# Who will be exercising the powers of the Venezuelan presidency on 31 December 2026?

Canonical URL: https://preseen.com/reports/1ef0302e-7c5e-4f15-98be-1806917ce5bd/who-will-be-exercising-the-powers-of-the-venezuelan-presidency-on-31-december-20
Markdown URL: https://preseen.com/reports/1ef0302e-7c5e-4f15-98be-1806917ce5bd/markdown

## Forecast

Top outcome: Delcy Rodriguez at 95.5%. Other leading outcomes: Other Chavista (Jorge Rodriguez, Diosdado Cabello, or other PSUV figure): 2.8%; Other / power vacuum / civil war: 0.9%; Maria Corina Machado: 0.6%; Nicolas Maduro: 0.1%.

Generated: November 8, 2026 at 7:07 PM UTC
Resolution check date: 2026-12-31
Forecast model: gpt-6.1-sol
Research model: gpt-5.6-sol+gpt-6.1-sol+claude-opus-5-5

## Analysis

# Venezuela’s presidency at year-end 2026

## Executive Summary

**Delcy Rodriguez has a 95.5% probability of exercising Venezuela’s presidential powers at 23:59 ET on 31 December 2026.** The main alternative is another Chavista insider replacing her—not an electoral handover to Maria Corina Machado before year-end.

| Option | Probability |
| --- | --- |
| Nicolas Maduro | 0.1% |
| Delcy Rodriguez | 95.5% |
| Maria Corina Machado | 0.6% |
| Other / power vacuum / civil war | 0.9% |
| Other Chavista (Jorge Rodriguez, Diosdado Cabello, or other PSUV figure) | 2.8% |

As of 8 November, recent reporting still identifies Rodriguez as the governing head of state. Washington’s publicly described transition process targets elections in **2027**, after judicial and electoral reforms. Machado has returned to Venezuela, but her own stated approach also points toward that later electoral process.

The question concerns **actual executive authority**, not legal title. A declaration that Maduro’s presidency is permanently vacant, a new title for Rodriguez, or an announced election would not change the answer unless someone else actually takes power before the deadline.

## Key drivers

### 1. Rodriguez remains the incumbent in practice

AP’s 6 November reporting describes Rodriguez as acting president and continuing to function as head of state. Reuters’ 2 November coverage likewise describes Washington negotiating with her administration. Machado’s recent activity—including demands over political prisoners—is that of an opposition leader addressing the government, not someone exercising presidential authority.

With approximately 53 days remaining, continuity requires no additional transfer of power. Every competing outcome requires a succession, exceptional installation, restoration, or breakdown within that short period.

### 2. The transition timetable extends beyond this deadline

The strongest timing evidence is the institutional sequence Washington has outlined: renew the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, then reform the electoral council, then proceed toward a presidential election. The court’s reconstruction is targeted around mid-December; later steps remain unfinished.

In a 5 November interview published the following day, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said elections would ideally occur in 2027. Machado and Edmundo Gonzalez’s 5 November declaration endorsed the institutional-reform roadmap and a subsequent election process. These are political objectives, not a binding election calendar, but neither establishes a normal route to a new president taking office during December.

### 3. Washington is still working through the incumbent governing network

Treasury’s 2 November readout records discussions with Rodriguez’s foreign minister about energy production, financial reconnection, and investment. The United States also removed Jorge Rodriguez from its sanctions list on 14 October.

These implemented actions support continued accommodation with the current governing structure. They do not guarantee Delcy Rodriguez’s personal tenure: Washington could conceivably support a different caretaker. However, the reviewed public evidence does not establish an agreed replacement.

### 4. Security appointments support incumbency, but private loyalties remain uncertain

Reporting on military appointments during January–July documents Rodriguez replacing senior commanders and regional military chiefs. That demonstrates exercised appointment power and an effort to build her own command structure.

More recent retired-officer allegations of persecution and military divisions are warning signs, but they do not establish coordinated defections by serving commanders. This distinction matters: discontent creates risk, while an operational coalition capable of removing her would provide a concrete replacement mechanism.

### 5. Declaring a vacancy does not automatically remove Rodriguez

Article 233 of the published constitution provides for the executive vice president to exercise presidential powers pending election and inauguration following an in-term permanent vacancy. A declaration concerning Maduro’s permanent absence could therefore coexist with continued Rodriguez rule.

