# Which airlines will take control of the takeoff and landing slots at LaGuardia that were held by Spirit Airlines prior to their May 2026 bankruptcy?

Canonical URL: https://preseen.com/reports/a5a864f3-865e-49eb-93b3-849f88e60fc3/which-airlines-will-take-control-of-the-takeoff-and-landing-slots-at-laguardia-t
Markdown URL: https://preseen.com/reports/a5a864f3-865e-49eb-93b3-849f88e60fc3/markdown

## Forecast

Top outcome: Frontier Airlines at 56.9%. Other leading outcomes: JetBlue Airways: 28.8%; Other airline(s): 22.8%; Southwest Airlines: 21.5%; American Airlines: 20.8%.

Generated: June 27, 2026 at 10:31 PM UTC
Forecast model: gpt-5.5
Research model: gpt-5.5

## Analysis

## TL;DR
Frontier is the clear favorite at 56.9%, because it was already the named buyer for this exact LaGuardia package and it best matches the FAA/DOT low-fare-carrier signal ([JetBlue/Frontier agreement](https://news.jetblue.com/latest-news/press-release-details/2023/JetBlue-and-Frontier-Announce-Divestiture-Agreement-in-Connection-with-JetBlues-Combination-with-Spirit/default.aspx), [Bloomberg Law](https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcy-law/spirits-laguardia-slots-should-go-to-low-cost-carrier-faa-says)). JetBlue, Southwest, and Other airline(s) are live mostly through a split or conditioned award, not as clean whole-package favorites. American is the main high-bid threat, but the FAA and Port Authority constraints keep it near 21%, while Delta, United, and Alaska are long shots ([Bloomberg Law](https://news.bloomberglaw.com/litigation/spirits-laguardia-slot-sale-kicks-off-high-stakes-airport-fight)).

## Context
Spirit announced on May 2, 2026 that it had begun an immediate wind-down and that all flights were cancelled ([Spirit wind-down release](https://www.spiritrestructuring.com/resources/Spirit-Airlines-Begins-Orderly-Wind-Down-of-Operations.pdf)). The live sale process is not finished: Spirit’s May 27 bankruptcy filing in SDNY Case No. 25-11897 set the LGA sale track, and reporting as of June 17 said bids were due June 30 with an auction set for July 9 ([Spirit bankruptcy sale motion](https://documents.elevenflo.com/uuid_database_8_14_23/09ccbccb-ca58-4b5e-8623-336463c4daae.pdf), [Bloomberg Law](https://news.bloomberglaw.com/litigation/spirits-laguardia-slot-sale-kicks-off-high-stakes-airport-fight)).

The key legal fact is that these are not normal assets. Slots can be bought, sold, leased, or traded, but the recipient may not use a transferred slot until the FAA gives written confirmation, and federal rules describe slots as operating privileges subject to FAA control rather than property rights ([14 CFR 93.221](https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/93.221), [14 CFR 93.223](https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/93.223)). The Port Authority adds a second constraint because an airline needs usable facilities at LaGuardia, not just runway operating authority; it objected that slots have no practical value without airport-sponsor facility permission ([The Points Guy](https://thepointsguy.com/news/spirit-airlines-port-authority-laguardia-flight-sale/)).

## Evidence
The historical backbone favors low-cost or limited-incumbent recipients. In the Delta-US Airways slot swap, DOT/FAA required 16 LaGuardia slot pairs and 8 Reagan National slot pairs to be divested, limited LGA eligibility to carriers with less than 5% of airport slots, and awarded one LGA bundle to WestJet even though JetBlue bid highest for all LGA bundles ([DOT](https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/jetblue-westjet-gain-slots-laguardia-reagan-national-airports)). In the American-US Airways merger settlement, DOJ required 34 LaGuardia slots plus supporting facilities to be transferred to low-cost carrier purchasers approved by the department, with preference for airlines that did not already hold a large share of slots or gates ([DOJ](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-us-airways-and-american-airlines-divest-facilities-seven-key)). Those are not bankruptcy cases, but they are the closest LGA slot-allocation precedents.

The clean official baseline is the FAA Summer 2025 LGA holder report, status date December 5, 2025, and the FAA Summer 2025 operator report, status date December 9, 2025. The unit is an FAA operating authorization, meaning one takeoff or one landing, not a round-trip pair; both reports exclude FAA-held slots and slots held for fewer than five days ([FAA holder totals](https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/systemops/perf_analysis/slot_administration/data/doc/LGA_S25_Slot_HOLDER_TOTALS.pdf), [FAA operator totals](https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/systemops/perf_analysis/slot_administration/data/doc/LGA_S25_Slot_OPERATOR_TOTALS.pdf)).

