# What percentage of Russian seaborne crude oil export loading capacity will be offline at end of June 2026 due to Ukrainian strikes (vs the H2 2025 baseline)?

Canonical URL: https://preseen.com/reports/4a3d97fd-8163-4363-b832-c50380d9c849/what-percentage-of-russian-seaborne-crude-oil-export-loading-capacity-will-be-of
Markdown URL: https://preseen.com/reports/4a3d97fd-8163-4363-b832-c50380d9c849/markdown

## Forecast

Median forecast: 24.4; 80% interval: 8 to 37.6.

Generated: May 31, 2026 at 7:02 PM UTC
Forecast model: gpt-5.5
Research model: gpt-5.5

## Analysis

## TL;DR
I forecast **24%** resolved offline capacity for 1–28 June 2026, because western-port loadings had mostly recovered by mid-May ([Reuters/LSEG via Baird Maritime, 18 May 2026](https://www.bairdmaritime.com/shipping/tankers/russia-pumps-more-oil-through-western-ports-despite-drone-attacks)) while the fallback rule would score a normal-looking 3.6–3.9 mb/d Russian seaborne crude month as roughly 22–28% offline against the 5.0 mb/d denominator ([Bloomberg summary, 27 May 2026](https://www.russiamatters.org/news/russia-review/russia-review-may-22-29-2026); [S&P Global, 5 May 2026](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/refined-products/050526-russian-crude-exports-jump-8-on-sanctions-relief-supply-fears)).

## Context
The March shock was real. Reuters, republished on 25 March, said Ukrainian attacks had suspended loadings at Primorsk and Ust-Luga, left Novorossiysk behind schedule, and put about 2.0 mb/d, or 40%, of Russian oil export capacity offline ([Reuters via The Moscow Times, 25 March 2026](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/03/25/ukrainian-drone-strikes-halt-at-least-40-of-russias-oil-export-capacity-reuters-a92339)). KSE’s Kpler-based assessment, using data accessed 7 April, showed Ust-Luga crude falling from 725 kb/d in the week of 16–22 March to 101–155 kb/d in the next two weeks, while Primorsk crude stayed at 780–848 kb/d ([KSE Institute, 9 April 2026](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/KSE_Drone-Strike-Impact-Assessment_April-9-2026.pdf)).

By late May, the system was not stuck at the March trough. Ust-Luga resumed exports after a nearly two-week suspension, with Reuters/LSEG describing the Baltic port as capable of about 700 kb/d of crude loading ([Reuters via Baird Maritime, 8 April 2026](https://www.bairdmaritime.com/shipping/ports/russia-resumes-oil-exports-from-ust-luga-port-despite-drone-strikes)). The forecast problem is therefore a strike-versus-repair problem, plus a measurement problem: a direct Reuters/Bloomberg capacity stocktake would likely resolve lower than the fallback formula, while the fallback formula uses actual June seaborne crude exports divided by 5.0 mb/d.

## Evidence
The historical backbone is fast damage, then fast partial repair. Carnegie estimated that Russian port shipments of oil and products fell from 5.2 mb/d during 1 January–24 March to 3.5 mb/d during 25 March–11 April, but also said Ust-Luga had resumed loading by 7 April and sent about half of pre-strike volumes over the following two weeks ([Carnegie, 20 April 2026](https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2026/04/russia-oil-gains-losses)). Reuters’ 30 April stocktake said April loadings of Urals, Siberian Light and KEBCO through Primorsk, Ust-Luga and Novorossiysk were about 2.2 mb/d, broadly in line with revised March, despite the Ust-Luga suspension and a four-day Novorossiysk/Sheskharis halt ([Reuters via Business Recorder, 30 April 2026](https://www.brecorder.com/news/40418907)).

