# Will Bolivian president Rodrigo Paz Pereira remain in power through the end of 2026?

Canonical URL: https://preseen.com/reports/330399e5-67ab-46eb-92f9-1396c9b51946/will-bolivian-president-rodrigo-paz-pereira-remain-in-power-through-the-end-of-2
Markdown URL: https://preseen.com/reports/330399e5-67ab-46eb-92f9-1396c9b51946/markdown

## Forecast

P(Yes): 88.9%; P(No): 11.1%.

Generated: October 15, 2026 at 7:06 AM UTC
Resolution check date: 2027-01-02
Forecast model: gpt-6.1-sol
Research model: gpt-5.6-sol+gpt-6.1-sol+claude-opus-5-5

## Analysis

## TL;DR

I assign an **89% probability of YES**: Rodrigo Paz remains president without a qualifying interruption through the deadline. He survived the main protest campaign, and subsequent legislative votes and security deployments show that his government retains working institutional support ([El País, September 17](https://elpais.com/america/2026-09-17/paz-extiende-el-estado-de-excepcion-por-otros-90-dias-en-bolivia-para-evitar-nuevas-protestas.html); [El Deber, October 10](https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/policias-militares-mantienen-control-carreteras-tres-dias-anunciada-marcha-evista_1791676322)). The main danger is a renewed national confrontation that produces elite or security defections, not another march by itself.

## Context

This forecast uses the supplied cutoff of October 15, 2026, at 06:52 UTC. The deadline is January 1, 2027, at 03:59 UTC—December 31 at 23:59 in Bolivia—leaving 77.88 days, calculated from the question’s timestamps. The official presidential website identifies Paz as president and records his inauguration on November 8, 2025 ([Presidency Ministry, checked October 15](https://presidencia.gob.bo/index.php/presidente-de-bolivia/)).

I apply the question’s continuity requirement, not merely a year-end officeholder test. A completed constitutional transfer to an interim president counts as NO; travel or delegation without loss of the presidency does not. The September dispute over authority during Paz’s foreign travel therefore requires separate scrutiny from the risk of his future removal ([Infobae, September 24](https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2026/09/24/crece-la-polemica-por-la-sucesion-constitucional-en-bolivia-tras-la-ausencia-de-rodrigo-paz-y-lara/)).

## Evidence

Bolivia’s modern democratic record provides a useful starting point. My reference period runs from democratic restoration on October 10, 1982, to Paz’s inauguration on November 8, 2025—about 43 years ([KAS historical study](https://www.kas.de/documents/288373/288422/libro%2B40%2Ba%C3%B1os%2Bdemocracia.pdf/1662a7a9-f323-904b-3024-13a6751869a5?t=1691662635972&version=1.1); [Presidency Ministry](https://presidencia.gob.bo/index.php/presidente-de-bolivia/)). I count four clear unscheduled permanent departures: Banzer’s illness-related resignation in 2001, Sánchez de Lozada’s resignation in 2003, Mesa’s resignation in 2005, and Morales’s departure in 2019 ([CIDOB](https://www.cidob.org/lider-politico/hugo-banzer-suarez); [Washington Post, 2003](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/10/18/protests-force-bolivian-leader-to-resign/40cd44ad-700d-4fb5-9298-b3d87e319e38/); [Washington Post, 2005](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2005/06/10/court-chief-assumes-presidency-in-bolivia/8c27dddf-bb50-45ab-b271-62641142037e/); [Time, 2019](https://time.com/5723753/bolivia-evo-morales-resigns/)).

A constant-hazard calculation using those four events gives roughly a 2% departure risk over the remaining horizon. Including Siles Zuazo’s negotiated early handover in 1985 as a fifth event still leaves the rounded benchmark near 2% ([KAS historical study](https://www.kas.de/documents/288373/288422/libro%2B40%2Ba%C3%B1os%2Bdemocracia.pdf/1662a7a9-f323-904b-3024-13a6751869a5?t=1691662635972&version=1.1)). This is my coding of historical departures, not a fitted risk model. The sample is small, political exits cluster, and it excludes routine temporary substitutions. It anchors the forecast but cannot settle it.

The strongest current survival evidence is that Paz already endured a serious removal campaign. The government survived 53 days of protests demanding his resignation. On September 17, legislators then approved another 90 days of emergency powers with 100 votes among 158 participants ([El País, September 17](https://elpais.com/america/2026-09-17/paz-extiende-el-estado-de-excepcion-por-otros-90-dias-en-bolivia-para-evitar-nuevas-protestas.html)). Joint police–military deployments at nine access points around La Paz were reported on October 10 ([El Deber](https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/policias-militares-mantienen-control-carreteras-tres-dias-anunciada-marcha-evista_1791676322)). These establish current cooperation. They do not establish unconditional loyalty during a larger confrontation.