| Carrier | Holder OAs | Share of 1,141 listed holder OAs | Operator OAs |
|---|---:|---:|---:|
| Delta Air Lines | 511 | 44.8% | 580 |
| American Airlines | 327 | 28.7% | 327 |
| United Airlines | 94 | 8.2% | 67 |
| Southwest Airlines | 57 | 5.0% | 70 |
| JetBlue Airways | 31 | 2.7% | 31 |
| Alaska Airlines | 12 | 1.1% | not listed |
| Frontier Airlines | 4 | 0.4% | 10 |
| Spirit Airlines | 22 | 1.9% | 22 |

That concentration is why Delta is a very weak candidate and American is only a mid-probability candidate despite its willingness and ability to bid. Delta already operated 580 LGA authorizations in the operator report, and American held 327 authorizations in the holder report ([FAA operator totals](https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/systemops/perf_analysis/slot_administration/data/doc/LGA_S25_Slot_OPERATOR_TOTALS.pdf), [FAA holder totals](https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/systemops/perf_analysis/slot_administration/data/doc/LGA_S25_Slot_HOLDER_TOTALS.pdf)). The June 23, 2026 LGA order also keeps 71 scheduled operating authorizations per hour, imposes an 80% usage rule, allows trades and leases only with FAA approval, and says surrendered or withdrawn authorizations above the hourly cap may be retired until the hour reaches 71 ([Federal Register](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/06/23/2026-12592/operating-limitations-at-new-york-laguardia-airport)).

The current regulatory signal points the same way as the precedents. FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford said on May 28 that FAA and DOT would support the slots going to a low-fare airline for the public good, and that if this is not possible the alternative is retiring the slots to reduce congestion ([Bloomberg Law](https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcy-law/spirits-laguardia-slots-should-go-to-low-cost-carrier-faa-says)). The Port Authority position also disfavors a pure highest-dollar sale to an airline that cannot or will not use Terminal A, because it argues that a buyer must solve the facility problem as well as the runway-authorization problem ([Bloomberg Law](https://news.bloomberglaw.com/litigation/spirits-laguardia-slot-sale-kicks-off-high-stakes-airport-fight)).

Frontier has the strongest airline-specific edge. On June 1, 2023, JetBlue and Frontier announced a definitive agreement under which JetBlue would divest all of Spirit’s LaGuardia holdings to Frontier if the JetBlue-Spirit merger closed; the package was six Marine Air Terminal gates and 22 takeoff and landing slots, subject to Port Authority and FAA/DOT approval ([JetBlue/Frontier agreement](https://news.jetblue.com/latest-news/press-release-details/2023/JetBlue-and-Frontier-Announce-Divestiture-Agreement-in-Connection-with-JetBlues-Combination-with-Spirit/default.aspx)). That deal failed only because the merger failed, not because the LGA package stopped fitting Frontier. Frontier has also been the largest schedule gainer in former Spirit markets: Aviation Week’s June 16 schedule analysis found Frontier added about 1.3 million seats across former Spirit markets for June-August 2026, lifting its share in those markets from 5.6% to 10.4% ([Aviation Week](https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/airports-networks/analysis-spirits-exit-drives-growth-frontier-jetblue)).

JetBlue is the second-best named candidate. It is a New York carrier, it is evaluating LGA opportunities, and it added more than 500,000 seats across former Spirit markets for June-August 2026, but it is not a clean Spirit-like ULCC and it previously offered these exact LGA assets to Frontier as a merger remedy ([Bloomberg Law](https://news.bloomberglaw.com/litigation/spirits-laguardia-slot-sale-kicks-off-high-stakes-airport-fight), [Aviation Week](https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/airports-networks/analysis-spirits-exit-drives-growth-frontier-jetblue), [JetBlue/Frontier agreement](https://news.jetblue.com/latest-news/press-release-details/2023/JetBlue-and-Frontier-Announce-Divestiture-Agreement-in-Connection-with-JetBlues-Combination-with-Spirit/default.aspx)). Southwest has a cleaner low-cost identity than JetBlue and it benefited from the 2013 American-US Airways remedy, but I found less direct evidence that it wants this specific LGA package ([DOJ](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-us-airways-and-american-airlines-divest-facilities-seven-key), [The Points Guy](https://thepointsguy.com/news/spirit-laguardia-slots/)). Other airline(s) is meaningful because Porter said it was interested in more LGA slots if the allocation process was defined, and the Port Authority named Allegiant, Frontier, El Al, Arkia, and Etihad as carriers interested in expanding or entering its airports ([Bloomberg Law](https://news.bloomberglaw.com/litigation/spirits-laguardia-slot-sale-kicks-off-high-stakes-airport-fight)).

American is the main high-bid threat. The Points Guy reported that many observers saw American, Frontier, JetBlue, and Southwest as leading candidates, and American’s CEO said in April that the airline has a long history of being aggressive when assets become available ([The Points Guy](https://thepointsguy.com/news/spirit-laguardia-slots/)). But the same facts that make LGA slots valuable to American make them hard to approve for American: it already holds a large LGA position, and the current FAA/DOT signal is about preserving low-fare access rather than reinforcing dominant carriers ([FAA holder totals](https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/systemops/perf_analysis/slot_administration/data/doc/LGA_S25_Slot_HOLDER_TOTALS.pdf), [Bloomberg Law](https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcy-law/spirits-laguardia-slots-should-go-to-low-cost-carrier-faa-says)).