The legal arrangements are not settled, however. The reported roadmap describes a six-month election period, while Article 233 specifies 30 consecutive days in the relevant circumstances. The forecast relies on observed authority and the publicly described political process—not on assuming that either timetable mechanically determines who governs.

## Scenarios

The scenarios below explain the relative weights in the forecast; they are routes to the year-end outcome, not predictions about Venezuela’s ultimate political settlement.

| Scenario | How it produces the outcome—and why it carries its weight |
| --- | --- |
| **Rodriguez continues governing** | Institutional reforms advance, stall, or change her title without transferring executive authority. Continued US engagement, current incumbency, and the later electoral horizon make this overwhelmingly the best-supported path. She could also survive a disruption and still govern at the deadline. |
| **Another Chavista takes over** | A negotiated caretaker arrangement, internal removal, or personal contingency elevates Jorge Rodriguez, Cabello, a Chavismo-aligned military figure, or another insider. This is the largest alternative because it could preserve the existing administrative and security apparatus without waiting for an election. No agreed successor has been publicly established. |
| **Another figure, collective authority, or a vacuum** | A wider breakdown produces fragmented authority, a junta, direct foreign administration, or a non-Chavista caretaker other than Machado. These outcomes require a more substantial departure from the current arrangement and have less direct support in the reviewed evidence. This category should not be read as a forecast of civil war alone. |
| **Machado assumes power** | An exceptional negotiated installation or unexpectedly rapid election and inauguration transfers executive authority to her before year-end. Her return strengthens her political influence, but the documented roadmap does not currently provide this short-term accession mechanism. |
| **Maduro regains substantive control** | A legal or diplomatic reversal leads to release and genuine restoration of executive command. Continuing US prosecution and the additional political steps required make this the most remote outcome. Retaining a nominal legal title while Rodriguez governs would not qualify. |

## Implications

- **Use continued Rodriguez rule as the near-term planning assumption.** The evidence supports treating her administration as the likely executive counterpart through year-end, while retaining contingency arrangements for an insider succession.
- **Do not mistake transition milestones for a handover.** New judges, a vacancy declaration, or an election announcement could be important political developments while leaving the forecast’s answer unchanged.
- **Focus contingency monitoring on personnel and command arrangements.** A named caretaker, a transfer of military authority, or Washington shifting its operational engagement to a replacement matters more for this question than campaign popularity alone.
- **Keep the horizon narrow.** A forecast of leadership continuity through December is not a forecast that reforms will succeed, elections will occur on schedule, or economic and security conditions will remain unchanged.

## Signs to watch

| Date or trigger | What could happen and how it would affect the forecast |
| --- | --- |
| **17 November: scheduled Maduro court hearing on dismissal arguments** | Continued detention would reinforce the already narrow restoration path. A ruling leading toward release would make Maduro’s outcome more likely, although release alone would not restore executive control. An actual release-and-restoration arrangement would warrant rerunning the forecast. |
| **11 December: planned submission of judicial nominees; mid-December: target for a new Supreme Tribunal** | These are reported process dates, not presidential handover dates. Appointments that preserve Rodriguez’s caretaker role would support her continuation. A ruling or agreement naming a different executive would make her outcome less likely and warrant rerunning the forecast. |
| **After court reform: electoral-council changes and a permanent-vacancy declaration, with no firm completion date established** | Explicit confirmation that Rodriguez governs until a successor’s inauguration would strengthen her outcome. A separate caretaker appointment or pre-year-end transfer date would weaken it. A vacancy declaration alone need not shift the forecast materially. |
| **Without warning: Washington changes its counterpart** | Continued engagement through Rodriguez’s ministers supports continuity. US support for a named replacement, especially alongside a negotiated departure or security guarantees, would make her continuation less likely and warrant rerunning the forecast. |
| **Without warning: a security-elite rupture or personal contingency** | Coordinated resignations, refusal of executive orders, rival control of presidential protection, or Rodriguez’s incapacitation would weaken her outcome. A cohesive insider succession would favor Other Chavista; competing chains of command would favor the Other / power vacuum / civil war category. Verified changes in command would warrant rerunning the forecast. |
| **Before 31 December: an exceptional opposition transfer agreement** | An enforceable agreement installing Machado, backed by the institutions controlling executive power, would make her outcome more likely. An election announcement or declared winner without an actual handover would not by itself displace the incumbent under these resolution rules. |

## Research and methodology

The forecast uses a **judgmental scenario model** over the remaining short horizon. It distinguishes continued management of the negotiated process from a major disruption, then considers who would actually control the executive under each route. The calculations organize assumptions about rare political events; they are not measured historical succession frequencies.

