# Will Bolivian president Rodrigo Paz Pereira remain in power through the end of 2026?

Canonical URL: https://preseen.com/reports/6e06b56f-12b6-4c2a-b298-d88e94aa794a/will-bolivian-president-rodrigo-paz-pereira-remain-in-power-through-the-end-of-2
Markdown URL: https://preseen.com/reports/6e06b56f-12b6-4c2a-b298-d88e94aa794a/markdown

## Forecast

P(Yes): 66.9%; P(No): 33.1%.

Generated: September 26, 2026 at 12:51 PM UTC
Resolution check date: 2027-01-02
Forecast model: gpt-5.6-sol
Research model: gpt-5.6-sol

## Analysis

## TL;DR

I put **YES at 67%**. Paz is likely to survive politically through the next 96.6 days because he survived the larger May–June blockade crisis, parliament renewed his emergency powers, and the first transport response to the diesel increase is divided. **The main hidden risk is legal:** there is a real chance that Bolivia’s constitutional rules mean the September foreign trip already triggered a temporary presidential succession, which would resolve this question NO even if Paz never resigns.

## Context

Bolivia’s [official Presidency website](https://presidencia.gob.bo/index.php/presidente-de-bolivia/) still identifies Rodrigo Paz Pereira as president and says he assumed office on November 8, 2025. He continued conducting presidential business during his September trip to the United States, including a remote cabinet meeting and his UN agenda. 

Paz nevertheless enters the final quarter of 2026 in a weak position. He survived 53 days of resignation-demanding protests and blockades that later reporting associated with 22 deaths, but he now faces a new diesel-price shock, a hostile vice president, low urban approval, and a planned transport stoppage on September 28 ([EL PAÍS](https://elpais.com/america/2026-09-17/paz-extiende-el-estado-de-excepcion-por-otros-90-dias-en-bolivia-para-evitar-nuevas-protestas.html); [Red Uno](https://www.reduno.com.bo/noticias/transporte-anuncia-paro-de-24-horas-y-exigen-abrogar-el-ds-5716-202692213935)). 

## Evidence

Bolivia’s historical prior is worse than that of a typical presidential democracy. A study of the democratic era identifies four protest-driven early departures—in 1985, 2003, 2005, and 2019—while Hugo Banzer also left early because of illness in 2001 ([Journal of Latin American Studies](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-latin-american-studies/article/when-does-lethal-repression-fail-unarmed-militancy-and-backfire-in-bolivia-19822021/EF57368D13F9C5683EE42BD9025F2B6B)). That is five interruptions over roughly 44 years of democratic exposure, a small sample but a useful reference class. 

A constant-hazard conversion gives a random 96.6-day interruption risk near 3%:

$$P_{96d}=1-e^{-(5/44)(96.6/365.25)}=0.030.$$

Current conditions warrant a much higher risk than this prior. Paz has 21% approval and 65% disapproval in the latest Ipsos-CIESMORI monitor, fielded August 19–31 among 400 internet-connected adults in La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz. This is an urban online sample, not a nationally representative poll, but the scale of the deterioration is clear ([Brújula Digital](https://brujuladigital.net/politica/2026/09/02/encuesta-tras-escandalo-cerimedo-aprobacion-de-rodrigo-paz-cae-al-21--65847)). Only six of his original 15 ministers remained by August 21, according to AP, and Congress had just forced the dismissal of his economy minister ([AP](https://apnews.com/article/fba61c2e7879a51000c7ad8230bda4a6)). 

The same-presidency evidence is more encouraging. Paz survived the May–June crisis without a decisive congressional or security-force rupture. On September 17, the Assembly approved another 90 days of emergency rule by 100 votes to 58 among 158 legislators present, based on reports from the police, armed forces, and relevant ministries ([Bolivian Ministry of Government](https://web.mingobierno.gob.bo/?nota_prensa=%F0%9D%97%A0%F0%9D%97%AE%F0%9D%98%86%F0%9D%97%BC%F0%9D%97%BF%F0%9D%97%B6%F0%9D%97%AE-%F0%9D%97%AE%F0%9D%97%AF%F0%9D%98%80%F0%9D%97%BC%F0%9D%97%B9%F0%9D%98%82%F0%9D%98%81%F0%9D%97%AE)). This does not create a stable governing coalition, but it shows that most pivotal legislators still prefer the Paz government to disorder or immediate succession. 