Routine legal removal also faces barriers. Recall cannot be requested until half the presidential term has elapsed. The constitutional criminal-trial route requires authorization from two-thirds of legislators present before proceedings in the Supreme Court. Given Paz’s inauguration date, recall is unavailable within this forecast window; rapid criminal removal would require an exceptional institutional acceleration ([Constitution, Articles 168, 184 and 240](https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009); [Presidency Ministry](https://presidencia.gob.bo/index.php/presidente-de-bolivia/)). Resignation under pressure and an institutional rupture remain more credible routes.

Financing and economic adjustment pull in opposite directions. The IMF approved a roughly US$1.9 billion, 36-month facility on October 2, authorizing an immediate disbursement of about US$214 million; later funds depend on program reviews ([IMF announcement](https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/10/02/pr26317-bolivia-imf-approves-36-month-eff-arrangement)). That reduces immediate liquidity pressure. But ending diesel subsidies raises costs across transport and production, giving different groups a shared grievance ([AP](https://apnews.com/article/d5ac4a2558132559e1d544807b89d528)). Reporting published before this cutoff documents food-price pressure, while placing the remaining gasoline-subsidy removal at the beginning of the following year—outside the deadline ([El País, October 15](https://elpais.com/america/2026-10-15/la-eliminacion-del-subsidio-al-diesel-en-bolivia-dispara-el-precio-de-alimentos-de-la-canasta-basica.html)).

Paz has little popular cushion. Ipsos CIESMORI fieldwork from September 18–28 found 21% approval for Paz and 11% for Vice President Edmand Lara. The October 4 report describes 400 self-administered online interviews with internet-connected adults in La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz. This is a four-city online sample, not a demonstrated nationally representative probability sample. I use it as directional evidence of vulnerability, not a precise measure of national support ([Brújula Digital, October 4](https://brujuladigital.net/politica/2026/10/04/encuesta-se-mantiene-en-21-el-respaldo-al-presidente-paz-67271)).

The latest mobilization evidence is mixed rather than uniformly reassuring. The anticipated October 13 march did not begin on that timetable. October 14 reporting announced departmental demonstrations for October 19 and a Patacamaya–La Paz march beginning November 6. Postponement is not cancellation ([Radio Splendid, October 14](https://radiosplendid.bo/2026/10/14/evistas-anuncia-movilizaciones-en-nueve-departamentos-desde-el-19-de-octubre-y-marcha-a-la-paz-el-6-de-noviembre/)). Yet CONAMAQ declined participation, while different campesino factions took different positions. These are concrete coordination problems, not merely an absence of alarming headlines ([Los Tiempos, October 14](https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/pais/20261014/conamaq-se-desmarca-marchas-csutcb-se-divide-evistas-insisten)).

I translate this evidence into the following judgmental scenarios. They are mutually exclusive trajectories over the remaining period, not fitted statistical estimates.

| Political trajectory | Scenario probability | Political loss of office within scenario |
|---|---:|---:|
| Unrest remains contained or negotiable; institutions continue functioning | 65% | 1% |
| Serious renewed protest or coalition stress, without general institutional breakdown | 28% | 13% |
| Acute crisis involving major elite or security-force fracture | 7% | 60% |

Let \(q\) denote the weighted probability of future political departure. I then apply a conditional continuity factor, \(c\), for otherwise-unaccounted past interruptions or future technical succession, and a conditional health-survival factor, \(h\):

$$
q=0.65(0.01)+0.28(0.13)+0.07(0.60)=0.0849,
\qquad c=0.975,\qquad h=0.997.
$$

$$
P(\mathrm{YES})=(1-q)ch.
$$

The continuity allowance excludes political removals already counted in the scenarios. The health allowance is a generic contingency, not a medical assessment. These are sequential conditional judgments, so the calculation does not assume that all underlying risks are independent. The result is 89% YES and 11% NO; the additional digits in the JSON record the calculation, not comparable certainty about the inputs.

## What's non-obvious

**Disliking the president is not the same as agreeing to replace him.** Senate president Diego Ávila’s behavior is more informative than predictions of collapse: he rejected the September attempt to treat him as acting president and later described brokering the selection of an interim prosecutor from names supplied by Paz. Those actions weigh against an already-assembled legislative succession coalition ([Brújula Digital, September 23](https://brujuladigital.net/politica/2026/09/23/avila-responde-a-mariaca-el-presidente-en-ejercicio-sigue-siendo-rodrigo-paz-66802); [Brújula Digital, October 9](https://brujuladigital.net/politica/2026/10/09/avila-urioste-fue-propuesto-junto-con-otros-nombres-por-el-presidente-paz-67520)).

