# What percentage of Russian seaborne crude oil export loading capacity will be offline at end of June 2026 due to Ukrainian strikes (vs the H2 2025 baseline)? Canonical URL: https://preseen.com/reports/4bd30662-2eb7-4b96-8e10-7dfe0d884038/what-percentage-of-russian-seaborne-crude-oil-export-loading-capacity-will-be-of Markdown URL: https://preseen.com/reports/4bd30662-2eb7-4b96-8e10-7dfe0d884038/markdown ## Forecast Median forecast: 12.4; 80% interval: 10 to 18. Generated: July 12, 2026 at 7:14 PM UTC Forecast model: gpt-5.5 Research model: gpt-5.5 ## Analysis ## TL;DR My resolution forecast is **13% offline**, with the modal resolution near 11.6%. June flow data shows the late-March 40% outage did not persist: Russia was loading record or near-record crude volumes at sea. The main source-path risk is Bloomberg's exact June 1–28 tanker number, which maps to 17.4%, versus the CREA/Kpler-style fallback near 11.6%. ## Context The resolution window has already closed, but the primary-source deadline has not: the question waits until 14 July 2026 for a Reuters or Bloomberg stocktake that explicitly quantifies crude export loading capacity offline due to Ukrainian operations. I found flow articles, not a clean end-June capacity-offline stocktake. That makes the fallback path the dominant resolution path. The late-March shock was real. Reuters reported that about 2.0 mb/d, or 40%, of Russian crude export capacity was offline after strikes and related disruptions at Primorsk, Ust-Luga, Novorossiysk, Druzhba, and tanker flows ([Reuters via The Moscow Times, 25 Mar. 2026](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/03/25/ukrainian-drone-strikes-halt-at-least-40-of-russias-oil-export-capacity-reuters-a92339); [Reuters via The Business Standard, 2 Apr. 2026](https://www.tbsnews.net/worldbiz/europe/least-40-russias-oil-export-capacity-halted-reuters-calculations-show-1400486)). By June, the story had changed: Bloomberg said Baltic and Black Sea export terminals had largely resumed normal operations by the four weeks to 31 May, and Reuters said western-port June crude shipments from Primorsk, Ust-Luga, and Novorossiysk reached nearly 3.0 mb/d ([Bloomberg via The Moscow Times, 2 Jun. 2026](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/06/02/ukraines-refinery-strikes-push-russian-crude-exports-to-wartime-high-bloomberg-a92908/pdf); [Reuters via Stockopedia, 2 Jul. 2026](https://www.stockopedia.com/share-prices/novorossiysk-commercial-sea-port-pao-LON%3ANCSP/news/russia-apos-s-western-oil-exports-hit-record-in-june-due-to-refinery-outages-sources-say-019f232f-8261-7447-92df-f84b22a8c7aa/)). ## Evidence The baseline supports the 5.0 mb/d denominator but not a 5.0 mb/d normal-flow assumption. KSE's April assessment, using Kpler data accessed on 7 April 2026, put 2025 observed oil export flows at 1.26 mb/d through Primorsk, 1.15 mb/d through Ust-Luga, 0.97 mb/d through Novorossiysk, 1.00 mb/d through Nakhodka/Kozmino, and 0.30 mb/d through Murmansk, or 4.68 mb/d across the main nodes ([KSE Institute, 9 Apr. 2026](https://institute.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/drone_strike_smpact_assessment_eng_april_-2026.pdf)). The same report shows why March mattered: Ust-Luga crude fell from 725 kb/d in the week of 16–22 March to 101 kb/d and 155 kb/d in the next two weeks, while Primorsk crude stayed near 780 kb/d and then rose to 848 kb/d ([KSE Institute, 9 Apr. 2026](https://institute.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/drone_strike_smpact_assessment_eng_april_-2026.pdf)). Bloomberg's tanker tracking also showed a one-week drop from 4.07 mb/d to 2.32 mb/d in the week to 29 March, driven by Baltic disruptions ([Bloomberg via The Moscow Times, 31 Mar. 2026](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/03/31/russian-oil-exports-fall-by-175m-bpd-as-drones-assaults-baltic-ports-a92392)). The comparable flow history below uses average million barrels per day of Russian seaborne crude, not products. Annual rows are calendar-year averages, monthly rows are calendar months, and four-week rows are 28-day tanker-tracking averages; the source vintage is the publication date shown in the source column. | Coverage window | Seaborne crude exports, mb/d | Fallback value vs 5.0 mb/d | Source vintage | |---|---:|---:|---| | 2022 average | 3.25 | 35.0% | [IEA/Kpler/Argus May OMR mirror, 13 May 2026](https://empresaclima.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/06-Oil-Market-Report_INT.pdf) | | 2023 average | 3.52 | 29.6% | [IEA/Kpler/Argus May OMR mirror, 13 May 2026](https://empresaclima.