A historical timing check—the rapid 2013 succession following Hugo Chavez’s death—showed that a fast election and inauguration cannot be ruled out merely because little time remains. It was not treated as a transferable base rate. Today’s unfinished institutional reforms and actors’ stated plans carry much more weight.

The sources with the greatest bearing were:

- **Current governing status:** [AP, 6 November](https://apnews.com/article/a9575d2827eaf906210e2d5c60daa3c0) and [Reuters, 2 November](https://www.marketscreener.com/news/rubio-speaks-to-venezuelan-minister-about-reforms-that-lay-groundwork-for-elections-ce785fd9dd89ff27), establishing continued Rodriguez incumbency and diplomatic engagement.
- **Transition timing:** [AP, 2 November](https://apnews.com/article/bc2edbe9c9257e82c821ccdc89035936), [Rubio’s interview, republished 6 November](https://www.infobae.com/america/the-new-york-times/2026/11/06/marco-rubio-dice-que-las-elecciones-en-venezuela-idealmente-se-realizaran-en-2027/), and the [Machado–Gonzalez declaration, 5 November](https://www.ventevenezuela.org/wp-inter/uploads/2026/11/Comunicado_Cumbre_Iberoam._EGU-MC.pdf), documenting the institution-first, later-election approach.
- **Implemented US policy:** [Treasury, 2 November](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0674) and the [14 October sanctions removal](https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20261014), showing accommodation with the incumbent network rather than an announced executive replacement.
- **Succession rules and alternatives:** the [constitutional text, Articles 233–234](https://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/mesicic3_ven_anexo8.pdf) and [El Pitazo, 30 October](https://elpitazo.net/politica/quien-estaria-al-frente-de-venezuela-si-hay-una-vacante-presidencial/), distinguishing a vacancy declaration from a personnel change and identifying unresolved caretaker possibilities.
- **Military authority and contrary warning signs:** [Efecto Cocuyo, 9 August](https://efectococuyo.com/politica/siete-meses-captura-maduro-fanb-cohesionada-disminuida/) and [Infobae, 26 October](https://www.infobae.com/venezuela/2026/10/26/militares-retirados-denuncian-persecucion-en-los-cuarteles-y-una-fuerza-armada-fracturada/). Appointment history was distinguished from allegations about current internal loyalties.
- **Maduro’s legal position:** the [Justice Department’s 8 October announcement](https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/nicolas-maduro-moros-and-cilia-adela-flores-de-maduro-charged-torture) and [Reuters’ court-schedule reporting](https://www.marketscreener.com/news/venezuela-s-maduro-due-back-in-us-court-in-drug-trafficking-case-ce7f51d9d889f126), supporting continued prosecution rather than an established restoration arrangement.

## Limitations

The most consequential missing evidence is the **actual instrument governing executive succession after a vacancy declaration**, together with current command-level behavior inside the armed forces. Public appointments and expressions of unity do not reveal private loyalty or confidential departure bargains.

A complete, current set of Supreme Tribunal rulings and executive orders could not be verified. Direct access to court and electoral-authority sites was unavailable, and some State Department material required corroboration through republications and press reporting. No authoritative instrument was found reconciling the roadmap’s reported election period with the published constitutional text.

These gaps mainly affect confidence in the small replacement probabilities. Failure to identify a public succession agreement is not proof that no private agreement or removal plan exists, and the numerical precision should not be mistaken for equally precise knowledge of those hidden risks.

