# Will Bolivian president Rodrigo Paz Pereira remain in power through the end of 2026?

Canonical URL: https://preseen.com/reports/6f91df5c-71ec-492a-9724-b65782b52330/will-bolivian-president-rodrigo-paz-pereira-remain-in-power-through-the-end-of-2
Markdown URL: https://preseen.com/reports/6f91df5c-71ec-492a-9724-b65782b52330/markdown

## Forecast

P(Yes): 82.8%; P(No): 17.2%.

Generated: October 1, 2026 at 5:36 PM UTC
Resolution check date: 2027-01-02
Forecast model: gpt-6.1-sol
Research model: gpt-5.6-sol+gpt-6.1-sol

## Analysis

## TL;DR
I assign an **83% probability of YES**: Paz meets the question’s uninterrupted-tenure requirement through year-end. Legislative cooperation and divided protest organizations favor survival over the short remaining horizon ([September legislative vote](https://elpais.com/america/2026-09-17/paz-extiende-el-estado-de-excepcion-por-otros-90-dias-en-bolivia-para-evitar-nuevas-protestas.html); [AP’s transport-strike report](https://www.jornada.com.mx/noticia/2026/09/28/mundo/huelga-parcial-de-transportistas-en-bolivia-en-rechazo-a-eliminacion-del-subsidio-al-diesel)). The main danger is unrest that breaks institutional support, with a separate risk from the disputed acting-presidency claim ([succession reporting](https://correodelsur.com/politica/20260922/vicepresidencia-propone-a-diego-avila-para-asumir-la-presidencia-en-medio-de-disputa-por-sucesion-del-ejecutivo.html)).

## Context
This estimate uses the client’s October 1, 2026, 17:24 UTC cutoff. About 91 days remain until the stipulated deadline. Official records show Paz exercising presidential authority on September 30, and October 1 reporting continues to identify him as president. Current incumbency is established; uninterrupted tenure requires a separate check ([Presidency, September 30](https://presidencia.gob.bo/index.php/nota_prensa/presidente-paz-promulga-ley-de-prediarios-que-reduce-la-carga-financiera-de-gobiernos-subnacionales/); [AP, October 1](https://apnews.com/article/5c003f1a6639df2cc155eb5b3202f56c)).

The original protest crisis is not the unchanged current situation. Paz survived the May–June confrontation, which lasted 53 days and reportedly caused 22 deaths. The immediate test is a new adjustment-driven protest cycle, including Morales’s announced mobilization from October 13 ([El País, September 17 retrospective](https://elpais.com/america/2026-09-17/paz-extiende-el-estado-de-excepcion-por-otros-90-dias-en-bolivia-para-evitar-nuevas-protestas.html); [EFE, September 27](https://efe.com/mundo/2026-09-27/bolivia-evo-morales-movilizacion/)).

## Evidence
The historical anchor is Bolivia’s democratic period, not its earlier era of repeated military governments. My reconstruction covers October 10, 1982, through November 8, 2025: roughly 43 president-years, with four clear premature permanent exits. These were Banzer’s medical resignation in 2001, Sánchez de Lozada’s protest-driven resignation in 2003, Mesa’s resignation in 2005, and Morales’s departure in 2019. The chronology and causes are documented in historical officeholder records and congressional research ([officeholder chronology](https://www.archontology.org/nations/bolivia/00_1964_2009_s.php); [CRS, January 30, 2009](https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL32580.html); [CRS, November 14, 2019](https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20191114_IN11198_b3f6c2e460b0d88ea218b9a0eefe8eee834fb089.pdf); [Paz’s accession record](https://presidencia.gob.bo/index.php/presidente-de-bolivia/)).

A constant-hazard calculation using those four exits gives about 98% survival over the remaining horizon. Including Siles Zuazo’s shortened term lowers that benchmark to about 97%; I exclude it from the central numerator because its electoral handover was scheduled in advance. This is a small, heterogeneous sample, not a fitted model of today’s crisis. It also excludes ordinary acting-presidency episodes, so it cannot answer the continuity issue by itself ([Law 679, December 14, 1984](https://docs.bolivia.justia.com/nacionales/leyes/ley-679-1982-1985.pdf)).