The travel dispute is also less settled than either side’s slogans suggest. Lara claimed presidential authority, and prosecutor Roger Mariaca recognized Ávila, but Ávila recognized Paz’s continued presidency while Paz conducted government business remotely ([Infobae, September 24](https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2026/09/24/crece-la-polemica-por-la-sucesion-constitucional-en-bolivia-tras-la-ausencia-de-rodrigo-paz-y-lara/)). The operative decree is DS 5675, dated August 13: it repealed DS 5515 and retained remote presidential exercise in Article 22 ([decree text](https://bolivia.infoleyes.com/norma/8698/organizacio-n-del-o-rgano-ejecutivo-5675)). Article 169’s temporary-succession provision creates a genuine constitutional question, but a disputed claim is not proof of an effective transfer ([Constitution](https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009)). October 9 reporting also documents the constitutional court’s quorum problem and proposed legislation to repair it. I read that as an obstacle to an immediate authoritative ruling, not protection against any eventual ruling ([Opinión](https://www.opinion.com.bo/pais/diputado-camacho-plantea-que-tcp-funcione-7-magistrados-miles-causas-pendientes/20261009160343997428.html)).

## Uncertainties

The largest factual gap is an exhaustive official-record audit of continuity since the question opened. I found competing September claims and positive evidence of Paz continuing to exercise authority, but not a definitive constitutional judgment settling the episode. The forecast therefore retains a separate continuity allowance rather than treating current incumbency as conclusive.

The main political unknown is whether organized labor joins an implemented cross-sector campaign. The COB’s October 15 meeting had not occurred at the cutoff, so its outcome is not included ([Xinhua, October 13](https://spanish.xinhuanet.com/20261013/83428334963247678c1c4902bfd3cfe9/c.html)). Named units refusing orders, sustained coordination among labor and transport groups, or Ávila backing an alternative authority would matter far more than further resignation demands.

Finally, current deployments do not reveal how security institutions would respond after casualties or prolonged disruption. Reasonable optimistic and pessimistic assumptions produce survival estimates of roughly 78%–95%; that is an assumption-sensitivity range, not a statistical confidence interval. The central estimate stays near 89% because the remaining horizon is short and opposition coordination remains incomplete, while the economic grievances and succession dispute leave real routes to failure.

