Will the Iranian soccer team be able to play all of their scheduled matches in the 2026 FIFA World Cup?

TL;DR

My forecast is 83% Yes: Iran plays every 2026 World Cup match it is scheduled to play.

Context

Iran is still listed for Group G. FIFA’s May 16 update says Iran is scheduled to face New Zealand on June 15 in Los Angeles, Belgium on June 21 in Los Angeles, and Egypt on June 26 in Seattle; AP’s May 23 report repeats the same three U.S. group matches and says the tournament runs from June 11 to July 19 (FIFA, May 16, AP, May 23).

Since the client asked on May 4, the evidence has moved toward implementation. FIFA met Iranian federation officials in Istanbul on May 16, Iranian players were in Antalya for camp by May 18, players and staff attended U.S. and Canadian visa appointments in Ankara on May 21, and Iran’s federation said on May 23 that its base camp had been moved from Tucson to Tijuana, though AP said FIFA had not publicly confirmed the move (FIFA, May 16, AP, May 19, Iran International/Reuters, May 21, AP, May 23).

Evidence

The historical base rate strongly favors Yes. Modern World Cups almost never lose a scheduled finalist after the field is set. The early failures were concentrated around 1938 and 1950, while the 1954-2022 period has 432 finalist entries and no comparable team failing to appear or complete its scheduled finals matches (FIFA team-count history, Le Monde, March 5).

Iran is not a normal entrant. Iran’s sports minister said on March 11 that the team could not participate because players had no safety after U.S.-Israeli attacks, and Iran’s Ministry of Sports announced a ban on teams traveling to hostile countries on March 27, although that ban did not specifically name the World Cup (GPB/NPR, March 11, AP, March 27). Those facts justify moving far below the modern base rate.

The more recent revealed behavior is the main reason I still land in the 80s. FIFA President Gianni Infantino affirmed at the April 30 FIFA Congress that Iran would participate and play in the United States, FIFA’s secretary general said after the May 16 Istanbul meeting that FIFA and Iran were looking forward to Team Melli’s participation, and Iran’s federation said on May 9 that the country would participate while pressing for visa, security, and treatment guarantees (AP, April 30, FIFA, May 16, AP, May 9). A team preparing to boycott usually does not send players to visa appointments, shift a base camp, and keep training abroad three weeks before kickoff.

The visa risk is real but narrower than the headline suggests. U.S. policy suspends visa issuance to Iranian nationals but has exceptions for participants in certain major sporting events, and the White House proclamation expressly exempts athletes, team members, coaches, necessary support staff, and immediate relatives traveling for the World Cup or similar events (State Department, last updated February 2, White House proclamation, December 2025). The dangerous edge is IRGC-linked people. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on April 23 that Washington did not object to Iranian players but would bar people with IRGC ties, while Iran’s federation has asked for visas for players and technical staff who did mandatory service in the IRGC (Reuters via Investing.com, April 23, AP, May 9). Canada has already enforced a hard line: Iranian federation officials were denied entry before the FIFA Congress, and Canada’s 2024 IRGC listing makes senior Iranian officials and top IRGC members inadmissible (AP, April 30, Government of Canada, June 19 2024).

The Tijuana move lowers the day-to-day U.S. exposure but does not remove the U.S. match requirement. Iran’s federation says the Tijuana base lets the squad fly directly to Mexico and cross into the United States for matches; AP reported that the three group matches remain in Inglewood and Seattle, and that FIFA had not independently confirmed the base-camp approval as of May 23 (AP, May 23, Al Jazeera/Reuters, May 23). I read this as a compromise that solves part of the visa and security problem, not as evidence of withdrawal.

The war path keeps the forecast below 90%. AP reported on May 24 that the United States and Iran were close to a deal that would end the war and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, but also that the agreement would not be signed that day and that previous near-deals had faltered; Reuters reported the same day that Trump said not to rush a deal and that the U.S. blockade would remain until an agreement was reached, certified, and signed (AP, May 24, Reuters via Investing.com, May 24). That means the next three weeks still contain a real tail risk of renewed escalation, symbolic visa denial, or a political reversal in Tehran.

My numerical model has three stages. I put Iran’s chance of starting its June 15 opener at 88.5%, reflecting strong operational preparation but unresolved visas and war risk. Conditional on starting, I put the chance of completing all three group matches at 97.0%, because modern mid-tournament withdrawals are extremely rare but this team still has repeated border, security, and political exposure. For possible knockout matches, I used a 65% chance that Iran advances under the format where the top two teams in each group and eight of twelve third-place teams reach the Round of 32, and a 4.5% chance of failing to complete an added knockout match if it gets one (FIFA format explainer). The product is 0.885 x 0.970 x (1 - 0.65 x 0.045) = 0.833, which I round in prose to 83%.

What's non-obvious

The obvious story is a U.S. travel ban or FIFA ban. That is not the main crux. The legal carve-out and FIFA’s public behavior point toward letting the players and essential staff in. The real crux is whether Iran accepts a trimmed or screened delegation if the U.S. or Canada bars federation officials, security-linked staff, journalists, or anyone treated as IRGC-linked.

The Tijuana base-camp switch is also easy to misread. It shows the normal plan broke. But it is still a costly operational workaround. It gives Iran a face-saving story, reduces the time spent inside the United States, and lets FIFA preserve the match schedule. That is exactly the kind of compromise that tends to keep a World Cup field intact.

Limitations

I could not verify public issuance of the necessary U.S., Canadian, and Mexican entry approvals for Iran’s final squad and essential staff. The latest hard evidence I found is visa appointments and applications on May 21, not approvals (Iran International/Reuters, May 21).

I also could not verify FIFA’s own public confirmation of the Tijuana base-camp switch; the best report says Iran’s federation claimed FIFA approval, while AP said FIFA had not confirmed the move in that story (AP, May 23). The forecast would rise into the low 90s if core visas are issued and a ceasefire deal is signed. It would fall toward 65-75% if talks collapse, a major new strike occurs, or a high-profile player or coach is denied entry over IRGC-related screening.