# Will the ceasefire between Iran and the United States continue to hold 7 days from today?

Canonical URL: https://preseen.com/reports/0b60986a-739c-46f3-898f-cbc4961077ba/will-the-ceasefire-between-iran-and-the-united-states-continue-to-hold-7-days-fr
Markdown URL: https://preseen.com/reports/0b60986a-739c-46f3-898f-cbc4961077ba/markdown

## Forecast

P(Yes): 81.0%; P(No): 18.9%.

Generated: May 25, 2026 at 10:57 PM UTC
Forecast model: gpt-5.5
Research model: gpt-5.5

## Analysis

## TL;DR
I estimate an 81% chance that the U.S.–Iran ceasefire will still be treated as holding on June 1, 2026.

## Context
The forecast date is May 25, 2026, so the resolution date is June 1, 2026. A ceasefire is in effect now under the reporting standard I expect resolvers to use: Trump announced a two-week U.S.–Iran ceasefire on April 7, extended it on April 21, and the White House said on May 20 that there were no present hostilities and that the February 28 hostilities had terminated with the April 7 ceasefire ([American Presidency Project, Apr. 7](https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-announcing-ceasefire-the-war-with-iran); [American Presidency Project, Apr. 21](https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-announcing-extension-the-ceasefire-the-war-with-iran); [White House SAP, May 20](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/SAP-HCR86.pdf)).

The ceasefire is fragile, but the resolution rule is forgiving. The U.S. blockade continues, Iran still restricts Hormuz traffic, and both sides are negotiating a possible framework that would extend the ceasefire, reopen the strait, and defer nuclear details into a later negotiating period ([CENTCOM, May 23](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4499878/us-blockade-of-iran-reaches-milestone-of-redirecting-100-ships/); [CBS News, May 25](https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-us-war-trump-deal-obstacles-remain/)). The main question is whether the next week brings an acknowledged return to sustained U.S.–Iran hostilities, not whether every ship encounter or threat stops.

## Evidence
The historical backbone points to high one-week survival once an interstate ceasefire has already lasted several weeks. Fortna’s interstate ceasefire data notes, vintage November 2002, cover 48 dyadic ceasefires in interstate wars ending from 1946 through 1994, with observations running until a new war or January 1, 1998; 21 cases failed, but the listed failed cases show no war resumption within seven days, and the shortest listed failure was the first Turkey–Cyprus ceasefire after 16 days in 1974 ([Fortna data notes](https://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/datanotes.pdf)). Kohama’s broader study of post-1946 interstate ceasefires finds that more than 40% of 56 pairs of countries later reverted from ceasefire to full-scale war, but it also frames ceasefires as still maintained despite small-scale military actions when no full-scale war resumes ([Kohama, 2019](https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/19/2/269/4951543)). That maps well to this question’s threshold. Civil-war data are a weaker fit, but the ETH/PRIO dataset shows why I should not treat ceasefires as clean peace: it covers more than 2,200 ceasefires in 107 civil conflicts across 65 countries from 1989 to 2020, including informal and weak arrangements ([ETH/PRIO Civil Conflict CeaseFire dataset](https://css.ethz.ch/en/research/datasets/civil-conflict-ceasefire.html)).

The current ceasefire has already passed a severe test that did not end it under public reporting. On May 7, CENTCOM said Iranian forces launched missiles, drones, and small boats at three U.S. destroyers in the Strait of Hormuz, and that U.S. forces hit Iranian launch sites, command-and-control locations, and ISR nodes after no U.S. assets were struck ([CENTCOM, May 7](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4480437/centcom-protects-us-warships-transiting-strait-of-hormuz/)). Axios reported the same day that a U.S. official said the exchange did not constitute a resumption of the war, while Iran called the U.S. strikes a ceasefire violation ([Axios, May 7](https://www.axios.com/2026/05/07/us-iran-hormuz-strait-fire-exchange)). This is load-bearing: another isolated clash of similar size would raise risk, but would not automatically resolve NO unless major outlets and officials reframed it as renewed war.

The strongest NO evidence is the continuing military pressure around Hormuz. CENTCOM said that by May 23, U.S. forces had redirected 100 commercial vessels, disabled four, allowed 26 humanitarian ships to pass, and deployed more than 15,000 service members plus more than 200 aircraft and warships to enforce the blockade ([CENTCOM, May 23](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4499878/us-blockade-of-iran-reaches-milestone-of-redirecting-100-ships/)). AP reported on May 20 that the U.S. boarded the Iranian-flagged M/T Celestial Sea and that Trump had recently called off a planned major attack after Gulf allies asked for more time for diplomacy ([AP, May 20](https://apnews.com/article/iran-blockade-oil-tanker-military-boards-8a1bafe95f2d76665d65db4effd91680)). That creates a real tripwire: casualties, a sunk vessel, or an order to resume bombing could flip the forecast quickly.