The latest verifiable national ACLED aggregate ended on August 31. These are coded demonstration events, not crowd sizes or blockade-days; the eight-observation series was retrieved on September 26 from a weekly updated public aggregate ([ACLED Bolivia](https://acleddata.com/country/bolivia); [methodology](https://hdx-hapi.readthedocs.io/en/latest/data_usage_guides/coordination_and_context/)).

| Month in 2026 | Demonstration events |
|---|---:|
| January | 270 |
| February | 97 |
| March | 109 |
| April | 166 |
| May | 216 |
| June | 45 |
| July | 22 |
| August | 32 |

The post-May drop is large, though the low June count also shows why these data should not be treated as a census of political pressure. ACLED’s qualitative assessment found that the earlier coalition lacked unified leadership and fragmented after sector-specific negotiations, while warning that hard-line coca-growing and campesino groups retained localized escalation capacity ([ACLED](https://acleddata.com/report/demobilization-or-pause-bolivian-cross-sectoral-demonstrations-ease-may-re-escalate)). 

The diesel decision is the main new trigger. The September 18 decree fixed diesel at Bs 17.95 per litre, up from Bs 9.80, an increase of about 83%, and linked future pricing to import parity ([Official Gazette](https://www.gacetaoficialdebolivia.gob.bo/normas/verGratis_gob/281365)). The September 28 action is currently a 24-hour withdrawal of vehicles rather than a blockade, and major organizations in La Paz, El Alto, heavy transport, and Transporte Libre said they would not participate ([El Diario](https://www.eldiario.net/portal/2026/09/25/chuquiago-marka-transporte-libre-y-primero-de-mayo-no-acataran-paro/); [El Deber summary](https://www.instantaneas.org.bo/2026/09/25/trabajo-empleo/repliegue-nacional-choferes-bolivia-paz-alto)). That lowers immediate risk, but an indefinite follow-on action remains possible. 

The IMF package cuts both ways. The legislature approved the US$1.9 billion, 36-month arrangement, but the latest official IMF release still described it as a staff-level agreement requiring Executive Board approval and prior actions ([IMF](https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/07/29/pr26268-bolivia-imf-reaches-staff-level-agreement-on-an-extended-fund-facility-arrangement)). August national CPI was 1.10% month over month and 5.02% year over year, published in September, but it predates the diesel increase and therefore says little about the next inflation shock ([Central Bank of Bolivia](https://www.bcb.gob.bo/?q=inflacion_mensual)). 

The September succession dispute is the largest adjustment to the political-survival forecast. Article 169 of the [Bolivian Constitution](https://tcpbolivia.bo/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/CPE_2009.pdf) says the vice president assumes the presidency during a temporary presidential absence. A 2013 Constitutional Tribunal ruling concerning Evo Morales’s own UN trip said this substitution occurred automatically, without an oath or formal act ([SCP 0461/2013](https://juristeca.com/bo/tcp/sentencias/2013/4/sentencia-constitucional-plurinacional-0461-2013/i11-hechos-que-motivan-el-recurso)). 

Paz’s government instead relies on Decree 5675, which says a president abroad continues exercising authority digitally unless technology is unavailable and a written delegation is issued. Lara declared himself president in exercise, and a Vice Presidency legal official formally told Senate President Diego Ávila that Lara had assumed and that Ávila should succeed him during Lara’s own trip ([Visión 360](https://www.vision360.bo/noticias/2026/09/22/68905-un-jefe-de-unidad-de-la-vicepresidencia-comunica-al-presidente-del-senado-que-debe-asumir-la-presidencia-interina)). Against that, Paz continued directing the cabinet, Ávila refused to assume and said Paz remained in office, and no Constitutional Tribunal merits ruling had invalidated the current decree ([La Razón](https://larazon.bo/nacional/2026/09/23/avila-descarta-asumir-la-presidencia-y-afirma-que-paz-sigue-en-funciones/); [El Post](https://elpost.com.bo/2026/09/22/gobernar-a-distancia-lara-se-declara-presidente-y-cita-un-decreto-abrogado/)). 

