22](https://za.investing.com/news/world-news/us-and-iran-conclude-highlevel-talks-in-switzerland-mediators-say-4336769)).

The third limitation is that aggregate conflict datasets do not resolve this question. ACLED/HDX is useful for recent Iran and Lebanon intensity, but it is country-month data and cannot tell whether AP, Reuters, BBC, the New York Times, or the Washington Post will characterize a future incident as ending the U.S.–Iran ceasefire ([ACLED data portal](https://acleddata.com/data/)). The largest single update would be an acknowledged U.S. strike on Iranian targets after June 22, an Iranian missile or drone attack on U.S. forces, a ship sinking or seizure blamed on Iran, or either government saying the ceasefire or MOU is over.

## Sources

- Domain Expert Search (mcp)
  > Found 14 subagent groups for 'United States Iran conflict ceasefire Strait of Hormuz Lebanon Hezbollah June 2026 escalation risk decision makers':
- imf Portwatch (mcp)
  > ERROR: tool 'imf-portwatch.portwatch_get_shipping_data' returned 36,816 tokens of output (limit: 10,000). Your request produced too much data to fit in the model's tool-result budget. Reformulate to be more specific — narrow the date range, reduce the number of entities, ask for a summary instead of raw data, or call a more targeted tool.
- Acled (mcp)
  > {
- Aisstream (mcp)
  > ERROR: tool 'aisstream.aisstream_monitor_region' did not respond within 30s and was cancelled by the gateway. The downstream tool may be hung, the upstream API may be slow or unreachable, or your arguments may have triggered an unusually expensive query. Retry with narrower arguments (smaller date range, fewer entities), call a more targeted tool, or skip this dimension and continue with the rest of your research.
- Domain Expert Research Task (mcp)
  > Job domain_expert_research_task_0b37c441be done after 242727ms.
- [uk.marketscreener.com](https://uk.marketscreener.com/news/first-tankers-cross-strait-under-iran-deal-israeli-strikes-raise-doubt-in-lebanon-ce7f5cdddc80f221) (tool)
- [investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/world-news/vance-criticizes-israel-freakout-over-iran-deal-in-new-york-times-interview-4750335) (tool)
- [presidency.ucsb.edu](https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/national-security-presidential-memorandum-ceasing-united-states-participation-the-joint) (tool)
- [lemonde.fr](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2026/03/01/trump-s-war-of-choice-in-iran_6750980_23.html) (tool)
- [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/8/iran-names-khameneis-son-as-new-supreme-leader-after-fathers-killing-2) (tool)
- [lemonde.fr](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/06/16/iran-s-hardliners-protest-us-deal-but-the-regime-closes-ranks_6754530_4.html) (tool)
- [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/us-israel-iran-war/iran-s-parliament-speaker-signals-tough-response-to-any-breach-of-deal-with-us-excessive-demands/3971471) (tool)
- [nbcwashington.com](https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/national-international/strait-hormuz-reopen-us-lift-iran-sanctions-14-point-deal-seeking-end/4118316) (tool)
- [axios.com](https://www.axios.com/2026/06/07/trump-netanyahu-israel-iran-strikes-call) (tool)
- [axios.com](https://www.axios.com/2026/06/22/israel-lebanon-ceasefire) (tool)
- [washingtonpost.com](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/06/19/four-israeli-soldiers-killed-combat-lebanon-imperils-us-iran-deal) (tool)
- News (mcp)
  > Found 10 merged articles (asknews: 5, perigon: 5, both: 0).
- [doc.afp.com](http://doc.afp.com/B7U48NX) (tool)
- [indiatoday.in](https://www.indiatoday.in/amp/world/story/us-iran-talks-switzerland-lebanon-ceasefire-strait-of-hormuz-ptag-2931630-2026-06-22) (tool)
- [worldfinancialreview.com](https://worldfinancialreview.com/u-s-and-iran-hold-new-talks-as-strait-of-hormuz-dispute-raises-tensions) (tool)
- [foxnews.com](https://www.foxnews.com/video/6399078746112) (tool)
- [time.com](https://time.com/article/2026/06/22/how-did-we-get-here-a-timeline-of-the-u-s--iran-war) (tool)
- [news18.com](https://www.news18.com/amp/world/us-iran-talks-end-in-switzerland-60-day-roadmap-hormuz-security-among-key-outcomes-ws-l-10164719.html) (tool)
- [asiainsurancepost.com](https://asiainsurancepost.com/archives/81473) (tool)
- [yahoo.com](https://www.yahoo.com/news/politics/articles/us-iran-talks-focused-elements-001912971.html) (tool)
- [specialeurasia.com](https://www.specialeurasia.com/2026/06/22/us-iran-burgenstock-negotiations) (tool)
- [thehill.com](https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5934569-graham-predicts-strait-takeover) (tool)
- Bunker (mcp)
  > Error fetching spread data: asyncio.run() cannot be called from a running event loop
- Gpsjam (mcp)
  > GPS Interference Trend: 2026-06-01 to 2026-06-21
- gpr (mcp)
  > Country GPR Index (Benchmark (1985-present))
- Dvids (mcp)
  > Found 1 total results. Showing 1:
- [dvidshub.net](https://www.dvidshub.net/news/567021/centcom-forces-defeat-missiles-drones-launched-iran) (tool)
- American Presidency Project (mcp)
  > Found 7 total documents. Showing page 1:
- pic Member Statements (mcp)
  > Query: "Iran United States ceasefire Strait Hormuz June 2026"
- [gov.uk](https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-uk-strongly-condemns-russias-latest-mass-strikes-against-ukrainian-cities-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council) (tool)
- [gov.uk](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-uk-egypt-association-council-meeting) (tool)
- [gov.uk](https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/we-urge-israel-to-resume-negotiations-with-the-syrian-government-and-to-pursue-a-diplomatic-solution-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council) (tool)
- [gov.uk](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ukhsa-update-on-the-hantavirus-cruise-ship-outbreak) (tool)
- [gov.uk](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-launches-new-ai-partnership-to-boost-climate-security) (tool)
- [canada.ca](https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2026/06/minister-anand-to-attend-the-general-assembly-of-organization-of-american-states-in-panama.html) (tool)
- [canada.ca](https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2026/06/minister-anand-participates-in-discussions-with-counterparts-from-australia-and-united-kingdom.html) (tool)
- [canada.ca](https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2026/06/minister-anand-meets-with-gulf-cooperation-council-foreign-ministers.html) (tool)
- [canada.ca](https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2026/06/joint-statement-on-iranian-state-threats-and-hayi-claimed-attacks.html) (tool)
- [canada.ca](https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2026/06/minister-anand-to-travel-to-bahrain-united-kingdom-and-france.html) (tool)
- [auswaertiges-amt.de](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/newsletter) (tool)
- [auswaertiges-amt.de](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/brochures) (tool)
- [auswaertiges-amt.de](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/topics) (tool)
- [diplomatie.gouv.fr](https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/presse-et-ressources/decouvrir-et-informer/actualites/nations-unies-journee-mondiale-des-refugies) (tool)
- [diplomatie.gouv.fr](https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/presse-et-ressources/decouvrir-et-informer/actualites/condamnation-conjointe-des-actes-malveillants-de-l-iran) (tool)
- [exteriores.gob.es](https://www.exteriores.gob.es/en/Comunicacion/Comunicados/Paginas/index.aspx?p=2) (tool)