Paz retains usable legislative support. On September 17, lawmakers approved the emergency extension with 100 favorable votes and 58 against or abstaining: 158 participants, not a two-thirds governing bloc. Congress also approved the IMF financing agreement despite Paz’s party lacking a majority. I read these decisions as evidence that criticism of his government has not become institutional abandonment ([El País, September 17](https://elpais.com/america/2026-09-17/paz-extiende-el-estado-de-excepcion-por-otros-90-dias-en-bolivia-para-evitar-nuevas-protestas.html); [AP, September 19](https://www.wral.com/news/ap/d5ac4-bolivias-congress-approves-1-9-billion-imf-deal-triggering-threats-of-unrest/)). The military commander’s September 28 statement that military and police forces were prepared to protect road access is another favorable signal, though public declarations cannot establish private loyalty under a future crisis ([Noticias Argentinas, September 28](https://www.cadena3.com/noticia/mundo/fuerzas-armadas-de-bolivia-listas-para-actuar-ante-bloqueos-que-amenacen-la-constitucion_598563)).

The economic policy has opposing effects. The proposed IMF arrangement offers approximately US$1.9 billion in nominal financing over 36 months, not immediate cash of that amount; the official agreement remains conditional on Board approval and prior actions. Financing can improve supplies and bargaining room. But the September diesel adjustment raised the retail price from Bs9.80 to Bs17.95 per litre, an approximately 83% increase that directly pressures transport and production costs. Gasoline subsidies were reported to remain through year-end, postponing a broader consumer shock beyond this question’s deadline ([IMF, July 29](https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/07/29/pr26268-bolivia-imf-reaches-staff-level-agreement-on-an-extended-fund-facility-arrangement); [El Día, September 19](https://eldia.com.bo/2026-09-19/economia/el-diesel-sube-a-bs-1795-para-todos-en-bolivia-segun-el-decreto-5716-que-acaba-con-la-subvencion.html); [AP, September 28](https://www.jornada.com.mx/noticia/2026/09/28/mundo/huelga-parcial-de-transportistas-en-bolivia-en-rechazo-a-eliminacion-del-subsidio-al-diesel)).

The realized mobilization is less cohesive than the threats. The September 28 transport strike paralyzed Santa Cruz and some smaller cities, while urban transport operated normally in La Paz, El Alto and Cochabamba. Nevertheless, coalition-building is underway: an Evo-aligned campesino leader invited the COB, miners and transport organizations to an October 3 coordinating meeting. Teachers and neighborhood groups also marched in Santa Cruz on October 1. These are meaningful escalation signals, but an invitation and local marches are not yet a synchronized national resignation campaign ([AP, September 28](https://www.jornada.com.mx/noticia/2026/09/28/mundo/huelga-parcial-de-transportistas-en-bolivia-en-rechazo-a-eliminacion-del-subsidio-al-diesel); [Visión 360, September 29](https://www.vision360.bo/noticias/2026/09/29/70111-dirigente-evista-invita-a-la-cob-a-la-fstmb-a-articular-movilizaciones-contra-el-gobierno); [El Deber, October 1](https://eldeber.com.bo/santa-cruz/maestros-junto-otros-sectores-marchan-eliminacion-subvencion-diesel_1790866576)).

Public legitimacy is weak. The Ipsos CIESMORI survey fielded August 19–31, released September 2, reported 21% approval and 65% disapproval for Paz. Its N=400 voluntary online respondents were internet-connected adults in La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, with demographic weighting—not a nationally representative household sample. Lara had 10% approval, while Morales had 12% favorable opinion. Dissatisfaction with Paz therefore does not establish enthusiasm for either challenger. These measurements also predate the diesel shock ([original August survey](https://oxigeno.bo/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Aprobacion-de-Autoridades-MOP-0826.pdf); [September 2 publication](https://oxigeno.bo/encuesta-paz-tiene-una-desaprobacion-del-65-y-lara-del-75-en-el-eje-troncal-del-pais/)).

