# Will Bolivian president Rodrigo Paz Pereira remain in power through the end of 2026?

Canonical URL: https://preseen.com/reports/546b518d-c2af-43b4-983a-c33252d56410/will-bolivian-president-rodrigo-paz-pereira-remain-in-power-through-the-end-of-2
Markdown URL: https://preseen.com/reports/546b518d-c2af-43b4-983a-c33252d56410/markdown

## Forecast

P(Yes): 85.0%; P(No): 15.0%.

Generated: September 16, 2026 at 4:00 AM UTC
Resolution check date: 2027-01-02
Forecast model: gpt-5.6-sol
Research model: gpt-5.6-sol

## Analysis

## TL;DR
I put the chance that Rodrigo Paz Pereira remains continuously president through December 31 at **85%**. He survived a more dangerous 53-day blockade crisis in May–June, and the police and military chain of command still held at the September 15 cutoff ([AP](https://apnews.com/article/b279b823152c51c27f794cd9837d4aa6), [Bolivian Army reporting](https://www.vision360.bo/noticias/2026/09/09/66830-el-ejercito-respalda-al-militar-que-lara-acusa-de-insubordinacion-y-pide-respeto-a-quienes-cumplen-tareas-en-circunstancias-de-riesgo)). The main risk is that the COB, transport unions, campesino groups, teachers, and Evo-aligned organizations merge their separate protest calendars into one national resignation drive ([COB](https://larazon.bo/nacional/2026/09/01/cob-advierte-que-ampliar-el-estado-de-excepcion-seria-contraproducente/), [Pando campesinos](https://larazon.bo/nacional/2026/09/15/campesinos-de-pando-anuncian-bloqueo-indefinido-desde-el-21-de-septiembre/), [Evo-aligned CSUTCB](https://www.instantaneas.org.bo/2026/09/15/politica/csutcb-movilizacion-permanente-decreto-5707)).

## Context
Paz assumed office on November 8, 2025. The official presidency still listed him as president and published government actions in his name on September 15, 2026, so there was no sign that the question had already resolved NO before the cutoff ([Presidency profile](https://presidencia.gob.bo/index.php/presidente-de-bolivia/), [September 15 government release](https://presidencia.gob.bo/index.php/nota_prensa/gobierno-declara-prioridad-nacional-la-lucha-contra-la-corrupcion-y-nombra-a-garcia-como-representante-gubernamental/)). About 107 days remained.

Bolivia was no longer under the nationwide siege seen in May and June. The official highway site carried a communiqué saying the fundamental road network was transitable, while the Ombudsman's Office said emergency rule had quickly reduced blockades but had not resolved fuel, living-cost, and employment grievances ([ABC](https://www.abc.gob.bo/), [Ombudsman, August 27](https://www.defensoria.gob.bo/noticias/defensor-del-pueblo-un-estado-de-excepcion-es-un-mecanismo-temporal-frente-a-una-crisis%2C-pero-no-resuelve-sus-causas%E2%80%9D)). Paz had issued Decree 5707 seeking another 90 days of emergency rule, with the legislature scheduled to consider it on September 16, after the forecast cutoff ([Decree report](https://brujuladigital.net/seguridad/2026/09/15/gobierno-publica-decreto-sobre-ampliacion-del-estado-de-excepcion-66392), [legislative agenda](https://www.opinion.com.bo/articulo/pais/lara-convoca-sesion-alp-tratar-ampliacion-estado-excepcion/20260915151040996169.html)).

