# What will the US tariff rate on China be on July 1?

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## Forecast

Median forecast: 22.4; 80% interval: 20.2 to 27.

Generated: May 24, 2026 at 5:33 AM UTC
Forecast model: gpt-5.5
Research model: gpt-5.5

## Analysis

## TL;DR
I forecast a **23.2%** mean U.S. trade-weighted effective tariff rate on imports from China on July 1, 2026, with the modal resolving value at Yale Budget Lab’s **22.22%** current-law China rate.

## Context
The July 1 date falls inside the temporary Section 122 window. After the Supreme Court held on February 20, 2026 that IEEPA did not authorize the president to impose tariffs, the administration used Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 as a bridge: CBP guidance issued February 23 says covered imports entered from February 24 through 12:01 a.m. EDT on July 24, 2026 face an additional 10% ad valorem duty, with product and program exemptions ([Supreme Court/Justia](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/2025/24-1287/), [CBP CSMS #67844987](https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSCBP/bulletins/40b3b7b), [White House Section 122 fact sheet](https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-imposes-a-temporary-import-duty-to-address-fundamental-international-payment-problems/)).

The court risk is real but not the base case. The Court of International Trade ruled on May 7, 2026 that the Section 122 tariff was unlawful, but relief was limited to named plaintiffs, and the Federal Circuit’s May 12 administrative stay left the surcharge in place while it considers a longer stay; PwC’s May 22 update says CBP continues to collect the 10% surcharge ([Skadden](https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2026/05/us-trade-court-strikes-down-section-122-tariffs), [Davis Wright Tremaine](https://www.dwt.com/insights/2026/05/trade-court-invalidating-section-122-tariff), [PwC Canada](https://www.pwc.com/ca/en/services/tax/publications/tax-insights/us-court-strike-down-section-122-tariffs-2026.html)).

## Evidence
The historical backbone says China tariffs are far above the pre-2025 regime, even after the IEEPA layer disappeared. USAFacts uses Census/USITC customs-duty revenue divided by goods imports, so it is a realized-collections measure rather than a point-in-time statutory tracker ([USAFacts](https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/china/)).

| Measure | Coverage window | Unit and framing | Value | Source vintage |
|---|---:|---|---:|---|
| Long-run China ETR | 2002-2024 | Customs duties / goods imports | about 5% | [USAFacts, updated Apr. 16, 2026](https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/china/) |
| China ETR | 2024 annual | Customs duties / goods imports | 10.9% | [USAFacts, updated Apr. 16, 2026](https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/china/) |
| China ETR | 2025 annual | Customs duties / goods imports | 30.6% | [USAFacts, updated Apr. 16, 2026](https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/china/) |
| China ETR | Jan.-Feb. 2026 | Customs duties / goods imports | 30.7% | [USAFacts, updated Apr. 16, 2026](https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/china/) |
| China ETR | Feb. 2026 | Customs duties / goods imports | 29.6% | [USAFacts, updated Apr. 16, 2026](https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/china/) |

The best current-law source is Yale Budget Lab’s tariff tracker, because the question asks what rate is in effect on a day. The tracker assigns daily statutory rates to almost 20,000 HS10 products across about 240 partners, weights them by 2024 Census import values, and excludes behavioral substitution from the daily ETR ([Budget Lab tracker note](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/research/introducing-tariff-rate-tracker-open-source-tool-daily-effective-tariff-rates), [Budget Lab GitHub](https://github.com/Budget-Lab-Yale/tariff-rate-tracker)). The public Datawrapper dataset for Figure 3 gives China at 22.22% on July 1, 2026 and 17.81% on July 24, 2026, so the Section 122 layer adds 4.41 percentage points in that framework ([Datawrapper CSV](https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/2kEIW/1/dataset.csv), [Datawrapper chart](https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/2kEIW/1/)). That is my central anchor.

