# Will the ceasefire between Iran and the United States continue to hold 7 days from today?

Canonical URL: https://preseen.com/reports/2e2dddcd-f3d4-414a-a489-8c025997fc9c/will-the-ceasefire-between-iran-and-the-united-states-continue-to-hold-7-days-fr
Markdown URL: https://preseen.com/reports/2e2dddcd-f3d4-414a-a489-8c025997fc9c/markdown

## Forecast

P(Yes): 80.7%; P(No): 19.3%.

Generated: May 24, 2026 at 10:55 PM UTC
Forecast model: gpt-5.5
Research model: gpt-5.5

## Analysis

## TL;DR
The U.S.–Iran ceasefire is likely to still be treated as holding on May 31, 2026; my YES probability is 81%.

## Context
The forecast date is May 24, 2026, so the resolution date is May 31, 2026. The resolution standard is not “no shots fired.” It is whether major reporting or either government treats events before or on May 31 as a return to sustained or large-scale direct U.S.–Iran hostilities.

A ceasefire is still in effect on the forecast date. The White House said on May 20 that “there are no present hostilities” and that the February 28 hostilities “terminated with the ceasefire ordered by the President on April 7” ([White House, May 20](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/SAP-HCR86.pdf)). AP and Axios still frame the live diplomacy as an effort to end the war and extend or formalize the ceasefire, not as talks after a ceasefire already collapsed ([AP, May 24](https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-war-ceasefire-negotiations-hormuz-e603a7759d6cbd70ce5ed01f439a29dc); [Axios, May 24](https://www.axios.com/2026/05/24/iran-deal-white-house-delay-days-trump)).

## Evidence
The historical backbone points to high one-week survival once a ceasefire has already lasted six weeks, but this case is much riskier than a normal ceasefire. The ETH/PRIO Civil Conflict CeaseFire dataset covers more than 2,200 civil-conflict ceasefires across 107 conflicts and 65 countries from 1989 through 2020; failed ceasefires have median durations of 65 days under a 25-battle-death endpoint and 193 days under a 100-battle-death endpoint ([Journal of Conflict Resolution / ETH-PRIO](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00220027221129183); [Ceasefire Project documentation](https://ceasefireproject.org/documentation/)). A crude exponential survival model, \(S_7 = 2^{-7/m}\), where \(m\) is the median failed-ceasefire duration in days, gives 93% one-week survival at \(m=65\) and 98% at \(m=193\). I discount that sharply because this is an interstate U.S.–Iran crisis, not a civil-war dataset, and because a live naval blockade creates daily contact risk.

Other ceasefire research points the same way. Clayton and Sticher’s written civil-war ceasefire study found that 85% of simple cessations, 92% of preliminary ceasefires, and 96% of definitive ceasefires remained active 30 days after taking effect, while three-month survival fell to 48%, 70%, and 80% respectively ([International Studies Quarterly, 2021](https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/65/3/633/6277949)). Fortna’s interstate ceasefire work also finds that agreement design, monitoring, guarantees, and dispute-management mechanisms make peace more durable after interstate wars ([Fortna, International Organization, 2003](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818303572046)). Those datasets are not a clean fit, but they support the main base-rate point: after the first few days, ceasefires usually do not fail within any given single week unless a political or military shock intervenes.

The ceasefire began around April 7–8 and has already survived incidents that would look severe under a strict “any fire” rule. On April 8, the White House said Iran had agreed to a ceasefire and reopening of Hormuz while broader negotiations continued ([White House, Apr. 8](https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/04/peace-through-strength-operation-epic-fury-crushes-iranian-threat-as-ceasefire-takes-hold/)). On May 7, CENTCOM said Iranian forces launched missiles, drones, and small boats at three U.S. destroyers, and that U.S. forces hit Iranian military facilities tied to the attacks; CENTCOM still said it did not seek escalation ([CENTCOM, May 7](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4480437/centcom-protects-us-warships-transiting-strait-of-hormuz/)). On May 20, AP reported that the U.S. boarded an Iranian-flagged tanker suspected of breaching the blockade, and described the blockade as having been imposed in mid-April “several days into a ceasefire” ([AP, May 20](https://apnews.com/article/iran-blockade-oil-tanker-military-boards-8a1bafe95f2d76665d65db4effd91680)). That precedent matters: direct exchanges have occurred, but major sources and U.S. officials have not yet treated them as ceasefire-ending sustained hostilities.

