# What will the US tariff rate on China be on July 1?

Canonical URL: https://preseen.com/reports/414b26d6-1baa-4c2e-8b47-9ea52a1f5c07/what-will-the-us-tariff-rate-on-china-be-on-july-1
Markdown URL: https://preseen.com/reports/414b26d6-1baa-4c2e-8b47-9ea52a1f5c07/markdown

## Forecast

Median forecast: 22.8; 80% interval: 19.2 to 27.

Generated: May 26, 2026 at 5:40 AM UTC
Forecast model: gpt-5.5
Research model: gpt-5.5

## Analysis

## TL;DR
My forecast is **23.1%**, with the most likely current-law value just above 22%.

## Context
The live tariff stack on Chinese imports is now the old Section 301 China regime, product-specific Section 232 measures, ordinary MFN duties, and the temporary Section 122 surcharge that replaced the invalidated IEEPA tariff layer. Proclamation 11012 imposed a 10% surcharge on most imports effective February 24, 2026 through 12:01 a.m. EDT on July 24, 2026, unless suspended, changed, terminated, or extended by Congress ([White House proclamation](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/02/imposing-a-temporary-import-surcharge-to-address-fundamental-international-payments-problems/), [Federal Register](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/full_text/html/2026/02/25/2026-03824.html)).

The legal state is messy but operationally clear. The Court of International Trade ruled on May 7, 2026 that the Section 122 surcharge exceeded statutory authority, but the government appealed, the Federal Circuit issued an administrative stay on May 12, 2026, and trade-law summaries as of May 22, 2026 say CBP continues to collect the surcharge while the stay is in place ([PwC Canada](https://www.pwc.com/ca/en/services/tax/publications/tax-insights/us-court-strike-down-section-122-tariffs-2026.html), [Skadden](https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2026/05/us-trade-court-strikes-down-section-122-tariffs)). For a July 1 resolution, I treat Section 122 as counted in the modal case.

## Evidence
The historical backbone is a regime shift, not a stable trend. Before the 2025-2026 tariff shock, USAFacts reports China’s average effective U.S. tariff rate was 10.9% in 2024 and 30.6% in 2025, using estimated customs duties divided by goods imports; its page was updated April 16, 2026 and reports February 2026 at 29.6% ([USAFacts](https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/china/)). PWBM’s monthly customs-data series, also duties divided by imports and based on USITC DataWeb, shows the China rate falling to 25.0% in March 2026, the first full month after IEEPA tariffs were replaced by the 10% Section 122 surcharge ([PWBM May 12, 2026](https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/p/2026-05-12-effective-tariff-rates-and-revenues-updated-may-12-2026/)). The table below is the full monthly history since the 2025 tariff shock through the latest PWBM China observation; units are percent of import value, monthly, observed customs data, N=15 months, current vintage through the May 12, 2026 PWBM update with earlier monthly updates for December 2025 through February 2026 ([PWBM Feb. 3, 2026](https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2026/2/3/effective-tariff-rates-and-revenues-updated-february-3-2026), [PWBM Feb. 23, 2026](https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2026/2/23/effective-tariff-rates-and-revenues-updated-february-23-2026), [PWBM Mar. 16, 2026](https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/p/2026-03-16-effective-tariff-rates-and-revenues-updated-march-16-2026/), [PWBM Apr. 15, 2026](https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/p/2026-04-15-effective-tariff-rates-and-revenues-updated-april-15-2026), [PWBM May 12, 2026](https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/p/2026-05-12-effective-tariff-rates-and-revenues-updated-may-12-2026/)).

| Month | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---:|---:|
| Jan | 10.7 | 33.9 |
| Feb | 13.2 | 31.6 |
| Mar | 27.1 | 25.0 |
| Apr | 39.9 | — |
| May | 51.0 | — |
| Jun | 43.0 | — |
| Jul | 42.6 | — |
| Aug | 42.1 | — |
| Sep | 39.4 | — |
| Oct | 39.9 | — |
| Nov | 34.7 | — |
| Dec | 33.4 | — |

For the resolution definition, the better anchor is Budget Lab’s statutory tracker framework, not the lagging customs-receipts series. Budget Lab says its Tariff Rate Tracker assigns daily HTS-10-by-country statutory tariff rates from official USITC HTS data, covers almost 20,000 HS10 products and 240 trading partners, excludes real substitution behavior, and aggregates using 2024 Census import weights ([Budget Lab tracker](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/research/introducing-tariff-rate-tracker-open-source-tool-daily-effective-tariff-rates)). That is closest to “the rate imposed on July 1.”