## Sources

- Domain Expert Search (mcp)
  > Found 6 domain experts for 'Venezuela Delcy Rodriguez Diosdado Cabello Donald Trump Marco Rubio decision making incentives November 2026 presidential transition and risk of replacing incumbent':
- Constitute (mcp)
  > [1]
- News (mcp)
  > NOTE: Perigon matched too few on Venezuela AND Rodriguez AND presidency AND vacancy AND caretaker; added results for Venezuela AND Rodriguez AND presidency.
- [doc.afp.com](http://doc.afp.com/D6KH39E) (tool)
- [nypost.com](https://nypost.com/2026/10/27/opinion/brazil-and-venezuela-face-a-tough-road-back-to-sanity) (tool)
- [elpuntocritico.com](https://www.elpuntocritico.com/internacionales/14-noticias-del-mundo/225231-respalda-machado-declarar-vacante-presidencia-en-venezuela) (tool)
- [diariolibre.com](https://www.diariolibre.com/mundo/estados-unidos/2026/10/27/delcy-rodriguez-debe-declarar-vacante-la-presidencia-de-venezuela/3702764) (tool)
- [prensalibre.com](https://www.prensalibre.com/ahora/internacional/gobierno-de-trump-espera-que-delcy-rodriguez-deje-la-presidencia-de-venezuela-en-2027) (tool)
- [axios.com](https://www.axios.com/2026/10/27/rubio-venezuela-maria-machado-elections) (tool)
- [pulzo.com](https://www.pulzo.com/nacion/salida-de-rodrigo-lara-del-ministerio-del-interior-motivos-y-relevos-en-colombia-PP5339256A) (tool)
- [martinoticias.com](https://www.martinoticias.com/a/eeuu-prev%c3%a9-que-delcy-declare-la-vacante-permanente-una-vez-renovados-el-tsj-y-el-cne/482858.html) (tool)
- [cnnespanol.cnn.com](https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2026/10/31/venezuela/oliver-blanco-quien-es-nuevo-canciller-venezuela-orix) (tool)
- [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/28/us-midterms-six-days-left-who-leads-in-the-polls-as-trump-obama-rally) (tool)
- [caraotadigital.net](https://caraotadigital.net/eeuu/el-perlazo-de-eeuu-sobre-el-momento-en-que-delcy-rodriguez-deberia-declarar-vacante-la-presidencia) (tool)
- [https://elpitazo.net/politica/quien-estaria-al-frente-de-venezuela-si-hay-una-vacante-presidencial/](https://elpitazo.net/politica/quien-estaria-al-frente-de-venezuela-si-hay-una-vacante-presidencial) (openai)
- [elpais.com.co](https://www.elpais.com.co/mundo/denuncian-que-diosdado-cabello-estaria-ofreciendo-refugio-en-venezuela-a-alias-silvana-guerrero-cabecilla-del-eln-0401.html) (tool)
- [washingtonexaminer.com](https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/restoring-america/4764543/venezuela-needs-more-than-an-election-date) (tool)
- [infobae.com](https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2026/11/05/alias-jonas-presunto-lugarteniente-de-la-estructura-33-y-hombre-de-confianza-de-john-mechas-se-sometio-a-la-justicia-en-tibu-norte-de-santander) (tool)
- [cibercuba.com](https://www.cibercuba.com/noticias/2026-10-11-u1-e207888-s27061-nid342596-sombra-delcy-rodriguez-jerarcas-chavistas-siguen) (tool)
- [semana.com](https://www.semana.com/mundo/articulo/venezuela-extrema-precauciones-en-la-frontera-con-colombia-por-temas-de-seguridad/202653) (tool)
- [miamiherald.com](https://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/op-ed/article317780499.html) (tool)
- [abc.es](https://www.abc.es/espana/andalucia/cordoba/brigada-cerro-muriano-20261020114459-nts.html) (tool)
- [elpitazo.net](https://elpitazo.net/politica/abc-diosdado-cabello-entrego-ficheros-secretos-del-sebin-a-estados-unidos) (tool)
- [lapatilla.com](https://lapatilla.com/2026/11/02/cabello-anuncio-despliegue-militar-en-la-frontera-con-colombia-ante-escalada-del-conflicto-armado) (tool)
- [thegatewaypundit.com](https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2026/10/maduro-his-wife-face-additional-charges-torture-americans) (tool)
- [laverdad.es](https://www.laverdad.es/murcia/ejercito-pone-cartagenero-liderar-guzman-bueno-20261020190528-nt.html) (tool)
- [eluniverso.com](https://www.eluniverso.com/internacional/latinoamerica/diosdado-cabello-seria-cc-1-en-acusacion-por-torturas-en-venezuela-dicen-fuentes-a-abc-nota) (tool)
- [naturalnews.com](https://www.naturalnews.com/2026-11-07-trump-announces-arrival-barrels-of-venezuelan-oil.html) (tool)
- [telesurtv.net](https://www.telesurtv.net/delcy-100-porciento-planta-industrial-venezuela) (tool)
- [newsable.asianetnews.com](https://newsable.asianetnews.com/world/venezuela-hosts-grand-diwali-celebration-led-by-president-rodriguez-articleshow-0zcmf8b) (tool)
- [elespectador.com](https://www.elespectador.com/mundo/venezuela/rubio-apunta-a-elecciones-en-venezuela-en-2027-pero-exige-reformas-antes-de-convocarlas) (tool)
- [miamitimesonline.com](https://www.miamitimesonline.com/jislem-rodriguez/image_db16b0d5-dd6c-4873-bdb3-a8f93a13264d.html) (tool)
- [albertonews.com](https://albertonews.com/nacionales/delcy-rodriguez-destaca-avances-en-las-relaciones-con-estados-unidos-tras-gira-de-oliver-blanco-por-washington-y-madrid) (tool)
- [capradio.org](https://www.capradio.org/about/bios/jacob-garcia-rodriguez) (tool)
- Domain Expert Research Task (mcp)
  > Job domain_expert_research_task_9c984be476 done after 289083ms.
- [miamiherald.com](https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/article317787171.html) (tool)
- [asambleanacional.gob.ve](https://www.asambleanacional.gob.ve/storage/documentos/botones/constitucion-nacional-20191205135853.PDF) (tool)
- [breitbart.com](https://www.breitbart.com/latin-america/2026/10/27/state-department-venezuela-will-renovate-top-court-by-end-of-year-paving-way-for-elections) (tool)
- [bloomberg.com](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-10-26/us-maps-path-for-venezuela-to-hold-fresh-presidential-election?srnd=phx-economics-v2) (tool)
- [x.com](https://x.com/jorgerpsuv/status/2113410707450372292) (tool)
- [x.com](https://x.com/Asamblea_Ven/status/2117260216559374531) (tool)
- [nytimes.com](https://www.nytimes.com/es/2026/11/05/espanol/estados-unidos/marco-rubio-elecciones-venezuela-2027.html) (tool)
- [state.gov](https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesman/2026/10/secretary-rubios-meeting-with-venezuelas-2015-national-assembly-president-dinorah-figuera) (tool)
- [straitstimes.com](https://www.straitstimes.com/world/united-states/rubio-speaks-to-venezuelan-minister-about-reforms-that-lay-groundwork-for-elections) (tool)
- [presidency.ucsb.edu](https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/white-house-press-release-president-trump-announces-arrival-first-one-million-barrels-oil) (tool)
- [theatlantic.com](https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/2026/11/machado-rodriguez-venezuela-trump/689251) (tool)
- [Venezuela-related Designation Removal | Office of Foreign Assets Control](https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20261014) (openai)
- [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/14/us-lifts-sanctions-on-venezuelas-top-legislator) (tool)
- [asambleanacional.gob.ve](https://www.asambleanacional.gob.ve/noticias/diputado-jorge-rodriguez-cooperacion-entre-venezuela-y-ee-uu-es-fundamental-para-la-estabilidad) (tool)
- [talcualdigital.com](https://talcualdigital.com/noticias/cabello-denuncia-presiones-contra-la-mesa-de-negociacion-por-parte-de-la-oposicion) (tool)