## Evidence
The historical backbone favors survival over a short window. My broad Bolivia reference class covers eight continuous, directly elected presidential tenures from democratic restoration in October 1982 through November 2025. It contains four early endings over about 38.8 directly elected president-years: Hernán Siles Zuazo's crisis-shortened term, Hugo Banzer's health resignation, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada's 2003 resignation, and Evo Morales's 2019 resignation ([Bolivian presidential chronology](https://pdba.georgetown.edu/Executive/Bolivia/pres.html), [Siles Zuazo](https://www.upi.com/Archives/1985/07/16/Former-dictator-claims-election-victory/8107490334400/), [Sánchez de Lozada](https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/25341.htm), [Morales](https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20191219_IN11198_8db8617a3ecb264e64f2de76138f048eca85be93.pdf)). A constant-hazard calculation gives `1 - exp[-(4 / 38.8) × (107.0 / 365.25)] = 3.0%` interruption risk. This is a broad base rate: it includes illness and a negotiated early election, not just coups or protest-driven resignations.

That 3% baseline is too low for Paz's current position. Comparative research finds that presidential interruptions emerge when street mobilization combines with institutional vulnerability; protest alone can be neutralized by a legislative or elite shield, while legislative hostility becomes much more dangerous when mass protest is also present ([América Latina Hoy](https://revistas.usal.es/cuatro/index.php/1130-2887/article/view/1352), [Latin American Politics and Society](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/latin-american-politics-and-society/article/abs/twolevel-theory-of-presidential-instability/EF3394682AD835A8AA1E8946E4CCA471)). Paz has the street and coalition risk, but no comparable security-force break.

The best pro-survival evidence is his revealed ability to withstand pressure. The May–June crisis lasted about 53 days, included widespread roadblocks, serious shortages, deaths, arrests, and explicit demands for Paz to resign. He divided the coalition through sector-by-sector deals, reached an agreement with the COB, declared a state of exception on June 20, and had the main routes reopened by June 23 ([CIDH](https://www.oas.org/es/CIDH/jsForm/?File=/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2026/097.asp), [June 20 agreement](https://elpais.com/america/2026-06-20/paz-y-los-manifestantes-firman-un-acuerdo-para-pacificar-bolivia-despues-de-50-dias-de-protestas-y-14-muertos.html), [June 23 reopening](https://elpais.com/america/2026-06-23/paz-logra-desbloquear-las-carreteras-de-bolivia-despues-de-mas-de-50-dias-de-conflicto-social.html)). A second wave can occur, but it must rebuild a coalition that already failed once.

The de-escalation is incomplete. The Ombudsman's monitoring window from June 20 through August 20 recorded 72 conflict events; 68% were classified as manifest or escalating and 23% as pre-conflict. The same report said road transit had recovered without reports of widespread disproportionate force, while warning that fuel, prices, and labor disputes could combine into another cycle ([Ombudsman report](https://www.defensoria.gob.bo/noticias/defensor-del-pueblo-un-estado-de-excepcion-es-un-mecanismo-temporal-frente-a-una-crisis%2C-pero-no-resuelve-sus-causas%E2%80%9D)). I read this as latent danger, not an active terminal crisis.

The September warning signals are concrete. Urban teachers marched nationally on September 15; Pando campesino leaders announced an indefinite departmental blockade from September 21; Evo-aligned organizations declared permanent mobilization and set a September 26 meeting in Lauca Ñ; and independent transport organizations issued demands over fuel and emergency rule ([teachers](https://larazon.bo/sociedad/2026/09/15/maestros-rompen-el-estado-de-excepcion-con-una-marcha-de-cacerolas-vacias/), [Pando](https://larazon.bo/nacional/2026/09/15/campesinos-de-pando-anuncian-bloqueo-indefinido-desde-el-21-de-septiembre/), [CSUTCB](https://www.instantaneas.org.bo/2026/09/15/politica/csutcb-movilizacion-permanente-decreto-5707), [transport](https://www.aygun.com.bo/transporte-libre-rechaza-ampliacion-estado-excepcion-48-horas-gobierno/)). The COB also opposes extending emergency rule and wants the diesel decree repealed, but it had not announced a new resignation-only national strike by the cutoff ([COB](https://www.ccb.com.bo/sociales/noticia/928/cob-ratifica-pedido-de-abrogacion-de-ds-5676-y-rechaza-posible-ampliacion-del-estado-de-excepcion)).