Other credible sources sit higher, but they are less directly tied to the July 1 statutory question. Budget Lab’s April 8 country table gives China at 23.9% pre-substitution if Section 122 is extended and 19.4% if it expires, with post-substitution values of 23.5% and 18.9% ([Budget Lab, Apr. 8, 2026](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/sites/default/files/page_to_pdf/1466/publication_1466.pdf)). Penn Wharton’s May 12 update, using USITC DataWeb customs data, reports a 25.0% effective rate for China in March 2026, the first full month after IEEPA was replaced by a 10% Section 122 tariff ([Penn Wharton Budget Model, May 12, 2026](https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/p/2026-05-12-effective-tariff-rates-and-revenues-updated-may-12-2026/)). Global Trade Alert’s February 21 model uses 274,000-plus exporter-by-HS8 flows and 2024 import weights; it reports aggregate U.S. rates of 11.4% under Section 122 at 10% and 13.0% under Section 122 at 15%, and a China rate near 29.7% under its 15% scenario ([Global Trade Alert](https://globaltradealert.org/reports/S122-US-Tariff-Estimates)). CBP and the White House still point to 10%, so I treat the 15% figures as source-method upside, not the base case ([CBP CSMS #67844987](https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSCBP/bulletins/40b3b7b), [White House Section 122 fact sheet](https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-imposes-a-temporary-import-duty-to-address-fundamental-international-payment-problems/)).

The near-term policy calendar supports no broad change before July 1. The scheduled Section 122 expiry is July 24, not July 1 ([CBP CSMS #67844987](https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSCBP/bulletins/40b3b7b)). USTR’s March 2026 Section 301 investigations into structural excess capacity and forced labor are live, with hearings in late April and early May, but I found no final tariff action effective before July 1 ([USTR structural-excess-capacity page](https://ustr.gov/trade-topics/enforcement/section-301-investigations/section-301-structural-excess-capacity-and-production-manufacturing-sectors), [USTR forced-labor release](https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026/march/ustr-initiates-60-section-301-investigations-relating-failures-take-action-forced-labor)). The May 17-18 U.S.-China summit created boards of trade and investment and purchase commitments, but the U.S. readouts did not announce a broad U.S. tariff cut; USTR said the next step is a public-comment process for non-sensitive goods ([White House China fact sheet](https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/05/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-secures-historic-deals-with-china-delivering-for-american-workers-farmers-and-industry/), [USTR, May 18, 2026](https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026/may/president-trumps-state-visit-china-delivers-historic-deals-and-greater-market-access-american)).

My scenario model is centered on source selection and whether Section 122 is counted on July 1:

| Scenario | Weight | Center | Interpretation |
|---|---:|---:|---|
| Yale current-law tracker resolves; Section 122 counted | 60% | 22.2% | Exact July 1 statutory-tracker anchor. |
| No major policy change, but resolver/source lands higher | 16% | 24.8% | Median across Budget Lab April, Penn Wharton, or GTA-style methods. |
| Section 122 broadly excluded or ended before July 1 | 9% | 18.2% | Legal or executive downside, near Yale’s post-expiry value. |
| Targeted China product relief before July 1 | 5% | 20.8% | Narrow Board-of-Trade or exclusion relief. |
| Moderate new tariff action or 15% source treatment | 7% | 29.5% | New Section 301/sectoral tariff, or resolver uses higher GTA framing. |
| Large escalation | 2% | 35.5% | Fast, broad replacement tariff. |
| Extreme re-escalation above 40% | 1% | 45.0% | Thin tail from the 2025 precedent of very high China tariff stacks. |

This mixture gives a mean of 23.2%, a median of 22.3%, a 10th-90th percentile range of 20.0%-26.9%, and about 0.9% probability above 40%.