The public Budget Lab number I can verify is the April 8, 2026 country table, not an exact July 1 China line. It reports China at 23.9% pre-substitution if Section 122 is extended and 19.4% if Section 122 expires, both for end-2026 tariff policy; the same table gives post-substitution China rates of 23.5% and 18.9% ([Budget Lab April 8 report](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/sites/default/files/page_to_pdf/1466/publication_1466.pdf)). The report also says Section 232 tariffs preempt Section 122 where they overlap, Section 122 is a 10% flat rate with exemptions for critical minerals, energy, agricultural goods, pharmaceuticals, electronics, and other goods, and the new pharmaceutical tariff does not take effect until September 29, 2026 ([Budget Lab April 8 report](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/sites/default/files/page_to_pdf/1466/publication_1466.pdf)). I read this as a July 1 current-law center near 22.6%: below the 23.9% end-2026 “extended” China rate because pharmaceuticals are not yet active, but above the 19.4% no-Section-122 endpoint because July 1 is before the July 24 Section 122 cliff.

The policy risks are asymmetric. USTR opened Section 301 investigations on March 11, 2026 into structural excess capacity across 16 economies including China, with comments due April 15, 2026 and hearings starting May 5, 2026 ([USTR March 11](https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026/march/ustr-initiates-section-301-investigations-relating-structural-excess-capacity-and-production), [USTR May 4](https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026/may/public-hearings-regarding-section-301-investigations-relating-structural-excess-capacity)). That creates upside risk, but July 1 is early for a completed determination and implemented remedy. The May 2026 Trump-Xi summit created a Board of Trade and agricultural purchase commitments, while the USTR readout did not announce an implemented U.S. tariff cut; Chinese and Reuters-linked reporting described possible product-specific tariff reductions but left implementation details open ([White House May 17 fact sheet](https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/05/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-secures-historic-deals-with-china-delivering-for-american-workers-farmers-and-industry/), [USTR May 18](https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026/may/president-trumps-state-visit-china-delivers-historic-deals-and-greater-market-access-american), [Reuters via Investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/commodities-news/china-again-flags-tariff-cuts-for-us-agricultural-trade-after-trumpxi-meeting-but-still-no-details-4700227)).

My scenario model is:

| Scenario | Probability | Center used |
|---|---:|---:|
| Section 122 counted on July 1; no new China action | 62% | 22.6% |
| Section 122 broadly excluded, suspended, or removed before July 1 | 11% | 18.4% |
| Product-specific China de-escalation or expanded exclusions before July 1 | 5% | 20.8% |
| Mild upside from source choice, 15% confusion, or small new tariffs | 9% | 24.8% |
| Moderate Section 301 or sectoral China action effective before July 1 | 8% | 28.0% |
| Large China-specific action effective before July 1 | 3% | 34.0% |
| Major rollback of the China-specific stack | 1% | 15.0% |
| Extreme escalation above 40% | less than 1% | 46.0% |

This mixture gives a mean of 23.1%, a median of 22.6%, a 10th percentile of 19.1%, and a 90th percentile of 27.0%. It puts 12% below 20% and 5% above 30%.

## What's non-obvious
The 10% Section 122 surcharge does not add 10 percentage points to China’s trade-weighted rate. Budget Lab’s China table implies the difference between “Section 122 extended” and “Section 122 expires” is only 4.5 points, because exemptions and Section 232 preemption dilute the surcharge in the trade-weighted average ([Budget Lab April 8 report](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/sites/default/files/page_to_pdf/1466/publication_1466.pdf)).

The high-20s narrative is mostly a measurement and vintage issue. Realized customs series still printed 31.6% in February 2026 and 25.0% in March 2026, while some secondary trackers report values near 29.7% after describing a 15% global tariff; the official proclamation and Budget Lab April 8 report use a 10% Section 122 rate ([PWBM Apr. 15, 2026](https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/p/2026-04-15-effective-tariff-rates-and-revenues-updated-april-15-2026), [PWBM May 12, 2026](https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/p/2026-05-12-effective-tariff-rates-and-revenues-updated-may-12-2026/), [China Briefing](https://www.china-briefing.com/news/us-china-tariff-rates-2025/), [Federal Register](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/full_text/html/2026/02/25/2026-03824.html), [Budget Lab April 8 report](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/sites/default/files/page_to_pdf/1466/publication_1466.pdf)). I put weight on that high-source tail, but not enough to move the center away from the statutory Budget Lab-style estimate.