Paz's political base is weak. The PDC won 65 of the Assembly's 166 seats—49 deputies and 16 senators—leaving it short of a majority ([official-election reporting](https://sisin.oep.org.bo/medios_digitales/155133/detalle)). Unidad withdrew its alliance with the government in July, the PDC has since split between pro-Paz and anti-government factions, and the legislature forced the removal of Economy Minister José Gabriel Espinoza after censuring him ([Unidad rupture](https://larazon.bo/nacional/2026/07/27/ruptura-entre-paz-y-samuel-reconfigura-la-asamblea-y-obliga-al-gobierno-a-buscar-consensos/), [PDC split](https://correodelsur.com/politica/20260910/pdc-se-divide-entre-respaldo-a-rodrigo-paz-y-ruptura-con-el-gobierno.html), [ministerial dismissal](https://efe.com/mundo/2026-08-21/presidente-bolivia-destituye-ministro-economia/)). An August 19–31 Ipsos CIESMORI online poll of 400 adults in La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz put Paz at 21% approval and 65% disapproval, with a reported sampling margin of ±4.9 percentage points. The urban, internet-based frame is not nationally representative, but the level is still a serious vulnerability signal ([El Día](https://www.eldia.com.bo/2026-09-02/politica/en-medio-del-escandalo-por-cerimedo-desaprobacion-de-rodrigo-paz-sube-a-65-.html)).

Vice President Edmand Lara increases insider risk. He says he regrets helping elect Paz, calls him corrupt, and would campaign for both men to be removed in a future recall ([Lara's statement](https://radiosplendid.bo/2026/09/12/lara-dice-que-haria-campana-por-su-propia-revocatoria-y-se-arrepiente-de-haber-pedido-el-voto-para-paz/)). Yet the same Ipsos CIESMORI poll put Lara at only 10% approval and 75% disapproval, making him a poor consensus successor ([Oxígeno](https://oxigeno.bo/encuesta-paz-tiene-una-desaprobacion-del-65-y-lara-del-75-en-el-eje-troncal-del-pais/)). Lara has not shown control of a removal coalition or the security apparatus.

**No police or military break was visible at the cutoff.** Paz installed a new police high command after Mirko Sokol's August 31 resignation, and the Army publicly defended an officer whom Lara had accused of insubordination, emphasizing the authorized chain of command ([new police command](https://unitel.bo/noticias/seguridad/este-es-el-nuevo-alto-mando-policial-posesionado-por-paz-tras-la-salida-de-sokol-FI23181015), [Army statement](https://www.vision360.bo/noticias/2026/09/09/66830-el-ejercito-respalda-al-militar-que-lara-acusa-de-insubordinacion-y-pide-respeto-a-quienes-cumplen-tareas-en-circunstancias-de-riesgo)). A widely circulated claim of a police mutiny was traced to manipulated 2019 imagery rather than a current revolt ([ChequeaBolivia](https://chequeabolivia.bo/es-falso-que-haya-ocurrido-un-motin-policial-contra-rodrigo-paz)). These signals do not prove private loyalty, but they are materially different from the police and military abandonment that preceded Morales's 2019 departure.

Formal removal routes are narrow. The Constitution ends a presidential mandate through death, resignation, definitive incapacity or absence, a final criminal conviction, or recall; recall cannot be requested until half the term has elapsed ([Constitution, Articles 169–171 and 240](https://www.senapi.gob.bo/normativas/constitucion-politica-del-estado/constitucion-politica-del-estado-plurinacional-de-bolivia), [Electoral Authority](https://www.oep.org.bo/institucional-institucional/conoce-los-requisitos-y-el-sistema-electoral-para-las-revocatorias-de-mandato/)). Paz's recall window therefore does not open until roughly May 2028. The Cerimedo affair is politically dangerous, but the public action seeking a presidential trial was still a citizen filing, Paz had requested forensic examination of the recordings, and prosecutors reported insufficient evidence to expand one related complaint to the first lady as of September 9 ([citizen action](https://www.opinion.com.bo/articulo/pais/presentan-recurso-que-alp-impulse-juicio-responsabilidades-rodrigo-paz/20260827205646995356.html), [Paz response](https://unitel.bo/noticias/politica/que-les-hagan-el-peritaje-paz-se-refiere-a-audios-difundidos-por-lara-y-dice-que-no-le-preocupa-NL23289545), [prosecutor statement](https://noticiasfides.com/nacional/seguridad/pese-a-audios-aparentemente-con-cerimedo-fiscalia-no-amplia-denuncia-contra-la-primera-dama-por-falta-de-indicios)). A completed criminal removal before December 31 would require an unusually fast legal and political cascade.