I assign a 24% probability that final resolution treats this September episode as a countable interim succession. That is below 50% because Paz retained operational control and official executive recognition. It is far above a token risk because the constitutional text, earlier jurisprudence, and formal Vice Presidency correspondence all support the opposite result.

Conditional on the September trip not already resolving the question, my remaining-period scenario model is:

| Scenario through December 31 | Weight | Probability of NO within scenario | Contribution to NO |
|---|---:|---:|---:|
| Managed tension: limited strikes, concessions, emergency remains enforceable | 57% | 2% | 1.14% |
| Serious but fragmented crisis: renewed blockades without a unified elite or security defection | 32% | 15% | 4.80% |
| Systemic rupture: broad coalition, shortages or casualties, followed by elite and security defections | 11% | 55% | 6.05% |

This gives a 11.99% probability of a future loss of office, conditional on no prior interruption. Combining the two channels:

$$P(YES)=(1-0.24)(1-0.1199)=0.6689.$$

## What's non-obvious

The obvious story is about protests. The more important forecasting edge is the definition of continuity. Paz can remain the internationally recognized, effective president through December and the question can still resolve NO if Article 169 is eventually found to have made Lara acting president during the September trip.

The street risk is also more conditional than headlines suggest. Low approval, cabinet turnover, and an 83% diesel increase make a new crisis plausible, but blockades remove presidents only when they join a wider collapse in political and security support. The Assembly’s 100–58 emergency vote, Ávila’s refusal to become a rival center of power, and the divided transport response all show that such a coalition does not yet exist.

## Uncertainties

- The largest gap is the legal record. A current Constitutional Tribunal docket, a merits ruling on Decree 5675, or a verified presidential act signed and implemented by Lara or Ávila would sharply change the 24% succession estimate.
- The Lauca Ñ meeting was scheduled for September 26, but no completed resolution was verifiable by the 08:38 Bolivia-time cutoff. A joint call for indefinite blockades or Paz’s resignation would lower the forecast.
- The September 28 transport action had not occurred. Its geographic reach, whether it remains a one-day service withdrawal, and whether the COB or campesino organizations join are the most useful immediate indicators.
- IMF Executive Board approval and actual disbursement were not confirmed in the latest official IMF material. Fast funding and improved fuel availability would support Paz; delay combined with higher freight and food prices would weaken him.
- Protest data available through the public ACLED aggregate ended on August 31, and the approval poll covers only 400 urban internet users. Fresh September event data and a nationally representative poll would narrow the political-risk range.