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/06-Oil-Market-Report_INT.pdf) | | 2024 average | 3.47 | 30.6% | [IEA/Kpler/Argus May OMR mirror, 13 May 2026](https://empresaclima.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/06-Oil-Market-Report_INT.pdf) | | 2025 average | 3.47 | 30.6% | [IEA/Kpler/Argus May OMR mirror, 13 May 2026](https://empresaclima.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/06-Oil-Market-Report_INT.pdf) | | January 2026 | 3.40 | 32.0% | [IEA/Kpler/Argus May OMR mirror, 13 May 2026](https://empresaclima.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/06-Oil-Market-Report_INT.pdf) | | February 2026 | 3.24 | 35.2% | [IEA/Kpler/Argus May OMR mirror, 13 May 2026](https://empresaclima.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/06-Oil-Market-Report_INT.pdf) | | March 2026 | 3.57 | 28.6% | [IEA/Kpler/Argus May OMR mirror, 13 May 2026](https://empresaclima.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/06-Oil-Market-Report_INT.pdf) | | April 2026 | 3.76 | 24.8% | [IEA/Kpler/Argus May OMR mirror, 13 May 2026](https://empresaclima.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/06-Oil-Market-Report_INT.pdf) | | May 2026 | 3.88 | 22.4% | [KSE Russian Oil Tracker, 1 Jul. 2026](https://kse.ua/about-the-school/news/russian-oil-tracker-june-2026-russia-ramps-up-crude-exports-after-refinery-strikes-as-a-shadow-fleet-shortage-deepens-its-reliance-on-western-maritime-services/) | | Four weeks to 31 May 2026 | 3.64 | 27.2% | [Bloomberg via The Moscow Times, 2 Jun. 2026](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/06/02/ukraines-refinery-strikes-push-russian-crude-exports-to-wartime-high-bloomberg-a92908/pdf) | | 1–28 June 2026 | 4.13 | 17.4% | [Bloomberg via Meduza, 30 Jun./1 Jul. 2026](https://meduza.io/en/news/2026/07/01/russia-s-seaborne-oil-exports-hit-a-wartime-record-in-june-but-export-revenue-sank-to-a-three-month-low) | | June 2026 full month | 4.414 | 11.7% | [S&P Global CAS, 2 Jul. 2026, updated 3 Jul.](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/refined-products/070226-refinery-attacks-boost-june-russian-crude-exports-dampen-products) | The fallback formula is: $$ R = \max\left(0, \left(1 - \frac{E}{5.0}\right) \times 100\right), $$ where \(E\) is average Russian seaborne crude exports in mb/d. CREA's June bulletin says Russian crude export volumes rose 14% month on month, with Novorossiysk crude loadings up 68%, Ust-Luga down 10%, and Primorsk down 9% ([CREA, 10 Jul. 2026](https://energyandcleanair.org/june-2026-monthly-analysis-of-russian-fossil-fuel-exports-and-sanctions/)). Applying that 14% rise to KSE's May seaborne crude figure of 3.88 mb/d gives 4.42 mb/d, which implies 11.5% under the fallback; S&P Global's separate 4.414 mb/d June estimate implies 11.7% ([KSE Russian Oil Tracker, 1 Jul. 2026](https://kse.ua/about-the-school/news/russian-oil-tracker-june-2026-russia-ramps-up-crude-exports-after-refinery-strikes-as-a-shadow-fleet-shortage-deepens-its-reliance-on-western-maritime-services/); [S&P Global CAS, 2 Jul. 2026, updated 3 Jul.](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/refined-products/070226-refinery-attacks-boost-june-russian-crude-exports-dampen-products)). Bloomberg's exact-window 4.13 mb/d implies 17.4%, and I keep substantial probability there because it matches the 1–28 June window exactly ([Bloomberg via Meduza, 30 Jun./1 Jul. 2026](https://meduza.io/en/news/2026/07/01/russia-s-seaborne-oil-exports-hit-a-wartime-record-in-june-but-export-revenue-sank-to-a-three-month-low)). The June narrative flipped during the month. Reuters reported on 8 June that western-port crude loadings could fall to 1.7 mb/d in June from 2.5 mb/d in May as Russia tried to raise refinery runs and output weakened ([Reuters via MarketScreener, 8 Jun. 2026](https://www.marketscreener.com/news/russia-to-reduce-june-oil-exports-amid-higher-refinery-runs-and-lower-crude-output-sources-say-ce7f5dd3d989f42c)). By 24 June, Reuters sources expected those same ports to reach 2.7–2.8 mb/d because refinery damage left more crude available for export, and by 2 July Reuters sources put western-port exports at nearly 3.0 mb/d in June ([Reuters via Ukrainska Pravda, 24 Jun. 