PortWatch confirms that the strait remains far from normal. The unit is daily vessel transits and reported cargo capacity in tons; coverage in this pull is March 2023 through May 17, 2026, with 1,000 daily observations, so the latest observation is eight days stale and should be treated as a stress indicator rather than a live military signal ([IMF PortWatch](https://portwatch.imf.org/)).

| PortWatch Strait of Hormuz history | Daily observations | Avg vessels/day | Avg capacity/day, tons |
|---|---:|---:|---:|
| 2023 from March start | 132 | 96.6 | 3,751,238 |
| 2024 | 366 | 98.6 | 3,795,757 |
| 2025 | 365 | 93.7 | 3,571,863 |
| 2026 through May 17 | 137 | 39.5 | 1,568,124 |

The diplomatic evidence is net positive for seven-day survival, but not for a clean deal. Axios reported on May 24 that the draft being discussed involves a 60-day ceasefire extension, reopening Hormuz, sanctions waivers, and follow-on nuclear talks, while warning that the deal was not finalized and could still fall apart ([Axios, May 24](https://www.axios.com/2026/05/24/iran-deal-strait-hormuz-sanctions-nuclear)). Reuters reported on May 25 that Rubio said the U.S. would give diplomacy every chance but would deal with Iran another way if talks failed; the same report said Trump kept the blockade in force until an agreement is reached, certified, and signed ([Reuters via Investing.com, May 25](https://www.investing.com/news/stock-market-news/rubio-says-us-will-find-another-way-if-iran-talks-fail-4708305)). Reuters also reported on May 25 that Iran’s top negotiator and foreign minister were in Doha, with talks focused on Hormuz, enriched uranium, and frozen funds, while Iran’s spokesman said many topics had reached conclusions but not that an agreement was close to signing ([Reuters via Internazionale, May 25](https://www.internazionale.it/ultime-notizie-reuters/2026/05/25/iran-s-top-envoys-discussing-potential-peace-deal-with-qatar-prime-minister-official-says-2)). Late on May 25, AP added that Trump tied any Iran deal to more countries joining the Abraham Accords, which could add diplomatic complications even while the track remains active ([AP, May 25](https://apnews.com/article/iran-deal-trump-israel-abrams-01a13e9a63ece786a0a7fa4933dbf09b)).

My final estimate uses a simple scenario tree. I put 41% on a signed or effectively announced ceasefire extension by June 1, with 97% conditional YES. I put 41% on no signed framework but continued talks and the current ambiguous ceasefire, with 84% conditional YES. I put 18% on a visible collapse, hard rejection, or serious Hormuz incident before June 1, with 38% conditional YES because even a collapse would not automatically mean sustained U.S.–Iran hostilities by the resolution date. The weighted result is 0.41 x 0.97 + 0.41 x 0.84 + 0.18 x 0.38 = 0.8105.

## What's non-obvious
The obvious read is that a ceasefire with missiles, drones, ship boardings, and blockade enforcement is almost broken. The better read is that the resolution rule is closer to a resumed-war test. The May 7 clash was direct and serious, yet officials and major reporting still treated the ceasefire as alive ([CENTCOM, May 7](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4480437/centcom-protects-us-warships-transiting-strait-of-hormuz/); [Axios, May 7](https://www.axios.com/2026/05/07/us-iran-hormuz-strait-fire-exchange)). That makes the chance of some violence materially higher than the chance of a NO resolution.

A signed deal is also not required for YES. The U.S. gets legal and political value from saying hostilities have terminated while it keeps pressure on Iran; Iran gets to avoid giving Washington a clean pretext for a wider campaign while bargaining over Hormuz and frozen assets; Gulf mediators get another week to protect energy flows ([White House SAP, May 20](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/SAP-HCR86.pdf); [Reuters via Internazionale, May 25](https://www.internazionale.it/ultime-notizie-reuters/2026/05/25/iran-s-top-envoys-discussing-potential-peace-deal-with-qatar-prime-minister-official-says-2)). I read that as making continued ambiguity more likely than a formal return to large-scale war by June 1.

## Limitations
The largest gap is the absence of a jointly published U.S.–Iran ceasefire text, monitoring mechanism, or violation procedure. Public resolution will depend on how AP, Reuters, BBC, and similar outlets characterize any next incident, and that characterization may lag the facts.

The historical data are useful but imperfect. Fortna and Kohama are interstate-war reference classes, but they mostly measure war resumption after older conventional wars, not a live U.S. blockade and Hormuz coercion campaign. ETH/PRIO is large-N but civil-war based. I used those data to anchor the short-horizon base rate, not to override current reporting.