The economy remains a trigger, but not an uncontrolled spiral. The official August CPI release, covering prices through August 31 and published September 3, showed 1.10% month-over-month inflation, 3.01% accumulated since January, and 5.02% over twelve months ([INE](https://www.ine.gob.bo/index.php/el-indice-de-precios-al-consumidor-ipc-presento-una-variacion-positiva-de-110-en-agosto-de-2026/)). A non-government INESAD estimate published September 14 put real GDP contraction at 3.34% in the first half of 2026, so lower inflation coexists with a deep recession ([INESAD](https://www.inesad.edu.bo/2026/09/14/pulso-macroeconomico-agosto-2026/)). The July 29 IMF staff-level agreement provides a possible US$1.9 billion, 36-month stabilization package, but remained subject to prior actions and Executive Board approval ([IMF](https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/07/29/pr26268-bolivia-imf-reaches-staff-level-agreement-on-an-extended-fund-facility-arrangement)). Government plans put the larger move toward cost-recovery fuel pricing in January 2027, outside this contract's window ([Finance Ministry](https://economiayfinanzas.gob.bo/node/22995)).

The OAS adds a modest institutional shield. Its September mission report found broad agreement that electoral mandates should be respected and disputes handled inside Bolivia's constitutional framework; a September 11 statement again supported democratic continuity and dialogue ([OAS mission](https://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-095%2F26), [OAS statement](https://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-097%2F26)). This cannot stop a domestic resignation, but it raises the diplomatic cost of a coup or improvised succession.

My quantitative synthesis uses a two-branch event tree. I assign a 44% chance that a broad, resignation-threatening national crisis returns before year-end; a 30% chance that such a crisis removes Paz; and a 3.2% exit risk if no broad crisis develops, covering scandal, an isolated security rupture, death, incapacity, and other shocks. Thus `P(NO) = 0.44 × 0.30 + 0.56 × 0.032 ≈ 0.15`, leaving **85% for YES**. The result is far above an acute-crisis forecast because Paz is not currently under nationwide siege, but far below the 97% historical baseline because several organizations are preparing new mobilizations while his coalition and approval are weak.

## What's non-obvious
Low approval is less decisive than it looks. Bolivia does not have an ordinary parliamentary no-confidence mechanism for removing the president, recall is unavailable, and Lara is even less popular than Paz. The key state variable is whether the police and armed forces continue following the presidential chain of command. They were still doing so at the cutoff.

**The COB matters more than Lara's rhetoric.** It helped create the May–June crisis, then split the protest front by reaching an agreement with Paz. Its present opposition to extending emergency rule is therefore the clearest bridge between today's fragmented protests and another nationwide campaign. The counterweight is that the largest scheduled fuel-price adjustment falls in January 2027 rather than before December 31 ([COB](https://larazon.bo/nacional/2026/09/01/cob-advierte-que-ampliar-el-estado-de-excepcion-seria-contraproducente/), [Finance Ministry](https://economiayfinanzas.gob.bo/node/22995)).