The strongest YES evidence is the late-May diplomatic track. AP reported on May 24 that the United States was close to a deal that would end the war, reopen Hormuz, and address Iran’s highly enriched uranium, though the agreement would not be signed that day and earlier near-deals had faltered ([AP, May 24](https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-war-ceasefire-negotiations-hormuz-e603a7759d6cbd70ce5ed01f439a29dc)). Axios reported the same day that the draft involved a 60-day ceasefire extension, Hormuz reopening, U.S. blockade relief, Iranian oil sales, and nuclear talks; it also said the deal was not final and could still fall apart ([Axios, May 24](https://www.axios.com/2026/05/24/iran-deal-strait-hormuz-sanctions-nuclear)). A later Axios report said the White House expected approval could take several days, that Trump told his negotiators not to rush, and that the U.S. blockade would stay until a deal was reached, certified, and signed ([Axios, May 24](https://www.axios.com/2026/05/24/iran-deal-white-house-delay-days-trump)). I read this as a net positive for a seven-day forecast: delay reduces the chance of a rushed Sunday breakdown, even though it keeps the blockade in place.

The strongest NO evidence is that the blockade is large, active, and politically coercive. CENTCOM said on May 23 that more than 15,000 U.S. personnel and over 200 aircraft and warships were enforcing the blockade; it said 100 vessels had been redirected, four disabled, and 26 humanitarian ships allowed through since April 13 ([CENTCOM, May 23](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4499878/us-blockade-of-iran-reaches-milestone-of-redirecting-100-ships/)). IMF PortWatch daily chokepoint data are AIS-based, not seasonally adjusted, and the full available history I checked runs from March 2023 through May 17, 2026, with 1,000 daily observations; the latest observation is one week stale, so I use it as a pressure gauge rather than a live incident feed ([IMF PortWatch](https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/cb5856222a5b4105adc6ee7e880a1730)).

| Year | Daily observations | Avg vessels/day | Avg capacity/day, tons |
|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| 2023 | 132 | 96.6 | 3,751,238 |
| 2024 | 366 | 98.6 | 3,795,757 |
| 2025 | 365 | 93.7 | 3,571,863 |
| 2026 through May 17 | 137 | 39.5 | 1,568,124 |

The deal is also not as settled as U.S. leaks suggest. AP reported on May 24 that the agreement would not be signed Sunday and that the sides had seemed close before only to falter ([AP, May 24](https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-war-ceasefire-negotiations-hormuz-e603a7759d6cbd70ce5ed01f439a29dc)). A senior Iranian source told Reuters on May 24 that Tehran had not agreed to hand over its highly enriched uranium stockpile and that the nuclear file was not part of the preliminary agreement ([Reuters via TBS News, May 24](https://www.tbsnews.net/world/iran-has-not-agreed-hand-over-highly-enriched-uranium-stockpile-senior-iranian-source-tells)). AP also reported on May 24 that hard-line Republicans criticized Trump’s emerging proposal as too soft on Iran ([AP, May 24](https://apnews.com/article/iran-war-trump-agreement-republicans-criticism-7894b2f0e6459cddbcdaaaef5d5f1850)). That combination raises the risk of a failed-signing week or a deliberate strike order if Trump decides Iran is stalling.