## Limitations
I did not find an official public Budget Lab table giving China’s exact daily rate for July 1, 2026. The public tracker explains the method and says it projects future rates under current law, but the exact country-by-date value was not published in the sources I could verify ([Budget Lab tracker](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/research/introducing-tariff-rate-tracker-open-source-tool-daily-effective-tariff-rates)). That is why the point estimate is an inference from the April 8 country table and the known timing of Section 122 and pharmaceutical tariffs.

The largest resolution ambiguity is whether the resolver uses a statutory pre-substitution rate or a realized customs-duty share. A statutory Budget Lab-style source should land near 22-24% if policy does not change. A customs-source value for a nearby month could resolve several points higher because it reflects product mix, entry timing, liquidation, exclusions, and refund mechanics rather than only the tariff schedule in force ([PWBM May 12, 2026](https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/p/2026-05-12-effective-tariff-rates-and-revenues-updated-may-12-2026/)).

The largest policy uncertainty is still legal and administrative timing. A Federal Circuit order, an administrative decision to stop Section 122 collection, a fast Section 301 remedy, or a specific U.S.-China tariff-cut package before July 1 would move the answer. I give the no-Section-122 downside and the pre-July new-tariff upside real mass, but the current law on May 26 points to a rate just above 22%.

## Sources

- Domain Expert Search (mcp)
  > Found 10 subagent groups for 'US trade policy tariffs China Section 122 Section 301 2026 legal court ruling tariff tracker':
- us Tariffs (mcp)
  > Active Chapter 99 tariffs for China as of 2026-07-01
- Claude Code (e2b)
  > Job coding_whiz_job_7ee0626a36 done after 380024ms.
- [State of U.S. Tariffs: April 8, 2026 | The Budget Lab](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/research/state-us-tariffs-april-8-2026) (openai)
- [github.com](https://github.com/Budget-Lab-Yale/tariff-rate-tracker) (tool)
- [github.com](https://github.com/Budget-Lab-Yale/Tariff-Model) (tool)
- [budgetlab.yale.edu](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/research/introducing-tariff-rate-tracker-open-source-tool-daily-effective-tariff-rates) (tool)
- [crowell.com](https://www.crowell.com/en/insights/client-alerts/trump-administration-imposes-section-232-tariffs-on-patented-pharmaceutical-imports-tiered-rate-structure-takes-effect-beginning-july-31-2026) (tool)
- Domain Expert Research Task (mcp)
  > Job domain_expert_research_task_b9b3eb19da done after 650706ms.
- [ustr.gov](https://ustr.gov/trade-topics/enforcement/section-301-investigations/section-301-chinas-targeting-semiconductor-industry-dominance) (tool)
- [ustr.gov](https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2025/october/ustr-initiates-section-301-investigation-chinas-implementation-phase-one-agreement) (tool)
- [ustr.gov](https://ustr.gov/trade-topics/enforcement/section-301-investigations/section-301-chinas-implementation-commitments-under-phase-one-agreement) (tool)
- [Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Secures Historic Deals with China, Delivering for American Workers, Farmers, and Industry – The White House](https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/05/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-secures-historic-deals-with-china-delivering-for-american-workers-farmers-and-industry) (openai)
- [ustr.gov](https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/may/us-trade-representative-katherine-tai-take-further-action-china-tariffs-after-releasing-statutory) (tool)
- [law.cornell.edu](https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/19/2414) (tool)
- [US-China Tariff Rates - What Are They Now?](https://www.china-briefing.com/news/us-china-tariff-rates-2025) (openai)
- [federalregister.gov](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/25/2026-03824/imposing-a-temporary-import-surcharge-to-address-fundamental-international-payments-problems) (tool)
- [globaltradealert.org](https://globaltradealert.org/reports/S122-US-Tariff-Estimates) (tool)
- [federalregister.gov](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/05/06/2026-08806/initiation-of-second-four-year-review-process-chinas-acts-policies-and-practices-related-to) (tool)
- [federalregister.gov](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/12/01/2025-21671/notice-of-product-exclusion-extensions-chinas-acts-policies-and-practices-related-to-technology) (tool)
- [cit.uscourts.gov](https://www.cit.uscourts.gov/sites/cit/files/26-47.pdf) (tool)
- [Tax Insights: US Court of International Trade strikes down section 122 tariffs | PwC Canada](https://www.pwc.com/ca/en/services/tax/publications/tax-insights/us-court-strike-down-section-122-tariffs-2026.html) (openai)
- [www.federalregister.gov](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/full_text/html/2026/02/25/2026-03824.html) (openai)
- [U.S. Trade Court: 10% import surcharge under Section 122 is unlawful](https://kpmg.com/us/en/taxnewsflash/news/2026/05/us-trade-court-import-surcharge-section-122-unlawful.html) (openai)
- [What is the average US tariff rate for China? | USAFacts](https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/china) (openai)
- [The Budget Lab at Yale | State of U.S. Tariffs: April 8, 2026](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/sites/default/files/page_to_pdf/1466/publication_1466.pdf) (openai)
- [USTR Initiates Section 301 Investigations Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors | United States Trade Representative](https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026/march/ustr-initiates-section-301-investigations-relating-structural-excess-capacity-and-production) (openai)
- [China again flags tariff cuts for US agricultural trade after Trump-Xi meeting, but still no details By Reuters](https://www.investing.com/news/commodities-news/china-again-flags-tariff-cuts-for-us-agricultural-trade-after-trumpxi-meeting-but-still-no-details-4700227) (openai)
- [The People's Republic of China | United States Trade Representative](https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china) (openai)
- [budgetlab.yale.edu](https://budgetlab.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2026-05/TBL-Data-Tariff-Rate-Tracker-20260509.xlsx) (tool)