Cabinet instability and the Cerimedo scandal weaken governing cohesion. The October 1 arrest of Attorney General Roger Mariaca adds a fresh institutional confrontation: police carried out a high-profile operation, but allegations and disputed arrest procedures can also unite opponents around a rule-of-law grievance. I treat this as added volatility, not proof of either consolidation or imminent collapse ([AP, August 21](https://abcnews.com/Business/wireStory/bruising-week-bolivias-president-paz-scandal-setbacks-test-135851918); [AP, October 1](https://apnews.com/article/5c003f1a6639df2cc155eb5b3202f56c)). A lawful recall cannot occur within this horizon because requests require half the presidential term to have elapsed ([Constitution, Articles 168 and 240](https://www.oas.org/dil/esp/constitucion_bolivia.pdf)).

The strict continuity criterion is a separate risk. Lara declared himself acting president during Paz’s September foreign trip, and his office proposed a further transfer to Senate President Diego Ávila. Yet Ávila expressly denied assuming the presidency, while Paz chaired a remote cabinet meeting. I found no authoritative determination establishing a completed replacement. That is a bounded finding, not proof that every relevant official act has been inspected ([September 22 reporting](https://correodelsur.com/politica/20260922/vicepresidencia-propone-a-diego-avila-para-asumir-la-presidencia-en-medio-de-disputa-por-sucesion-del-ejecutivo.html); [Ávila’s denial, September 24](https://larazon.bo/nacional/2026/09/24/avila-niega-haber-asumido-la-presidencia-paz-no-deja-de-ser-presidente-fuera-del-pais/)).

Lara’s legal argument is substantial. Constitution Article 169.II provides for vice-presidential assumption during temporary absence, and a Supreme Court decision describes that temporary exercise as not requiring a specific procedure. Against this stands the operative remote-governance rule in Article 22 of Decree 5675, dated August 13, which replaced the earlier decree. The older judgment does not decide the validity of this mechanism or Paz’s September trip ([Constitution](https://www.oas.org/dil/esp/constitucion_bolivia.pdf); [Supreme Court decision, December 22, 2023](https://juristeca.com/bo/tsj/auto-supremo/2023/12/as-2064-2023-rrc/iv-resolucion-del-recurso); [Decree 5675](https://bolivia.infoleyes.com/norma/8698/organizacio-n-del-o-rgano-ejecutivo-5675)).

I translate this evidence into the following remaining-period scenarios. The weights and conditional survival probabilities are my judgments, not observed frequencies.

| Political trajectory through year-end | Weight | Conditional political survival |
|---|---:|---:|
| Fragmented protests, bargaining and continued institutional cooperation | 60.0% | 98% |
| Sustained major confrontation, without broad institutional abandonment | 30% | 88% |
| Serious elite or security rupture | 10% | 40.0% |

Weighted political survival is 0.892. I then apply conditional factors of 0.95 for no disqualifying past interruption, 0.98 for no additional technical succession interruption, and 0.997 for death or definitive incapacity not already included. The legal allowances exclude politically driven replacements already counted in the scenarios. The calculation is \(0.892 \times 0.95 \times 0.98 \times 0.997\), yielding the reported 83% estimate. The precise JSON value records the arithmetic, not nine-decimal certainty.

## What's non-obvious
The opposition’s objectives are not interchangeable. Doria Medina has sharply criticized Paz while supporting emergency powers and IMF financing to prevent governmental collapse. Santa Cruz’s governor publicly supported concrete cooperation with Paz on September 30. Meanwhile, Evo-aligned organizers were still publicly recruiting labor and transport partners. I read this as a government that has lost unconditional allies but retains enough transactional support to survive—not an already assembled replacement coalition ([Doria Medina’s September 18 interview](https://bolpress.com/2026/09/18/doria-medina-acusa-al-gobierno-de-paz-de-corrupto-incapaz-e-inutil-pero-apoya-sus-medidas-clave-por-la-democracia/); [Presidency, September 30](https://presidencia.gob.bo/index.php/nota_prensa/presidente-paz-promulga-ley-de-prediarios-que-reduce-la-carga-financiera-de-gobiernos-subnacionales/); [coordination invitation](https://www.vision360.bo/noticias/2026/09/29/70111-dirigente-evista-invita-a-la-cob-a-la-fstmb-a-articular-movilizaciones-contra-el-gobierno)).

