# What will the US tariff rate on China be on July 1?

Canonical URL: https://preseen.com/reports/71d75bb6-e29f-4830-8e41-286c2a66d296/what-will-the-us-tariff-rate-on-china-be-on-july-1
Markdown URL: https://preseen.com/reports/71d75bb6-e29f-4830-8e41-286c2a66d296/markdown

## Forecast

Median forecast: 22.4; 80% interval: 19.2 to 28.6.

Generated: May 30, 2026 at 5:36 AM UTC
Forecast model: gpt-5.5
Research model: gpt-5.5

## Analysis

## TL;DR
My median forecast is 22.3%, with a probability-weighted mean of 23.3%, because the latest Budget Lab daily tracker already puts the current-law China rate for July 1 at 22.2184%.

## Context
The question asks for a point-in-time, trade-weighted effective tariff rate on imports from China on July 1, 2026. The cleanest source is The Budget Lab's Tariff Rate Tracker, because it computes daily statutory effective tariff rates at the HS10-by-country level, uses 2024 Census import values as weights, and says the rates capture the tariff legally applied on a given day rather than post-substitution trade flows ([Budget Lab tracker, updated May 9, 2026](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/research/introducing-tariff-rate-tracker-open-source-tool-daily-effective-tariff-rates), [Budget Lab GitHub, version 2026.05.20](https://github.com/Budget-Lab-Yale/tariff-rate-tracker/)).

The big legal reset was the February 20, 2026 Supreme Court IEEPA decision. The administration then imposed a temporary 10% Section 122 surcharge effective February 24 through 12:01 a.m. EDT on July 24, 2026, with product exceptions and no stacking on Section 232-covered portions of an import ([USTR statement, February 20, 2026](https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026/february/ambassador-greer-issues-statement-supreme-court-ieepa-decision), [White House Proclamation 11012](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/02/imposing-a-temporary-import-surcharge-to-address-fundamental-international-payments-problems/)). The Court of International Trade ruled against Section 122 on May 7, 2026, but the Federal Circuit entered an administrative stay on May 12; as of the May 22 PwC update, CBP was still collecting the surcharge from all importers while the appeal proceeded ([PwC, May 22, 2026](https://www.pwc.com/ca/en/services/tax/publications/tax-insights/us-court-strike-down-section-122-tariffs-2026.html)).

## Evidence
The historical backbone is the Budget Lab daily country series, not a monthly customs-revenue series. The public May 9 workbook, sheet `F3a`, is in percent units, covers daily China observations from January 1, 2025 through December 31, 2026, and uses 2024 annual Census import weights at the HS10-by-country level. It reports China at 22.2184% on July 1, 2026 and July 23, 2026, then 17.8100% on July 24, 2026 when Section 122 expires ([Budget Lab May 9 data file](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2026-05/TBL-Data-Tariff-Rate-Tracker-20260509.xlsx), [Budget Lab methodology](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/research/introducing-tariff-rate-tracker-open-source-tool-daily-effective-tariff-rates)).

| Date or period | China ETR (%) | Main policy state in the tracker |
|---|---:|---|
| 2025-01-01 | 11.51 | Baseline pre-2025 stack |
| 2025-01-27 | 21.43 | China IEEPA fentanyl layer begins |
| 2025-02-04 | 31.34 | China IEEPA fentanyl layer rises |
| 2025-04-02 | 49.69 | April reciprocal-tariff phase |
| 2025-04-03 | 76.10 | China escalation |
| 2025-04-09 | 97.80 | Peak China IEEPA escalation |
| 2025-04-14 | 36.93 | Geneva pause |
| 2025-05-14 | 41.56 | Later 2025 adjustment |
| 2025-11-10 | 31.95 | Trump-Xi deal reduces fentanyl layer |
| 2026-01-01 | 33.25 | Annual baseline update |
| 2026-02-24 | 21.73 | IEEPA removed; Section 122 bridge begins |
| 2026-05-09 to 2026-07-23 | 22.2184 | Current public Budget Lab value, including Section 122 |
| 2026-07-24 to 2026-12-31 | 17.8100 | Scheduled post-Section-122 value |

The direct customs-data check points a little higher, but it is not the same object. Penn Wharton Budget Model's May 12 update uses USITC DataWeb customs data and says March 2026 was the first full month after IEEPA tariffs were replaced by the 10% Section 122 tariff; it puts China at 25.0% in March 2026 and the overall U.S. rate at 7.1% ([PWBM, May 12, 2026](https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/p/2026-05-12-effective-tariff-rates-and-revenues-updated-may-12-2026/)). USAFacts' customs-duty measure gives China at 29.6% in February 2026 and 30.6% for calendar 2025, but February straddled the legal transition and later refund process ([USAFacts, updated April 16, 2026](https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/china/)). I therefore use those as measurement-risk checks, not as the central July 1 statutory estimate.