## Sources

- Domain Expert Search (mcp)
  > Found 7 domain experts for 'Bolivia constitutional presidential succession Rodrigo Paz Edmand Lara foreign travel decree 5675 Article 169 legal office continuity':
- Constitute (mcp)
  > [1]
- News (mcp)
  > NOTE: Perigon (native) matched too few on Rodrigo AND Paz AND marcha AND COB AND evistas; added results for Rodrigo AND Paz AND marcha.
- [reduno.com.bo](https://www.reduno.com.bo/noticias/sectores-evistas-anuncian-movilizaciones-en-los-nueve-departamentos-y-una-marcha-hacia-la-paz-20261014142558) (tool)
- [bloomberg.com](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-10-15/bolivia-revamps-gold-export-rules-in-bid-to-attract-dollars) (tool)
- [europapress.es](https://www.europapress.es/internacional/noticia-sectores-afines-morales-aplazan-viernes-inicio-marcha-paz-bolivia-contra-ajuste-economico-20261013065501.html) (tool)
- [lostiempos.com](https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/pais/20261014/evistas-deciden-iniciar-su-marcha-paz-23-dias-mas) (tool)
- [Dirigentes interculturales evistas replantean la fecha de su marcha a La Paz| Red Uno de Bolivia](https://www.reduno.com.bo/noticias/dirigentes-interculturales-evistas-replantean-la-fecha-de-su-marcha-a-la-paz-20261012201810) (anthropic)
- [ground.news](https://ground.news/article/paz-urges-the-ombudsman-to-defend-work-against-blockades-la-patria-bolivia) (tool)
- [opinion.com.bo](https://www.opinion.com.bo/pais/gobierno-defiende-protesta-advierte-que-permitira-bloqueos-que-vulneren-derechos/20261013092722997534.html) (tool)
- [latercera.com](https://www.latercera.com/mundo/noticia/sectores-afines-a-evo-morales-aplazan-para-el-viernes-el-inicio-de-la-marcha-hacia-la-paz-contra-el-ajuste-economico) (tool)
- [riotimesonline.com](https://www.riotimesonline.com/bolivia-who-is-marcelo-blanco-2026) (tool)
- [ticker-noticiasep.microcontenidos.com](https://ticker-noticiasep.microcontenidos.com/NoticiaRSS.vbhtml?user=AA512JJ477&cod=20261013065501) (tool)
- [lostiempos.com](https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/pais/20261014/conamaq-se-desmarca-marchas-csutcb-se-divide-evistas-insisten) (tool)
- [riotimesonline.com](https://www.riotimesonline.com/bolivia-economy-shrink-imf-forecast-2026) (tool)
- [oxigeno.bo](https://oxigeno.bo/lara-propone-que-de-ser-necesario-se-apruebe-una-ley-corta-para-viabilizar-la-eleccion-del-nuevo-fiscal-general) (tool)
- [yahoo.com](https://www.yahoo.com/news/us/articles/under-trump-pressure-bolivia-arrests-170916763.html) (tool)
- [eju.tv](https://eju.tv/2026/10/juicio-de-responsabilidades-contra-morales-y-garcia-linera-pasa-a-sala-penal-del-tsj-tras-tramite-administrativo) (tool)
- [brujuladigital.net](https://brujuladigital.net/politica/2026/09/22/legisladores-cuestionan-la-sucesion-presidencial-tras-los-viajes-de-paz-y-lara-66740) (tool)
- [opinion.com.bo](https://www.opinion.com.bo/pais/diputado-camacho-plantea-que-tcp-funcione-7-magistrados-miles-causas-pendientes/20261009160343997428.html) (tool)
- [ground.news](https://ground.news/article/lara-declares-herself-president-in-the-absence-of-paz-la-patria-bolivia-digital-newspaper) (tool)
- [Crece la polémica por la sucesión constitucional en Bolivia tras la ausencia de Rodrigo Paz y Lara - Infobae](https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2026/09/24/crece-la-polemica-por-la-sucesion-constitucional-en-bolivia-tras-la-ausencia-de-rodrigo-paz-y-lara) (openai)
- [brujuladigital.net](https://brujuladigital.net/politica/2026/09/22/legisladores-cuestionan-a-paz-y-lara-por-sus-viajes-y-la-sucesion-constitucional-66740) (tool)
- Domain Expert Research Task (mcp)
  > Job domain_expert_research_task_2dca1e4aec done after 588702ms.
- [erbol.com.bo](https://erbol.com.bo/nacional/evistas-anuncian-protestas-departamentales-desde-el-lunes-y-marcha-nacional-el-6-de) (tool)
- [brujuladigital.net](https://brujuladigital.net/sociedad/2026/10/12/evistas-postergan-inicio-de-movilizaciones-esperan-que-otros-sectores-se-sumen-67662) (tool)
- [eldeber.com.bo](https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/dirigencia-interculturales-dicen-marcha-evista-no-sera-manana-esta-fecha_1791843321) (tool)
- [Dirigentes de Evo Morales dan marcha atrás con las protestas y postergan las movilizaciones previstas - Infobae](https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2026/10/13/dirigentes-de-evo-morales-dan-marcha-atras-con-las-protestas-y-postergan-las-movilizaciones-previstas) (openai)
- [brujuladigital.net](https://brujuladigital.net/politica/2026/09/23/avila-responde-a-mariaca-el-presidente-en-ejercicio-sigue-siendo-rodrigo-paz-66802) (tool)
- [brujuladigital.net](https://brujuladigital.net/politica/2026/10/09/avila-urioste-fue-propuesto-junto-con-otros-nombres-por-el-presidente-paz-67520) (tool)
- [brujuladigital.net](https://brujuladigital.net/sociedad/2026/10/11/se-viene-una-semana-dificil-evistas-se-movilizan-y-otros-tres-sectores-estan-en-apronte-67618) (tool)
- [brujuladigital.net](https://brujuladigital.net/politica/2026/09/22/lara-borra-comunicado-en-el-que-designaba-a-avila-como-suplente-en-la-presidencia-de-la-alp-66728) (tool)
- [eju.tv](https://eju.tv/2026/10/lara-defiende-que-montano-morales-asumiera-la-fiscalia-general-interina-y-cuestiona-la-amenaza-de-aprehension) (tool)
- [infobae.com](https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2026/10/03/el-vicepresidente-de-bolivia-edmand-lara-denuncio-un-supuesto-plan-policial-para-detenerlo-temo-por-mi-vida) (tool)
- [vision360.bo](https://www.vision360.bo/noticias/2026/10/05/70998-rodrigo-paz-reconoce-al-fiscal-general-urioste-mientras-edmand-lara-pone-en-duda-su-designacion-y-pide-informes) (tool)
- [x.com](https://x.com/LaRazon_Bolivia/status/2108213707985625113) (tool)
- [x.com](https://x.com/BunkerBolivia/status/2108331321319997727) (tool)
- [eju.tv](https://eju.tv/2026/09/avila-sobre-sucesion-presidencial-el-presidente-es-rodrigo-paz-y-yo-estoy-aqui-como-presidente-del-senado) (tool)
- [vision360.bo](https://www.vision360.bo/noticias/2026/10/11/72054-cob-convoca-a-un-ampliado-nacional-en-medio-del-anuncio-de-la-marcha-evista) (tool)
- [x.com](https://x.com/RadPanamericana/status/2109733603345043567) (tool)
- [vision360.bo](https://www.vision360.bo/noticias/2026/09/29/70111-dirigente-evista-invita-a-la-cob-a-la-fstmb-a-articular-movilizaciones-contra-el-gobierno) (tool)
- [eju.tv](https://eju.tv/2026/10/evo-morales-sobre-la-orden-de-aprehension-por-protestas-yo-no-estaba-en-la-marcha-no-estaba-en-los-bloqueos) (tool)
- [x.com](https://x.com/ahora_elpueblo/status/2108350047754838059) (tool)
- [brujuladigital.net](https://brujuladigital.net/politica/2026/09/23/mariaca-dice-que-para-el-avila-es-presidente-constitucional-el-dia-de-hoy-de-bolivia-66771) (tool)
- [notimerica.com](https://www.notimerica.com/politica/noticia-sectores-afines-morales-aplazan-viernes-inicio-marcha-paz-bolivia-contra-ajuste-economico-20261013065515.html) (tool)
- hdx Hapi (mcp)
  > ACLED monthly conflict events for Bolivia (Plurinational State of) (BOL): national rows from HDX HAPI.
- GDELT (mcp)
  > {"query":"in BL with event codes 14, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145","parameters":{"actor1":null,"actor2":null,"event_codes":["14","140","141","142","143","144","145"],"locations":["BL"],"location_scope":"action_location","date_range":["2026-01-01","2026-10-15"],"aggregation":"monthly","return_format":"timeseries"},"interpretation_note":"GDELT counts media-coded event records, not verified or unique incidents. Check source URLs and duplicate coverage before using a count as evidence.","backtestin…
- imf (mcp)
  > Real GDP growth (NGDP_RPCH)
- [france24.com](https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20260930-entre-la-escasez-de-d%C3%B3lares-y-el-fin-del-subsidio-a-combustibles-rodrigo-paz-enfrenta-el-desaf%C3%ADo-econ%C3%B3mico-en-bolivia) (tool)
- [youtube.com](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k0eyhnnx6bM) (tool)