The full comparable IEA/Kpler/Argus public series also argues against a persistent 40% June baseline. Units are mb/d of Russian seaborne crude exports. The 2022–2025 figures are annual averages, the 2026 figures are monthly averages, and the vintage is the IEA May Oil Market Report published 13 May 2026 ([IEA May 2026 Oil Market Report PDF](https://factorenergetico.mx/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/OilMarketReport_May-2026.pdf)).

| Coverage window | Russian seaborne crude exports, mb/d |
|---|---:|
| 2022 annual average | 3.25 |
| 2023 annual average | 3.52 |
| 2024 annual average | 3.47 |
| 2025 annual average | 3.47 |
| January 2026 | 3.40 |
| February 2026 | 3.24 |
| March 2026 | 3.57 |
| April 2026 | 3.76 |

The freshest flow evidence points to moderate impairment, not a renewed collapse. Reuters/LSEG estimated that Primorsk, Ust-Luga and Novorossiysk handled 2.35–2.40 mb/d during 1–15 May, up from about 2.2 mb/d in April; the same 15-day window put Primorsk just above 1.1 mb/d, Ust-Luga near 0.6 mb/d, and Novorossiysk near 0.7 mb/d ([Reuters/LSEG via Baird Maritime, 18 May 2026](https://www.bairdmaritime.com/shipping/tankers/russia-pumps-more-oil-through-western-ports-despite-drone-attacks)). Bloomberg tanker-tracking data put total Russian seaborne crude shipments at 3.66 mb/d in the four weeks to 24 May, little changed from 3.65 mb/d in the four weeks to 17 May and about 100 kb/d above 2025 levels ([Bloomberg summary, 27 May 2026](https://www.russiamatters.org/news/russia-review/russia-review-may-22-29-2026)). S&P Global’s separate Commodities at Sea series put April seaborne crude exports higher, at 3.949 mb/d, a six-month high, which is a useful cross-check but not the resolver’s preferred source ([S&P Global, 5 May 2026](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/refined-products/050526-russian-crude-exports-jump-8-on-sanctions-relief-supply-fears)).

The upside risk is still real. Ukraine hit Primorsk again on 3 May; Reuters reported a fire, Ukrainian claims of significant terminal damage, and Russian claims that the fire was quickly extinguished with no spill ([Reuters via Investing.com, 3 May 2026](https://www.investing.com/news/commodities-news/russias-primorsk-port-hit-as-ukraine-launches-wave-of-drone-strikes-4654818)). Ukraine hit Sheskharis/Novorossiysk on 23 May, with AP reporting a fire at an oil terminal and two injuries ([AP, 23 May 2026](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-drones-oil-refinery-9e5b15b9cf8cf80882da6f7a23b88848)). But satellite-image reporting two days later said all three Sheskharis oil-transfer berths were operating with tankers moored ([Mezha citing Reuters/Bloomberg, 26 May 2026](https://mezha.net/eng/bukvy/91314e96_sheskharis_terminal_continues/)). On 31 May, hours before the forecast window, Reuters reported Ukrainian strikes on the Lazarevo pumping station serving the Surgut-Gorky-Polotsk crude line, the Saratov refinery, and a Rostov fuel depot; the Lazarevo damage is a material weak signal, but it was not yet a quantified outage at Primorsk, Ust-Luga, Novorossiysk, or Kozmino ([Reuters via MarketScreener, 31 May 2026](https://ca.marketscreener.com/news/ukrainian-drones-hit-pipeline-refinery-fuel-depot-in-overnight-strikes-on-russia-ce7f5dd8dc89f224)).

For the denominator, I use 5.0 mb/d. That is the fixed fallback in the question, and it is close to KSE’s 2025 port-exposure sum for Primorsk, Ust-Luga, Novorossiysk, Nakhodka/Kozmino and Murmansk, which was 4.68 mb/d of seaborne oil exports rather than a clean crude-only nameplate capacity series ([KSE Institute, 9 April 2026](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/KSE_Drone-Strike-Impact-Assessment_April-9-2026.pdf)). My submitted distribution is a six-state mixture: repaired physical capacity if a direct stocktake appears, normal-flow fallback, direct moderate impairment, fallback/moderate impairment, a renewed March-like wave, and a severe multi-terminal tail. I weighted those states 18%, 36%, 14%, 18%, 11%, and 3%, respectively, with centers of 7.5%, 24.5%, 17%, 30%, 38%, and 55%. It has mean 24%, median 24%, P10 8%, and P90 37%. The bucket mass is about 14% below 10%, 40% from 10% to 25%, 38% from 25% to 40%, and 8% above 40%.