## Sources

- Domain Expert Search (mcp)
  > Found 14 domain experts for 'Bolivia politics presidential survival protests civil-military relations constitutional succession Rodrigo Paz 2026':
- hdx Hapi (mcp)
  > ACLED Conflict Events (20 records)
- Domain Expert Research Task (mcp)
  > Job domain_expert_research_task_204337d695 done after 298666ms.
- [investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/economy-news/bolivias-paz-declares-state-of-emergency-over-blockade-crisis-4751603) (tool)
- [CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO | SERVICIO NACIONAL DE PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL](https://www.senapi.gob.bo/normativas/constitucion-politica-del-estado/constitucion-politica-del-estado-plurinacional-de-bolivia) (openai)
- [opinion.com.bo](https://www.opinion.com.bo/pais/suplencia-legal-lara-afirma-que-sera-presidente-ejercicio-cuando-paz-viaje-exterior/20260921120437996450.html) (tool)
- [bolivia.infoleyes.com](https://bolivia.infoleyes.com/norma/8698/organizacio-n-del-o-rgano-ejecutivo-5675) (tool)
- [instantaneas.org.bo](https://www.instantaneas.org.bo/2026/09/22/gobierno/paz-gobierna-eeuu-medios-digitales) (tool)
- [eju.tv](https://eju.tv/2026/09/avila-a-lara-el-presidente-en-ejercicio-sigue-siendo-rodrigo-paz-no-son-temas-que-una-persona-puede-decidir) (tool)
- [larazon.bo](https://larazon.bo/nacional/2026/09/23/mariaca-reconoce-a-avila-como-presidente-constitucional-ante-ausencia-de-paz-y-lara) (tool)
- [Gob.bo](https://presidencia.gob.bo/index.php/nota_prensa/presidente-paz-dara-un-discurso-para-mostrar-al-mundo-las-potencialidades-de-bolivia-no-para-ofrecer-un-mensaje-lastimero) (openai)
- [prensamercosur.org](https://prensamercosur.org/2026/09/24/explicador-quien-es-el-presidente-en-ejercicio-en-bolivia) (tool)
- [eju.tv](https://eju.tv/2026/09/ernesto-justiniano-norma-que-permite-a-paz-gobernar-desde-el-exterior-se-presume-constitucional-mientras-el-tcp-no-se-pronuncie) (tool)
- [oopp.gob.bo](https://www.oopp.gob.bo/nota_prensa/estado-de-excepcion-no-hay-toque-de-queda-y-continua-la-atencion-en-los-bancos) (tool)
- [efe.com](https://efe.com/mundo/2026-06-03/bolivia-rodrigo-paz-protestas-dimision-presidente-ministros-renuncia) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/ba51256622a6b17939929a3daa623096) (tool)
- [Ministerio de Gobierno](https://web.mingobierno.gob.bo/?nota_prensa=%F0%9D%97%A0%F0%9D%97%AE%F0%9D%98%86%F0%9D%97%BC%F0%9D%97%BF%F0%9D%97%B6%F0%9D%97%AE-%F0%9D%97%AE%F0%9D%97%AF%F0%9D%98%80%F0%9D%97%BC%F0%9D%97%B9%F0%9D%98%82%F0%9D%98%81%F0%9D%97%AE) (openai)
- [vision360.bo](https://www.vision360.bo/noticias/2026/09/22/68839-tras-el-fin-de-la-subvencion-y-la-subida-del-diesel-el-gobierno-ve-un-pais-sin-grandes-tensiones-ni-movilizaciones) (tool)
- [unitel.bo](https://unitel.bo/noticias/politica/evistas-convocan-a-un-ampliado-nacional-para-el-26-de-septiembre-tras-la-conclusion-del-estado-de-excepcion-CD22745601) (tool)
- [urgente.bo](https://www.urgente.bo/noticia/evistas-invitan-lara-su-ampliado-y-dicen-que-no-iniciaran-bloqueos-lo-haran-los-sectores) (tool)
- [ahoradigital.net](https://ahoradigital.net/politica/24/09/2026/cocaleros-de-lauca-n-declaran-alerta-maxima-y-refuerzan-seguridad-en-torno-a-evo-morales) (tool)
- [reduno.com.bo](https://www.reduno.com.bo/noticias/transporte-anuncia-paro-de-24-horas-y-exigen-abrogar-el-ds-5716-202692213935) (tool)
- [reduno.com.bo](https://www.reduno.com.bo/noticias/ultimo-transporte-libre-decide-no-acatar-el-paro-nacional-del-lunes-202692420530) (tool)
- [instantaneas.org.bo](https://www.instantaneas.org.bo/2026/09/25/trabajo-empleo/repliegue-nacional-choferes-bolivia-paz-alto) (tool)
- [pst.bo](https://pst.bo/archivos/36874) (tool)
- [Bolivia approves $1.9 billion IMF deal, eliminates diesel subsidies](https://apnews.com/article/d5ac4a2558132559e1d544807b89d528) (openai)
- [IMF Reaches Staff-Level Agreement with Bolivia on an Extended Fund Facility Arrangement](https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/07/29/pr26268-bolivia-imf-reaches-staff-level-agreement-on-an-extended-fund-facility-arrangement) (openai)
- [economiayfinanzas.gob.bo](https://economiayfinanzas.gob.bo/node/23373) (tool)
- [static.nuso.org](https://static.nuso.org/media/articles/downloads/3493_2.pdf) (tool)
- [citeseerx.ist.psu.edu](https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?doi=e25b61b79aae9f98a59117d9e2422f88c0bd9ac9&repid=rep1&type=pdf) (tool)
- [cambridge.org](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/latin-american-politics-and-society/article/abs/understanding-presidential-failure-in-south-america/F42BC0FB5D2F0081A4D30BAFE8764632) (tool)
- [researchgate.net](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351549266_Predicting_and_Explaining_Presidential_Interruptions_in_Latin_America) (tool)
- [onlinelibrary.wiley.com](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/blar.70059) (tool)
- [gacetaoficialdebolivia.gob.bo](https://www.gacetaoficialdebolivia.gob.bo/app/webroot/archivos/constitucion.pdf) (tool)
- [fmbolivia.com.bo](https://fmbolivia.com.bo/gaceta/decreto-supremo/5675) (tool)
- [presidencia.gob.bo](https://presidencia.gob.bo/index.php/nota_prensa/el-mundo-en-bolivia-el-estado-se-moderniza-con-el-primer-decreto-supremo-firmado-desde-el-exterior) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-protestas-rodrigo-paz-evo-morales-145f235d923211c6175199ee43790c5d) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-protestas-sociales-rodrigo-paz-evo-morales-estado-excepcion-733cc7b842952dca5fba41b90b53b787) (tool)
- [Protesters, police clash in Bolivia after president signs law enabling a harsher crackdown](https://apnews.com/article/e2f71fb33b704a679cbebfd3d84311ab) (openai)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-rodrigo-paz-evo-morales-salazar-protestas-carcel-crisis-economica-a8736368227f03ed08199d98a4572d34) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-rodrigo-paz-crisis-economica-5290fae581b98696c332660a20b1989c) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/d4a92da12189304ce763ad08656a0853) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/3df9cc7c109570302a2fe7f8fe58d933) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-evo-morales-fiscalia-denuncia-protestas-prolongadas-4b31b043b24faa295c65b08572e4bfcd) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-evo-morales-orden-detencion-protestas-contra-paz-e6a13512246aadf420f92e7a9e6f9656) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-evo-morales-rodrigo-paz-chapare-detencion-6d96f4e94087d54d14845dbfeb9d3ffd) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-rodrigo-paz-evo-morales-protestas-crisis-economica-f475da26726b74adf459f8d7421e2879) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-protesta-maestros-estado-de-excepcion-economia-crisis-a1bef6a9e7ef7675d307602e4f8da2b7) (tool)
- [presidencia.gob.bo](https://presidencia.gob.bo/index.php/nota_prensa/presidente-paz-posesiona-al-nuevo-alto-mando-militar-y-anuncia-una-etapa-de-modernizacion-y-mayor-cercania-con-la-poblacion) (tool)
- [policia.bo](https://www.policia.bo/) (tool)