My final model is a scenario tree, with the base rate used as a ceiling rather than a direct input.

| Scenario through May 31 | Probability | Conditional YES | Contribution |
|---|---:|---:|---:|
| Framework, MOU, or de facto extension signed or accepted | 53% | 98% | 51.7 pp |
| No signed framework, but talks continue and the messy status quo holds | 28% | 83% | 23.2 pp |
| Talks sour or a serious incident occurs, but no consensus return to sustained hostilities | 12% | 45% | 5.4 pp |
| Major acknowledged resumption of U.S.–Iran hostilities or official end of ceasefire | 7% | 5% | 0.4 pp |

The calculation is \(0.53 \times 0.975 + 0.28 \times 0.83 + 0.12 \times 0.45 + 0.07 \times 0.05 = 0.80665\). That gives a final forecast of 81% YES.

## What's non-obvious
The ceasefire can absorb more violence than the word “ceasefire” suggests. The May 7 exchange included Iranian missiles and drones, U.S. defensive action, and U.S. strikes on Iranian military sites, yet the official and media frame remained a fragile ceasefire rather than a resumed war ([CENTCOM, May 7](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4480437/centcom-protects-us-warships-transiting-strait-of-hormuz/); [AP, May 20](https://apnews.com/article/iran-blockade-oil-tanker-military-boards-8a1bafe95f2d76665d65db4effd91680)). For this resolution, a future isolated clash is not enough unless major sources call it the end of the ceasefire.

The second non-obvious point is that delay helps the seven-day YES case even though it hurts the durable-peace case. On May 18, Trump had a planned attack paused while talks continued, and Axios said the military was told to be ready for a large-scale assault if no acceptable deal emerged ([Axios, May 18](https://www.axios.com/2026/05/18/trump-iran-attack-suspend-nuclear-talks)). By May 24, the public line had shifted toward “do not rush,” several more days for Iranian approval, and blockade leverage while negotiations continue ([Axios, May 24](https://www.axios.com/2026/05/24/iran-deal-white-house-delay-days-trump)). That is bad for quick peace, but good for avoiding an acknowledged return to war before May 31.

## Limitations
The largest gap is private information. The actual draft text, Iran’s internal approval process, U.S. strike planning, and Israeli red lines are not public; AP and Axios both describe the deal as close but unsigned and vulnerable to failure ([AP, May 24](https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-war-ceasefire-negotiations-hormuz-e603a7759d6cbd70ce5ed01f439a29dc); [Axios, May 24](https://www.axios.com/2026/05/24/iran-deal-white-house-delay-days-trump)). Official sources also have incentives to shape the ceasefire label: Washington benefits legally and politically from saying hostilities have terminated, while Tehran can call U.S. naval actions violations without necessarily declaring the ceasefire dead ([White House, May 20](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/SAP-HCR86.pdf)).

The second gap is real-time visibility in Hormuz. IMF PortWatch’s latest daily data point is May 17, while the forecast is made on May 24, so the shipping data are stale by about a week ([IMF PortWatch](https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/cb5856222a5b4105adc6ee7e880a1730)). A U.S. ship hit with casualties, a large U.S. strike package, or an official statement that the ceasefire has ended would move this forecast sharply down. Without that kind of signal, the most likely path is still another week of coercive bargaining under a ceasefire label.