The legal risk also cuts both ways. Articles 4 and 14 of the Constitutional Procedure Code presume norms constitutional until invalidated and protect acts performed under that presumption from later revision. This does not settle who held office, but it weakens the claim that a later adverse ruling would automatically establish a retrospective presidential transfer. September 30 reporting still described the challenge as unresolved. Those findings support a meaningful continuity discount, rather than either automatic NO or certain continuity ([Constitutional Procedure Code](https://www.lexivox.org/norms/BO-L-N254.html); [constitutional-court reporting, September 30](https://correodelsur.com/seguridad/20260930/tcp-tiene-en-tramite-mas-100-acciones-de-inconstitucionalidad.html)).

## Uncertainties
The largest uncertainty is whether separate economic grievances become coordinated disruption and then change institutional behavior. Public military statements cannot reveal how units would respond after another lethal confrontation. I also lack an exhaustive official audit of the disputed presidential acts and a definitive constitutional ruling; the statutory protections discussed above are not a conclusive officeholding judgment.

The most valuable missing evidence is an authenticated succession record, labor organizations’ actual acceptance of a joint campaign, verified strike compliance across regions, confirmed financing receipts, and nationally representative opinion measured after the diesel adjustment. Silence in public reporting does not establish that private coordination or dissent is absent.

My subjective 80% uncertainty range is approximately 70%–92% YES. Moving ten percentage points of scenario weight from contained conflict to institutional rupture lowers the central estimate to about 77%. Recognized interim succession would be decisive regardless of Paz’s later return; fragmented mobilization and continuing institutional cooperation would raise the estimate. No prediction-market prices or public forecast aggregates were used.