## What's non-obvious
The obvious answer from recent customs collections is near 30%, but that is not the cleanest resolution concept. USAFacts’ 29.6% for February 2026 and Penn Wharton’s 25.0% for March 2026 are realized customs-duty measures, while Yale’s 22.22% is a statutory daily rate weighted by 2024 import values and explicitly designed for “rate in effect” questions ([USAFacts](https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/china/), [Penn Wharton Budget Model, May 12, 2026](https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/p/2026-05-12-effective-tariff-rates-and-revenues-updated-may-12-2026/), [Budget Lab tracker note](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/research/introducing-tariff-rate-tracker-open-source-tool-daily-effective-tariff-rates), [Datawrapper CSV](https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/2kEIW/1/dataset.csv)).

The second trap is the Section 122 court ruling. The May 7 ruling makes Section 122 legally vulnerable, but it does not by itself zero out the tariff for July 1 because the relief was narrow and the Federal Circuit stay keeps collection going for now ([Skadden](https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2026/05/us-trade-court-strikes-down-section-122-tariffs), [PwC Canada](https://www.pwc.com/ca/en/services/tax/publications/tax-insights/us-court-strike-down-section-122-tariffs-2026.html)). If Section 122 were broadly removed, the natural anchor would fall toward 18%, not to zero, because Section 301, Section 232, and ordinary MFN duties remain ([Budget Lab, Apr. 8, 2026](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/sites/default/files/page_to_pdf/1466/publication_1466.pdf)).

## Limitations
The biggest uncertainty is resolution method. If the resolver privileges the Yale daily statutory tracker, the answer is close to 22.2%. If it takes a median across Yale, Penn Wharton, and Global Trade Alert-style estimates, the value can land in the mid-20s. If it uses backward-looking customs collections, the value can land in the high-20s even without a new policy change ([Budget Lab tracker note](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/research/introducing-tariff-rate-tracker-open-source-tool-daily-effective-tariff-rates), [Penn Wharton Budget Model, May 12, 2026](https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/p/2026-05-12-effective-tariff-rates-and-revenues-updated-may-12-2026/), [Global Trade Alert](https://globaltradealert.org/reports/S122-US-Tariff-Estimates)).

The legal and policy state can still change before July 1. A Federal Circuit order, a broad CBP implementation change, or a fast Section 301 determination could move the answer by several percentage points. I did not find a country-specific OECD, World Bank, or USITC July 1 estimate that improves on the Yale daily tracker as of May 24, 2026.