## Uncertainties
- The legislature's September 16 decision on Decree 5707 occurred after the information cutoff. The government claimed that failure to act within 72 hours would leave the extension in force, while a separate legal analysis said the governing law contains no such automatic-approval deadline. I therefore treat the emergency extension's legal durability as unresolved ([government position](https://larazon.bo/nacional/2026/09/15/si-la-asamblea-no-trata-en-72-horas-la-ampliacion-el-estado-de-excepcion-sigue-vigente-vocero/), [contrary legal analysis](https://elpost.com.bo/2026/09/15/estado-de-excepcion-que-rige-desde-el-sabado-aunque-la-asamblea-no-sesione/)).
- The September 21 Pando blockade and September 26 Lauca Ñ meeting were future events at cutoff. The forecast would fall sharply if those actions merge with a new COB strike, national transport stoppage, or sustained blockades around La Paz and El Alto ([Pando](https://larazon.bo/nacional/2026/09/15/campesinos-de-pando-anuncian-bloqueo-indefinido-desde-el-21-de-septiembre/), [Lauca Ñ](https://www.instantaneas.org.bo/2026/09/15/politica/csutcb-movilizacion-permanente-decreto-5707)).
- Security-force cohesion is observed indirectly. Public compliance and command statements are positive evidence, but private dissatisfaction, unpaid obligations, or contingency planning cannot be measured from open reporting.
- The best approval poll has only 400 online respondents in four cities. There is no equally fresh, nationally representative urban-and-rural probability sample, and protest-event databases do not reliably measure participant numbers or strategic road control ([poll methodology](https://www.eldia.com.bo/2026-09-02/politica/en-medio-del-escandalo-por-cerimedo-desaprobacion-de-rodrigo-paz-sube-a-65-.html)).
- The Cerimedo recordings had not received a definitive official forensic finding by the cutoff. Authentication plus evidence of an unlawful presidential order would materially increase scandal and coalition-defection risk ([Unitel](https://unitel.bo/noticias/politica/lara-dice-que-cerimedo-grababa-al-presidente-y-difunde-un-audio-que-atribuye-a-una-llamada-entre-paz-y-el-asesor-politico-NA23232953)).