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/24/8040965/); [Reuters via Stockopedia, 2 Jul. 2026](https://www.stockopedia.com/share-prices/novorossiysk-commercial-sea-port-pao-LON%3ANCSP/news/russia-apos-s-western-oil-exports-hit-record-in-june-due-to-refinery-outages-sources-say-019f232f-8261-7447-92df-f84b22a8c7aa/)). CREA also said seaborne oil-product loadings fell 21% month on month to a record low, which supports the same mechanism: refineries and product logistics were the binding damage, not crude loading berths ([CREA, 10 Jul. 2026](https://energyandcleanair.org/june-2026-monthly-analysis-of-russian-fossil-fuel-exports-and-sanctions/)). My distribution puts 55% on the CREA/Kpler/S&P-style fallback near 11.6%, 22% on the Bloomberg exact-window path near 17.4%, 8% on a source blend near 14.6%, 10% on a late qualifying physical-capacity stocktake near 6–8%, and 5% on higher source or attribution surprises. That gives a mean near 13%, a median near 12%, and an 80% interval of roughly 10–18%. The physical engineering outage in June was probably lower than the resolved fallback value, because western ports were loading close to capacity while the fallback compares realized exports with a 5.0 mb/d capacity denominator. ## What's non-obvious The obvious story from March was that Ukraine had found a durable way to choke Russian crude exports. June data says the opposite for crude. Ukraine was still damaging the oil system, but refinery strikes pushed more unrefined oil to export terminals; Bloomberg described higher seaborne crude exports as a result of lower refinery processing, and Reuters reported that western-port loadings were revised up for the same reason ([Bloomberg via The Moscow Times, 2 Jun. 2026](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/06/02/ukraines-refinery-strikes-push-russian-crude-exports-to-wartime-high-bloomberg-a92908/pdf); [Reuters via Ukrainska Pravda, 24 Jun. 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/24/8040965/)). The resolution rule is also a trap. A normal 2025 seaborne crude export month of 3.47 mb/d would mechanically print 30.6% under the fallback even with no port damage, because the formula compares flow to a 5.0 mb/d capacity baseline ([IEA/Kpler/Argus May OMR mirror, 13 May 2026](https://empresaclima.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/06-Oil-Market-Report_INT.pdf)). June was not normal; it was a record or near-record crude export month, so the fallback falls into the low-to-mid teens instead of the 30% range ([Bloomberg via Meduza, 30 Jun./1 Jul. 2026](https://meduza.io/en/news/2026/07/01/russia-s-seaborne-oil-exports-hit-a-wartime-record-in-june-but-export-revenue-sank-to-a-three-month-low); [S&P Global CAS, 2 Jul. 2026, updated 3 Jul.](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/refined-products/070226-refinery-attacks-boost-june-russian-crude-exports-dampen-products)). ## Limitations The largest uncertainty is source-path risk. I did not find a Reuters or Bloomberg article, as of 12 July 2026, that explicitly quantifies June-average crude export loading capacity offline due to Ukrainian operations in the same way the 25 March Reuters article did. If such a qualifying article appears or is found by 14 July 2026, it would supersede the fallback and could pull the answer toward a lower physical-capacity estimate. The second gap is CREA's public text. CREA gives the 14% month-on-month crude-volume rise and port-level changes, but the accessible article text does not show a single all-Russia seaborne crude mb/d number ([CREA, 10 Jul. 2026](https://energyandcleanair.org/june-2026-monthly-analysis-of-russian-fossil-fuel-exports-and-sanctions/)). I infer the CREA/Kpler-style value from KSE's May 3.88 mb/d and cross-check it against S&P Global's 4.414 mb/d June print, but Bloomberg's exact-window 4.13 mb/d shows that vendor definitions differ enough to move the answer by nearly 6 percentage points ([KSE Russian Oil Tracker, 1 Jul. 2026](https://kse.ua/about-the-school/news/russian-oil-tracker-june-2026-russia-ramps-up-crude-exports-after-refinery-strikes-as-a-shadow-fleet-shortage-deepens-its-reliance-on-western-maritime-services/); [Bloomberg via Meduza, 30 Jun./1 Jul. 2026](https://meduza.io/en/news/2026/07/01/russia-s-seaborne-oil-exports-hit-a-wartime-record-in-june-but-export-revenue-sank-to-a-three-month-low)). The final gap is attribution. The fallback treats every barrel short of 5.0 mb/d as if it were unavailable capacity, while the actual shortfall can reflect normal underuse, crude output, grade mix, tanker timing, sanctions logistics, buyer demand, weather, or non-Russian barrels through Russian ports. That is why I treat 11.6% as the modal resolution