## Sources

- Domain Expert Search (mcp)
  > Found 7 domain experts for 'Bolivia constitutional law presidential temporary absence Rodrigo Paz Edmand Lara decree 5675 September 2026 succession':
- News (mcp)
  > Found 12 merged articles (asknews: 6, perigon: 6, both: 0).
- [intellinews.com](https://www.intellinews.com/bolivia-s-paz-rejects-morales-s-protest-threat-holds-firm-on-diesel-subsidy-cut-472337) (tool)
- [infobae.com](https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2026/09/29/el-fiscal-general-de-bolivia-fue-acusado-de-tener-vinculos-narcos-que-hara-el-gobierno-de-rodrigo-paz) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-gasolina-de-aviacion-precio-internacional-rodrigo-paz-05d350a4eeebcfa735da0b0ad03f7a4a) (tool)
- [infobae.com](https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2026/09/29/rodrigo-paz-afirmo-que-evo-morales-fue-el-peor-presidente-de-bolivia-y-rechazo-sus-amenazas-de-nuevas-protestas) (tool)
- [eldeber.com.bo](https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/gobierno-choferes-dialogan-paz-intentar-solucionar-conflicto-diesel_1790692244) (tool)
- [turkishminute.com](https://www.turkishminute.com/2026/09/29/turkeys-growing-military-role-in-somalia-draws-it-into-internal-political-crisis) (tool)
- [cadena3.com](https://www.cadena3.com/noticia/mundo/fuerzas-armadas-de-bolivia-listas-para-actuar-ante-bloqueos-que-amenacen-la-constitucion_598563) (tool)
- [riotimesonline.com](https://www.riotimesonline.com/bolivia-food-prices-families-minimum-wage-2026) (tool)
- [eldeber.com.bo](https://eldeber.com.bo/santa-cruz/maestros-junto-otros-sectores-marchan-eliminacion-subvencion-diesel_1790866576) (tool)
- [beinsports.com](https://www.beinsports.com/en-nz/football/friendlies/articles-video/paz-shines-as-argentina-beats-bolivia-with-ease-2026-10-01) (tool)
- [lostiempos.com](https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/opinion/20260929/editorial/amenaza-conflictos) (tool)
- [edexlive.com](https://www.edexlive.com/news/lpu-crisis-a-timeline-of-student-protests-police-action-and-campus-shutdown) (tool)
- [fmbolivia.com.bo](https://fmbolivia.com.bo/nacional/a-partir-de-ahora-asumire-la-presidencia-afirmo-el-vicepresidente-edmand-lara-21083) (tool)
- [infobae.com](https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2026/09/24/crece-la-polemica-por-la-sucesion-constitucional-en-bolivia-tras-la-ausencia-de-rodrigo-paz-y-lara) (tool)
- [opinion.com.bo](https://www.opinion.com.bo/pais/entregan-restos-seis-fallecidos-viacha-fiscalia-afirma-que-dara-responsables-que-avances/20260929151115996850.html) (tool)
- [brujuladigital.net](https://brujuladigital.net/politica/2026/09/22/legisladores-cuestionan-a-paz-y-lara-por-sus-viajes-y-la-sucesion-constitucional-66740) (tool)
- [reduno.com.bo](https://www.reduno.com.bo/noticias/comision-de-diputados-inicia-tratamiento-de-la-ley-antibloqueo-2026930181342) (tool)
- [brujuladigital.net](https://brujuladigital.net/politica/2026/09/22/legisladores-cuestionan-la-sucesion-presidencial-tras-los-viajes-de-paz-y-lara-66740) (tool)
- [fmbolivia.com.bo](https://fmbolivia.com.bo/politica/leonardo-loza-reconoce-a-edmand-lara-como-presidente-en-ejercicio-y-le-pidio-abrogar-dos-decretos-21100) (tool)
- [reduno.com.bo](https://www.reduno.com.bo/noticias/fiscal-general-saluda-a-avila-como-presidente-constitucional-ante-ausencia-de-paz-y-lara-202692310410) (tool)
- hdx Hapi (mcp)
  > ACLED Conflict Events (8 records, offset 0)
- Domain Expert Research Task (mcp)
  > Job domain_expert_research_task_8f80ec62b0 done after 218424ms.
- [la-epoca.com.bo](https://www.la-epoca.com.bo/2026/09/22/controversia-por-sucesion-vicepresidencia-plantea-relevo-y-paz-participa-de-gabinete-a-distancia) (tool)
- [CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO | SERVICIO NACIONAL DE PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL](https://www.senapi.gob.bo/normativas/constitucion-politica-del-estado/constitucion-politica-del-estado-plurinacional-de-bolivia) (openai)
- [gacetaoficialdebolivia.gob.bo](https://www.gacetaoficialdebolivia.gob.bo/normas/verGratis_gob/281032) (tool)
- [fmbolivia.com.bo](https://fmbolivia.com.bo/gaceta/decreto-supremo/5675) (tool)
- [elpost.com.bo](https://elpost.com.bo/2026/09/22/gobernar-a-distancia-lara-se-declara-presidente-y-cita-un-decreto-abrogado) (tool)
- [correodelsur.com](https://correodelsur.com/politica/20260922/vocero-responde-a-lara-y-aclara-que-paz-gobierna-desde-eeuu-con-medios-digitales.html) (tool)
- [juristeca.com](https://juristeca.com/bo/tsj/auto-supremo/2023/12/as-2064-2023-rrc/iv-resolucion-del-recurso) (tool)
- [correodelsur.com](https://correodelsur.com/politica/20260921/edmand-lara-se-declara-presidente-en-ejercicio-durante-viaje-de-rodrigo-paz-a-eeuu.html) (tool)
- [larazon.bo](https://larazon.bo/nacional/2026/09/21/lara-invoca-la-constitucion-y-se-declara-presidente-en-ejercicio-pero-dice-que-tambien-debe-viajar) (tool)
- [correodelsur.com](https://correodelsur.com/politica/20260922/vicepresidencia-propone-a-diego-avila-para-asumir-la-presidencia-en-medio-de-disputa-por-sucesion-del-ejecutivo.html) (tool)
- [redbolivision.tv.bo](https://www.redbolivision.tv.bo/noticia/edmand-lara-viaja-a-paraguay-y-diego-avila-asumira-la-suplencia-en-la-asamblea) (tool)
- [kawsachuncoca.com](https://kawsachuncoca.com/noticias/ver/edmand-lara-reivindica-la-presidencia-en-ejercicio-y-cuestiona-al-vocero-presidencial) (tool)
- [eju.tv](https://eju.tv/2026/09/avila-a-lara-el-presidente-en-ejercicio-sigue-siendo-rodrigo-paz-no-son-temas-que-una-persona-puede-decidir) (tool)
- [Ávila niega haber asumido la Presidencia: Paz ‘no deja de ser presidente fuera del país’](https://larazon.bo/nacional/2026/09/24/avila-niega-haber-asumido-la-presidencia-paz-no-deja-de-ser-presidente-fuera-del-pais) (openai)
- [abi.bo](https://abi.bo/presidente-paz-presenta-los-resultados-de-su-viaje-a-eeuu-marcado-por-32-reuniones-internacionales) (tool)
- [elpost.com.bo](https://elpost.com.bo/2026/09/24/tres-versiones-sobre-quien-manda-en-bolivia-sin-paz-ni-lara) (tool)
- [correodelsur.com](https://correodelsur.com/opinion/20260115/solucion-constitucional-a-la-suplencia-presidencial.html) (tool)
- [vision360.bo](https://www.vision360.bo/noticias/2026/09/21/68686-vicepresidente-lara-se-declara-presidente-interino-ante-el-viaje-del-mandatario-a-eeuu) (tool)
- [contraparte.com.bo](https://contraparte.com.bo/justiniano-defiende-norma-para-gobernar-desde-exterior) (tool)
- [prensamercosur.org](https://prensamercosur.org/2026/09/22/falso-el-presidente-del-senado-no-asume-el-mando-de-bolivia-por-los-viajes-de-paz-y-lara) (tool)
- [instantaneas.org.bo](https://www.instantaneas.org.bo/2026/09/21/gobierno/lara-suplencia-legal-paz-articulo-169) (tool)
- [lostiempos.com](https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/pais/20260922/paz-eeuu-cada-vez-que-he-salido-al-exterior-siempre-retorno-platita) (tool)
- [urgente.bo](https://www.urgente.bo/noticia/evismo-da-ultimatum-al-gobierno-para-abrogar-los-decretos-5516-y-5727-hasta-el-3-de-octubre) (tool)
- [vision360.bo](https://www.vision360.bo/noticias/2026/09/29/70111-dirigente-evista-invita-a-la-cob-a-la-fstmb-a-articular-movilizaciones-contra-el-gobierno) (tool)
- [unitel.bo](https://unitel.bo/noticias/politica/cob-convoca-a-ampliado-nacional-por-el-diesel-advierte-con-movilizaciones-y-responsabiliza-al-gobierno-HH23602353) (tool)
- [Paz extiende el estado de excepción por otros 90 días en Bolivia para evitar nuevas protestas | EL PAÍS América](https://elpais.com/america/2026-09-17/paz-extiende-el-estado-de-excepcion-por-otros-90-dias-en-bolivia-para-evitar-nuevas-protestas.html) (openai)

