# Will Bolivian president Rodrigo Paz Pereira remain in power through the end of 2026?

Canonical URL: https://preseen.com/reports/7a0a58b5-b513-46a5-b305-ccc1b5a4a4ac/will-bolivian-president-rodrigo-paz-pereira-remain-in-power-through-the-end-of-2
Markdown URL: https://preseen.com/reports/7a0a58b5-b513-46a5-b305-ccc1b5a4a4ac/markdown

## Forecast

P(Yes): 93.8%; P(No): 6.2%.

Generated: November 8, 2026 at 5:30 PM UTC
Resolution check date: 2027-01-02
Forecast model: gpt-6.1-sol
Research model: gpt-5.6-sol+gpt-6.1-sol+claude-opus-5-5

## Analysis

# Bolivia: Presidential continuity through the end of 2026

## Executive Summary

**The probability that the question resolves YES is 93.8%.** Rodrigo Paz Pereira is highly likely to remain continuously President of Bolivia through **23:59 local time on 31 December 2026**, without a qualifying interruption since the question was asked on 5 June.

As of 8 November, Paz has survived the earlier nationwide confrontation, remains officially recognized as president, and has roughly 53 days left to navigate. Demonstrations have declined, security forces continue implementing government policy, and external financing provides some breathing room.

The principal threat is a renewed nationwide protest crisis combined with defections among political or security leaders. A separate constitutional dispute over temporary succession also matters: an effective transfer of the presidency—even temporarily—would produce NO under the question’s rules.

## Key drivers

### The earlier confrontation has receded

The May–June blockades and resignation demands did not remove Paz. Negotiations and emergency measures broke up the confrontation, and current reporting continues to identify him as president. The June crisis should therefore not be treated as an uninterrupted siege continuing into November.

Recorded demonstration events fell from **216 in May to 57 in October**. These are event counts, not participant totals or measures of blockade effectiveness, but they support the broader evidence of reduced mobilization. A Morales-aligned march scheduled to leave Patacamaya on 6 November did not begin after police and military deployment; organizers said they would reschedule.

### Institutional support remains sufficient, though fragile

Recent security deployments demonstrate that the government can still execute its policies. They do not prove how commanders would behave during a larger confrontation.

Paz lacks a legislative majority, but lawmakers outside his party have supported major initiatives, including the IMF agreement. Formal removal also faces substantial barriers: presidential prosecution requires a substantiated prosecutorial request and authorization from two-thirds of legislators present. Recall cannot be requested before half the presidential term has elapsed. These constraints impede a rapid legal exit, although they cannot prevent forced resignation or extra-constitutional removal.

### Economic and political weakness could regenerate pressure

The latest reported Ipsos CIESMORI survey found **25% approval and 59% disapproval**. Its 400 respondents were adult internet users in four major cities, so it indicates urban vulnerability rather than a precise national measure.

Economic hardship remains substantial. Official data reported real gross domestic product—the value of economic output—down **3.27% in the first half of 2026** from the corresponding period a year earlier. October consumer prices rose **2.07% from September**. The output figures are lagged, but both releases help explain why renewed protests remain plausible.

The rupture with Vice President Edmand Lara, withdrawal of an important ally’s support, and controversy surrounding former adviser Fernando Cerimedo create additional channels for a fresh shock to fracture political support.

### Financing provides a near-term buffer

On 2 October, the IMF approved a **36-month arrangement worth approximately US$1.9 billion**, authorizing an immediate disbursement of approximately **US$214 million**. The larger amount is phased financing, not cash already received. Approval nevertheless reduces immediate funding pressure; associated reforms can simultaneously generate opposition.

### Constitutional continuity is a distinct uncertainty

Lara has declared himself “president in exercise” during Paz’s foreign travel. The evidence reviewed does **not** establish that those declarations produced an effective transfer: Paz continued issuing decrees remotely, and Senate leadership continued recognizing him as president.

The legal dispute is consequential nonetheless. Article 169 of the Constitution provides for temporary presidential substitution, while Article 22 of Decree 5675 permits remote government and specifies a substitution procedure when communication is impossible. The forecast treats the reported declarations as disputed claims, not completed successions, while retaining uncertainty about an authoritative legal determination.