The downside is discontinuous. A U.S. casualty event, a sunk ship, a major Iranian strike on a U.S. base, or a deliberate Trump order to resume broad strikes could move this from likely YES to likely NO within hours. That tail risk keeps the estimate near 81%, not near the low-90s suggested by a naive seven-day survival model.

## Sources

- Domain Expert Search (mcp)
  > Found 5 subagent groups for 'United States Iran ceasefire conflict Strait of Hormuz decision making Trump Khamenei incentives negotiations May 2026':
- imf Portwatch (mcp)
  > Daily averages by year:
- Correlatesofwar (mcp)
  > No wars found matching filters: country=USA, years=1945-2007.
- Domain Expert Research Task (mcp)
  > Job domain_expert_research_task_5089d97f26 done after 404228ms.
- [investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/stock-market-news/rubio-says-us-will-find-another-way-if-iran-talks-fail-4708305) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/b1659232611edc10808612e30647c17d) (tool)
- [axios.com](https://www.axios.com/2026/05/24/iran-deal-strait-hormuz-sanctions-nuclear) (tool)
- [investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/commodities-news/trump-says-iran-deal-largely-negotiated-dispute-over-strait-reopening-4708125) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/fa22df522fef9a4db873d4e8d9df0013) (tool)
- [centcom.mil](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4457255/us-to-blockade-ships-entering-or-exiting-iranian-ports) (tool)
- [centcom.mil](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4464037/us-forces-disable-vessel-attempting-to-enter-iranian-port-violate-blockade) (tool)
- [ca.marketscreener.com](https://ca.marketscreener.com/news/for-war-powers-resolution-purposes-us-hostilities-with-iran-that-began-in-february-have-terminated-ce7f58d8d081f025) (tool)
- [investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/world-news/us-destroys-six-iranian-small-boats-shoots-down-missiles-drones-us-admiral-says-4656977) (tool)
- [centcom.mil](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4479004/us-forces-disable-vessel-in-gulf-of-oman-attempting-to-violate-blockade) (tool)
- [investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/world-news/trump-sees-swift-end-to-war-as-iran-reviews-us-peace-proposal-4666139) (tool)
- [centcom.mil](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4480820/us-disables-2-more-vessels-violating-blockade-in-gulf-of-oman) (tool)
- [investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/commodities-news/trump-says-iran-ceasefire-on-life-support-after-rejecting-tehrans-response-4677371) (tool)
- [investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/world-news/iran-says-peace-proposal-includes-reparations-for-war-damage-us-troop-withdrawal-4697574) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/8a1bafe95f2d76665d65db4effd91680) (tool)
- [internazionale.it](https://www.internazionale.it/ultime-notizie-reuters/2026/05/25/iran-s-top-envoys-discussing-potential-peace-deal-with-qatar-prime-minister-official-says) (tool)
- [axios.com](https://www.axios.com/2026/05/18/trump-iran-attack-suspend-nuclear-talks) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/8166b4d513523ee8b73ff058210dc581) (tool)
- [centcom.mil](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4499878/us-blockade-of-iran-reaches-milestone-of-redirecting-100-ships) (tool)
- [investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/world-news/netanyahu-admits-difficulty-influencing-trump-decisions-on-iran-sources-say-4708505) (tool)
- [investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/world-news/netanyahu-told-trump-israel-will-remain-free-to-act-against-threats-israeli-source-says-4708198) (tool)
- [whtc.com](https://whtc.com/2026/05/23/u-s-and-iran-report-progress-on-talks-ending-war-looking-to-next-few-days) (tool)
- [centcom.mil](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/Transcripts/Article/4477143/adm-brad-cooper-centcom-commander-conducts-a-media-conference-call) (tool)
- [Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after Civil and Interstate Wars](https://polisci.columbia.edu/sites/polisci.columbia.edu/files/content/pdfs/Publications/Fortna/Journal%20Articles/inside%20%26%20out%20ISR%202003%20offprint.pdf) (openai)
- [columbia.edu](https://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/scrapstext.pdf) (tool)
- [cambridge.org](https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/5499951E06962B1F016219ECE5CF1C98/S0020818305050095a.pdf/making_and_keeping_peace.pdf) (tool)
- [academic.oup.com](https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/19/2/269/4951543) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/1c283f26d037102cc5e6f798546d0e59) (tool)
- [axios.com](https://www.axios.com/2026/05/24/iran-deal-white-house-delay-days-trump) (tool)
- [centcom.mil](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4480437/centcom-protects-us-warships-transiting-strait-of-hormuz) (tool)
- [axios.com](https://www.axios.com/2026/05/07/us-iran-hormuz-strait-fire-exchange) (tool)
- [whitehouse.gov](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/SAP-HCR86.pdf) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/fa15b3bf47b0cd5ff2b3495644a9c32e) (tool)
- [Muddying the Waters: The Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns and the Failure of Ceasefires in Civil Wars - Jessica Maves Braithwaite, Charles Butcher, 2023](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/00220027231159828) (openai)
- [ca.investing.com](https://ca.investing.com/news/commodities-news/trump-says-iran-deal-is-largely-negotiated-would-reopen-strait-of-hormuz-4657852) (tool)
- [columbia.edu](https://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/datanotes.pdf) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/a250d10ff4b145ec9ad7dd2a3a14ffb0) (tool)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/c4be639e938fa57533f28f9fd62fb43b) (tool)
- [m.investing.com](https://m.investing.com/news/world-news/for-war-powers-resolutionpurposes-us-hostilities-with-iran-that-began-in-february-have-terminated-official-says-4651847?ampMode=1) (tool)
- [ca.investing.com](https://ca.investing.com/news/commodities-news/pentagon-chief-hegseth-ceasefire-with-iran-is-not-over-4609268) (tool)
- [centcom.mil](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4476318/us-military-supports-launch-of-project-freedom-in-strait-of-hormuz) (tool)
- [ukmto.org](https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/update-042-jmic-advisory-note-07-may.pdf?rev=32c9089a0140488abe0fb4d451a9f082) (tool)
- [ukmto.org](https://www.ukmto.org/indian-ocean/recent-incidents?oref=newsletters_dbrief) (tool)
- [maritime.dot.gov](https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2026-004-persian-gulf-strait-hormuz-and-gulf-oman-iranian-attacks-commercial-vessels) (tool)
- [ukmto.org](https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/2026-05-20-guidance-strait-of-hormuz.pdf?rev=c6d71aece731450da79d8112a9e758dc) (tool)
- [cambridge.org](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/scraps-of-paper-agreements-and-the-durability-of-peace/70A924CC6B4785C30BADF415244FFA1F) (tool)