## What's non-obvious
The word “capacity” points lower than the likely resolution value. If Reuters or Bloomberg publishes a clean end-June engineering stocktake, I would expect a high-single-digit to high-teen result unless there is a fresh coordinated June hit. But if no such article appears, the fallback is $$R=100\times\max(0,1-E/5.0),$$ where \(E\) is June average Russian seaborne crude exports in mb/d. At \(E=3.66\), the Bloomberg four-week average to 24 May, \(R=26.8\%\); at \(E=3.76\), the IEA April value, \(R=24.8\%\); at \(E=3.949\), the S&P April value, \(R=21.0\%\) ([Bloomberg summary, 27 May 2026](https://www.russiamatters.org/news/russia-review/russia-review-may-22-29-2026); [IEA May 2026 Oil Market Report PDF](https://factorenergetico.mx/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/OilMarketReport_May-2026.pdf); [S&P Global, 5 May 2026](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/refined-products/050526-russian-crude-exports-jump-8-on-sanctions-relief-supply-fears)).

The other trap is treating refinery damage as the same thing as export-loading damage. The IEA said Russian crude exports rose in April partly because attacks on refineries cut domestic use and pushed more crude toward export channels ([IEA, 13 May 2026](https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-may-2026)). That can make seaborne crude exports look strong while the broader oil system is under stress. It is also why product-export and refinery-throughput headlines are weak evidence for this question unless they identify a crude-loading terminal, a tanker loading operation, or a dedicated feed pipeline.

## Limitations
Public data still measure flows better than engineering capacity. Reuters, Bloomberg, IEA, S&P Global, KSE, and CREA use different cargo timing, commodity definitions, and revision practices; CREA’s Russia Fossil Tracker uses Kpler for seaborne flows and is likely to be the fallback source, but that does not make CREA’s export-volume number a direct measure of strike-disabled capacity ([CREA methodology](https://www.russiafossiltracker.com/methodology/)). The 31 May Lazarevo strike could matter if it constrains feedstock to western export routes, but I found no quantified throughput loss before the forecast window began ([Reuters via MarketScreener, 31 May 2026](https://ca.marketscreener.com/news/ukrainian-drones-hit-pipeline-refinery-fuel-depot-in-overnight-strikes-on-russia-ce7f5dd8dc89f224)). The largest source of forecast error is a single successful June strike on Primorsk, Ust-Luga, Novorossiysk/Sheskharis, Kozmino, or a dedicated feed line; the largest measurement error is whether resolvers get a direct Reuters/Bloomberg capacity stocktake or have to use the fallback export formula.