## Question Details

On 3 January 2026 a US military operation captured Nicolas Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores in Caracas and extradited them to the United States, where Maduro is now jailed in New York awaiting trial. Two days later, Venezuela's Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) declared Maduro's situation a 'temporary absence' and swore in Vice President Delcy Rodriguez as acting president, with a constitutional 90-day cap that the National Assembly could extend to six months by formal vote. The 90-day deadline expired on 4 April 2026 without a public Assembly extension vote, but Rodriguez has remained in office, and the US State Department has formally recognised her as Venezuela's 'sole Head of State'.\n\nRodriguez has moved to consolidate power: in March 2026 she ousted longtime Defence Minister Gen. Vladimir Padrino Lopez and replaced him with intelligence chief Gen. Gustavo Gonzalez Lopez. The Trump administration lifted Treasury sanctions on her personally on 1 April 2026 and is openly backing her over opposition leader Maria Corina Machado. Trump told reporters Machado 'didn't have the support needed to run the country in the short term' — a position reportedly driven by a CIA assessment and advice from Secretary Rubio that backing Machado now would destabilise the country. Machado, who polls at ~67% support to Rodriguez's ~25%, has said she expects to return to Venezuela before year-end and is pressing Washington for a fast election timetable. The opposition coalition has unified behind her as its presidential candidate. No election date has been announced.\n\nThe original prompt asked whether Rodriguez 'or successor in role' would remain in power. The cleanest operationalisation is: which of the named candidates will be the de facto exerciser of Venezuelan presidential powers on 31 December 2026? This is the same question Polymarket's $80M+ market is resolving, and it captures the multiple plausible scenarios — Rodriguez consolidating, a Maduro-loyalist successor (Jorge Rodriguez, Cabello) replacing her, an opposition transition to Machado, a US-installed transitional figure, or a power vacuum.