## Question Details

This question asks whether Rodrigo Paz Pereira will continue to hold the office of President of the Plurinational State of Bolivia without interruption through the end of calendar year 2026. Rodrigo Paz Pereira assumed the presidency on 8 November 2025 after winning the 2025 presidential election and is the incumbent president as of June 2026. Recent reporting has described significant political and social unrest, including nationwide protests, road blockades, cabinet resignations, and public calls for his resignation during 2026. (presidencia.gob.bo) (elpais.com) The forecasting period runs from the time the question is asked until 31 December 2026. The question concerns whether Paz remains president continuously through that date.

### Resolution Criteria

Resolve YES if Rodrigo Paz Pereira is still serving as President of Bolivia at 23:59 local time in Bolivia on 31 December 2026 and has not permanently left the office before that moment. Resolve NO if, at any time before that moment, he ceases to be President of Bolivia due to resignation, removal, impeachment, death, incapacity, judicial or constitutional action, military coup, succession, replacement by an acting or permanent president, or any other loss of the presidency. Resolution will be based on official Bolivian government announcements and records. If those are unclear or unavailable, major international news organizations and widely recognized reference sources documenting the officeholder of the Bolivian presidency may be used.

### Fine Print

Temporary foreign travel, medical leave, or short-term delegation of powers does not count as leaving office if Rodrigo Paz Pereira legally remains President. If constitutional succession transfers the presidency to another person, even on an interim basis, before the end of 31 December 2026, the question resolves NO. If he leaves office and later returns before the end of 2026, the question still resolves NO because he did not remain in power continuously through the period. If reliable information sufficient to determine the officeholder is unavailable on the resolution check date, resolution may be delayed until the facts can be established.