## Scenarios

The reasoning gives the greatest weight to continued tenure, while distinguishing renewed unrest from an actual loss of office.

| Scenario | Why it carries this weight | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| **Unrest remains contained** | The dominant path: mobilization is below earlier levels, opposition coordination is incomplete, and the government retains operational capacity. Negotiations, enforcement and selective legislative cooperation carry Paz through the short remaining period. | YES |
| **A renewed crisis occurs, but Paz survives** | A meaningful possibility given economic hardship and organized discontent. The earlier confrontation demonstrated that even severe protests need not produce resignation; concessions or continued institutional support could again preserve his tenure. | YES |
| **A renewed crisis produces political departure** | The principal failure scenario. Protests would need to become sufficiently coordinated and consequential, with political or security defections converting pressure into resignation, removal or replacement before the deadline. | NO |
| **A constitutional transfer or another qualifying interruption occurs** | A smaller residual pathway that does not require nationwide unrest. An authoritative succession decision, an effective interim transfer, or death or incapacity could break continuity. Current evidence supports continued tenure, but the legal record is incomplete. | NO |

## Implications

- **Presidential continuity is the appropriate year-end planning assumption.** The evidence does not support expecting a replacement before the deadline.
- **Continuity does not mean political or operational calm.** Strikes, blockades, economic pressure and legislative conflict could persist while Paz remains president. Disruption planning remains warranted even under the main scenario.
- **The forecast should not be extrapolated to his full term.** Its high probability depends substantially on the short remaining horizon, not on a conclusion that the underlying political and economic weaknesses have been resolved.
- **Legal status matters more than succession rhetoric.** A unilateral acting-president claim is not conclusive, but an effective constitutional transfer would settle the question against YES even if Paz later returned.

## Signs to watch

| Timing | Development and forecast direction |
|---|---|
| **9–10 November 2026: teachers’ national strike** | Participation by other sectors, sustained nationwide blockades or a shared demand for Paz’s departure would make YES **less likely**. A bounded sectoral stoppage followed by an agreement would make YES **more likely**. A clear expansion into cross-sector action would warrant rerunning the forecast. |
| **Any time: rescheduling of the Morales-aligned march** | Actual turnout and coordination matter more than another announcement. A march that gains broad organizational backing would make YES **less likely**; another postponement or failure to mobilize would make it **more likely**. |
| **17 December 2026: reported expiry of emergency powers** | The extension ends before year-end, not on 31 December. A contested renewal or renewed blockade campaign around expiry would make YES **less likely**. An orderly extension or peaceful expiry would make it **more likely**. Expiry alone does not remove Paz. Rerun if it materially changes security-force capacity or protest coordination. |
| **Any time: security or legislative defections** | Refusal of orders, command-level breaks or a coordinated removal initiative would make YES **less likely** and warrant an immediate rerun. Continued compliance and legislative cooperation would make it **more likely**. |
| **Any time: constitutional ruling or official succession record** | A ruling requiring substitution or establishing a past qualifying transfer would make YES **less likely** and could settle NO outright. Authoritative confirmation of uninterrupted tenure would make YES **more likely**. This is a major uncertainty requiring an immediate rerun if resolved. |
| **Before year-end: fuel-policy reversal or supply disruption** | A sudden price increase, worsening shortages or financing setback could revive protests and make YES **less likely**. Continued financing access and avoidance of a fresh supply shock would make it **more likely**. The economy minister’s stated timetable retained gasoline subsidies during 2026, with evaluation in January 2027; no automatic pre-deadline increase was assumed. |

## Research and methodology

The forecast combines a historical benchmark with a judgment-based scenario model: whether another nationally consequential crisis occurs, whether it leads to departure, and whether a separate interruption defeats continuity. The calculation is structured, but its inputs are judgments rather than precisely measured political probabilities.

The most influential sources were:

- **Current incumbency and political conditions:** the [official presidential record](https://presidencia.gob.bo/index.php/presidente-de-bolivia/) and [EFE’s 8 November anniversary review](https://efe.com/mundo/2026-11-08/primer-ano-gobierno-rodrigo-paz-bolivia/) support current officeholding and document political vulnerabilities.
- **Protest activity:** a twelve-month review of [ACLED aggregated demonstration data](https://acleddata.com/conflict-data/download-data-files/aggregated-data) assessed the change in activity through October. ACLED’s [assessment of the easing confrontation](https://acleddata.com/report/demobilization-or-pause-bolivian-cross-sectoral-demonstrations-ease-may-re-escalate) supplied context. Counts were not treated as direct measures of removal risk.
- **Constitutional continuity:** the [Constitution](https://www.senapi.gob.bo/normativas/constitucion-politica-del-estado/constitucion-politica-del-estado-plurinacional-de-bolivia), a [reproduction of Decree 5675](https://bolivia.infoleyes.com/norma/8698/organizacio-n-del-o-rgano-ejecutivo-5675), [Bolivia Verifica’s documentary review](https://boliviaverifica.bo/explicador-quien-es-el-presidente-en-ejercicio-en-bolivia/), and [ANF’s 6 November reporting](https://www.noticiasfides.com/nacional/politica/como-presidente-en-ejercicio-lara-dice-que-no-anulara-decretos-de-paz-por-temor-a-un-juicio-de-responsabilidades) informed the distinction between disputed claims and effective succession.
- **Economic resilience and distress:** the [IMF approval announcement](https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/10/02/pr26317-bolivia-imf-approves-36-month-eff-arrangement), official [national accounts](https://www.ine.gob.bo/index.php/el-ine-presenta-los-resultados-del-pib-de-bolivia-al-segundo-trimestre-de-2026/) and [consumer-price release](https://www.ine.gob.bo/index.php/bolivia-registra-una-variacion-mensual-del-ipc-de-207-en-octubre-de-2026/) established the financing buffer and continuing hardship. [Reporting on the Ipsos CIESMORI survey](https://brujuladigital.net/politica/2026/11/06/cae-el-respaldo-al-presidente-paz-pasa-de-65-a-25-en-un-ano-68811) informed the public-support assessment.
- **Near-term calendar:** reporting documented the [teachers’ strike](https://larazon.bo/sociedad/2026/11/07/maestros-ratifican-paro-nacional-para-lunes-y-martes/), [17 December emergency endpoint](https://abi.bo/la-ampliacion-del-estado-de-excepcion-entra-en-vigencia-inmediata-y-gobierno-aplaude-su-aprobacion/) and [ministerial statements on fuel-subsidy timing](https://www.reduno.com.bo/programa/fmi-gobierno-aclara-que-eliminacion-de-subsidios-sera-solo-para-carburantes-no-para-energia-ni-gas-2026109224926).
- **Historical benchmark:** a [study of protest and repression in Bolivia from 1982–2021](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-latin-american-studies/article/when-does-lethal-repression-fail-unarmed-militancy-and-backfire-in-bolivia-19822021/EF57368D13F9C5683EE42BD9025F2B6B) identified four protest-driven shortened presidencies. This small, uneven reference class anchored the assessment without determining it mechanically.

## Limitations

The most consequential missing evidence is a **complete, current judicial docket and official succession record**. No authoritative evidence of a completed qualifying transfer was found, but the review was not an exhaustive legal audit. The official-gazette copy of Decree 5675 could not be retrieved, so that check relied on a legal-text reproduction and documentary reporting.

Security-force cohesion and opposition coordination are only partly observable. Recent deployment demonstrates present operational capacity, not future loyalty under greater pressure. A nationally representative public-opinion survey would also improve on the available four-city online poll.

Finally, the demonstration series lacked an exact underlying release timestamp and November observations. It cannot measure whether a few strategically placed blockades are becoming more consequential. These gaps limit confidence in the probability’s precision, rather than altering the stated forecast.