### Resolution Criteria

Resolves to whichever option below describes the person who is exercising the substantive powers of the Venezuelan head of state at 23:59 ET on 31 December 2026, as determined by (1) which person is publicly recognised in that role by the US State Department (https://www.state.gov/) and the Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ), (2) confirmatory wire-service reporting from Reuters and AP describing that person as 'president', 'acting president', or 'interim president' of Venezuela, and (3) which person is in fact issuing executive decrees, commanding the FANB, and conducting head-of-state diplomacy. If those signals diverge, resolution prefers the de facto exerciser of executive power inside Venezuela (criterion 3) over formal recognition.\n\nOptions:\n- 'Delcy Rodriguez' — resolves YES if the current acting president is still in that role on 31 Dec 2026, regardless of whether her title has changed (e.g., 'president', 'transitional president').\n- 'Nicolas Maduro' — resolves YES if Maduro is somehow returned to office (e.g., released from US custody and reinstated, recognised by the TSJ as president-in-exile while Rodriguez is treated as a placeholder, or restored after a deal). Note: per Polymarket's framing, simply being the 'legally absent' officeholder while Rodriguez exercises power resolves to 'Delcy Rodriguez', not Maduro — the question is who actually exercises the powers.\n- 'Maria Corina Machado' — resolves YES if Machado is sworn in as president (whether by election, transitional accord, or US-brokered installation).\n- 'Other Chavista (Jorge Rodriguez, Diosdado Cabello, or other PSUV figure)' — resolves YES if Delcy Rodriguez is replaced by another Maduro-era PSUV figure.\n- 'Other / power vacuum / civil war' — resolves YES if no single person is exercising recognised presidential powers, or if the answer is someone not in the above buckets (e.g., a US-appointed administrator, a junta, an opposition figure other than Machado, an election produces a different winner).\n\nPrimary resolution sources: US State Department press releases (https://www.state.gov/), TSJ rulings (http://historico.tsj.gob.ve/), Reuters Venezuela coverage (https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela/), AP, and the official Presidencia de Venezuela channel for executive decrees. Polymarket's 'Venezuela leader end of 2026' market may be referenced as a sanity check but is not the resolution authority.

### Fine Print

The question is about WHO IS EXERCISING POWER, not who holds the legal title. If Maduro remains technically the 'legal' officeholder (as the TSJ initially framed) but Rodriguez or another person is actually running the country at year-end, this resolves to whoever is exercising power. If Rodriguez's formal title changes (e.g., from 'acting' to 'transitional' or 'interim' or 'president'), she still counts as 'Delcy Rodriguez'. If a transitional government is announced but Rodriguez heads it, that is still 'Delcy Rodriguez'. If elections are held by 31 Dec 2026 and a winner is sworn in before that date, the new sworn-in president resolves the question; if a winner is declared but not yet sworn in, the still-serving incumbent resolves it. If Rodriguez is killed, incapacitated, or formally deposed and replaced by someone outside the named buckets (e.g., the Defence Minister Gen. Gustavo Gonzalez Lopez), resolve to 'Other Chavista...' if the replacement is a Chavismo-aligned figure, or 'Other / power vacuum / civil war' otherwise. A US military occupation administering the country directly (with no Venezuelan figure in charge) resolves to 'Other / power vacuum / civil war'. Source ambiguity at the deadline: defer to Reuters and AP wire reporting in the 24 hours either side of 23:59 ET on 31 Dec 2026.