The current-law rate is flat through July 23 in the Budget Lab data. I found no final USTR determination, White House proclamation, Federal Register notice, or CBP implementation notice after May 9 and before May 30 that changes the July 1 China rate; the USTR public page for the structural-excess-capacity Section 301 investigation still shows comments due April 15 and hearings on May 5-8, not a final tariff action ([USTR Section 301 docket page](https://ustr.gov/trade-topics/enforcement/section-301-investigations/section-301-structural-excess-capacity-and-production-manufacturing-sectors), [USTR 2026 press releases](https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026)). The GitHub repository also does not provide a newer public daily country output; the public `release/data` folder is empty apart from a placeholder, so the May 9 workbook is still the controlling public Budget Lab data vintage I found ([Budget Lab release folder](https://github.com/Budget-Lab-Yale/tariff-rate-tracker/tree/master/release/data)).

My mixture model is: 68.5% current law and a Budget Lab-style resolution centered at 22.2184%; 9% Section 122 not counted by July 1, centered at 17.81%; 6% alternate statutory-source treatment around 23.9%; 5% customs-revenue or higher-source measurement around 26%; 8% a fast Section 301 or related replacement before July 1, centered in the low 30s; 1.5% negotiated relief, centered in the mid-teens; and 2% a larger escalation above 40%. This gives a median of 22.3%, a mean of 23.3%, a 10th-to-90th percentile range of 19.1% to 28.6%, and about a 2% chance of a value above 40%.

## What's non-obvious
A 10% Section 122 surcharge does not add 10 percentage points to the China average. In the Budget Lab workbook, China falls from 22.2184% on July 23 to 17.8100% on July 24, so the Section 122 contribution to China's import-weighted average is only about 4.4 percentage points. The gap is smaller than 10 points because the surcharge has exclusions and does not stack on Section 232-covered portions of imports ([Budget Lab May 9 data file](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2026-05/TBL-Data-Tariff-Rate-Tracker-20260509.xlsx), [White House Proclamation 11012](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/02/imposing-a-temporary-import-surcharge-to-address-fundamental-international-payments-problems/)).

The common “around 30%” answer is a stale or mixed measure. It matches February customs data and some 2025 averages, but the July 1 legal stack excludes IEEPA tariffs and includes only the temporary Section 122 bridge. The other easy mistake is to treat the May 7 CIT ruling as already removing Section 122. It has legal force as a warning sign, but the injunction was plaintiff-limited and stayed, so CBP was still collecting the surcharge as of May 22 ([PwC, May 22, 2026](https://www.pwc.com/ca/en/services/tax/publications/tax-insights/us-court-strike-down-section-122-tariffs-2026.html)).

## Limitations
The biggest limitation is source choice. The Budget Lab daily tracker is a statutory, fixed-weight effective rate; PWBM and USAFacts are customs-duty-over-import-value measures that can move with import mix, entry timing, refunds, and behavioral substitution ([Budget Lab methodology](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/research/introducing-tariff-rate-tracker-open-source-tool-daily-effective-tariff-rates), [PWBM, May 12, 2026](https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/p/2026-05-12-effective-tariff-rates-and-revenues-updated-may-12-2026/)). The resolution criteria name policy trackers and ask for the rate “in effect,” so I weight Budget Lab highest.

The main legal uncertainty is still Section 122. A Federal Circuit order before July 1 could change whether a resolver counts it, even if the practical CBP effect is narrower. The main policy uncertainty is a new Section 301 action before July 1; the process is active and accelerated, but no final China tariff schedule had been posted by May 30 ([USTR Section 301 docket page](https://ustr.gov/trade-topics/enforcement/section-301-investigations/section-301-structural-excess-capacity-and-production-manufacturing-sectors), [PwC, May 22, 2026](https://www.pwc.com/ca/en/services/tax/publications/tax-insights/us-court-strike-down-section-122-tariffs-2026.html)).