value but 13% as the final mean forecast. ## Sources - Domain Expert Search (mcp) > Found 14 subagent groups for 'Russian oil exports Ukrainian strikes terminals Primorsk Ust-Luga Novorossiysk Kozmino June 2026 energy security sanctions tanker tracking': - imf Portwatch (mcp) > No ports found matching query 'Novorossiysk' and country 'Russia'. - Telegram Pulse (mcp) > Tool telegram_pulse_search_keywords on telegram-pulse returned an error: - [errors.pydantic.dev](https://errors.pydantic.dev/2.13/v/unexpected_keyword_argument) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23617) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23618) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23619) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23620) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23621) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23622) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23623) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23624) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23625) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23626) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23627) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23628) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23629) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23630) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23631) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23632) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23633) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23634) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23635) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23636) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/rybar/81700) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/rybar/81701) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/rybar/81704) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/rybar/81705) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/rybar/81706) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/rybar/81707) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/rybar/81708) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/rybar/81709) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/rybar/81710) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/rybar/81711) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/rybar/81712) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/rybar/81715) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/rybar/81716) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/rybar/81717) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/rybar/81718) (tool) - [t.me](https://t.me/rybar/81719) (tool) - Domain Expert Research Task (mcp) > Job domain_expert_research_task_bab76e30e4 done after 204978ms. - News (mcp) > Found 10 merged articles (asknews: 5, perigon: 5, both: 0). - [euromaidanpress.com](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/18/russia-set-to-import-gasoline-by-sea-as-ukrainian-strikes-cut-refinery-output) (tool) - [yahoo.com](https://www.yahoo.com/news/world/articles/russias-fourth-largest-refinery-halts-175500374.html) (tool) - [telanganatoday.com](https://telanganatoday.com/indias-russian-crude-imports-hit-record-in-jun-even-as-moscows-oil-revenues-slip) (tool) - [foxnews.com](https://www.foxnews.com/video/6398782607112) (tool) - [newsukraine.rbc.ua](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/ukraine-strikes-russia-s-syzran-oil-refinery-1783844293.html) (tool) - [dailykos.com](https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2026/6/18/800056829/community/russian-stuff-blowing-up) (tool) - [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-set-export-record-oil-volumes-western-ports-june-sources-say-2026-06-24) (tool) - [ndtv.com](https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/video-massive-blast-rocks-moscow-oil-refinery-after-ukrainian-drone-strike-11653979) (tool) ## Question Details Through 2024-2025, Russia's seaborne crude export loading capacity ran at roughly 5 million barrels per day, concentrated in a small number of terminals: Primorsk and Ust-Luga on the Baltic, Novorossiysk on the Black Sea, and Kozmino on the Pacific. In late March 2026, after a sustained Ukrainian drone campaign hit Primorsk, Ust-Luga, and Novorossiysk - and after disputed CPC pipeline damage and tanker seizures - Reuters calculated that at least 40% of Russia's oil export capacity (~2 mb/d) was halted, the worst disruption in modern Russian history. Carnegie measured that actual shipments fell from ~5.2 to ~3.5 mb/d (a 33% drop) between 25 March and 11 April 2026.