## Sources

- Domain Expert Search (mcp)
  > Found 6 domain experts for 'Bolivia constitutional presidential succession Article 169 Rodrigo Paz Edmand Lara remote government decree 5675 November 2026':
- Acled (mcp)
  > {
- AskNews (mcp)
  > Found 10 articles:
- Domain Expert Research Task (mcp)
  > Job domain_expert_research_task_b636a45184 done after 345859ms.
- Constitute (mcp)
  > Found 1 constitutions:
- News (mcp)
  > NOTE: Perigon matched too few on Rodrigo AND Paz AND Bolivia AND presidency AND protests AND resignation; added results for Rodrigo AND Paz AND Bolivia.
- [lostiempos.com](https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/pais/20261101/lara-descarta-renuncia-seria-cobardia-todo-traicionar-confianza-millones) (tool)
- [dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/bolivia-declares-emergency-as-el-nino-intensifies-threatens-severe-weather/a-79820253) (tool)
- [https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/rodrigo-paz-cierra-primer-ano-10-ajustes-5-ministros-gabinete-original_1794098052](https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/rodrigo-paz-cierra-primer-ano-10-ajustes-5-ministros-gabinete-original_1794098052) (openai)
- [theobjective.com](https://theobjective.com/internacional/2026-10-07/evo-morales-espanol-rodrigo-paz-capturarlo) (tool)
- [opinion.com.bo](https://www.opinion.com.bo/pais/ipsos-ciesmori-59-desaprueba-gestion-rodrigo-paz-primer-ano-gobierno/20261107113159998814.html) (tool)
- [gulfnews.com](https://gulfnews.com/world/americas/bolivia-declares-state-of-emergency-as-el-ni%C3%B1o-brings-severe-drought-and-floods-1.500731568) (tool)
- [oxigeno.bo](https://oxigeno.bo/exviceministro-paredes-la-unica-salida-buena-para-bolivia-es-mantener-al-presidente-rodrigo-paz) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-autoriza-importar-gas-1eaca1a91f15aca0c88f6d041fa39f94) (tool)
- [ft.com](https://www.ft.com/content/21f0822e-eb0b-4056-bcf2-2b6e2a14c221) (tool)
- [eldeber.com.bo](https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/ahi-esta-octubre-senores-ministro-bascope-dice-entorno-evo-va-siendo-desolador_1791989452) (tool)
- [lapatilla.com](https://lapatilla.com/2026/10/06/evo-morales-reto-de-nuevo-a-rodrigo-paz-por-pedir-ayuda-internacional-para-capturarlo) (tool)
- [elnuevodiario.com.do](https://elnuevodiario.com.do/evo-morales-llama-corregidor-espanol-a-paz-por-pedir-ayuda-internacional-para-capturarlo) (tool)
- [france24.com](https://www.france24.com/es/video/20261017-kast-y-paz-se-re%C3%BAnen-para-mejorar-las-relaciones-entre-bolivia-y-chile-tensas-desde-hace-d%C3%A9cadas) (tool)
- [https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2026/10/13/dirigentes-de-evo-morales-dan-marcha-atras-con-las-protestas-y-postergan-las-movilizaciones-previstas/](https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2026/10/13/dirigentes-de-evo-morales-dan-marcha-atras-con-las-protestas-y-postergan-las-movilizaciones-previstas) (openai)
- [eju.tv](https://eju.tv/2026/11/rodrigo-paz-cierra-primer-ano-con-10-ajustes-y-5-ministros-del-gabinete-original) (tool)
- [infobae.com](https://www.infobae.com/america/agencias/2026/10/23/maestros-de-bolivia-amenazan-con-una-huelga-indefinida-contra-las-politicas-del-gobierno) (tool)
- [bloomberg.com](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-10-15/chile-bolivia-seek-diplomatic-reset-in-new-right-wing-alignment) (tool)
- [ticker-noticiasep.microcontenidos.com](https://ticker-noticiasep.microcontenidos.com/NoticiaRSS.vbhtml?user=AA512JJ477&cod=20261002192709) (tool)
- [brujuladigital.net](https://brujuladigital.net/politica/2026/10/07/hernan-paredes-renuncia-al-viceministerio-de-regimen-interior-peter-maldonado-asumira-el-cargo-67448) (tool)
- [elcomercio.pe](https://elcomercio.pe/mundo/latinoamerica/bolivia-evo-morales-llama-corregidor-espanol-a-rodrigo-paz-por-pedir-ayuda-internacional-para-capturarlo-fernando-aramayo-ultimas-noticia) (tool)
- [france24.com](https://www.france24.com/es/minuto-a-minuto/20261104-el-presidente-del-tribunal-supremo-de-bolivia-abandona-el-pa%C3%ADs-y-denuncia-una-persecuci%C3%B3n-pol%C3%ADtica) (tool)
- [es-us.noticias.yahoo.com](https://es-us.noticias.yahoo.com/maestros-bolivia-amenazan-huelga-indefinida-212946308.html) (tool)
- [foreignpolicy.com](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/10/23/bolivia-chile-relations-thaw-kast-paz-lithium) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-chile-maderas-drogas-reunion-paz-kast-60f8d1af05eff39e845ee521350e0acf) (tool)
- [latimes.com](https://www.latimes.com/espanol/internacional/articulo/2026-10-28/bolivia-autoriza-importar-gas-despues-de-anos-de-ser-exportador-de-ese-energetico) (tool)
- [bloomberg.com](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-10-16/bolivia-sets-aside-maritime-rift-with-chile-in-diplomatic-thaw) (tool)
- [bloomberg.com](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-10-28/bolivia-set-to-import-gas-after-years-as-export-powerhouse?srnd=phx-economics-v2) (tool)
- [bloomberg.com](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2026-10-02/bolivia-mining-critical-mineral-boom-blocked-by-500-000-local-miners?srnd=phx-economics-v2) (tool)
- [france24.com](https://www.france24.com/es/video/20261017-informe-desde-santiago-por-primera-vez-desde-1955-un-presidente-de-chile-visita-bolivia) (tool)
- [indiatoday.in](https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/bolivia-attorney-general-roger-mariaca-arrested-after-us-visa-sanctions-ptag-3007787-2026-10-02) (tool)
- [larepublica.pe](https://larepublica.pe/mundo/2026/11/05/bolivia-abre-una-investigacion-por-los-audios-de-cerimedo-sobre-presuntas-conversaciones-con-el-entorno-de-rodrigo-paz-161285) (tool)
- [brujuladigital.net](https://brujuladigital.net/politica/2026/09/07/rodrigo-paz-dice-ahora-que-cerimedo-ayudo-a-poner-a-bolivia-en-el-mundo-66052) (tool)
- [reduno.com.bo](https://www.reduno.com.bo/nacional/caso-fernando-cerimedo-fiscalia-crea-comision-para-esclarecer-audios-que-mencionan-a-autoridades-202611454341) (tool)
- [brujuladigital.net](https://brujuladigital.net/politica/2026/10/27/diputados-cuestionan-silencio-de-la-fiscalia-y-exigen-investigar-los-11-audios-atribuidos-a-cerimedo-68369) (tool)
- [opinion.com.bo](https://www.opinion.com.bo/pais/dos-meses-audios-sospecha-caso-beller-supuestos-negociados/20261102073457998567.html) (tool)
- [vision360.bo](https://www.vision360.bo/noticias/2026/08/23/63988-que-papel-cumplia-fernando-cerimedo-en-el-gobierno-de-rodrigo-paz-en-bolivia) (tool)
- [lostiempos.com](https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/opinion/20261029/columna/escandalo-cerimedo-rodrigo-paz-debe-dar-cara) (tool)
- [brujuladigital.net](https://brujuladigital.net/politica/2026/10/27/diputados-exigen-investigar-los-once-audios-atribuidos-a-cerimedo-y-cuestionan-la-falta-de-respuestas-de-la-fiscalia-68369) (tool)
- [lostiempos.com](https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/opinion/20261103/columna/no-es-culpa-papa-noel) (tool)
- [resumenlatinoamericano.org](https://www.resumenlatinoamericano.org/2026/08/24/bolivia-rodrigo-paz-otorgo-la-ciudadania-boliviana-a-cerimedo-de-forma-ilegal) (tool)
- [opinion.com.bo](https://www.opinion.com.bo/pais/lara-desmarca-audio-atribuido-cerimedo-exige-fiscalia-investigar/20261014130152997607.html) (tool)
- [eju.tv](https://eju.tv/2026/09/escandalos-irresueltos-danan-la-imagen-de-paz-y-el-gobierno) (tool)
- [infobae.com](https://www.infobae.com/america/america-docs/2026/10/14/se-filtra-audio-atribuido-a-fernando-cerimedo-en-el-que-llama-tibios-e-idiotas-a-ministros-bolivianos) (tool)
- [eltribuno.com](https://www.eltribuno.com/internacionales/2026-11-8-0-0-0-rodrigo-paz-pidio-investigar-los-audios-atribuidos-a-cerimedo) (tool)