## Sources

- imf Portwatch (mcp)
  > Daily averages by year:
- Domain Expert Search (mcp)
  > Found 5 subagent groups for 'Iran United States military conflict ceasefire May 2026 geopolitical crisis Strait of Hormuz':
- Domain Expert Research Task (mcp)
  > Job domain_expert_research_task_19836630f2 done after 324255ms.
- [whitehouse.gov](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/SAP-HCR86.pdf) (tool)
- [internazionale.it](https://www.internazionale.it/ultime-notizie-reuters/2026/05/01/for-war-powers-resolution-purposes-us-hostilities-with-iran-that-began-in-february-have-terminated-official-says) (tool)
- [investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/commodities-news/trump-says-iran-ceasefire-on-life-support-after-rejecting-tehrans-response-4677371) (tool)
- [pbs.org](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/trump-says-u-s-officials-will-hold-more-talks-with-iran-in-pakistan) (tool)
- [internazionale.it](https://www.internazionale.it/ultime-notizie-reuters/2026/04/22/trump-declares-iran-ceasefire-extension-with-hormuz-strait-still-blocked) (tool)
- [washingtonpost.com](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/04/28/iran-war-blockade-ships-strait-hormuz/7fd37e2a-4346-11f1-b19d-32431046b5b4_story.html) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/a4857f28d9b47e0170b65ced19451a25) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/b70f88f5aeef24e3c3e139c52f79c6fe) (tool)
- [washingtonpost.com](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/05/07/president-donald-trump-iran/b45e87d2-4a0f-11f1-a119-857cd2bf4fd4_story.html) (tool)
- [washingtonpost.com](https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2026/05/09/iran-us-war/c2b6f446-4b99-11f1-a119-857cd2bf4fd4_story.html) (tool)
- [investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/world-news/iran-says-peace-proposal-includes-reparations-for-war-damage-us-troop-withdrawal-4697574) (tool)
- [investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/commodities-news/us-and-iran-report-progress-on-talks-ending-war-looking-to-next-few-days-4708058) (tool)
- [investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/commodities-news/axios-says-proposed-usiran-deal-involves-opening-strait-during-60day-ceasefire-extension-4708133) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/984b44a42e512a4cbf8fcc5cd0d82fbe) (tool)
- [uk.investing.com](https://uk.investing.com/news/economy-news/us-iran-near-deal-to-reopen-strait-of-hormuz-during-ceasefire-extension--axios-4696665) (tool)
- [docs.house.gov](https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20260519/119289/HMTG-119-AS00-Wstate-CooperB-20260519.pdf) (tool)
- [defense.gov](https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4227082/historically-successful-strike-on-iranian-nuclear-site-was-15-years-in-the-maki) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/8a1bafe95f2d76665d65db4effd91680) (tool)
- [whitehouse.gov](https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/04/peace-through-strength-operation-epic-fury-crushes-iranian-threat-as-ceasefire-takes-hold) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/41ef029df176a6486422e9d68aa6d872) (tool)
- [investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/commodities-news/trump-agrees-to-twoweek-ceasefire-iran-says-safe-passage-through-hormuz-possible-4601917) (tool)
- [investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/commodities-news/trump-says-he-does-not-want-to-extend-ceasefire-with-iran-4626205) (tool)
- [investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/world-news/trump-extends-ceasefire-until-iranian-proposal-is-submitted-talks-are-over-4627432) (tool)
- [internazionale.it](https://www.internazionale.it/ultime-notizie-reuters/2026/04/20/ceasefire-at-risk-after-us-seizes-iranian-ship-iran-shuns-peace-talks-2) (tool)
- [investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/commodities-news/seized-iranian-ship-likely-carrying-equipment-deemed-dualuse-by-us--sources-4623959) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/6490db55a65880a61a6233eff7acc68b) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/e603a7759d6cbd70ce5ed01f439a29dc) (tool)
- [washingtonpost.com](https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2026/04/19/us-iran-war-israel-hormuz-19-april-2026/ffe8f0a4-3bc1-11f1-90c4-9772c7fabc03_story.html) (tool)
- [washingtonpost.com](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/05/04/us-ships-iran-hormuz-ceasefire) (tool)
- [washingtonpost.com](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/05/18/trump-says-hes-called-off-attack-iran) (tool)
- [washingtonpost.com](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/05/23/us-seeks-iran-ceasefire-extension-war-threats-loom) (tool)
- [lite.irna.ir](https://lite.irna.ir/en/news/86142925) (tool)
- Correlatesofwar (mcp)
  > No wars found matching filters: country=USA, years=1900-2007.
- gpr (mcp)
  > Country GPR Index (Benchmark (1985-present))
- [internazionale.it](https://www.internazionale.it/ultime-notizie-reuters/2026/04/22/us-announces-ceasefire-extension-with-iran) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/0e9067769efea20e9d45e3d43158ad8c) (tool)
- [investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/commodities-news/us-destroyer-interdicts-two-oil-tankers-attempting-to-leave-iran-official-says-4614125) (tool)
- [centcom.mil](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4464037/us-forces-disable-vessel-attempting-to-enter-iranian-port-violate-blockade) (tool)
- [marketscreener.com](https://www.marketscreener.com/news/for-war-powers-resolution-purposes-us-hostilities-with-iran-that-began-in-february-have-terminated-ce7f58d8d081f025) (tool)
- [ca.investing.com](https://ca.investing.com/news/commodities-news/pentagon-chief-hegseth-ceasefire-with-iran-is-not-over-4609268) (tool)
- [centcom.mil](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4479004/us-forces-disable-vessel-in-gulf-of-oman-attempting-to-violate-blockade) (tool)
- [centcom.mil](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4480437/centcom-protects-us-warships-transiting-strait-of-hormuz) (tool)
- [centcom.mil](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4480820/us-disables-2-more-vessels-violating-blockade-in-gulf-of-oman) (tool)
- [internazionale.it](https://www.internazionale.it/ultime-notizie-reuters/2026/05/24/trump-says-there-is-no-rush-for-iran-deal-us-blockade-stays) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/1c283f26d037102cc5e6f798546d0e59) (tool)
- [investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/world-news/trump-says-holding-off-on-iran-attack-planned-for-tuesday-4696712) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/7894b2f0e6459cddbcdaaaef5d5f1850) (tool)