## Sources

- Domain Expert Search (mcp)
  > Found 14 subagent groups for 'US trade policy China tariffs Section 122 Section 301 legal status May 2026 effective tariff rate':
- us Tariffs (mcp)
  > ERROR: tool 'us-tariffs.us_tariffs_active_general_tariffs' did not respond within 30s and was cancelled by the gateway. The downstream tool may be hung, the upstream API may be slow or unreachable, or your arguments may have triggered an unusually expensive query. Retry with narrower arguments (smaller date range, fewer entities), call a more targeted tool, or skip this dimension and continue with the rest of your research.
- Claude Code (e2b)
  > Job coding_whiz_job_0a9b5623c4 done after 388424ms.
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- [budgetlab.yale.edu](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2026-05/TBL-Data-Tariff-Rate-Tracker-20260509.xlsx) (tool)
- [budgetlab.yale.edu](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/research/introducing-tariff-rate-tracker-open-source-tool-daily-effective-tariff-rates) (tool)
- [congress.gov](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48549) (tool)
- [US Trade Court Strikes Down Section 122 Tariffs, but Ruling’s Fate Is Uncertain and Practical Impact Is Limited | Insights | Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP](https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2026/05/us-trade-court-strikes-down-section-122-tariffs) (openai)
- [troutman.com](https://www.troutman.com/insights/federal-circuit-hits-pause-on-cits-section-122-tariff-ruling) (tool)
- [whitehouse.gov](https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/11/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-strikes-deal-on-economic-and-trade-relations-with-china) (tool)
- [budgetlab.yale.edu](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/research/state-us-tariffs-april-8-2026) (tool)
- [hklaw.com](https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2026/05/us-court-of-international-trade-invalidates-the-administrations) (tool)
- [ustr.gov](https://ustr.gov/trade-topics/enforcement/section-301-investigations/section-301-china-technology-transfer/china-section-301-tariff-actions-and-exclusion-process/four-year-review) (tool)
- [budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu](https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2026/2/23/effective-tariff-rates-and-revenues-updated-february-23-2026) (tool)
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- [ustr.gov](https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/december/ustr-increases-tariffs-under-section-301-tungsten-products-wafers-and-polysilicon-concluding) (tool)
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- [whitehouse.gov](https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/07/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-takes-action-to-address-the-threat-to-national-security-from-imports-of-copper) (tool)
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## Question Details

This question asks for the effective trade-weighted average tariff rate imposed by the United States on imports from China as of July 1, 2026. As of early 2026, U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods are highly complex and consist of multiple overlapping measures, including longstanding Section 301 tariffs (generally ranging from 7.5% to 25% or higher on specific goods), sector-specific tariffs (e.g., steel, semiconductors), and more recent policy changes. (lenzo.ai) In 2025–2026, additional “reciprocal” and emergency tariffs were introduced and then partly invalidated by a U.S. Supreme Court ruling in February 2026, which removed certain IEEPA-based tariffs. (chrobinson.com) Following these changes, a temporary global tariff (reported around 10–15%) and other adjustments have resulted in an estimated trade-weighted average U.S. tariff rate on Chinese imports of roughly 25–30% as of early 2026, though this remains in flux due to ongoing legal, legislative, and executive actions. (china-briefing.com) Because tariffs vary widely across products, this question focuses on the overall trade-weighted average tariff rate applied to Chinese imports, rather than any single statutory tariff rate. The forecast should reflect the rate in effect on July 1, 2026.

### Resolution Criteria

The question will resolve to the best available estimate of the trade-weighted average effective U.S. tariff rate on imports from China in effect on July 1, 2026. Primary source: Publications from reputable economic policy trackers such as: - The Budget Lab at Yale - OECD - World Bank - U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) - Other widely cited economic research institutions If multiple credible sources report values, the resolution will use: 1. The most recent estimate explicitly referring to a date closest to July 1, 2026; or 2. If multiple estimates exist for that date, the median of those estimates. If no source reports an exact July 1 value, the closest available estimate (within ±30 days) will be used. The value will be expressed as a percentage (e.g., 29.7%).

### Fine Print

- “Tariff rate” refers to the trade-weighted average effective tariff rate across all imports from China, not statutory rates on specific products. - The measure should include all applicable tariffs in force on July 1, 2026 (e.g., Section 301, Section 232, or any new tariffs), and exclude any tariffs that have been repealed or invalidated before that date. - Temporary tariffs count if they are in effect on July 1, 2026, even if scheduled to expire later. - If the U.S. eliminates all China-specific tariffs but applies a global tariff affecting China, that global tariff should be included. - If no credible estimate is available by December 31, 2026, the question will be annulled. - Units: percent (%), measured to at least one decimal place.