## Sources

- Domain Expert Search (mcp)
  > Found 9 subagent groups for 'Russia oil export infrastructure Ukrainian drone strikes seaborne crude terminals Primorsk Ust-Luga Novorossiysk capacity repair June 2026':
- imf Portwatch (mcp)
  > No ports found matching query 'Primorsk' and country 'Russia'.
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- [Russia Boosts Oil Exports to Earn the Most Since the Ukraine War Began - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-05/russia-boosts-oil-exports-to-earn-the-most-since-the-ukraine-war-began) (openai)
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- [Russia Oil Exports Get Stuck at Sea Amid Pullback by Indian Refiners - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-27/russia-oil-exports-get-stuck-at-sea-amid-pullback-by-indian-refiners) (openai)
- [Kremlin’s War Chest Hit by Big Discounts That Keep Russia's Oil Exports Flowing - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-02-10/kremlin-s-war-chest-hit-by-big-discounts-that-keep-russia-s-oil-exports-flowing?srnd=phx-industries) (openai)
- [Moscow Boosts Oil Exports Amid Iran War Price Surge - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-24/moscow-boosts-oil-exports-amid-iran-war-price-surge) (openai)
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- Domain Expert Research Task (mcp)
  > Job domain_expert_research_task_df71422747 done after 318286ms.
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- [streetinsider.com](https://www.streetinsider.com/Reuters/Russias%2BUst-Luga%2Brestarts%2Boil%2Bexports%2C%2BPrimorsk%2Bremains%2Bshut%2Bafter%2Bdrone%2Battacks%2C%2Bsources%2Bsay/26199447.html) (tool)
- [unn.ua](https://unn.ua/en/news/russias-novorossiysk-port-partially-resumed-oil-shipments-after-drone-attack-reuters) (tool)
- [tradingview.com](https://www.tradingview.com/news/reuters.com%2C2026%3Anewsml_L6N41Q18Q%3A0-russia-s-espo-blend-crude-exports-from-kozmino-port-set-to-rise-1-5-in-may-traders-say) (tool)
- [institute.kse.ua](https://institute.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/drone_strike_smpact_assessment_eng_april_-2026.pdf) (tool)
- [streetinsider.com](https://www.streetinsider.com/Reuters/Russia%27s%2BBaltic%2Bports%2Bhalt%2Boil%2Bloadings%2Bafter%2Bmassive%2BUkrainian%2Bdrone%2Battack%2C%2Bsources%2Bsay/26212150.html) (tool)
- [bloomberg.com](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-02/russia-baltic-crude-terminal-looks-undamaged-in-satellite-images) (tool)
- [bloomberg.com](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-17/russia-s-main-black-sea-port-resumes-loading-crude-at-key-berth) (tool)
- [marketscreener.com](https://www.marketscreener.com/news/russia-s-oil-output-down-460-000-bpd-year-on-year-in-april-iea-says-ce7f5bdfd189f322) (tool)
- [energyandcleanair.org](https://energyandcleanair.org/march-2026-monthly-analysis-of-russian-fossil-fuel-exports-and-sanctions) (tool)
- [investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/commodities-news/russias-primorsk-port-hit-as-ukraine-launches-wave-of-drone-strikes-4654818) (tool)
- [marketscreener.com](https://www.marketscreener.com/news/falling-drone-debris-triggers-fire-at-oil-terminal-in-russia-s-novorossiysk-ce7f5adcdb8ef620) (tool)
- [ca.marketscreener.com](https://ca.marketscreener.com/news/ukrainian-drones-strike-port-oil-depot-in-southern-russia-authorities-say-ce7f5dd8d980f426) (tool)
- [marketscreener.com](https://www.marketscreener.com/news/transneft-says-russia-s-oil-exports-seen-stable-in-2026-media-reports-ce7f5ad3d081f72c) (tool)
- [marketscreener.com](https://www.marketscreener.com/news/russia-s-primorsk-oil-port-partially-resumes-loadings-after-drone-strikes-sources-say-ce7d58dada8ffe23) (tool)