## Question Details

As of May 4, 2026, the United States and Iran are in a fragile and temporary ceasefire following the outbreak of war on February 28, 2026. A two-week ceasefire was agreed around April 7–8, 2026, and although U.S. officials have claimed that hostilities have ‘terminated’ since then, tensions remain extremely high, with recent reports of Iranian fire on U.S. ships and threats to maritime operations in the Strait of Hormuz putting the ceasefire at risk. (en.wikipedia.org) This question asks: if assessed on a given calendar date (the "forecast date"), will the ceasefire between Iran and the United States still be holding 7 days later? For example, if the forecast date is May 4, 2026, the resolution date would be May 11, 2026. The question is intended to be evergreen and reusable: each time it is forecast, it refers to whether the ceasefire remains in effect 7 days after the forecast date.

### Resolution Criteria

The question resolves YES if, on the calendar date exactly 7 days after the forecast date, a ceasefire between Iran and the United States is still in effect. A ceasefire is considered to be "still in effect" if there has been no acknowledged resumption of sustained or large-scale military hostilities between U.S. and Iranian forces prior to or on the resolution date. The question resolves NO if, before or on the resolution date, there is clear and widely reported evidence of renewed active hostilities between the United States and Iran, including but not limited to: - Airstrikes, missile strikes, or naval attacks conducted by either side against the other - Sustained exchanges of fire between U.S. and Iranian forces - An official declaration by either government that the ceasefire has ended or that hostilities have resumed Isolated incidents (e.g., single exchanges, proxy attacks, warnings, or minor skirmishes) do NOT by themselves count as a breakdown unless they are widely characterized by reliable sources as ending the ceasefire. Resolution will be based on consensus reporting from major international news organizations (e.g., AP, Reuters, BBC, Washington Post, New York Times).

### Fine Print

- The "forecast date" is the date on which the prediction is made; the "resolution date" is exactly 7 days later (using calendar days, not hours). - If no ceasefire is in effect on the forecast date, the question resolves NO. - If the status of the ceasefire is ambiguous or disputed, resolution should follow the preponderance of credible reporting. - Cyberattacks, proxy actions by third parties, or economic measures (e.g., sanctions, blockades) do not count as ending the ceasefire unless they are widely reported as marking a return to open warfare between the U.S. and Iran. - If no reliable information is available to determine whether the ceasefire is still in effect, the question should be annulled. - The question concerns direct conflict between the United States and Iran only; actions involving third countries count only if they clearly constitute U.S.–Iran hostilities.