## Sources

- Domain Expert Search (mcp)
  > Found 14 domain experts for 'Bolivia politics Rodrigo Paz government survival protests military police legislature September 2026':
- Domain Expert Research Task (mcp)
  > Job domain_expert_research_task_e0ff65130e done after 353936ms.
- [oas.org](https://www.oas.org/es/CIDH/jsForm?File=%2Fes%2Fcidh%2Fprensa%2Fcomunicados%2F2026%2F097.asp) (tool)
- [Bolivia's president declares a state of emergency as road blockades choke supplies](https://apnews.com/article/b279b823152c51c27f794cd9837d4aa6) (openai)
- [oas.org](https://www.oas.org/es/centro_noticias/comunicado_prensa.asp?sCodigo=C-095%2F26) (tool)
- [CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO | SERVICIO NACIONAL DE PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL](https://www.senapi.gob.bo/normativas/constitucion-politica-del-estado/constitucion-politica-del-estado-plurinacional-de-bolivia) (openai)
- [oep.org.bo](https://www.oep.org.bo/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/LEY_026.pdf) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-evo-morales-orden-detencion-protestas-contra-paz-e6f9656) (tool)
- [unitel.bo](https://unitel.bo/noticias/politica/el-presidente-paz-y-argollo-de-la-cob-firman-acuerdo-al-cumplirse-50-dias-de-bloqueos-OH21518204) (tool)
- [france24.com](https://www.france24.com/es/minuto-a-minuto/20251218-lara-el-vicepresidente-de-bolivia-que-dispara-contra-su-gobierno) (tool)
- [france24.com](https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20260822-bolivia-rodrigo-paz-destituye-a-su-ministro-de-econom%C3%ADa-en-medio-de-una-semana-de-esc%C3%A1ndalos) (tool)
- [erbol.com.bo](https://erbol.com.bo/node/48252) (tool)
- [oxigeno.bo](https://oxigeno.bo/lara-convoca-a-sesion-de-la-alp-el-miercoles-para-tratar-del-decreto-que-amplia-el-estado-de-excepcion) (tool)
- [oxigeno.bo](https://oxigeno.bo/encuesta-paz-tiene-una-desaprobacion-del-65-y-lara-del-75-en-el-eje-troncal-del-pais) (tool)
- [correodelsur.com](https://correodelsur.com/politica/20260915/rodrigo-paz-cae-8-9-puntos-en-sondeo-de-aprobacion.html) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-petrolera-estatal-intervencion-combustible-diesel-0ed52242e6502b4452fbd92bd6709531) (tool)
- [IMF Reaches Staff-Level Agreement with Bolivia on an Extended Fund Facility Arrangement](https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/07/29/pr26268-bolivia-imf-reaches-staff-level-agreement-on-an-extended-fund-facility-arrangement) (openai)
- [economiayfinanzas.gob.bo](https://economiayfinanzas.gob.bo/node/22995) (tool)
- [radiosplendid.bo](https://radiosplendid.bo/2026/09/15/campesinos-de-pando-anuncian-bloqueo-indefinido-de-carreteras-por-incumplimientos-del-gobierno) (tool)
- [unitel.bo](https://unitel.bo/noticias/politica/evistas-convocan-a-un-ampliado-nacional-para-el-26-de-septiembre-tras-la-conclusion-del-estado-de-excepcion-CD22745601) (tool)
- [radiosplendid.bo](https://radiosplendid.bo/2026/09/11/andronico-cuestiona-liderazgo-de-evo-destruye-todo-lo-que-no-puede-controlar) (tool)
- Claude Code (e2b)
  > Job coding_whiz_job_24b70073dd done after 525635ms.
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- [en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Bolivian_protests) (tool)
- [csis.org](https://www.csis.org/analysis/bolivias-governance-crisis-under-rodrigo-paz) (tool)
- [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/5/22/bolivia-in-crisis-social-unrest-demands-for-president-to-resign-escalate) (tool)
- [npr.org](https://www.npr.org/2026/05/20/nx-s1-5828203/bolivia-capital-protests-crisis) (tool)
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- hdx Hapi (mcp)
  > ACLED Conflict Events (20 records)
- GDELT (mcp)
  > {"query":"in BL with event codes 14, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145","parameters":{"actor1":null,"actor2":null,"event_codes":["14","140","141","142","143","144","145"],"locations":["BL"],"themes":null,"date_range":["2025-01-01","2026-09-15"],"aggregation":"monthly","return_format":"timeseries"},"backtesting_info":{"cutoff_date":"2026-09-16","effective_end_date":"2026-09-15","is_backtesting":false,"warning":null},"data":{"data":[{"date":"2025-01","event_count":99,"avg_tone":-3.627715871273428,"avg…
- Views (mcp)
  > ViEWS Conflict Forecasts: Bolivia (BOL)
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- [EL ÍNDICE DE PRECIOS AL CONSUMIDOR (IPC) PRESENTÓ UNA VARIACIÓN POSITIVA DE 1,10% EN AGOSTO DE 2026 - INE](https://www.ine.gob.bo/index.php/el-indice-de-precios-al-consumidor-ipc-presento-una-variacion-positiva-de-110-en-agosto-de-2026) (openai)
- [ine.gob.bo](https://www.ine.gob.bo/index.php/el-indice-de-precios-al-por-mayor-ipm-registro-una-variacion-positiva-de-207-en-agosto-de-2026) (tool)
- [defensoria.gob.bo](https://www.defensoria.gob.bo/noticias/alza-de-preciosdefensor-del-pueblo-exige-al-estado-acciones-inmediatas-ante-riesgo-de-regresion-del-derecho-a-la-alimentacion) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/82c47ceb6d7802c268ebeb2d97e7146a) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/3df9cc7c109570302a2fe7f8fe58d933) (tool)
- [A bruising week for Bolivia's President Paz as scandal and setbacks test his presidency](https://apnews.com/article/fba61c2e7879a51000c7ad8230bda4a6) (openai)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/e2f71fb33b704a679cbebfd3d84311ab) (tool)
- [economiayfinanzas.gob.bo](https://economiayfinanzas.gob.bo/node/22972) (tool)
- [mhe.gob.bo](https://www.mhe.gob.bo/2026/09/02/el-gobierno-interviene-ypfb-mediante-una-comision-para-recuperar-la-eficiencia-tecnica-administrativa-y-operativa-de-la-estatal-petrolera) (tool)
- [mhe.gob.bo](https://www.mhe.gob.bo/2026/09/03/gobierno-interviene-de-forma-extraordinaria-la-agencia-nacional-de-hidrocarburos-anh) (tool)
- [mhe.gob.bo](https://www.mhe.gob.bo/2026/09/08/presidente-firma-d-s-5701-para-permitir-el-abastecimiento-de-combustibles-y-fortalecer-la-refinacion) (tool)
- [produccion.gob.bo](https://produccion.gob.bo/nota_prensa/comision-de-intervencion-a-la-anh-frena-desvio-de-combustibles-restablece-el-control-digital-y-activa-procesos-penales-bajo-la-politica-de-cero-impunidad) (tool)
- [oopp.gob.bo](https://www.oopp.gob.bo/nota_prensa/intervencion-a-ypfb-da-sus-primeros-resultados-ya-no-hay-filas-por-combustible-en-santa-cruz) (tool)
- [bcb.gob.bo](https://www.bcb.gob.bo/?trk=organization_guest_main-feed-card-text) (tool)
- [growthlab.hks.harvard.edu](https://growthlab.hks.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-04-glwp-261-bolivia-economic-pivot-macro1-english.pdf) (tool)
- [bcb.gob.bo](https://www.bcb.gob.bo/notas-prensa-embed) (tool)
- [bcb.gob.bo](https://www.bcb.gob.bo/webdocs/publicacionesbcb/2026/04/59/INFORME%20TRIM%20RIN%201-2026.pdf) (tool)
- [bcb.gob.bo](https://www.bcb.gob.bo/webdocs/programamonetario/Programa_Monetario_Mayo_2026.pdf) (tool)