## Question Details

This question asks whether Rodrigo Paz Pereira will continue to hold the office of President of the Plurinational State of Bolivia without interruption through the end of calendar year 2026. Rodrigo Paz Pereira assumed the presidency on 8 November 2025 after winning the 2025 presidential election and is the incumbent president as of June 2026. Recent reporting has described significant political and social unrest, including nationwide protests, road blockades, cabinet resignations, and public calls for his resignation during 2026. (presidencia.gob.bo) (elpais.com) The forecasting period runs from the time the question is asked until 31 December 2026. The question concerns whether Paz remains president continuously through that date.

### Resolution Criteria

Resolve YES if Rodrigo Paz Pereira is still serving as President of Bolivia at 23:59 local time in Bolivia on 31 December 2026 and has not permanently left the office before that moment. Resolve NO if, at any time before that moment, he ceases to be President of Bolivia due to resignation, removal, impeachment, death, incapacity, judicial or constitutional action, military coup, succession, replacement by an acting or permanent president, or any other loss of the presidency. Resolution will be based on official Bolivian government announcements and records. If those are unclear or unavailable, major international news organizations and widely recognized reference sources documenting the officeholder of the Bolivian presidency may be used.

### Fine Print

Temporary foreign travel, medical leave, or short-term delegation of powers does not count as leaving office if Rodrigo Paz Pereira legally remains President. If constitutional succession transfers the presidency to another person, even on an interim basis, before the end of 31 December 2026, the question resolves NO. If he leaves office and later returns before the end of 2026, the question still resolves NO because he did not remain in power continuously through the period. If reliable information sufficient to determine the officeholder is unavailable on the resolution check date, resolution may be delayed until the facts can be established.