My scenario model uses four branches. I put 43% on one low-fare or limited-incumbent winner, 30% on a split or conditioned allocation, 17% on a creditor-driven high-bid or legacy-mixed outcome, and 10% on retirement, litigation, or no qualifying allocation before the resolution deadline. In the single low-fare branch, Frontier gets most of the probability because of the 2023 agreement and the FAA fit; in the split branch, Frontier, JetBlue, Southwest, and Other airline(s) all have material inclusion chances; in the legacy branch, American dominates but some low-fare participation remains possible as a regulatory compromise.

## What's non-obvious
The common mistake is to treat this as a simple bankruptcy auction. The sale procedures use a highest or otherwise best standard, which lets deal certainty and regulatory feasibility matter, and the FAA still must confirm any transfer before the buyer can use the slots ([Spirit bankruptcy sale motion](https://documents.elevenflo.com/uuid_database_8_14_23/09ccbccb-ca58-4b5e-8623-336463c4daae.pdf), [14 CFR 93.221](https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/93.221)). A high American bid that cannot clear FAA and Port Authority concerns is not really the best bid.

The other subtle point is the unit problem. Public FAA data and most reporting say Spirit held 22 individual operating authorizations, while the question says slot pairs; 22 individual authorizations are closer to 11 daily round trips if paired cleanly ([FAA holder totals](https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/systemops/perf_analysis/slot_administration/data/doc/LGA_S25_Slot_HOLDER_TOTALS.pdf), [The Points Guy](https://thepointsguy.com/news/spirit-laguardia-slots/)). That smaller practical package favors a whole-package recipient such as Frontier, but the prior LGA remedy history keeps a split allocation very plausible.

## Limitations
The bid list is still private. No final allocation, stalking-horse bidder, qualified-bid list, bid amounts, exact slot times, Terminal A cure costs, or FAA-confirmed transfer had been publicly reported by June 27, 2026, and the final-bid and auction dates were still ahead ([Bloomberg Law](https://news.bloomberglaw.com/litigation/spirits-laguardia-slot-sale-kicks-off-high-stakes-airport-fight)). A credible financed Frontier bid would push Frontier above 70%; a visibly higher American bid with FAA neutrality would push American toward the top.

The largest legal uncertainty is how hard the FAA and Port Authority will push after the court selects a buyer. Bedford’s statement is a strong policy signal, not a final transfer order, and the Port Authority’s facility leverage could either force a Terminal A whole-package deal or delay the sale enough for a more negotiated split. The forecast should move sharply once the June 30 bid slate or July 9 auction result becomes public.

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## Question Details

On May 2, 2026, Spirit Airlines ceased operations and began liquidating its assets following bankruptcy, canceling all flights and vacating facilities including its operations at LaGuardia Airport (LGA) in New York. (opb.org) Spirit had been the sole tenant of the Marine Air Terminal at LaGuardia and held a portfolio of FAA-controlled takeoff and landing slots at this slot-constrained airport. (en.wikipedia.org) In a liquidation scenario, such slots are valuable assets that may be reassigned by regulators (e.g., the FAA and U.S. Department of Transportation) or transferred/sold through bankruptcy proceedings to other airlines. This question asks which airlines will ultimately take control (through purchase, transfer, or regulatory reallocation) of the LaGuardia slot pairs that were held by Spirit Airlines immediately prior to its shutdown on May 2, 2026. The resolution will consider developments from May 2, 2026 onward until a clear, authoritative allocation of the majority of these slots has occurred.

### Resolution Criteria

This question will resolve based on publicly reported final allocation(s) of Spirit Airlines' former LaGuardia (LGA) slot pairs. Primary sources for resolution will include: - Official announcements or orders from the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) or Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) - Bankruptcy court filings or rulings related to Spirit Airlines asset disposition - Confirmed reporting from major reputable news outlets (e.g., Reuters, AP News, Bloomberg, Wall Street Journal) Each listed airline option will be considered "true" if it is confirmed to have obtained control of at least one slot pair formerly held by Spirit at LGA, whether via purchase, lease, or regulatory reassignment. If multiple airlines acquire slots, multiple options may resolve as true. If no clear or final allocation is reported by May 2, 2028, the question will be annulled.

### Fine Print

- "Control" includes ownership, long-term lease, or formal allocation of slot usage rights sufficient to operate scheduled service at LGA. - Temporary or emergency use of slots (e.g., short-term accommodation flights immediately after shutdown) does not count unless later formalized. - If a merger or acquisition results in slots being transferred indirectly (e.g., via acquisition of Spirit assets), the acquiring airline counts. - If slots are returned to a general FAA pool and later redistributed, the eventual recipient airlines count. - If an airline ceases to exist or merges before resolution, its successor entity is credited. - Options are not mutually exclusive: multiple airlines may receive portions of the slot portfolio.