## Question Details

This question asks whether Rodrigo Paz Pereira will continue to hold the office of President of the Plurinational State of Bolivia without interruption through the end of calendar year 2026. Rodrigo Paz Pereira assumed the presidency on 8 November 2025 after winning the 2025 presidential election and is the incumbent president as of June 2026. Recent reporting has described significant political and social unrest, including nationwide protests, road blockades, cabinet resignations, and public calls for his resignation during 2026. (presidencia.gob.bo) (elpais.com) The forecasting period runs from the time the question is asked until 31 December 2026. The question concerns whether Paz remains president continuously through that date.

### Resolution Criteria

Resolve YES if Rodrigo Paz Pereira is still serving as President of Bolivia at 23:59 local time in Bolivia on 31 December 2026 and has not permanently left the office before that moment. Resolve NO if, at any time before that moment, he ceases to be President of Bolivia due to resignation, removal, impeachment, death, incapacity, judicial or constitutional action, military coup, succession, replacement by an acting or permanent president, or any other loss of the presidency. Resolution will be based on official Bolivian government announcements and records. If those are unclear or unavailable, major international news organizations and widely recognized reference sources documenting the officeholder of the Bolivian presidency may be used.

### Fine Print

Temporary foreign travel, medical leave, or short-term delegation of powers does not count as leaving office if Rodrigo Paz Pereira legally remains President. If constitutional succession transfers the presidency to another person, even on an interim basis, before the end of 31 December 2026, the question resolves NO. If he leaves office and later returns before the end of 2026, the question still resolves NO because he did not remain in power continuously through the period. If reliable information sufficient to determine the officeholder is unavailable on the resolution check date, resolution may be delayed until the facts can be established.