## Question Details

As of May 4, 2026, the United States and Iran are in a fragile and temporary ceasefire following the outbreak of war on February 28, 2026. A two-week ceasefire was agreed around April 7–8, 2026, and although U.S. officials have claimed that hostilities have ‘terminated’ since then, tensions remain extremely high, with recent reports of Iranian fire on U.S. ships and threats to maritime operations in the Strait of Hormuz putting the ceasefire at risk. (en.wikipedia.org) This question asks: if assessed on a given calendar date (the "forecast date"), will the ceasefire between Iran and the United States still be holding 7 days later? For example, if the forecast date is May 4, 2026, the resolution date would be May 11, 2026. The question is intended to be evergreen and reusable: each time it is forecast, it refers to whether the ceasefire remains in effect 7 days after the forecast date.

### Resolution Criteria

The question resolves YES if, on the calendar date exactly 7 days after the forecast date, a ceasefire between Iran and the United States is still in effect. A ceasefire is considered to be "still in effect" if there has been no acknowledged resumption of sustained or large-scale military hostilities between U.S. and Iranian forces prior to or on the resolution date. The question resolves NO if, before or on the resolution date, there is clear and widely reported evidence of renewed active hostilities between the United States and Iran, including but not limited to: - Airstrikes, missile strikes, or naval attacks conducted by either side against the other - Sustained exchanges of fire between U.S. and Iranian forces - An official declaration by either government that the ceasefire has ended or that hostilities have resumed Isolated incidents (e.g., single exchanges, proxy attacks, warnings, or minor skirmishes) do NOT by themselves count as a breakdown unless they are widely characterized by reliable sources as ending the ceasefire. Resolution will be based on consensus reporting from major international news organizations (e.g., AP, Reuters, BBC, Washington Post, New York Times).

### Fine Print

- The "forecast date" is the date on which the prediction is made; the "resolution date" is exactly 7 days later (using calendar days, not hours). - If no ceasefire is in effect on the forecast date, the question resolves NO. - If the status of the ceasefire is ambiguous or disputed, resolution should follow the preponderance of credible reporting. - Cyberattacks, proxy actions by third parties, or economic measures (e.g., sanctions, blockades) do not count as ending the ceasefire unless they are widely reported as marking a return to open warfare between the U.S. and Iran. - If no reliable information is available to determine whether the ceasefire is still in effect, the question should be annulled. - The question concerns direct conflict between the United States and Iran only; actions involving third countries count only if they clearly constitute U.S.–Iran hostilities.