## Question Details

This question asks for the effective trade-weighted average tariff rate imposed by the United States on imports from China as of July 1, 2026. As of early 2026, U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods are highly complex and consist of multiple overlapping measures, including longstanding Section 301 tariffs (generally ranging from 7.5% to 25% or higher on specific goods), sector-specific tariffs (e.g., steel, semiconductors), and more recent policy changes. (lenzo.ai) In 2025–2026, additional “reciprocal” and emergency tariffs were introduced and then partly invalidated by a U.S. Supreme Court ruling in February 2026, which removed certain IEEPA-based tariffs. (chrobinson.com) Following these changes, a temporary global tariff (reported around 10–15%) and other adjustments have resulted in an estimated trade-weighted average U.S. tariff rate on Chinese imports of roughly 25–30% as of early 2026, though this remains in flux due to ongoing legal, legislative, and executive actions. (china-briefing.com) Because tariffs vary widely across products, this question focuses on the overall trade-weighted average tariff rate applied to Chinese imports, rather than any single statutory tariff rate. The forecast should reflect the rate in effect on July 1, 2026.

### Resolution Criteria

The question will resolve to the best available estimate of the trade-weighted average effective U.S. tariff rate on imports from China in effect on July 1, 2026. Primary source: Publications from reputable economic policy trackers such as: - The Budget Lab at Yale - OECD - World Bank - U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) - Other widely cited economic research institutions If multiple credible sources report values, the resolution will use: 1. The most recent estimate explicitly referring to a date closest to July 1, 2026; or 2. If multiple estimates exist for that date, the median of those estimates. If no source reports an exact July 1 value, the closest available estimate (within ±30 days) will be used. The value will be expressed as a percentage (e.g., 29.7%).

### Fine Print

- “Tariff rate” refers to the trade-weighted average effective tariff rate across all imports from China, not statutory rates on specific products. - The measure should include all applicable tariffs in force on July 1, 2026 (e.g., Section 301, Section 232, or any new tariffs), and exclude any tariffs that have been repealed or invalidated before that date. - Temporary tariffs count if they are in effect on July 1, 2026, even if scheduled to expire later. - If the U.S. eliminates all China-specific tariffs but applies a global tariff affecting China, that global tariff should be included. - If no credible estimate is available by December 31, 2026, the question will be annulled. - Units: percent (%), measured to at least one decimal place.