## Question Details

This question asks whether Rodrigo Paz Pereira will continue to hold the office of President of the Plurinational State of Bolivia without interruption through the end of calendar year 2026. Rodrigo Paz Pereira assumed the presidency on 8 November 2025 after winning the 2025 presidential election and is the incumbent president as of June 2026. Recent reporting has described significant political and social unrest, including nationwide protests, road blockades, cabinet resignations, and public calls for his resignation during 2026. (presidencia.gob.bo) (elpais.com) The forecasting period runs from the time the question is asked until 31 December 2026. The question concerns whether Paz remains president continuously through that date.

### Resolution Criteria

Resolve YES if Rodrigo Paz Pereira is still serving as President of Bolivia at 23:59 local time in Bolivia on 31 December 2026 and has not permanently left the office before that moment. Resolve NO if, at any time before that moment, he ceases to be President of Bolivia due to resignation, removal, impeachment, death, incapacity, judicial or constitutional action, military coup, succession, replacement by an acting or permanent president, or any other loss of the presidency. Resolution will be based on official Bolivian government announcements and records. If those are unclear or unavailable, major international news organizations and widely recognized reference sources documenting the officeholder of the Bolivian presidency may be used.

### Fine Print

Temporary foreign travel, medical leave, or short-term delegation of powers does not count as leaving office if Rodrigo Paz Pereira legally remains President. If constitutional succession transfers the presidency to another person, even on an interim basis, before the end of 31 December 2026, the question resolves NO. If he leaves office and later returns before the end of 2026, the question still resolves NO because he did not remain in power continuously through the period. If reliable information sufficient to determine the officeholder is unavailable on the resolution check date, resolution may be delayed until the facts can be established.