## Question Details

As of May 4, 2026, the United States and Iran are in a fragile and temporary ceasefire following the outbreak of war on February 28, 2026. A two-week ceasefire was agreed around April 7–8, 2026, and although U.S. officials have claimed that hostilities have ‘terminated’ since then, tensions remain extremely high, with recent reports of Iranian fire on U.S. ships and threats to maritime operations in the Strait of Hormuz putting the ceasefire at risk. (en.wikipedia.org) This question asks: if assessed on a given calendar date (the "forecast date"), will the ceasefire between Iran and the United States still be holding 7 days later? For example, if the forecast date is May 4, 2026, the resolution date would be May 11, 2026. The question is intended to be evergreen and reusable: each time it is forecast, it refers to whether the ceasefire remains in effect 7 days after the forecast date.

### Resolution Criteria

The question resolves YES if, on the calendar date exactly 7 days after the forecast date, a ceasefire between Iran and the United States is still in effect. A ceasefire is considered to be "still in effect" if there has been no acknowledged resumption of sustained or large-scale military hostilities between U.S. and Iranian forces prior to or on the resolution date. The question resolves NO if, before or on the resolution date, there is clear and widely reported evidence of renewed active hostilities between the United States and Iran, including but not limited to: - Airstrikes, missile strikes, or naval attacks conducted by either side against the other - Sustained exchanges of fire between U.S. and Iranian forces - An official declaration by either government that the ceasefire has ended or that hostilities have resumed Isolated incidents (e.g., single exchanges, proxy attacks, warnings, or minor skirmishes) do NOT by themselves count as a breakdown unless they are widely characterized by reliable sources as ending the ceasefire. Resolution will be based on consensus reporting from major international news organizations (e.g., AP, Reuters, BBC, Washington Post, New York Times).

### Fine Print

- The "forecast date" is the date on which the prediction is made; the "resolution date" is exactly 7 days later (using calendar days, not hours). - If no ceasefire is in effect on the forecast date, the question resolves NO. - If the status of the ceasefire is ambiguous or disputed, resolution should follow the preponderance of credible reporting. - Cyberattacks, proxy actions by third parties, or economic measures (e.g., sanctions, blockades) do not count as ending the ceasefire unless they are widely reported as marking a return to open warfare between the U.S. and Iran. - If no reliable information is available to determine whether the ceasefire is still in effect, the question should be annulled. - The question concerns direct conflict between the United States and Iran only; actions involving third countries count only if they clearly constitute U.S.–Iran hostilities.