## Question Details

This question asks whether Rodrigo Paz Pereira will continue to hold the office of President of the Plurinational State of Bolivia without interruption through the end of calendar year 2026. Rodrigo Paz Pereira assumed the presidency on 8 November 2025 after winning the 2025 presidential election and is the incumbent president as of June 2026. Recent reporting has described significant political and social unrest, including nationwide protests, road blockades, cabinet resignations, and public calls for his resignation during 2026. (presidencia.gob.bo) (elpais.com) The forecasting period runs from the time the question is asked until 31 December 2026. The question concerns whether Paz remains president continuously through that date.

### Resolution Criteria

Resolve YES if Rodrigo Paz Pereira is still serving as President of Bolivia at 23:59 local time in Bolivia on 31 December 2026 and has not permanently left the office before that moment. Resolve NO if, at any time before that moment, he ceases to be President of Bolivia due to resignation, removal, impeachment, death, incapacity, judicial or constitutional action, military coup, succession, replacement by an acting or permanent president, or any other loss of the presidency. Resolution will be based on official Bolivian government announcements and records. If those are unclear or unavailable, major international news organizations and widely recognized reference sources documenting the officeholder of the Bolivian presidency may be used.

### Fine Print

Temporary foreign travel, medical leave, or short-term delegation of powers does not count as leaving office if Rodrigo Paz Pereira legally remains President. If constitutional succession transfers the presidency to another person, even on an interim basis, before the end of 31 December 2026, the question resolves NO. If he leaves office and later returns before the end of 2026, the question still resolves NO because he did not remain in power continuously through the period. If reliable information sufficient to determine the officeholder is unavailable on the resolution check date, resolution may be delayed until the facts can be established.