## Question Details

Through 2024-2025, Russia's seaborne crude export loading capacity ran at roughly 5 million barrels per day, concentrated in a small number of terminals: Primorsk and Ust-Luga on the Baltic, Novorossiysk on the Black Sea, and Kozmino on the Pacific. In late March 2026, after a sustained Ukrainian drone campaign hit Primorsk, Ust-Luga, and Novorossiysk - and after disputed CPC pipeline damage and tanker seizures - Reuters calculated that at least 40% of Russia's oil export capacity (~2 mb/d) was halted, the worst disruption in modern Russian history. Carnegie measured that actual shipments fell from ~5.2 to ~3.5 mb/d (a 33% drop) between 25 March and 11 April 2026.\n\nRussia has been working hard to restore loading: Ust-Luga was back to roughly half pre-strike volumes by 7 April per Carnegie. But Ukraine has not stopped: drone strikes hit Tuapse on 16 and 20 April, Kstovo, Ufa, and a Leningrad-region refinery in early-to-mid April, and the Atlantic Council and Adapt Institute both characterize Ukraine's spring 2026 campaign as a deliberate escalation. Reuters (21 April) reports Russia is now slashing April crude output 300-400 kbpd, the sharpest monthly decline since the COVID era. The IEA expects Russian refining to stay below 5 mb/d until at least mid-2026.\n\nThis question forecasts how much of Russia's seaborne crude export loading capacity is offline at the end of June 2026 - i.e., does the strike-vs-repair race resolve toward (a) full or near-full restoration (well under 10% offline, similar to 2024 baseline disruption levels), (b) a persistent moderate impairment (10-25%), (c) something close to the late-March peak (30-45%), or (d) something even worse if Ukraine sustains or escalates the campaign through Q2. The question deliberately tracks export loading specifically (not total refining throughput), because the late-March 40% figure that anchors the prompt was about export loading capacity.

### Resolution Criteria

Resolves to the percentage of Russia's seaborne crude oil export loading capacity that is unavailable for use at end-of-June 2026 (averaged across the four-week window 1 June 2026 through 28 June 2026) due to physical damage, fire, or operational suspension caused by Ukrainian strikes or other Ukrainian operations (drones, missiles, sabotage, naval action), expressed as a percentage of the H2 2025 baseline loading capacity rounded to one decimal place.\n\nNumerator: average daily mb/d of crude export loading capacity offline at the four named primary terminals (Primorsk, Ust-Luga, Novorossiysk, Kozmino) and any additional Russian seaborne crude export terminal that was operational in H2 2025, attributable to Ukrainian action, across the resolution window.\n\nDenominator: total H2 2025 baseline loading capacity at those terminals as reported by the most recent published Reuters or Bloomberg stocktake. As a fixed fallback the denominator is 5.0 mb/d (the working figure used in Reuters' 25 March 2026 calculation that 2 mb/d = ~40%).\n\nPrimary resolution source: an end-of-June or early-July 2026 Reuters or Bloomberg stocktake article that explicitly quantifies Russian oil export capacity offline due to Ukrainian strikes, analogous to the 25 March 2026 Reuters calculation (https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/03/25/ukrainian-drone-strikes-halt-at-least-40-of-russias-oil-export-capacity-reuters-a92339).\n\nFallback resolution path if no such article exists by 14 July 2026: compute (1 - June 2026 average seaborne crude exports in mb/d as reported by CREA's Russia Fossil Tracker / Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air monthly bulletin / 5.0 mb/d) * 100, floored at 0. If CREA's June 2026 figure is unavailable, use Kpler's June 2026 Russian seaborne crude export average. If multiple sources differ by more than 5 percentage points, use the simple average of Reuters and CREA.

### Fine Print

'Offline due to Ukrainian operations' includes capacity unavailable because of (a) direct physical damage from Ukrainian drones/missiles, (b) precautionary shutdowns following nearby Ukrainian strikes, (c) Ukrainian seizures or attacks on tankers loading at Russian ports, and (d) damage to dedicated export pipelines feeding the four terminals (e.g., CPC). It does NOT include offline capacity caused by routine maintenance, OPEC+ quota cuts, sanctions-driven self-limitation, or weather. Pacific exports to China via Kozmino count as seaborne. Pipeline exports (Druzhba, ESPO into China) do NOT count - the metric is seaborne loading. Refining capacity that is offline does NOT count toward this question unless it specifically removes seaborne crude export volume (refined products are not 'crude'). If the four-terminal H2 2025 baseline cannot be reconstructed by resolvers, use 5.0 mb/d. If a comprehensive ceasefire silences Ukrainian strikes before June and all damaged terminals fully repair, the answer can be near 0%. The question resolves on realized capacity, not on whether terminals are 'legally open'.