## Sources

- Domain Expert Search (mcp)
  > Found 5 subagent groups for 'US trade tariffs China Section 122 Section 301 legal status effective tariff rate July 2026':
- us Tariffs (mcp)
  > Active Chapter 99 tariffs for China as of 2026-07-01
- Claude Code (e2b)
  > Job coding_whiz_job_36bc1568a1 done after 282177ms.
- [datawrapper.dwcdn.net](https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/2kEIW/1/dataset.csv) (tool)
- [github.com](https://github.com/Budget-Lab-Yale/tariff-rate-tracker) (tool)
- [globaltradealert.org](https://globaltradealert.org/reports/S122-US-Tariff-Estimates) (tool)
- [Introducing the Tariff Rate Tracker: An Open-Source Tool for Daily Effective Tariff Rates | The Budget Lab](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/research/introducing-tariff-rate-tracker-open-source-tool-daily-effective-tariff-rates) (openai)
- [federalregister.gov](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/25/2026-03824/imposing-a-temporary-import-surcharge-to-address-fundamental-international-payments-problems) (tool)
- [gtlaw.com](https://www.gtlaw.com/en/insights/2026/5/us-tariff-update-section-122-duties-found-unauthorized-by-law-ieepa-refunds-under-way) (tool)
- [customsandinternationaltradelaw.com](https://customsandinternationaltradelaw.com/2026/05/14/appeals-court-keeps-section-122-tariffs-in-place-for-now-what-importers-need-to-know) (tool)
- [carraglobe.com](https://carraglobe.com/section-122-tariff-2026) (tool)
- [tariffstool.com](https://www.tariffstool.com/guides/china-tariff-rate) (tool)
- [budgetlab.yale.edu](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/research/state-us-tariffs-april-2-2026) (tool)
- Domain Expert Research Task (mcp)
  > Job domain_expert_research_task_055ceb0a7a done after 416010ms.
- [budgetlab.yale.edu](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/research/state-us-tariffs-april-8-2026) (tool)
- [ustr.gov](https://www.ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026/february/ambassador-greer-issues-statement-supreme-court-ieepa-decision) (tool)
- [ustr.gov](https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2025/november/ustr-extends-exclusions-china-section-301-tariffs-related-forced-technology-transfer-investigation) (tool)
- [whitehouse.gov](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/04/strengthening-actions-taken-to-adjust-imports-of-aluminum-steel-and-copper-into-the-united-states) (tool)
- [whitehouse.gov](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/03/adjusting-imports-of-automobiles-and-autombile-parts-into-the-united-states?query-11-page=2) (tool)
- [whitehouse.gov](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/10/adjusting-imports-of-medium-and-heavy-duty-vehicles-medium-and-heavy-duty-vehicle-parts-and-buses-into-the-united-states) (tool)
- [whitehouse.gov](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/01/adjusting-imports-of-semiconductors-semiconductor-manufacturing-equipment-and-their-derivative-products-into-the-united-states?query-11-page=96&trk=article-ssr-frontend-pulse_little-text-block) (tool)
- [whitehouse.gov](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/02/imposing-a-temporary-import-surcharge-to-address-fundamental-international-payments-problems) (tool)
- [whitehouse.gov](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/02/continuing-the-suspension-of-duty-free-de-minimis-treatment-for-all-countries) (tool)
- [whitehouse.gov](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/02/ending-certain-tariff-actions) (tool)
- [whitehouse.gov](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/04/adjusting-imports-of-pharmaceuticals-and-pharmaceutical-ingredients-into-the-united-states) (tool)
- [budgetlab.yale.edu](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/research/state-us-tariffs-scotus-ruling-update) (tool)
- [dwt.com](https://www.dwt.com/insights/2026/05/trade-court-invalidating-section-122-tariff) (tool)
- [bhfs.com](https://www.bhfs.com/insight/seeking-section-122-relief-immediately-is-in-all-importers-interests) (tool)
- [internationaltradeinsights.com](https://www.internationaltradeinsights.com/2026/05/court-of-international-trade-denies-governments-motion-to-stay-section-122-ruling) (tool)
- [public-inspection.federalregister.gov](https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-08806.pdf) (tool)
- [ustr.gov](https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026/march/ustr-initiates-60-section-301-investigations-relating-failures-take-action-forced-labor) (tool)
- [datawrapper.dwcdn.net](https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/2kEIW/full.png) (tool)
- [budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu](https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/p/2026-02-23-effective-tariff-rates-and-revenues-updated-february-23-2026) (tool)
- [oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2026/03/oecd-economic-outlook-interim-report-march-2026_254a8d56/full-report/component-2.html) (tool)
- [taxfoundation.org](https://taxfoundation.org/tariffs-trump-trade-war) (tool)
- [gibsondunn.com](https://www.gibsondunn.com/section-122-global-tariffs-invalidated-by-the-court-of-international-trade-ruling-and-next-steps) (tool)
- [budgetlab.yale.edu](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/node/1424/pdf) (tool)
- [Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Secures Historic Deals with China, Delivering for American Workers, Farmers, and Industry – The White House](https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/05/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-secures-historic-deals-with-china-delivering-for-american-workers-farmers-and-industry) (openai)
- [github.com](https://github.com/Budget-Lab-Yale/Tariff-ETRs) (tool)
- [whitehouse.gov](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/03/adjusting-imports-of-automobiles-and-autombile-parts-into-the-united-states) (tool)
- [whitehouse.gov](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/01/adjusting-imports-of-semiconductors-semiconductor-manufacturing-equipment-and-their-derivative-products-into-the-united-states) (tool)
- [taxfoundation.org](https://taxfoundation.org/research/all/federal/trump-tariffs-trade-war) (tool)
- [polsinelli.com](https://www.polsinelli.com/customs/publications/court-of-international-trade-invalidates-trump-section-122-tariffs-appeal-pending) (tool)
- [axios.com](https://www.axios.com/2026/05/07/trump-tariffs-trade-court) (tool)
- [Effective Tariff Rates and Revenues (Updated May 12, 2026) | Penn Wharton Budget Model](https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/p/2026-05-12-effective-tariff-rates-and-revenues-updated-may-12-2026) (openai)
- [clarkhill.com](https://www.clarkhill.com/news-events/news/section-122-tariffs-ruling) (tool)
- [crowell.com](https://www.crowell.com/en/insights/client-alerts/trump-administration-imposes-section-232-tariffs-on-patented-pharmaceutical-imports-tiered-rate-structure-takes-effect-beginning-july-31-2026) (tool)
- [USTR Initiates Section 301 Investigations Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors | United States Trade Representative](https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026/march/ustr-initiates-section-301-investigations-relating-structural-excess-capacity-and-production) (openai)
- [federalregister.gov](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/05/06/2026-08806/initiation-of-second-four-year-review-process-chinas-acts-policies-and-practices-related-to) (tool)
- [globaltradealert.org](https://globaltradealert.org/blog/from-ieepa-to-section-122) (tool)