\n\nRussia has been working hard to restore loading: Ust-Luga was back to roughly half pre-strike volumes by 7 April per Carnegie. But Ukraine has not stopped: drone strikes hit Tuapse on 16 and 20 April, Kstovo, Ufa, and a Leningrad-region refinery in early-to-mid April, and the Atlantic Council and Adapt Institute both characterize Ukraine's spring 2026 campaign as a deliberate escalation. Reuters (21 April) reports Russia is now slashing April crude output 300-400 kbpd, the sharpest monthly decline since the COVID era. The IEA expects Russian refining to stay below 5 mb/d until at least mid-2026.\n\nThis question forecasts how much of Russia's seaborne crude export loading capacity is offline at the end of June 2026 - i.e., does the strike-vs-repair race resolve toward (a) full or near-full restoration (well under 10% offline, similar to 2024 baseline disruption levels), (b) a persistent moderate impairment (10-25%), (c) something close to the late-March peak (30-45%), or (d) something even worse if Ukraine sustains or escalates the campaign through Q2. The question deliberately tracks export loading specifically (not total refining throughput), because the late-March 40% figure that anchors the prompt was about export loading capacity. ### Resolution Criteria Resolves to the percentage of Russia's seaborne crude oil export loading capacity that is unavailable for use at end-of-June 2026 (averaged across the four-week window 1 June 2026 through 28 June 2026) due to physical damage, fire, or operational suspension caused by Ukrainian strikes or other Ukrainian operations (drones, missiles, sabotage, naval action), expressed as a percentage of the H2 2025 baseline loading capacity rounded to one decimal place.\n\nNumerator: average daily mb/d of crude export loading capacity offline at the four named primary terminals (Primorsk, Ust-Luga, Novorossiysk, Kozmino) and any additional Russian seaborne crude export terminal that was operational in H2 2025, attributable to Ukrainian action, across the resolution window.\n\nDenominator: total H2 2025 baseline loading capacity at those terminals as reported by the most recent published Reuters or Bloomberg stocktake. As a fixed fallback the denominator is 5.0 mb/d (the working figure used in Reuters' 25 March 2026 calculation that 2 mb/d = ~40%).\n\nPrimary resolution source: an end-of-June or early-July 2026 Reuters or Bloomberg stocktake article that explicitly quantifies Russian oil export capacity offline due to Ukrainian strikes, analogous to the 25 March 2026 Reuters calculation (https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/03/25/ukrainian-drone-strikes-halt-at-least-40-of-russias-oil-export-capacity-reuters-a92339).\n\nFallback resolution path if no such article exists by 14 July 2026: compute (1 - June 2026 average seaborne crude exports in mb/d as reported by CREA's Russia Fossil Tracker / Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air monthly bulletin / 5.0 mb/d) * 100, floored at 0. If CREA's June 2026 figure is unavailable, use Kpler's June 2026 Russian seaborne crude export average. If multiple sources differ by more than 5 percentage points, use the simple average of Reuters and CREA. ### Fine Print 'Offline due to Ukrainian operations' includes capacity unavailable because of (a) direct physical damage from Ukrainian drones/missiles, (b) precautionary shutdowns following nearby Ukrainian strikes, (c) Ukrainian seizures or attacks on tankers loading at Russian ports, and (d) damage to dedicated export pipelines feeding the four terminals (e.g., CPC). It does NOT include offline capacity caused by routine maintenance, OPEC+ quota cuts, sanctions-driven self-limitation, or weather. Pacific exports to China via Kozmino count as seaborne. Pipeline exports (Druzhba, ESPO into China) do NOT count - the metric is seaborne loading. Refining capacity that is offline does NOT count toward this question unless it specifically removes seaborne crude export volume (refined products are not 'crude'). If the four-terminal H2 2025 baseline cannot be reconstructed by resolvers, use 5.0 mb/d. If a comprehensive ceasefire silences Ukrainian strikes before June and all damaged terminals fully repair, the answer can be near 0%. The question resolves on realized capacity, not on whether terminals are 'legally open'.