## Question Details

This question asks for the effective trade-weighted average tariff rate imposed by the United States on imports from China as of July 1, 2026. As of early 2026, U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods are highly complex and consist of multiple overlapping measures, including longstanding Section 301 tariffs (generally ranging from 7.5% to 25% or higher on specific goods), sector-specific tariffs (e.g., steel, semiconductors), and more recent policy changes. (lenzo.ai) In 2025–2026, additional “reciprocal” and emergency tariffs were introduced and then partly invalidated by a U.S. Supreme Court ruling in February 2026, which removed certain IEEPA-based tariffs. (chrobinson.com) Following these changes, a temporary global tariff (reported around 10–15%) and other adjustments have resulted in an estimated trade-weighted average U.S. tariff rate on Chinese imports of roughly 25–30% as of early 2026, though this remains in flux due to ongoing legal, legislative, and executive actions. (china-briefing.com) Because tariffs vary widely across products, this question focuses on the overall trade-weighted average tariff rate applied to Chinese imports, rather than any single statutory tariff rate. The forecast should reflect the rate in effect on July 1, 2026.

### Resolution Criteria

The question will resolve to the best available estimate of the trade-weighted average effective U.S. tariff rate on imports from China in effect on July 1, 2026. Primary source: Publications from reputable economic policy trackers such as: - The Budget Lab at Yale - OECD - World Bank - U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) - Other widely cited economic research institutions If multiple credible sources report values, the resolution will use: 1. The most recent estimate explicitly referring to a date closest to July 1, 2026; or 2. If multiple estimates exist for that date, the median of those estimates. If no source reports an exact July 1 value, the closest available estimate (within ±30 days) will be used. The value will be expressed as a percentage (e.g., 29.7%).

### Fine Print

- “Tariff rate” refers to the trade-weighted average effective tariff rate across all imports from China, not statutory rates on specific products. - The measure should include all applicable tariffs in force on July 1, 2026 (e.g., Section 301, Section 232, or any new tariffs), and exclude any tariffs that have been repealed or invalidated before that date. - Temporary tariffs count if they are in effect on July 1, 2026, even if scheduled to expire later. - If the U.S. eliminates all China-specific tariffs but applies a global tariff affecting China, that global tariff should be included. - If no credible estimate is available by December 31, 2026, the question will be annulled. - Units: percent (%), measured to at least one decimal place.